JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge This appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against judgment of acquittal dated 2.12.2006 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. in Sessions Trial Nos. 10/2002, 9/2005 whereby he acquitted all the accused under Section 498-A and Section 307 IPC. 2.When the matter came up before this Court on 14.5.2007, leave to appeal was granted only against respondent No.1. 3.Accused Murari Lal stands charged under sections 498-A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code on the allegations that he being husband of the complainant Satyavati from January, 1998 to January, 2001 at Kigas subjected the complainant to cruelty and that on 17.1.2001 at about 7.30 A.M. at Kigas he set on fire the complainant Satyavati by pouring kerosene oil on her with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if by that Act he had caused the death of Satyavati he would have been guilty of murder whereas accused Yog Raj, Dharma Devi and Chandravati stand charged under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code on the allegations that they being relatives of the husband of Satyavati subjected her to cruelty from January, 1998 to January, 2001. 4. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the complainant Satyavati (PW-3) was married to accused Murari Lal during 1995 and her relation with the accused remained cordial for about 11/2 years but thereafter the accused started harassing her on account of dowry regarding which disclosure was made to Chandravati (PW-7) sister of the complainant and Prem Singh ( PW-9) brother of the complainant. On 16.1.2001 in the evening Satyavati (PW-3) returned to village Kigas from the house of her parents and the accused started quarrelling with her and in the morning on 17.1.2001 at about 7.30 A.M. Satyavati was beaten by her husband and parents-in-law and at 8.30 A.M. accused Murari Lal sprinkled kerosene oil upon Satyavati and set her on fire. On 16.1.2001 in the evening Satyavati (PW-3) returned to village Kigas from the house of her parents and the accused started quarrelling with her and in the morning on 17.1.2001 at about 7.30 A.M. Satyavati was beaten by her husband and parents-in-law and at 8.30 A.M. accused Murari Lal sprinkled kerosene oil upon Satyavati and set her on fire. 5.The complainant Satyavati covered herself with the blanket and went beneath the water tap and thus saved herself but she suffered burn injuries and thereafter Satyavati proceeded towards P.H.C. Nagwain and on the way Netar Singh (PW-5) alongwith Kuber Singh (DW-2) met Satyavati to whom the occurrence was narrated by Satyavati and she was taken in a vehicle to Police, Station, Aut where rapat in the daily diary was entered by Naresh Kumar (PW-8) the then M.H.C. Police Station, Aut and Satyavati was sent to the hospital. 6.The medical examination of Satyavati was conducted by Dr. L.R. Bhatiya (PW-2) the then Medical Officer, P.H.C. Nagwain and she was found to have sustained burn injuries on her thighs, lower abdomen and hands which were simple in nature regarding which M.L.C. Ex.PW-2/A was issued and Satyavati was referred to Zonal Hospital, Mandi for treatment and at Zonal Hospital, Mandi Dr. L.D. Vaidya (PW-1) treated Satyavati who was admitted in Zonal Hospital, Mandi and she was found to have sustained approximately 30% of superficial to deep burns and she was operated twice during her admission in the hospital regarding which report Ex.PW-1/A was issued by PW-1 which bears his signature. 7.The statement of Satyavati the complainant (PW-3) was recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. on 17.1.2001 by Kushal Kumar (PW-13) the then Investigating Officer, on the basis of which FIR Ex.PW-8/C was recorded in the Police Station, Aut by H.C. Naresh Kumar (PW-8). The investigation in the case was conducted by H.C. Kushal Kumar (PW-13), who visited the spot and prepared the spot map Ex.PW-13/A. He had taken into possession the burnt clothes of Satyavati comprising shirt Ex.P-1, Dupata Ex.P-2 and Salwar Ex.P-3 vide memo Ex.PW-4/B in the presence of Pawan Kumar (PW-4). On bottle containing drops of kerosene oil alongwith match box lying at the spot were also seized vide memos Ex.PW-4/C and Ex.PW-4/A. The photographs of the spot were got snapped through Sh. Kirat Kumar (PW-6) which are Ex.PW-6/A-1 to Ex.PW-6/A-3 and the negatives are Ex.PW-6/A-4 to Ex.PW-6/A-7. On bottle containing drops of kerosene oil alongwith match box lying at the spot were also seized vide memos Ex.PW-4/C and Ex.PW-4/A. The photographs of the spot were got snapped through Sh. Kirat Kumar (PW-6) which are Ex.PW-6/A-1 to Ex.PW-6/A-3 and the negatives are Ex.PW-6/A-4 to Ex.PW-6/A-7. 