JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Acting Chief Justice (Oral) The appellants have called in question the judgment and award, dated 12th December, 2008, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in MAC Petition No. 05­MAC/2 of 2007, titled as Smt. Asha Devi and others versus H.R.T.C. and others, whereby the claim petition filed by the claimants­appellants came to be dismissed (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned award”), on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 2. The unfortunate claimants have been shown door by the novice Judge, namely, Mr. V.K. Gupta, who was manning the post of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, as Presiding Officer, on the ground which is not known to law. Brief facts: 3. The claimants are the victims of vehicular accident, which was caused by Ram Lal, driver, while driving HRTC bus No. HP­18­3592, rashly and negligently, on 25th November, 2006, at about 5.10 P.M. at Balmiki Basti Bus Stop near Petrol Pump at Nahan, in which Shri Shishu Pal lost his life, who was the bread earner of the claimants and on whom they were dependent. Being dependents, they filed a claim petition before the Tribunal, came to be diarized as MAC Petition No. 05­MAC/2 of 2007 and sought compensation to the tune of ‘ 30 lacs as per the break­ups given in the claim petition. 4.The respondents, i.e. the owner of the vehicle, the driver and the conductor appeared and contested the claim petition on the grounds taken in the memo of objections. 5.After examining the pleadings and the documents, the following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal on 25th July, 2007: “1. Whether Shishu Pal died on account of the injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident involving HRTC Bus No. HP­18­3592 being owned by respondent No. 1 and driven by respondent No. 2 in a rash and negligent manner as also due to the negligence of conductor of the bus in blowing the whistle on dated 25­11­2006, at Balmiki Basti Chowk near Petrol Pump at about 5.10 PM, as alleged? ... OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioners being L.Rs. of the deceased Shishu Pal are entitled to receive compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom? ... ... OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioners being L.Rs. of the deceased Shishu Pal are entitled to receive compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom? ... OPP3.Whether the deceased Shishu Pal was himself negligent in boarding the moving bus without the knowledge of the respondents No. 2 and 3 and as such the petitioners are not entitled to any compensation, as alleged? ... OPR­1 to 3 4. Relief.” 6.The claimants had to discharge the onus to prove issues No. 1 & 2 and respondents No. 1 to 3 had to discharge the onus to prove issue No. 3. The claimants have examined Smt. Asha Devi as PW­1, ShriAnilKumar as PW­2, Shri Sushil Kumar as PW­3, Shri Tarsem Kumar as PW­4, Shri Suresh Kumar as PW­5 and HC Bhim Singh as PW­6. The claimants have also proved a number of documents, which were exhibited, including the FIR. 7.The respondents have not examined any witness. Only driver­Ram Lal, respondent No. 2, has appeared in the witness box. Issues No. 1 and 3: 8.I wonder how the Tribunal has dealt with this case. The claimants have pleaded that the deceased boarded the bus alongwith the bag on 25th November, 2006, at Balmiki Basti Bus Stop near Petrol Pump, Nahan, at 5.10 P.M., while he was boarding the bus, the conductor had not closed the window and the driver, without taking caution and waiting for the whistle/signal of the conductor, started driving the bus, in the process, Shri Shishu Pal fell down on the road, sustained injuries, was taken to Zonal Hospital Nahan, was declared as brought dead by the Doctor. The claimants have averred that the deceased was a Lecturer and was drawing Rs. 19,366/­ as salary, as per the salary certificate, Ext. PW­5/A and his age was 43 years at the time of accident. 9.The respondents have not led any evidence in rebuttal. However, the driver­respondent No. 2 has tendered his own statement. The star witness of the respondents was the conductor of the bus, who has not been examined, though in the employment of respondent No. 1 and under the command of respondents No. 1 and 2. Thus, an adverse inference is drawn against the respondents. 10.The FIR, which has been exhibited as Ext. The star witness of the respondents was the conductor of the bus, who has not been examined, though in the employment of respondent No. 1 and under the command of respondents No. 1 and 2. Thus, an adverse inference is drawn against the respondents. 10.The FIR, which has been exhibited as Ext. PW­1/B, do disclose that the driver had driven the vehicle rashly and negligently and accident was outcome of the rash and negligent act on the part of the driver and the conductor. Not only the FIR is on the file, but the Investigating Officer, HC Bhim Singh (PW­6) has also supported the version of the claimants. But, Tribunal has shut its eyes and dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimants on the ground that during the trial of the criminal case, which was outcome of the said FIR, the witnesses had not supported the case. 11.It is not known how the Tribunal has discussed the said evidence, which was in the competence and power of the concerned Magistrate, who was trying the criminal case. The Tribunal has not only dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimants but has virtually rendered the judgment like judgment in a criminal case, which was not in the powers and competence of the Tribunal. 12.I have dealt with series of cases as Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and held that even if the driver has earned acquittal in the criminal case, that cannot be a ground to dismiss the claim petition. The standard of proof in a criminal case is different and heavy. The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But, the standard of proof in a claim petition is that the Tribunal has to deal with the claim petitions summarily and the claimants have only to bring on record the evidence to the extent that the accident was outcome of rashness and negligence. The claimants are not required to prove their case beyond reasonable doubts but by preponderance of probability. 