Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 592 (HP)

Om Parkash v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2014-05-19

P.S.RANA, SANJAY KAROL

body2014
Judgment Sanjay Karol, J. Appellant-convict Om Parkash, hereinafter referred to as the accused, has assailed the judgment dated 27.6.2008/30.6.2008, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Case No.11/2007 (Sessions Trial No.12/2007), titled as State v. Om Parkash, whereby he stands convicted of the offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and pay fine of Rs.25,000/- (on realization to be paid to the victim) and in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that prosecutrix (PW-1), aged about 11 years, who was living with her grandmother Laxmi Devi (PW-3) in village Upper Badehra, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, was studying in a school. After returning from the school, on 3.7.2007, at about 1-1.30 p.m., she left her home to play in the street (Gali). Son of the accused took the prosecutrix to his house. Accused sent his son to a shop for purchasing certain articles. Finding the prosecutrix alone at home, accused laid her on a bed and opened her Salwar. Thereafter, he subjected her to rape. When prosecutrix screamed, he gagged her mouth. After finishing the act, accused let go the prosecutrix by giving her one rupee coin, asking her not disclose the incident to anyone. In the meanwhile, son of the accused returned. Accused opened the door and ran after his son. At that time, prosecutrix also left the house of the accused. Reaching home, she narrated the incident to PW-3, who in turn went to the house of Bishan Dass (PW-4), Pradhan of the area and narrated the incident to him. PW-4 came to the house of PW-3 and after seeing the prosecutrix, telephonically informed the police, who arrived at the spot at 4.30 p.m. and recorded the statement of the prosecutrix (Ex. PW-1/A). SI Shiv Pal (PW-15), who conducted the investigation, sent the prosecutrix for medical examination to the hospital. In the meanwhile, statement of prosecutrix was sent through Constable Bodh Raj to Police Station, Haroli, where ASI Raghubir Singh (PW-7) registered FIR No.141, dated 3.7.2007 (Ex. PW-7/A), under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Haroop Kaur (PW-2) at Government Regional Hospital, Una, where she was admitted. In the meanwhile, statement of prosecutrix was sent through Constable Bodh Raj to Police Station, Haroli, where ASI Raghubir Singh (PW-7) registered FIR No.141, dated 3.7.2007 (Ex. PW-7/A), under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Haroop Kaur (PW-2) at Government Regional Hospital, Una, where she was admitted. In the meanwhile, PW-15 conducted the necessary investigation on the spot. MLC (Ex.PW-2/B) of the prosecutrix, prescription slip (Ex. PW-2/C) were taken on record. Also, clothes (Ex. P-1 & Ex.P-2) of the prosecutrix and her vaginal swab (Ex.P-3) were taken into possession. Accused was arrested and got medically examined through Dr. Ashwani Sharma (PW-6), who issued MLC (Ex.PW-6/A). Vaginal swab and clothes were sent for chemical analysis and report (Ex.PW-15/G) taken on record by the police. Prosecutrix remained admitted in the hospital for indoor treatment and was discharged on 24.7.2007. OPD slip (Ex.PW-14/A) and Indoor treatment summary (Ex.PW-14/B) were also taken on record by the police. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. As such, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses and the statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up the following defence: “I am innocent. I am President of H.P. Dr. Ambedkar Mission, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Kalyan Samiti Welfare Society, Branch of Santoshgarh Constituency at Village Badehra. The grant for development given by the Govt. was spent under my supervision and due to this fact Pradhan Gram Panchayat, namely Sh. Bishan Dass had nourished a grudge against me. And my wife was appointed as a Helper in Anganwari, whereas Bishan Dass was interested to get appointed daughter-in-law of his brother-in-law (Sadu) upon this post. There was also an altercation of my wife with P.W. Laxmi Devi. At this stage, the percentage of my blindness is 80%.” 5. It be only observed that opportunity to lead evidence, in defence, was afforded to the accused, who preferred not to do so. 6. There was also an altercation of my wife with P.W. Laxmi Devi. At this stage, the percentage of my blindness is 80%.” 5. It be only observed that opportunity to lead evidence, in defence, was afforded to the accused, who preferred not to do so. 6. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court convicted the accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal by the accused. 7. Mr. Vikas Rajput, learned counsel for the accused, has made the following submissions: (i) accused, who is a victim of circumstances, stands falsely implicated in the present case; and (ii) there is no legal evidence to establish complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. 8. We shall first examine the question of age of the prosecutrix. In her statement recorded in the Court on 21.11.2007, prosecutrix has disclosed her age to be 11 years. Her grandmother (PW-3) also testifies such fact. On the question of age, we find that there is no cross-examination of these witnesses. Also, Dr. Haroop Kaur (PW-2), who was posted as Medical Officer at Regional Hospital, Una, has corroborated such version. Further, we find that prosecution has proved birth certificate (Ex.PW-12/A) of the prosecutrix, which records her date of birth to be 26.10.1996. We find this witness to have been cross-examined but of no avail. Thus, in our considered view, prosecution has been able to establish the age of the prosecutrix to be 11 years and in any event less than 16 years. 