8.The statement of Satyavati was also got recorded before the Executive Magistrate, B.D. Sharma (PW-10) during the investigation which is Ex.PW/10/A. The burnt sweater of Satyavati was seized vide seizure memo Ex.PW-12/A by ASI Subhash Chand (PW-12) the then Investigating Officer, Police Station, Aut. The statements of the witnesses were recorded by S.I. Om Parkash (PW-11), ASI Subhash Chand ( PW-12) and H.C. Kushal Kumar (PW-13) as per their version. The case property was deposited with M.H.C. Police Station, Aut, who had forwarded the same to F.S.L. Junga for chemical examination and as per report of chemical examiner Ex.PW-13/B no traces of inflammable material were found on the Salwar, Dupata and Baniyan of the complainant as well as on match box and match sticks contained therein whereas bottle was found to be containing kerosene oil. 9.On conclusion of the investigation, on the basis of the material collected during the investigation, on being satisfied that the accused have committed offences punishable under sections 498-A/307 of the Indian Penal Code, the concerned Officer Incharge of the Police Station, Aut submitted a charge sheet against the accused in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No.II, Mandi, H.P. who vide order dated 4.1.2002 committed the case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, H.P. from where the same was assigned to the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandi. 10.The accused Chaitri Devi died during the pendency of the trial and as such the proceedings against her were dropped vide order dated 30.7.2005. On consideration, a charge as detailed above was framed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandi, H.P. against the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 11.The prosecution had examined 13 witnesses in support of their case. The statements of the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded in which they denied the case of the prosecution. The accused persons were given an opportunity to lead defence evidence, if any. 11.The prosecution had examined 13 witnesses in support of their case. The statements of the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded in which they denied the case of the prosecution. The accused persons were given an opportunity to lead defence evidence, if any. The defence of the accused is that the witnesses have deposed falsely as they are related with the complainant and further that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated in the case. It was averred that on the date of occurrence the complainant Satyavati quarreled with the respondent and thereafter she inflicted blow of iron pipe on his head in the kitchen and in a scuffle kerosene oil which was kept in the kitchen fell on her from the container and Satyavati caught fire from the hearth (Chulah) due to which she sustained burn injuries. The respondent had examined four witnesses in defence in order to substantiate the defence plea. 12.We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. H.K.S. Thakur learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant, who has argued that no doubt the prosecution is to stand on its own leg and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the respondent. Yet, once the defence has chosen to lead evidence which is found to be false that itself would clearly prove the case of the prosecution beyond any shadow of doubt. 13.His first submission is that the defence led evidence to the effect that prior to the incident relating to lodging of the FIR, a scuffle took place in which the respondent sustained injuries and blood splashed on the wall of the kitchen. This plea according to the learned Additional Advocate General is a false and concocted story as the records of the investigation and evidence recorded before the Court belies this submission. His second contention is that the doctor, who had in fact examined the complainant on 17.1.2001 is the very same doctor who later examined the respondent on 18.1.2001 and in case he had found some injuries on the head of the respondent, then he would have treated the respondent on 17.1.2001 itself and would have not waited for carrying out the treatment on the respondent till the time he had been brought by the police on 18.1.2001. According to him even the spot map Ex.PW-13/A did not reflect that the wall bore any blood marks as claimed by the respondent. He has further contended that in absence of any cogent and reliable evidence to this effect having been led by the respondent, it can be safely concluded that the version of the respondent is false and the injuries if at all appearing on the person of the respondent are self inflicted. 14. His third contention is that the FIR is not sacrosanct wherein all the details would be given and is only to put the criminal law in motion. Therefore, absence of allegation regarding demand of dowry in the FIR are insignificant since sufficient evidence has already been led by the prosecution to establish the demand of dowry at the instance of respondent No.1 and his family members. The whole story of the complainant cannot essentially come in the FIR and there is no law which prohibits the complainant to elaborate on this issue by getting supplementary statement recorded which cannot be called or termed as improvements. The evidence led regarding dowry nowhere alter the contents of the FIR. It is contended that the respondent had himself in his statement to Question No. 27 given a false answer, therefore, this belies his defence and accordingly proves the case of the prosecution. The question No. 27 reads as follows: “Have you to say anything else? Ans: I am innocent. I used to do business at Balichowki and used to come once in a month and Satyawati used to quarrel with me unnecessary and was living separately. On the day of occurrence she gave blow of iron pipe on my head in the kitchen and have a scuffle with me and kerosene oil which was kept in the kitchen fell on her from the container which caught fire from the hearth (chulah) with the result she sustained injuries. His fourth and last contention is that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and, therefore, the respondent deserves to be convicted for the offence he has been charged with. 15.Mr. Devinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case and therefore, the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Court below deserves to be upheld and affirmed. 