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2014 DIGILAW 581 (PNJ)

Ashwani Kumar Bansal v. Jai Pal Singh Sibia

2014-03-20

MAHESH GROVER

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JUDGMENT MAHESH GROVER, J. The facts of this case would reveal the devious manner contrived by the present contemner namely Jai Pal Singh Sibia son of Late Jagjit Singh Sibia in collusion with the other contemner namely Ajai Kumar Jain not only to deprive the present petitioners of the possessory rights, but also to send them into throes of protracted litigation. The present petitioners namely Ashwani Kumar Bansal and Anil Kumar Bansal are the owners of S.C.O. No. 321-322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh. For the purpose of reference of this case, it would be just and appropriate to describe both these premises separately as S.C.O. No. 321 and 322 as the respondent/contemners have tried to play upon this confusion to successfully throw the factual matrix off tangent. Jagjit Singh Sibia, the father of present contemner No. 1 Jai Pal Singh Sibia was inducted as a tenant in half of the Ground Floor and full basement of S.C.O. No. 321-322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh (S.C.O. 322 to be precise). A petition under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act was preferred by the owner Ashwani Kumar Bansal in the year 1995 and eviction orders passed on 29.4.2000. An appeal was preferred by Jai Pal Singh Sibia which was dismissed on 11.4.2002 leading to the filing of Civil Revision No. 4108 of 2002 which resulted in settlement and the recording of an undertaking by the present contemner Jai Pal Singh Sibia to vacate the complete portion under his tenancy. The settlement was arrived on 4.3.2004 and the same is extracted here below:- "That the parties have compromised the matter on the following terms and conditions:- (1) That it has been agreed that in view of the compromise the petitioner as well as Smt. Satwant Kaur shall not press for the present revision petition and the same may be dismissed as withdrawn and the landlords-respondents have agreed to allow the petitioners to enjoy the possession of the demised premises upto 31.3.2006 consisting of half ground floor and basement of the SCO in question. The landlord of his assignee shall not interfere into the peaceful possession of the demised premises of the petitioners till then. The landlord of his assignee shall not interfere into the peaceful possession of the demised premises of the petitioners till then. (2) That the petitioner tenant along with her mother Satwant Kaur being the LR of late Jagjit Singh Sibia undertakes to vacate the present premises i.e. half ground floor and the basement of SCO No. 321-322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh on or before 31.3.2006. (3) That they further undertake to pay future payment for the use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- per month by 10th of each month till 31.3.2006 and in case of default the landlords-respondents shall be entitled to execute the eviction order forthwith. The tenant further undertakes to supply the TDS certificates month-wise to the landlords. (4) That the landlords respondents shall not pursue the criminal case in respect of the lease deeds bearing F.I.R. No. 232 and they will file requisite affidavits to get the matter settled or quashed in view of the present compromise. They have also agreed to execute all the documents which are necessary for the purpose of quashing the said F.I.R. (5) That none of the parties shall claim anything in respect of any arrears of rent/damages etc. All the disputes between the parties are settled. Any other civil or criminal case pending/filed by any party shall be withdrawn by both the parties. Witness No. 1 Satwant Kaur Sd/- Petitioner Witness No. 2 Sd/- Respondent Dated – 27.2.2004." According to the undertaking given by Jai Pal Singh Sibia, the possession of the demised premises S.C.O. No. 322 was to be given to the petitioners/owners by 31.3.2006. This undertaking was never honoured in entirety and only the basement portion was surrendered to the owner in these proceedings. Evidently so, because this undertaking could possibly not be honoured by Jai Pal Singh Sibia on account of the fact that the possession of S.C.O. No. 322 was handed over on 1.2.2002 to the other contemner Ajay Kumar Jain. A fact which stands out is that respondent No. 1 Jai Pal Singh Sibia while giving an undertaking in the year 2004, did so with a distinct knowledge that possession of the premises stood subrogated in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain, which is prior to the passing of the order by the Appellate Court i.e. April, 2002. A fact which stands out is that respondent No. 1 Jai Pal Singh Sibia while giving an undertaking in the year 2004, did so with a distinct knowledge that possession of the premises stood subrogated in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain, which is prior to the passing of the order by the Appellate Court i.e. April, 2002. Thus, the two contemners aided and abetted each other and colluded to deprive the petitioners of their rightful possession with the second contemner setting up a plea of oral tenancy created on 6.10.2003 in his favour, whereas in the fact finding report, he conjured up a totally distinct plea on the strength of a document dated 30.9.2004 vide application dated 8.4.2008 just two months after the orders passed by this Court on 20.2.2008 ordering a fact finding enquiry. This report has been received since then which is elaborate and conclusion arrived at after the parties were given opportunities to adduce their evidence in this regard as they would have done before a proper Court of Law in appropriate proceedings. For reference the relevant portion of the report is extracted here below. Ajay Jain is