13.The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes & Ors. versus Joaquim Xavier Cruz & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6014, has held that the issue of negligence was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 13.The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes & Ors. versus Joaquim Xavier Cruz & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6014, has held that the issue of negligence was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is apt to reproduce para 7 of the judgment herein: “7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick­up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. [Bimla Devi & Ors. v. Himachal RTC (2009) 13 SCC 530 : ( Air 2009 SC 2819 : 2009 AIR SCW 4298)]. In United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Shila Datta & Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 509 : ( AIR 2012 SC 86 :2011 AIR SCW 6541) while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three­judge­bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: “(ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.” The following further observation available in paragraph 10 of the report would require specific note: “We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.” 14.In a case titled as Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another versus Vatschala Uttam More, reported in 1991 ACJ 777, a collision took place between a truck and petrol tanker and the tanker turned turtle, after 41/2 hours of the said accident the tanker exploded and caught fire resulting in injuries to and death of several persons assembled near it. The Apex Court was of the view that the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate; it can be less immediate. It is apt to reproduce para 36 of the judgment herein: “36. This would show that as compared to the expression ‘caused by’, the expression ‘arising out of’ has a wider connotation. The expression ‘caused by’ was used in sections 95(1) (b) (i) and (ii) and 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act. In section 92­A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression ‘arising out of’ which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under section 92­A, the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” in section 92­A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.” 15.The similar question arose before the Guahati High Court in a case titled Assam State Transport Corporation versus Smt. Champa Devi Bothra and others, reported in AIR 1995 Gauhati 2 and it was held as under: “8. From the evidence of witness No. 3 it is clear that the conductor without taking proper care rang the bell and the driver speeded up the vehicle without caring for the safety of the passengers and as a result, the deceased Prakash Chandra Bothra who was standing by holding a pipe stand fell down and the rear wheel of the bus ran over him. The said State Transport bus did not have the door. From the above it is clear that there was negligence on the part of the conductor and driver in driving the vehicle rashly and negligently without caring for the safety of the passengers. The appellant Corporation was also negligent in not providing the doors which were essential for the safety of the passengers. The Tribunal was, therefore, fully justified in holding that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently without caring for the safety of the passengers. In view of the above, we do not find any force in the submission of the learned counselfor the appellant.” 16.In another case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumani Ammal and others, reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1354, a bus hit an over­hanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties. The driver earned acquittal in the criminal case on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Apex Court held that the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the judgment herein: “2. The Apex Court held that the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the judgment herein: “2. The Facts: A stage carriage belonging to the petitioner was on a trip when, after nightfall, the bus hit an over­hanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties of which 8 proved instantaneously fatal. A criminal case ensued but the accused­driver was acquitted on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Accidents Claims Tribunal which tried the claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion, affirmed by the High Court, that, despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous overhanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spot. Some lost their lives instantly; several lost their limbs likewise. The High Court, after examining the materials, concluded: “We therefore sustain the finding of the Tribunal that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of R. W. 1 (driver) and consequently the appellant is vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimant.”The plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected and rightly. The requirements of culpable rashness under Section 304A, I.P.C. is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The quantum of compensation was moderately fixed and although there was, perhaps, a case for enhancement, the High Court dismissed the cross­claims also. Being questions offact, we are obviously unwilling to re­open the holdings on culpability and compensation.” 