15.Mr. Devinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case and therefore, the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Court below deserves to be upheld and affirmed. 16.We have given deep and thoughtful consideration to the arguments raised by the respective parties. 17.At the outset, it must be observed that the prosecution’s case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are complete in themselves. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable or point to any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. The evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu alias Madhuranatha and Another v. State of Karnataka AIR 2014 SC 394 has held as under: “6. This Court has dealt with the case of circumstantial evidence time and again. It has consistently been held that a conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are complete in themselves. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable or point to any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. The evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.” 18. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. The evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.” 18. It is further a settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution must not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. Therefore, irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility of a witness should be ignored. The Court has to examine whether evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence, more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, so as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the Court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. Keeping in view the aforesaid well settled principles of law, we proceed to determine the merits of the case. 19.In so far as the first and third contentions raised by the learned Additional Advocate General regarding the self inflicting wounds found in the person of the respondent and its non-mention in the spot map, suffice it to say that the same are contradicted by the record itself. It appears that during the course of investigation the supplementary statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the complainant was recorded on 17.2.2001 which has been exhibited on record as Ex. DX, wherein it is clearly stated that the respondent had sustained injuries as a result of grappling with the complainant. Not only this, even in the spot map Ex.PW-13/A under note IV, it is clearly reflecting therein that in the kitchen of the house certain dried blood stains were found. Once this is the position, then the question as to why the doctor did not treat the respondent on 17.1.2001 itself becomes inconsequential. Not only this, even in the spot map Ex.PW-13/A under note IV, it is clearly reflecting therein that in the kitchen of the house certain dried blood stains were found. Once this is the position, then the question as to why the doctor did not treat the respondent on 17.1.2001 itself becomes inconsequential. 20.Now, before we proceed to determine the contentions No. 2 and 4 raised by the prosecution regarding there being no allegation in the FIR with respect to cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A and its effect and also as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, it would be apt to reproduce the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC, 582 in the context of the concept of cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A IPC, which reads as under: “16 .In order to appreciate the rival stands, it would be useful to notice the statutory provisions. Section 498-A I.P.C. makes “cruelty” by husband or his relative a punishable offence. The word “cruelty” is defined in the Explanation appended to the said Section. Section 498-A I.P.C. with Explanation reads thus: “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation-For the purpose of this section, ‘cruelty’ means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her meet such demand.” 17. Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of “cruelty”, clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498-A I.P. C. postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute “cruelty”. Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of “cruelty”, clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498-A I.P. C. postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute “cruelty”. Such wilful conduct, which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman would also amount to “cruelty”. Clause (b) of the Explanation provides that harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, would also constitute “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. 18. It is plain that as per clause (b) of the Explanation, which,according to learned counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498-A I.P.C. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. harassment simpliciter is not “cruelty” and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc., that it amounts to “cruelty” punishable under Section 498-A I.P. C.” 21.The perusal of the FIR Ex.PW-8/C which was registered on the basis of the statement of the complainant Satyavati (PW-3) recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. Ex.PW-3/A immediately after the occurrence establishes that the complainant was married with the respondent about six years back and they were having no issue. It was further alleged that for the last about three years the respondent had been treating the complainant with cruelty and used to turn the complainant out of his house frequently after abusing and threatening her. On 17.1.2001 at about 7.30 a.m. when the complainant was offering prayer, the respondent came there and asked her to go to her parental house. On 17.1.2001 at about 7.30 a.m. when the complainant was offering prayer, the respondent came there and asked her to go to her parental house. Even about 15-20 days prior to 17.1.2001 the complainant had been sent to her parental house by the respondent and had returned to her matrimonial house only the previous day. The respondent then started beating the complainant with fist and kick blows and asked her to leave his house. When the complainant refused to leave the matrimonial house, then the respondent sprinkled kerosene oil upon her and lit the fire with the match stick. The complainant wrapped herself in a blanket and with the help of water she succeeded in putting off the fire and due to this the complainant suffered burn injuries on her person. She changed her clothes and proceeded to Nagwain for getting herself treated but on the way she became unconscious. It was further alleged that all the accused including the respondent herein used to harass the complainant in order to force her to leave the matrimonial house as the complainant could not bear any child. 22.At this stage, it may be observed that from the reading of the FIR Ex.PW-8.C, it is evident that no specific allegations regarding demand of dowry have been made. We are not oblivious to the fact that the object of FIR from the point of view of the informant is to only set the criminal law in motion and viewed from the point of the investigating agency, the same is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to enable it to take appropriate steps to trace and bring to book the guilty persons. It may not be sacrosanct as contended by learned Additional Advocate General but at the same time it cannot be ignored that the same is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for corroborating the oral evidence and to show on what material and basis the investigation commenced and what was the original version of the complainant. It is from this document that the Court may come to a conclusion whether there has been any improvement in material particulars from the original version given by the complainant. It is from this document that the Court may come to a conclusion whether there has been any improvement in material particulars from the original version given by the complainant. 23.In so far as the FIR Ex.PW-8/C is concerned, specific allegation has been made by the complainant against the respondent and his family members that she was being harassed on account of her not being in a position to bear a child. However, on perusal of the statement of the complainant (PW-3), it is evident that she has nowhere corroborated the version as reported vide Ex.PW-3/A in material particulars. As already observed, earlier as per the version Ex.PW-3/A, it has been alleged by the complainant (PW-3) that the respondent had started harassing for the last three years i.e. from 1998 onwards, whereas, her marriage with the respondent was solemnized during 1995. Further there is no allegation regarding demand of dowry made by the respondent in Ex.PW-3/A or regarding harassing or ill- treatment of the complainant on account of such demand of dowry. Rather a specific reason for causing such harassment to her has been given in the complaint which was that she was unable to bear a child. Once there is no allegation regarding demand of dowry or regarding harassment or ill-treatment by the respondent in the FIR, it can be safely concluded that the original version has been improved upon in material particulars. At the same time, it can also be safely concluded that there have been material contradictions/omissions in the statement of the complainant (PW-3) and the version as reported vide Ex.PW-3/A, therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, the statement of the complainant (PW-3) cannot be relied upon as her statement does not inspire confidence. 24.No doubt, the complainant in her cross-examination has stated that she had disclosed to the police while getting her statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. that she was being harassed on account of demand of dowry by the accused but such statement of the complainant stands contradicted/belied vide Ex.PW-3/A with which she has been duly confronted. The complainant no doubt got her statement recorded before the Executive Magistrate Ex.PW-10/A in which she has specifically alleged that she was being harassed by the accused persons for bringing insufficient dowry. The complainant no doubt got her statement recorded before the Executive Magistrate Ex.PW-10/A in which she has specifically alleged that she was being harassed by the accused persons for bringing insufficient dowry. However, even this version is contrary to the version as reported at the first instance vide Ex.PW-3/A on the basis of which the FIR Ex.PW-8/C came to be recorded. 