mentioned as an objector in the report:- "31. It is an admitted fact by way of pleadings as well as at the backdrop of previous litigation among the parties that the objector was put in possession of remaining half portion of ground floor of S.C.O. No. 322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh by way of license deed Ex.R-1 dated 1.2.2002 by the J.D. Mr. Ibia. It is also worthwhile to mention that J.D. Mr. Sibia had surrendered possession of basement of S.C.O. No. 321-322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh on 24.4.2006, whereas the constructive possession of the ground floor of S.C.O. No. 322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh was never surrendered until the statement suffered by the learned counsel for the JD before the Hon'ble High Court on 20.2.2008. It clearly goes to prove that the possession of the ground floor of S.C.O. No. 322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh with the objector was not in the capacity of tenant of the decree holders. Moreover, the decree holders were not competent to enter into a fresh tenancy with the objector without having terminated the previous tenancy with the JDs. It clearly goes to prove that the possession of the ground floor of S.C.O. No. 322, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh with the objector was not in the capacity of tenant of the decree holders. Moreover, the decree holders were not competent to enter into a fresh tenancy with the objector without having terminated the previous tenancy with the JDs. The objector has not been able to discharge its own burden of proving the said oral tenancy whereas the decree holder has been able to discharge its burden to rebut the evidence of the objector making this Court to hold that no oral tenancy was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 on 6.10.2003 in respect of remaining half portion of S.C.O. No. 321-322, ground floor, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh." The report concluded that there was no such oral tenancy and in fact, the contemner had the audacity of forging the documents the original of which has not seen the light of the day and also cooked up a plea that some settlement was arrived at upon a writing on a paper-napkin in the hand of Anil Kumar Bansal. The report concluded that there was no oral tenancy created by the petitioners in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain. In the execution, warrants of possession in respect of he disputed portion i.e. S.C.O. No. 322 were also issued but remained unexecuted because of the bailiff's report that it was not possible to segregate the portion described as 322. It is essential to state here that the partition between the two portions has been demolished leaving one complete hall. If there was no oral tenancy created by the petitioners, then this Court has to examine as to what is the status of Ajay Kumar Jain in the demised premises i.e. S.C.O. No. 322. It is not disputed that a lease deed was executed by Jai Pal Singh Sibia in February, 2002 somewhere around the time when the Appellate Authority in the rent proceedings gave its decision i.e. April, 2002. This fact is not disputed now by the contemner that a lease was executed by him in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain in the year 2002. There is corroborative material as well, since Jai Pal Singh Sibia along with his mother filed a suit for mandatory injunction and recovery against the petitioners. This fact is not disputed now by the contemner that a lease was executed by him in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain in the year 2002. There is corroborative material as well, since Jai Pal Singh Sibia along with his mother filed a suit for mandatory injunction and recovery against the petitioners. Ajay Kumar Jain also filed a suit for mandatory injunction and permanent injunction against the petitioners regarding this very property i.e. S.C.O. No. 322. Similarly, Ajay Kumar Jain filed another suit for permanent injunction against Jagjit Singh Sibia and Jai Pal Singh Sibia. All this shows a deceitful web woven by the respondents. Strangely enough, Ajay Kumar Jain admitted in his communication with the Electricity Department that he had taken S.C.O. No. 322 from Jai Pal Singh Sibia and S.C.O. No. 321 from Ashwani Kumar Bansal. This is in complete contrast to the plea of oral tenancy set up by him under the petitioners. Before the Rent Controller, who was to make an enquiry under the orders of this Court, Ajai Kumar Jain for the first time set up a document dated 30.9.2004 vide application dated 8.4.2008 i.e. two months after the High Court ordered a fact finding enquiry on 20.2.2008. This document was stated to be a rent agreement dated 30.9.2004. This indicates that Ajay Kumar Jain who had never pleaded this document earlier, and placed reliance on oral tenancy, conjured up this document after a fact finding enquiry was ordered by this Court to set up a rent agreement of 2004. This document was discarded in the fact finding enquiry report on sustainable reasons as it seems, after the handwriting was also got examined through an expert. In the fact finding enquiry on this issue, Ajay Kumar Jain himself admitted in his testimony that premises were taken from Jai Pal Singh Sibia and not the present petitioners. The report of the Rent Controller then conclusively went on to say that there was no tenancy created by the petitioners in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain qua S.C.O. No. 322 in view of the statement of Ajay Kumar Jain admitting that the premises were taken by him from Jai Pal Singh Sibia which fact is also not denied by Jai Pal Singh Sibia even now in the present contempt proceedings. To make the matter worse, Ajay Kumar Jain repeatedly tried to create a confusion about the description of the property by taking