JUDGMENT B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking the following relief:- “This Hon’ble Court may be graciously pleased to admit this writ application and after hearing the parties allow the same and issue a writ/direction/order quashing the final order passed with findings of the Departmental proceeding under Annexure-5 and that of the order of the appellate authority under Annexure-6/A. directing the opposite parties to pay the petitioner all his pecuniary benefits, including his arrear pay allowance etc. as admissible under the law from time to time with interest from 13.11.1972 to 20.04.1999, the date of his superannuation.” 2. The pleaded facts, in short, are that the petitioner was appointed as a Sectional Supervisor under the Odisha Forest Development Corporation, Sambalpur Division on 30.11.1963. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of Deputy Sub-Divisional Manager on 01.03.1973 and was in-charge of Anandapur Forest Sub-Division from 03.10.1981 to 28.07.1986. On 20.04.1987, a special audit of Anandapur Forest Sub-Division was conducted for the period from 1983-84 to 1985-86. A report was submitted showing huge financial irregularities vide Anneure-1 for the said period, as a consequence whereof, the petitioner was placed under suspension pending drawal of disciplinary proceeding on 08.02.1998, vide Annexure-2A, and FIR was also lodged against him by the Divisional Manager, Jajpur Road in Anandapur Police Station on 06.04.1988, vide Annexure-3 and a disciplinary proceeding was also initiated against him on 14.06.1989, vide Annexure-2. 3. Challenging the order of suspension dated 08.02.1988, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court, which was numbered as O.J.C. 1411 of 1989, but the same was subsequently withdrawn on 21.08.1989. The police submitted final form stating “FIR true under Section 409 I.P.C. Insufficient evidence to submit the C.S. against the accused. The investigation of the case will be reopened on receipt of compliance to the observation of DIG, CID (C) dated 10.10.1991 from Managing Director, OFDC, Bhubaneswar on 26.09.1992 vide Annexure-4. 4. The learned S.D.J.M. Anandapur accepted the final report on 15.02.1993 vide Annexure-7 observing as follows: “Acknowledgement of R.N. received from complainant. He had not filed any protest petition F.I.R. true under Section 409 IPC is accepted after perusing the C.D. & F.R.” 5. 4. The learned S.D.J.M. Anandapur accepted the final report on 15.02.1993 vide Annexure-7 observing as follows: “Acknowledgement of R.N. received from complainant. He had not filed any protest petition F.I.R. true under Section 409 IPC is accepted after perusing the C.D. & F.R.” 5. Enquiry report was submitted in the disciplinary proceeding on 16.04.1994 and final order was passed on 24.10.1994 as per Annexure-5 imposing penalty of discharge of the petitioner from service and treating the period of suspension from 08.02.1988 till 24.10.1994 as such. Against the said order of imposition of penalty dated 24.10.1994 in Annexure-5, the petitioner preferred an appeal and on considering the same, the Chairman, OFDC rejected his appeal on 11.08.1995 vide Annexure-6/A. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute against the imposition of penalty vide order dated 24.10.1994 in ID Case No. 7 of 1995 which was also dismissed on 12.02.1998 vide Annexure-6 with the finding that the acceptance of final report submitted by police on 26.09.1992 by the court was not an order of acquittal. Challenging the aforesaid award dated 12.02.1998, Annexure-6, the petitioner filed O.J.C. No. 6275 of 1998 before this Court, which was also dismissed on contest on 03.12.2008. 7. Challenging the order of this Court dismissing the O.J.C. filed by the petitioner, the petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition before the apex Court which was also dismissed. At this juncture, the petitioner filed CRLMC No. 915 of 2009 under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. challenging the order dated 15.02.1993, Annexure-3, passed by the learned S.D.J.M. Anandapur in G.R. Case No. 138 of 1988. This court by order dated 25.07.2009 disposed of the said CRLMC clarifying that – the observation that FIR is true cannot by no stretch of imagination mean that the allegations made in the FIR are true. This Court further observed that since investigation had not been kept open, the question of further investigation on the said FIR did not arise. It was also observed that subsequently if any FIR has been lodged, the matter could be investigated again after obtaining the report as mentioned in the final report by the Investigation Officer. However, in the said CRLMC the OFDC was not impleaded as a party. 8. It was also observed that subsequently if any FIR has been lodged, the matter could be investigated again after obtaining the report as mentioned in the final report by the Investigation Officer. However, in the said CRLMC the OFDC was not impleaded as a party. 8. In view of the order passed by this Court in the aforesaid CRLMC, the petitioner submitted a representation on 25.2.2010 vide Annexure-8 before the Managing Director, OFDC claiming to declare him not guilty of the charges in the disciplinary proceeding in view of the observation made by this Court in the aforesaid CRLMC and also to pay him full back wages including promotional service benefits at par with his junior, namely, Prafulla Chandra Kar, and other legal dues with 24% interest. 