25.The learned Additional Advocate General then sought to rely upon the statements of PW-7 Chandravati and PW-9 Prem Singh, who are the brother and sister of the complainant to prove the charge against the respondent. PW-7 has stated that the relation between the respondent and the complainant remained cordial for 11/2 years but thereafter the respondent started ill-treating the complainant for not being able to bear a child and also not bringing sufficient dowry. However, no specific instance has been narrated by this witness and he has also not stated the manner in which the complainant was being ill-treated by the accused. 26.On the other hand, Prem Singh, PW-9 has stated that relations of the complainant with the respondent remained cordial for about two years but thereafter some altercation started between the parties and the respondent started maltreating the complainant and would beat her and taunt her for not being able to bear a child. There is nothing in the statement of PW-9 to the effect that the respondent had made a demand of dowry or that the complainant was being ill-treated on account of not bringing sufficient dowry or on account of demand of dowry. Otherwise also, the statements of these witnesses have to be taken with a pinch of salt as both these witnesses are interested in the success of the case of the prosecution and their statements cannot be relied upon unless and until the same finds corroboration from some independent material on record which unfortunately is lacking in the instant case. 27.No other witness has been examined by the prosecution to corroborate or support the statements of PW-3, PW-7 and PW-9 regarding subjecting of the complainant to cruelty by the respondent. No doubt, the prosecution has examined PW-5 Netar Singh, who is a resident of the same locality where the house of the respondent is situate, but he too has not whispered a single word regarding the respondent having ill-treated or harassed the complainant after marriage on account of demand of dowry. No doubt, the prosecution has examined PW-5 Netar Singh, who is a resident of the same locality where the house of the respondent is situate, but he too has not whispered a single word regarding the respondent having ill-treated or harassed the complainant after marriage on account of demand of dowry. 28.The respondent on the other hand has examined Sidhu Ram, DW-3, whose house is adjoining to the house of the respondent. In his statement, this witness has clearly stated that the accused never maltreated and tortured the complainant, who had been residing separately from the respondent for more than two years prior to the occurrence. The complainant was staying in a separate room in the house of the respondent where she was cooking meals separately in the kitchen out of the food articles kept there by the respondent. It may be noticed that the testimony of this witness has not been shaken in his cross-examination and nothing contrary has come on record. 29.There is nothing on record which may suggest that the statement of this witness has been given in favour of the respondent simply in order to favour him. There is no material on record to suggest that this witness is either related to the respondent or is in any way biased or inimical against the complainant. Therefore, it can be safely held that DW-3, who is an independent witness of the locality has contradicted/belied the statements of PW-3, PW-7 and PW-9 regarding harassment or maltreatment of the complainant by the respondent. 30.In so far as the offence of Section 307 IPC is concerned, only a faint attempt was made by the prosecution to press for the charge particularly in view of the statement of PW-2 Dr. L.R. Bhatiya, who admitted in his cross-examination that on account of injury suffered by the complainant, there was no possibility of immediate death of the patient. The story put up by the complainant appears to be improbable and impossible because no sane person upon whom kerosene oil has been poured would without raising any hue and cry wait for a match stick being lighted and thrown upon her that too from another room. Not only this, it is surprisingly to note that no other article in the room where the kerosene oil has been poured catches fire. Not only this, it is surprisingly to note that no other article in the room where the kerosene oil has been poured catches fire. 31.As per the statement of the complainant, she was offering prayers when the respondent sprinkled kerosene oil upon her and set her on fire. In cross-examination, the complainant has stated that she was offering prayer by sitting on the floor of the room in which she was living separately from the respondent. It has also come in her statement that one table, trunk and almirah which had been given to her in dowry were also there in the same room where she was set on fire by the respondent. She has specifically stated that the respondent was in the kitchen and it was through the service window he sprinkled kerosene oil on the complainant and thereafter threw a burning match stick because of which the complainant caught fire. It is admitted by her in cross-examination that the bed in the room was immediately adjoining to the window and wooden almirah was also placed adjoining to the bed and a table was also lying in the said room adjoining almirah and the bed. The location and placement of the things have been duly supported by PW-6, Kirath Kumar, photographer, who in his statement has stated that there was a bed and table inside the room and the window was visible in Ex.D-1 which was about 8 feet from the table and it was a service window which was kept for service from the