advantage of its identity which has been described in the records by hyphenating the two numbers i.e. S.C.O. No. 321 and 322 and stated it to be a half portion of S.C.O. No. 321-322. It is for this reason that this Court has chosen to describe the premises separately in order to obviate the chances of any advantage being derived by Ajay Kumar Jain by alluding to these premises differently. To put it briefly for the sake of clarification S.C.O. No. 322 along with its basement was in possession of Jagjit Singh Sibia, the father of the present contemner and he surrendered the basement portion in the year 2006 pursuant to the execution filed by the present petitioners, but had alienated the possessory rights qua the half of ground floor (S.C.O. No. 322) enjoyed under a tenancy in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain in 2002 just around the time when the Appellate Authority under the Rent Act gave its verdict against Jai Pal Singh Sibia. The timing of subrogation assumes significance to show the malicious intent of the contemner as evidently he was apprehending an adverse view from the Court and thus, decided to capitalize on the situation to create a lease in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain who was in possession of S.C.O. No. 321 in his own independent right. In this way, he gave an access to the entire ground portion of S.C.O. No. 321-322 to Ajay Kumar Jain who was already the occupant of S.C.O. No. 321 as a tenant under the petitioners. To compound the situation for the petitioners further, the occupant of the premises Ajay Kumar Jain defaulted in payment of rent/mesne profits and deliberately created a further confusion about its rate. This Court wonders and marvels at the depravity and cunningness of the contemner Jai Pal Singh Sibia who in collusion with Ajay Kumar Jain, the other contemner, has virtually hijacked the building and forced the petitioners into a deplorable state, of seeing their property being enjoyed by the usurpers, besides, being embroiled in numerous suits and ancillary proceedings arising therefrom when respondent Jai Pal Singh Sibia filed a suit for injunction and recovery against Ajay Kumar Jain while Ajay Kumar Jain filed a separate suit. This singular act of subversion by respondent No. 1 and transgression by respondent No. 2 is sufficient to reduce a law abiding citizen to a cynic leaving him with doubting questions regarding relevance and prevalence of law in a society. One cannot help comparing the respondents to brigands who scourge not the forest but jungles of concrete, masquerading as well heeled gentlemen, craftily depriving people of their assets often wittingly and unwittingly aided by the blunted processes of law. Respondent Jai Pal Singh Sibia through his counsel Shri Anupam Gupta has argued that Jai Pal Singh Sibia is a man of education and at the time when the lease was created in favour of Ajai Kumar Jain, he had lost his father and therefore, he was driven by circumstances. He has tried to justify his conduct on these lines and also pleaded that the petitioners had the knowledge of the parting of possession in 2002 by referring to some statement of consent given by his counsel before the Court, agreeing to removal of partition indicating an acceptable arrangement between him and Ajay Kumar Jain. This is countered by the learned counsel for the petitioners who contends that there was a cemented partition which was contrary to the building laws and to avoid any repercussions, he had agreed to its removal and in any case, even if he had knowledge about this, it would be of no consequence as he could not take the law into his own hands to remove the usurper from the property and the only remedy available to him was to knock at the doors of the Court. Upon an appraisal of the material on record and the pleas raised before me, I am convinced that it is a case where the law has been flouted with impunity to deprive a person of his property and the fruits thereof. The courts can never condone an act of blatant usurpation of property and naked aggression towards the owner by a trespasser riding presumably on what he perceives to be the deficiencies of law. The courts can never condone an act of blatant usurpation of property and naked aggression towards the owner by a trespasser riding presumably on what he perceives to be the deficiencies of law. The contemptuous conduct of Jai Pal Singh Sibia is evident when he gave an undertaking which now he cannot honour considering that two years prior to the undertaking, he had parted with the possession in favour of Ajay Kumar Jain by subrogating his rights of tenancy which in any case stood extinguished by the orders of the Rent Controller and protected by the orders of the Appellate Court. His conduct is reprehensible. He has clearly subverted the law and obstructed the course of justice and hence committed contempt of Court. For similar reason, the beneficiary of this nefarious subversion of law Ajay Kumar Jain who through active collusion and abetment not only managed to usurp the premises to which he had no legitimate claim, but also deprived the petitioners of the fruitful gains of their property and frustrated the eviction orders in their favour which had attained finality and in the process, helped the judgment debtor to evade the consequences of the orders of the Court. Therefore, the Court finds Ajay Kumar Jain equally guilty of having committed Contempt of Court. This Court is of the opinion that any person whether he is a party to the proceedings or not, if he indulges in any act which has resulted in frustrating the lawful orders passed by the Court, should be seen to be an obstructionist to the cause of justice, in case he endeavours to thwart the implementation of the orders of the court and more particularly if he has acted in collusion with the judgment debtor in this regard. In S.N. Annerjee and Another vs. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd and Others, 1938 AIR (PC) 295, it was held that any person who aids or abets a party enjoined in its breach, is equally liable of contempt as the person breaching it. The Law of Contempts would not even spare the State and its functionaries or persons assigned under it if they violate any of the orders of the Court. In The State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 , it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- "34. The Law of Contempts would not even spare the State and its functionaries or persons assigned under it if they violate any of the orders of the Court. In The State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 , it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- "34. We feel wholly unable to accept the construction suggested of the expression person guilty of disobedience in the clause. The reason for the variation in the phraseology employed in Clause (1) and (3) of Order 39, Rule 2 is not far to seek. Under the law when an order of injunction is passed, that order is binding on and enforceable not merely against the person nominee impleaded as a party to the suit and against whom the order is passed but against the agents and servants etc. of such a party. If such were not the law, orders of injunction would be rendered nugatory, by their being contravened by the agents and servants of parties. For that reason, the law provides that in order that a plaintiff might seek to enforce an order against a servant or an agent of the defendant, these latter need not be added as defendants to the suit and an order obtained specifically against them an order against the defendant sufficing for this purpose. If such agents or servants etc. are proved to have formal notice of the order and they disobey the injunction, they are liable to be proceeded against for contempt, without any need for a further order against them under Order 39, Rule 2(1). This legal position is brought out by the terms of an injunction order set out in Form 8 of Appendix F to the Code which reads. The Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant C.D. his servants, agents and workmen, from. It is not suggested that the form which the order of the Subordinate Judge took in this case, departed from this model. 35. If such is the scope of an order for injunction, it would be apparent that the expression person has in Order 39, Rule 2(3) been employed merely compendiously to designate every one in the group Defendant, his agents, servants and workmen and not for excluding any defendant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed. 35. If such is the scope of an order for injunction, it would be apparent that the expression person has in Order 39, Rule 2(3) been employed merely compendiously to designate every one in the group Defendant, his agents, servants and workmen and not for excluding any defendant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed. It would therefore follow that in cases where the State is the defendant against whom an order of injunction has been issued, it is expressly named in the clause and not even by necessary implication, and the rule of construction invoked does not in any manner avail the appellant. 36. The matter may also be approached from a broader angle. Where a Court is empowered by statute to issue an injunction against any defendant, even if the defendant be the State the provision, would be frustrated and the power rendered ineffective and unmeaning if the machinery for enforcement specially enacted did not extend to every one against whom the order of injunction is directed. Apart, therefore, from a critical examination of the phraseology of Order 39, Rule 2(3). The obligation on the part of the State to obey the injunction and be proceeded against for disobedience if it should take place would appear to follow by necessary implication. As Maxwell on Interpretation of Statues, 10th edition, p.140, Cf. Moore vs. Smith, (1859) 28 L.J. M.C. 126 puts it the Crown is sufficiently named in a statute when an intention to include it is manifest. 44. When once an order has been passed which the Court has jurisdiction to pass, it is the duty of all persons bound by it to obey the order so long as it stands, and it would tend to the subversion of orderly administration and civil Government, if parties could disobey orders with impunity. If such is the position as regards private parties, the duty to obey is all the more imperative in the case of Governmental authorities, otherwise there would be a conflict between one branch of the State polity, viz. the executive and another branch the Judicial. If disobedience could go unchecked, it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself become a mockery. the executive and another branch the Judicial. If disobedience could go unchecked, it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself become a mockery. When the State Government obeys a law, or gives effect to an order of a Court passed against it, it is not doing anything which detracts from its dignity, but rather, invests the law and the Courts with the dignity which are their due, which enhances the prestige of the executive Government itself, in a democratic set up. Although this aspect regarding the State's obligation to obey the order is not the issue here, but the underlying principle and the message propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot go unnoticed that disobedience of order cannot go unchecked, otherwise it would result in orders of the courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself becoming a mockery. After determining the issue of the respondents having committed Contempt of Court, the Court is now confronted with a much larger issue and that is to restore the status