9. On being noticed, the OFDC filed its counter affidavit refuting the allegations made in this writ petition and specifically urging that once the matter has been finalized by the apex Court, there is no question of reopening the same as the matter has reached its finality with the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. 10. The petitioner also filed a rejoinder to the counter filed by the OFDC on 21.2.2012. At this point of time, the petitioner sought amendment of the writ petition, which was allowed and a consolidated writ petition was filed on 29.4.2014. To the said consolidated writ petition, opposite parties 1 and 2 also filed additional counter affidavit on 11.8.2014. 11. Mr. D.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged before this Court that the factum of dismissal of Special Leave Petition by the apex Court has no bearing on the present context in view of the fact that subsequently the petitioner having been acquitted in the criminal case, he is entitled to get the benefits admissible to him in accordance with law at par with his junior Sri P.C. Kar. Therefore, he claims arrear pay and allowances etc. as admissible to him from time to time with interest from 13.11.1972 to 20.4.1999. It is further urged that while deciding the Industrial Dispute Case, the learned Industrial Tribunal left the matter open in the event the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charges. Therefore, he pursued the matter being acquitted of the criminal charge and claimed his benefits. as admissible to him from time to time with interest from 13.11.1972 to 20.4.1999. It is further urged that while deciding the Industrial Dispute Case, the learned Industrial Tribunal left the matter open in the event the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charges. Therefore, he pursued the matter being acquitted of the criminal charge and claimed his benefits. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Nath Mohanty vs. Union of India and Others, 2014 (I) CLR, 869. 12. Mr. S.K. Pattnaik, learned Senior Counsel for opposite parties 1 and 2, strenuously refuted the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and stated that the challenge to Annexures-5 and 6A was rejected by order dated 12.2.1998 by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No. 7 of 1998, which was unsuccessfully challenged in O.J.C. No. 6275 of 1998 before this Court and in Civil Appeal No. 18845 of 2009, which were rejected. Therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of res judicata. In addition to that, it is urged that the writ petition is grossly barred by law of limitation, suffers from delay and latches and the claim of innocence on the basis of the order passed in the CRLMC No. 915 of 2009 disposed of on 25.9.2009 (supra) is misconceived since the said order does not disclose that the petitioner was acquitted of the charges. In order to substantiate his case, he has relied upon the decisions reported in the cases of State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena, 1996 (6) SCC 417 , Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1416 , State Bank of India and Another vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim, 2013 (9) Scale 222, Jayram Panda vs. D.V. Raiyani, 1988 (II) OLR 3 (FB), Corporation of Nagpur vs. Ramchandra G. Modak, AIR 1984 SC 626 . 13. With the above pleaded facts, it is to be considered whether departmental proceeding which reached finality could be reopened on subsequent observation made in the CRLMC and the benefits as claimed by the petitioner can be ordered to be paid to him in the present writ petition. 14. The admitted fact is that the petitioner was dismissed from service on 24.10.1994 vide Annexure-5, against which appeal was preferred, which was also rejected on 11.8.1995. 14. The admitted fact is that the petitioner was dismissed from service on 24.10.1994 vide Annexure-5, against which appeal was preferred, which was also rejected on 11.8.1995. Consequent upon dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner preferred an Industrial Dispute Case, which was also dismissed as per order dated 12.2.1998, Annexure-6, wherein it was held that dismissal of the petitioner was justified. Against the said order, the petitioner had filed O.J.C. No. 6275 of 1998, which too was dismissed on 3.12.2008. Challenging such order, the petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which was also dismissed. Therefore, the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service has been made confirmed by the apex Court. 15. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner relying upon the order passed by this Court in CRLMC No. 915 of 2009 decided on 25.7.2009 claiming arrear pay and allowances for the period from 13.11.1972 to 20.4.1999 at par with his junior Sri P.C. Kar. But subsequently, the writ petition was amended adding the appellate order dated 11.8.1995, Annexure-6A, and praying to quash the final order, Annexure-5, passed in the disciplinary proceeding and the order passed in appeal, Annexure-6A, even though the said orders were upheld by the Industrial Tribunal as well as this Court and the apex Court. The order of dismissal of the petitioner from service was challenged before the learned Industrial Tribunal in I.D. Misc. Case No. 7 of 1995 under Section 33-A of the I.D. Act and by award dated 12.2.1998 the learned Industrial Tribunal passed the following order: “Thus, on the foregoing analysis, this Tribunal is of the view that the discharge of the complainant from service was not the out-come of any victimization of the complainant for his trade union activities, but had its origin to the bonafide requirement concerning the O.P’s business transaction. In the circumstances, the complainant is not entitled for any relief. The award is passed within the scope of Section 33-A(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.” 