17.It is also profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 8 of the judgment rendered by the High Court of Karnataka in a case titled Vinobabai and others versus K.S.R.T.C. and another, reported in 1979 ACJ 282: “8. Thus, the law is settled that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. Thus, the law is settled that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. The converse is not true ; because the driver is acquitted in a criminal case arising out of the accident, it is not established even prima facie that the driver is not negligent, as a higher degree of culpability is required to bring home an offence.” 18.The Apex Court in a case titled Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and others versus M/s. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. and another, reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1735, held that the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 6 of the judgment herein: “6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident “speaks for itself” or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.) at p. 306 states: “The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable jury could find without further evidence that it was so caused”. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.) at p. 306 states: “The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable jury could find without further evidence that it was so caused”. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 28, at page 77, the position is stated thus: “An exception to the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant’s negligence, or where the event charged as negligence ‘tells its own story’ of negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear and unambiguous”. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. “ 19.Reliance is also placed on the judgment made by this Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another versus Jarnail Singh and others, reported in Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 174, wherein it has been held that acquittal of the driver in the criminal trial will have no bearing on the findings to be recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whether the driver was negligent or not in causing the accident. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. In view of the definitive law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the judgments cited hereinabove, it is now well settled law that the acquittal of the driver in the criminal trial will have no bearing on the findings to be recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whether the driver was negligence or not in causing the accident. “ 20.Having said so and while keeping in mind the aim and object of granting compensation, provisions contained in Sections 141 to 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”) and Rules 215 to 235 contained in Chapter­XI of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”), I am of the considered opinion that the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 1 and 3 are perverse, illegal and deserve to be set aside. 21.I have examined the evidence, scanned the documents and the pleadings of the parties and am of the considered view that the claimants have proved by leading oral as well as documentary evidence that the driver had driven the bus rashly and negligently resulting in the accident, in which the deceased sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries. Accordingly, the findings returned on issues No. 1 and 3 by the Tribunal are set aside and the same is decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents. Issue No.2: 22. Issue No. 2 was not discussed by the Tribunal in view of the findings returned by it on issue No. 1. Admittedly, the deceased was lecturer by profession and was earning Rs. 19,366/­ per month and the claimants were the dependents, keeping all these factors in mind read with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma & others versus Delhi Transport Corporation & another, reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 3104, upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. versus Madan Mohan & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120, I deem it proper to deduct 1/4th of the monthly income of the deceased towards his personal expenses and hold that the claimants have lost their dependency to the tune of ‘ 14,500/­ per month. 23.Now, the question is – what should be the multiplier to be applied? Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 43 years at the time of accident. Therefore, keeping in mind the Schedule appended with the MV Act and also approved by the Apex Court in series of cases, particularly in Sarla Verma’s case (supra), I deem it proper to hold that multiplier of ‘11’ is applicable in the present case. Thus, the claimants are held entitled to Rs. 14,500/­ x 12 =Rs. 1,74,000/­ x 11 = Rs. Thus, the claimants are held entitled to Rs. 14,500/­ x 12 =Rs. 1,74,000/­ x 11 = Rs. 19,14,000/­. The claimants are also held entitled to Rs. 5,000/­, Rs. 2,000/­ and Rs. 2,500/­ under the heads of loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate, respectively. Accordingly, it is held that the claimants are entitled to Rs.19,23,500/­ (Rs. 19,14,000/­ + Rs. 5,000/­ + Rs.2,000/­ + Rs.2,500/­) with interest @ 7.5% from the date of the filing of the claim petition till its realization. 24.The next question which arises for consideration is ­ who is to be saddled with liability? Respondent No. 1, being the owner of the vehicle, which fact is not disputed, rather admitted, is saddled with liability and is directed to deposit the awarded amount minus the amount of interim compensation, if paid, before the Registry of this Court within eight weeks from today. The claimants are held entitled to the compensation in equal shares. 50% of the shares of claimants­appellants No. 2 to 4 is to be deposited in the Fixed Deposits for a period of five years and the rest shares of claimants­appellants No. 2 to 4 and the shares of claimants­appellants No. 1 and 5 are to be released in their favour through payee’s account cheque. 25.Accordingly, the impugned judgment and award is set aside and the appeal is allowed and the claim petition is granted, as indicated hereinabove. 26.Send down the records after placing copy of the judgment on record.