quo ante by remedying and rectifying the situation and order restitution of the ill-gotten benefits by the contemners. The Court is unhesitatingly of the view that once the paramountcy of the orders of this Court is accepted, then as a logical corollary, enforcement of these orders to protect the rights of a decree holder also assumes similar paramountcy. If this is not accepted and resorted to by the courts, then not only will the majesty of law be brought down to its knees, but the entire judicial dispensation system would be put to sword at the mocking conduct of the persons in breach. In somewhat similar circumstances as the case in hand, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.C.G. Verghese vs. K.T. Rajendran and Another, (2003) 2 SCC 492 , directed the eviction of the unauthorized occupant and restored the possession to the rightful holder. In this case after giving an undertaking, the judgment debtor parted with possession in favour of another person and the Court held the second contemner i.e. usurper of property equally guilty of contempt. In Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and Another, AIR 1991 Madras 323, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed as follows:- "27. In this case after giving an undertaking, the judgment debtor parted with possession in favour of another person and the Court held the second contemner i.e. usurper of property equally guilty of contempt. In Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and Another, AIR 1991 Madras 323, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed as follows:- "27. Thus this court's special jurisdiction as well as inherent jurisdiction to make orders ex debito justitiae on the one hand and to punish for its contempt on the other, cannot be doubted and if a jurisdiction exists in a court, the court always has the right and duty to exercise that power as effectively as possible as it is always a inherent jurisdiction of the court to make its power effective even though there is no specific provision of law to cover that particular power. 28. Article 215 of the Constitution has made no distinction between a civil contempt or a criminal contempt and covers the whole field of litigation, civil or criminal and anything that tends to curtail or impair the freedom of the limbs of the judicial proceedings. The courts in their attempt to identify the nature of contempt have noticed however three different sorts of contempt viz. (1) scandalizing the court itself. (2) abusing parties who are concerned in causes before it and (3) prejudicing mankind against persons before the case is heard. We need not however wander into this arena as the Parliament has enacted the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and defied contempt of Court to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt, civil contempt to mean willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court and criminal contempt to mean the publication, whether by words, spoken or written or by single or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court or prejudice or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The present appeal is concerned with the civil contempt only although it is conceded before us that there are several allegations in the contempt application, which make out a case of criminal contempt. Civil contempt is thus essentially concerned with the enforcement of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court. The administration of justice can only be effective if it has the means to enforce the court's judgment and orders. That is why civil contempts are also called contempt in procedure. Courts also do not easily resort to the contempt procedure. Contempt is a blunt weapon. It is used sparingly and only in cases where when it is found difficult to generate obedience and respect for the court or when a court attempts to secure obedience to its orders, directions, etc. or to elicit respect to it. It rarely does any such thing to grandiose its Officers on the man power including the judges. It does so, first to undo the wrong done and secondly to ensure that the administration of justice is not brought into a scorn of ridicule because there is no interest of the court, which is not public interest. If violations of the Court's orders will be ignored, there will be nothing left save for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will ultimately result in the destruction of the rule of law and ultimately the society. Still courts before seeking enforcement of their order, want to be satisfied first to whom the order, writ or direction was addressed, whether to whom the order was addressed knew about the court's order or not and whether such a person had willfully disobeyed the order of the court or not." 60. Still courts before seeking enforcement of their order, want to be satisfied first to whom the order, writ or direction was addressed, whether to whom the order was addressed knew about the court's order or not and whether such a person had willfully disobeyed the order of the court or not." 60. Since we have found that the Court can grant temporary mandatory injunction pending a contempt petition or independent of it, we have no hesitation or doubt in holding that the Court, pending a decision on the desirability of issuing a temporary mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante to ensure the enforcement of or the execution of the order/direction which has been allegedly violated, can make an ad interim order as well either in the nature of mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante or by an order to ensure that until issue of the grant of mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante is decided, no injury is caused to the public interest of sports." Thus, the Court is clearly empowered to undo the wrong done by the contemner in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to uphold the dignity and majesty of law and to enforce the orders of this Court by erasing of the effect of wrongful acts of the judgment debtor aided and abetted by any person. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1996 SC 2005 , has observed as follows:- "17. The contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt." The principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris vs. R.J. Babuji, 1985 (1) SCR 598 , this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its order. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking). 18-20…………………… 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by over-ruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give away. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it." In Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the purpose of initiation of contempt proceedings are twofold to ensure the compliance with the order passed by the court and to punish the contemner as he has the audacity to challenge the majesty of law. Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maninderjit Singh Bitta vs. Union of India and Others, (2012) 1 SCC 273 , observed as follows:- "27. These are the cases which have impact in rem or on larger section of the society and not in personam simpliciter. Courts are called upon to exercise jurisdiction with twin objects in mind. Firstly, to punish the persons who have disobeyed or not carried out orders of the court i.e. for their past conduct. Secondly, to pass such orders, including imprisonment and use the contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance with its orders in future." This Court is thus, of the firm opinion that any person who resists the order of a Court or seeks to subvert it with the abetment of any other person who by his conduct active or passive lends support to such an exercise, is liable to action in contempt and in these circumstances, courts will not only inflict punishment upon the contemner, but will also forcefully ensure enforcement of its own orders and undo the mischief undone. Keeping in view the aforesaid conclusions, the Court while holding the contemners guilty of having committed contempt of court, would pass orders of sentence for which the contemners would be required to come present to this Court. They were directed to remain present in this Court on 20.3.2014 by intimating their respective counsels through the officers of this Court as also by reflecting it in the cause list. The counsels also informed the Court about intimating the contemners. Ajay Kumar Jain would thus vacate the premises described as S.C.O. No. 322 forthwith. The Executing Court is directed to retrieve the possession from him and restore the same to the petitioners instantaneously through the help of police unless the contemners volunteer to hand over the possession themselves within a period of one week from the date of passing of the order. Since the order has been passed with an advance intimation to the counsel for the parties, knowledge of the proceedings to the parties shall be presumed. This brings this Court to the last question of determining the mesne profits on account of the unauthorized use and occupation of the premises by Ajay Kumar Jain. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705 held that grant of mesne profits in the case of a person dispossessed during the pendency of the proceedings is to be considered a substantial loss and the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is empowered to grant any such relief that it may deem fit to reasonably compensate the wronged and in doing so, it has to rely on robust common sense, knowledge of human affairs and events gained by judicial experience and judicially noticeable facts, over and above the material available on record. By virtue of its order dated 13.2.2014, this Court by way of an interim measure, had determined Rs. 1 lac per month for the disputed premises i.e. S.C.O. No. 322 with effect from April, 2006 till date. This amount was determined on the basis of an order passed in the year 2008. By virtue of its order dated 13.2.2014, this Court by way of an interim measure, had determined Rs. 1 lac per month for the disputed premises i.e. S.C.O. No. 322 with effect from April, 2006 till date. This amount was determined on the basis of an order passed in the year 2008. Since it was an interim measure and amount was determined from 2006, I am of the view that mesne profits should be determined after calculating an increase of 10% per annum from the year 2008 as just and proper determination considering that the petitioners themselves rely upon a lease deed of a shop fetching a rental of Rs. 1,80,000/-in 2007. Since some sort of guess work always goes into such an exercise, the Court is of the opinion that Rs. 150000/- per month would be a sufficient justification to arrive at this conclusion. Ajay Kumar Jain would be required to pay this amount of Rs. 150000/- per month from 2002 when the possession was clandestinely given by Jai Pal Singh Sibia to Ajay Kumar Jain. This amount shall be paid by Ajay Kumar Jain to the petitioners within a period of one month from today. Needless to say the amount already paid by the respondent Ajay Kumar Jain shall be subject to adjustment. This Court is also of the opinion that Jai Pal Singh Sibia cannot escape the liability to re-compense the petitioners who have been forced into rounds of litigation and have been deprived of the fruits of their property and the decree and thus, orders that he be burdened with costs of Rs. 2 lacs and is also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months, while contemner No. 2 Ajay Kumar Jain is sentenced similarly to simple imprisonment for a period of three months and costs of Rs. 2 lacs. The petition stands disposed of.