16. The learned Industrial Tribunal having held that the order passed in the disciplinary proceeding could not be interfered with, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court, which was also dismissed and in the Special Leave Petition, the said order was made confirmed by the Apex Court. Such facts are admitted by the petitioner in paragraph 19 of the writ petition. Such facts are admitted by the petitioner in paragraph 19 of the writ petition. Therefore, by amendment of the writ petition, the prayer to quash the order passed by the disciplinary authority, Annexure-5 and the subsequent appellate order, Annexure-6A cannot be sustained by applying the principles of res judicata. 17. So far as the criminal proceeding is concerned, the learned S.D.J.M. Anandpur by order dated 15.2.1999 accepted the final report submitted by the police stating F.I.R. is true under Section 409, IPC. The said order neither meant that finding of guilt was recorded by the competent criminal court nor was it an order of acquittal. The F.I.R. was marked as Ext.14, and the order of the learned S.D.J.M. Anandpur accepting the final report submitted by the police was marked as Ext.15 in I.D. Case No. 7 of 1995. The learned Industrial Tribunal considering both the documents marked as Exts.14 and 15, in paragraph 12 of the award rejected the contention of the petitioner that he was acquitted in the criminal case and further held that even acquittal in the criminal case would have no effect on the finding recorded in the departmental enquiry and this Court by order dated 25.7.2009 in Annexure-7 has clearly indicated that acceptance of final report by the learned S.D.J.M. Anandpur did not mean that the allegations made in the F.I.R. were not true and that the investigation has not been kept open. Therefore, the order, Annexure-7 in CRLMC No. 915 of 2009 had no effect on the final order passed in the departmental proceeding. 18. Relying on the decision in the case of Shri Sailendra Nath Mohanty (supra), it is urged that for the self-same charges, if the departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding are continuing, the criminal charges against the petitioner having failed, it cannot be concluded in the departmental proceeding that the delinquent committed misappropriation and accordingly, while quashing the judgment of the learned Tribunal, this Court had directed reinstatement of the petitioner in service in his previous post. The period for which the petitioner remained out of service was treated as service period and not break in service and he was granted 30% of salary since he had not worked for the said period. 19. Mr. The period for which the petitioner remained out of service was treated as service period and not break in service and he was granted 30% of salary since he had not worked for the said period. 19. Mr. S.K. Pattnaik, learned Senior Counsel for opposite parties 1 and 2 has referred to the judgment in B.K. Meena case (supra), wherein the apex Court in para-17 observed as follows: “17. There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed.” 20. The case referred to above may not have any application to the present context in view of the fact that in the said case the Court was considering whether there would be stay of departmental proceeding awaiting the decision in criminal proceeding. But here is a case whether the petitioner has been dismissed from service following a disciplinary proceeding, which order has not been confirmed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, but this Court and subsequently by the apex Court. 21. The Apex Court in the case of Capt. M Paul Antony case (Supra) in paragraph 22 had held as follows: The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. 21. The Apex Court in the case of Capt. M Paul Antony case (Supra) in paragraph 22 had held as follows: The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest. 22. Subsequently the judgment in the said M. Paul case supra was considered by the Apex Court in various judgments. In G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujurat, 2006 (5) SCC 446 : AIR 2006 SC 2124 in Paragraphs-30 and 31 it has been held as follows: “30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellants residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case 1 will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 23. In State Bank of Hyderabad and Another vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : AIR 2008 SC 2146 , the Apex Court held as follows: “There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of the superior courts in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the enquiring officer is limited and that the High Court would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment and there cannot be any doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or where the departmental proceedings had already been initiated, to continue therewith.” The Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the