window and its size was one feet by one feet. 32.There is no explanation in the entire prosecution story as to how and why none of the articles kept in the room including the bed-sheet did not catch fire. The complainant has further contradicted herself when in Ex.PW-3/A she has claimed that none came to the place of occurrence when the complainant was set on fire by the respondent. While in her statement before the Executive Magistrate Ex.PW-10/A, she has stated that Kuber Singh, Netar Singh and Pappu etc. had come to the spot. This clearly proves on record that the complainant has given contrary and contradicted version of the occurrence at different times so as to suit her convenience. In the given facts and circumstances, her statement can clearly be held to be not inspiring confidence and being unworthy of any credence. had come to the spot. This clearly proves on record that the complainant has given contrary and contradicted version of the occurrence at different times so as to suit her convenience. In the given facts and circumstances, her statement can clearly be held to be not inspiring confidence and being unworthy of any credence. 33.Another important fact which has come on record in the statement of the complainant was that one Dhani Ram was also present in the house on the date of the occurrence, as he was the guest of the respondent. However, for the reasons best known the prosecution did not choose to examine this witness so as to lend credence /corroboration to the statement of the complainant. Therefore, adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution. 34. In so far as the contention regarding the reply given by the respondent to question No. 27 is concerned, in the given facts and circumstances and in view of the overwhelming evidence on record cannot in any manner be termed to be a blatant lie. But on the other hand, the version given by him is truthful and itself finds mention and corroborated from Ex.DX. 35. This appeal is against acquittal and what would be the scope of interference in such matters has been elaborately dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghurey Lal vs. State of Utter Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “43. The earliest case that dealt with the controversy in issue was Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 Privy Council 227 (2). In this case, the ambit and scope of the powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal has been aptly elucidated by the Privy Council. Lord Russell writing the judgment has observed as under: (at AIR p. 230): “.... In this case, the ambit and scope of the powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal has been aptly elucidated by the Privy Council. Lord Russell writing the judgment has observed as under: (at AIR p. 230): “.... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” The law succinctly crystallized in this case has been consistently followed by this Court. On proper analysis of the ratio and findings of this case, it is revealed that the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused further gets reinforced and strengthened by the acquittal of the trial court. The appellate court undoubtedly has wide powers of re-appreciating and re- evaluating the entire evidence but it would be justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal only when the judgment of the trial court is palpably wrong, totally ill- founded or wholly misconceived, based on erroneous analysis of evidence and non-existent material, demonstrably unsustainable or perverse.” “69. The following principles emerge from the cases above: 1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court’s decision. This is especially true when a witness’ credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. The trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court’s decision. This is especially true when a witness’ credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. 70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when: i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law; ii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”; iii) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; ii) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/ report of the ballistic expert, etc. iii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.” “75. On careful analysis of the entire evidence on record, we are of the view that the reasons given by the High Court for reversing the judgment of the acquittal is unsustainable and contrary to settled principles of law. The trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence, therefore, the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the trial Court. The trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence, therefore, the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the trial Court. An acquittal by the trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 36.The view taken by the learned Court below is a possible view and is not based on an erroneous view of law. Even otherwise the learned Court below appreciated the evidence in the right perspective and has neither ignored the evidence nor misread the material evidence placed on record. The judgment passed by the learned trial Court is just and reasonable calling for no interference. 37.We find no reason to interfere with the findings so recorded by the learned Court below and accordingly the appeal is dismissed and the bail bonds of respondent are discharged.