said decision further held as follows: “20. The legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the same set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a departmental proceedings and in a criminal case simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The dicta of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. however, remains unshaken although the applicability thereof had been found to be dependent on the fact situation obtaining in each case.” 24. The dicta of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. however, remains unshaken although the applicability thereof had been found to be dependent on the fact situation obtaining in each case.” 24. From the aforementioned judgment of the apex Court, it is clear that the High Court would ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment and there can be no doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee, who was facing a criminal charge was acquitted, the same by itself would not debar the disciplinary authority from initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or when a disciplinary proceeding was initiated, to continue with the same. 25. In the case of Jayaram Panda case (supra), a Full Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar matter, referred to the decision in the case of Ramachandra G. Modak (supra), wherein the apex Court observed thus: “Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it is not expedient to continue to the departmental enquiry on the very same charges, or grounds or evidence.” As to what is an honourable acquittal, the apex Court has referred to the discussions made in the case of Mandai Dutt vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another, 1980 (3) SLR 371, where the Rajasthan High Court faced with such a question. 26. A general observation, however, has been made in the famous case of R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 1964 SC 787 , as follows: “Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable.” 27. In the case of Robert Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor, 1934 (61) I.L.R. Cal 168, Lord Williams, J. observed as follows: “The expression honourably acquitted is unknown to Courts of justice. Apparently, it is a form of order used in Court martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term honourably acquitted.” 28. On a survey of the judicial opinions, however, it is not possible to accept the submission of the petitioner’s counsel as an absolute proposition inasmuch as the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur itself after making the observation just extracted above immediately proceeded to observe: “Merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away, nor its discretion in any way fettered. In that view of the matter, the discretion is left with the authority himself and, if he, on the facts and circumstances of the case, feels that notwithstanding the acquittal of the delinquent, a departmental enquiry is expedient, ordinarily that should not be open to scrutiny by a Court.” 29. Similarly, the expression Honourable acquittal as interpreted in paragraph 24 of the decision in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 . “The meaning of the expression honourable acquittal came up for consideration before this Court in RBI vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions honourable acquittal, acquitted of blame, fully exonerated are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression honourably acquitted. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 30. The aforesaid judgments of the apex Court were also taken into consideration by this Court in Guru Prasad Bose (since dead) by LRs. The aforesaid judgments of the apex Court were also taken into consideration by this Court in Guru Prasad Bose (since dead) by LRs. Mamata Rani Bose and Others vs. District Magistrate (ADM), Administration, OSRTC & Others, W.P. (C) No. 8912 of 2003, dated 22.7.2014. 31. On an analysis of the above judgments of the Apex Court, it can be conclusively held that mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no effect on a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Department, but the above principle though settled, has no application to the present context in view of the fact that the petitioner after being dismissed from service by following a disciplinary proceeding, had approached the Industrial forum, which upheld the order of dismissal. Against the said order, a writ petition was preferred by the petitioner before this Court, which was also dismissed. The petitioner thereafter preferred the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which too was dismissed. In that view of the matter, once the order of dismissal has been made confirmed by the concurrent findings of the Courts, more particularly, affirmed by the apex Court, taking advantage of a subsequent observation made in the CRLMC in Annexure-7 where no reference was made with regard to the disciplinary proceeding, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. That apart, the self-same order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority vide Annexure-5 and the order passed by the appellate authority under Annexure-6A cannot be called in question on the basis of an order passed by a criminal court, the same being hit by the principles of res judicata. Therefore, the writ petition merits no consideration. The writ petition is dismissed.