9. We now proceed to examine the testimonies of Dr. Haroop Kaur (PW-2) and Dr. Rajan Angra (PW-14), who examined the prosecutrix on 3.7.2007. Perusal of their testimonies would reveal that prosecutrix remained admitted in the Government hospital from 3.7.2007 to 24.7.2007. 10. According to Dr. Rajan Angra (PW-14), he first examined the prosecutrix and lateron PW-2 examined her in detail. With regard to physical condition of the prosecutrix, Dr. Haroop Kaur (PW-2), in Court, has deposed as under: “…. My detailed report, observation and opinion is as under:- There was alleged history of being lured by a neighbour into his house when the victim was returning home from school in the afternoon and then committed the crime. History of LMP-Not attained Menarche as yet. Haroop Kaur (PW-2), in Court, has deposed as under: “…. My detailed report, observation and opinion is as under:- There was alleged history of being lured by a neighbour into his house when the victim was returning home from school in the afternoon and then committed the crime. History of LMP-Not attained Menarche as yet. G.P.E. Patient is conscious, well oriented, co-operative and well oriented to place and time. Patient is febribe. (Temp. 100 degree F). P/A Tenderness is present in lower abdomen. Secondary sexual characters not developed. No signs of any external injury on whole body. Gait is not normal due to severe pain. Local Examination:- (Private Parts) Parting of the thighs is painful in lithotomy position. For local examination Xylocaine jelly was used after taking vaginal swab. There were multiple dry blood stains on medial aspects of both thighs. Labia majora not fully developed. Blood stains present on Vulva. Labia minora-abrasions present with fresh slight oozing of blood from the abrasions. Hymen-there is irregular tear in hymen with painful edges of the tear with fresh slight oozing of blood from torn edges of the hymen. Edges of tear are very tender. The tear of hymen admits tip of little finger with much pain and tenderness. Tip of little finger is admitted with difficulty in vagina. Opinion- Sexual assault has been done with the girl. Clothes which were worn during the deed (Salwar and Kameej) were stained with multiple blood stains. They were sealed and duly signed and packed in sealed packet and handed over to the police for chemical analysis of blood and semen. There were no foreign hair on the private parts of the victim.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. We must observe that while cross-examining these witnesses, accused has taken a defence that prosecutrix fell from a tree, as a result of which she sustained injuries on her body. But then there is no proof of the same. Also, the defence does not stood probablized by the accused in the cross-examination of the witnesses. But shockingly, it is also suggested to the doctors that injuries were self-inflicted by the victim with a stick. This suggestion, to say the least, is preposterous, if not abhorrent. We do not find veracity of prosecution witnesses to have been shaken in any manner. As such we hold that opinion given by the doctors, who issued MLC (Ex.PW-2/B) and medical record (Ex. This suggestion, to say the least, is preposterous, if not abhorrent. We do not find veracity of prosecution witnesses to have been shaken in any manner. As such we hold that opinion given by the doctors, who issued MLC (Ex.PW-2/B) and medical record (Ex. PW-14/A and Ex. PW-14/B), to be correct clear, cogent, convincing and correct. 12. To the benefit of accused, at this juncture, we may observe that as per report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. PW-15/G), human blood of Group-A was found on the bed sheet (Ex. P-5) recovered from house of the accused, Salwar (Ex. P-2) belonging to the prosecutrix. No blood or semen was found on shirt (Ex.P-1) of the prosecutrix. Human blood was found on the vaginal swab (Ex. P-3) and blood stains (Ex.P-4), but grouping results were found to be inconclusive. Also semen was not found on these exhibits. Semen was found on the underwear (Ex.P-7) of the accused, but no blood was found thereupon. In our considered view, this report, in no manner, renders the prosecution version to be shaky, false or incorrect. Absence of human blood or semen cannot be a ground to falsify the prosecution case, rendering the otherwise clear, convincing and cogent material on record, establishing the guilt of the accused, to be unbelievable. 13. Having perused the scientific and medical evidence on record, in the backdrop of defence taken by the accused, we now proceed to examine the testimony of material witnesses, i.e. PW-1, her grandmother (PW-3) and Pradhan Bishan Dass (PW-4). 14. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 769, the Apex Court has reiterated its earlier view and has held as under:- “11. 6.Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer J in Wheeler v. United States (159 U.S. 523). The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Surya Narayana v. State of Karnataka ( 2001 (1) Supreme 1 ). 15. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra ( 1997 (5) SCC 341 ) it was held as follows: '5. …..A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored'. The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.” 16. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar (2009)16 SCC 697 , the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the prosecutrix was ravished by the accused on 15.3.2000 which incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her sister later during the day. She also narrated the incident to her parents the following day and to the Doctors after the incident. Court accepted the statement of the sister, the parents and the doctors while holding the accused guilty. Importantly, the Apex Court reversed the finding recorded by the High Court wherein it was held that the statement of the prosecutrix being minor was not worthy of credence. 17. In Jetha Ram vs. The State of Rajasthan (1978) 4 SCC 425 , the Apex Court has held as under:- “11. The High Court also rightly rejected the view of the trial court that as the evidence regarding other accused were not accepted and the case of the conspiracy set up by the prosecution rejected, the evidence regarding the appellant cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of P.Ws. 11 and 18 would indicate that they heard the name of the appellant being mentioned as one of the assailants at the time of the occurrence and repeated those names without actually seeing them. On a reading of the evidence, we are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. It appears that the witnesses stated that they not only saw but also relied on the version given by the other witnesses. On a reading of the evidence, we are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. It appears that the witnesses stated that they not only saw but also relied on the version given by the other witnesses. It may also be noted that even taking that the witnesses relied on the version given by the persons at the scene immediately after the occurrence it is admissible as a relevant fact under the Evidence Act.” 18. The Apex Court in Sukhar versus State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507 has held as under: “6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of resgestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act reads thus : "Under the present Exception [to hearsay] an utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a carbrake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided, it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued." 19. Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) summarises the law relating to applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus : "1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous. 2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past. 3. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous. 2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past. 3. The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and by-standers. In conspiracy, riot &c. the declarations of all concerned in the common object are admissible. 4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated." 20. This Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P. [ (1996) 6 SCC 241 ] considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act held thus: (SCC pp.246-47, para 15) “15.The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae." 21. In another judgment in Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., (1997) 4 SCC 161 this Court examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held thus (SCC p.167, para 16) ".....................The aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted under Section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of murder. Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus: ‘(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.’ (Emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during dead of the night, victim's identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act." 22. In Balram Prasad Agrawal versus State of Bihar and others, (1997) 9 SCC 338 , the Apex Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of J. D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India, AIR 1982 SC 673 : (1982) 1 SCC 143 wherein a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in paragraph 10 of the Report has made the following observations : (AIR p. 676, para 10: SCC p.148, paras 21 and 22) “The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 23. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: ‘Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental, state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made'.” 24. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental, state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made'.” 24. In Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 , the Supreme Court has held that the previous statement of the raped girl to her mother, immediately after the occurrence, is not only admissible and relevant as to her conduct, but also constitutes corroboration of her statement under the provisions of section 157 of the Evidence Act. In order to come to the aforesaid conclusions, illustration (j) to section 8 of the Evidence Act was relied upon. In that case, the victim, named Purni, was 7/8 years old. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and believed. 25. Prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. If for some reason Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. [State of Maharashtra versus Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 ]. 26. The Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh and others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 has held that:- “… …The Courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a Court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? “21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.” … … (Emphasis supplied) 27. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.” … … (Emphasis supplied) 27. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. In order to ascertain as to whether discrepancy pointed out is minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness is making the statement. [State of H.P. versus Lekh Raj and another (2000) 1 SCC 247 ]. 28. In the aforesaid decision itself the Court reiterated its earlier view taken in State of Punjab versus Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277 wherein it was held that:- "A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give fight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." (Emphasis supplied) 29. The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan versus N.K. THE ACCUSED (2000) 5 SCC 30 has held that:- “… …It is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cobweb of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females. It is the spurt in the number of unmerited acquittals recorded by criminal Courts which gives rise to the demand for death sentence to the rapists. The Courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. In State of M.P. v. Dharkole alias Govind Singh and others, (2004) 13 SCC 308 the Apex Court has held that:- “9. … Eye witnesses' account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be credit-worthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness-box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” “10. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other." “11. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.” [Emphasis supplied] 31. In Radhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 12 SCC 57 , the Apex Court has held that “… Even if there is consent, the act will still be a 'rape', if the girl is under 16 years of age” and “There have also been rare instances where a parent has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make a false charge of a rape either to take revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case”. 32. We shall now discuss the evidence in view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law. 33. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case”. 32. We shall now discuss the evidence in view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law. 33. Trial Court observed that prosecutrix is having small physical structure and had to be offered a seat on which she stood and then only got her statement recorded in Court. 34. Having minutely examined the testimony of the prosecutrix, we are of the considered view that she is a reliable witness and her testimony fully inspires confidence. Despite her young age, and frail and small body composition, she has withstood the test of extensive cross-examination in a case of such nature. She states that after returning from school, her grandmother gave her a mango, which she was eating with her brother in the street adjoining to her house. On the asking of son of the accused, she went to the house of the accused. Thereafter, accused gave money to his son to purchase articles from a shop. When she was alone, accused threw her on bed. She started weeping but accused tore the string of her Salwar. She states that thereafter he “put his private part in my private part (bathroom wali Jagah)”. She felt pain in her private part. When she screamed that accused gagged her mouth and blood started oozing out of her private part, as a result of which her Salwar got stained. After finishing the act, accused gave her one rupee coin and asked her not to disclose the incident to anyone. When son of the accused came and opened the door, accused ran after him. She also ran away from the house of the accused, but while doing so, fell on the stairs. After reaching home, she narrated the incident to PW-3, who went to PW-4 and thereafter police came and recorded her statement (Ex. PW-1/A). She states that she was taken to the hospital and got medically examined. She identifies her clothes, i.e. shirt (Ex.P-1), Salwar (Ex.P-2), in Court, which she was wearing on the day of occurrence of the incident. Significantly, in cross-examination, the witness has explained that since offence took place during day hours, none in the neighbourhood was present. She denies having sustained injuries on her private part, as a result of fall from a mango tree, which she allegedly climbed to pluck fruits. Significantly, in cross-examination, the witness has explained that since offence took place during day hours, none in the neighbourhood was present. She denies having sustained injuries on her private part, as a result of fall from a mango tree, which she allegedly climbed to pluck fruits. She denies any altercation having taken place between her grandmother and wife of the accused. 35. We do not find the version rendered by the prosecutrix, in any manner, to be tutored, false or untrustworthy. Prosecutrix is a young child and a student of Class-V. She is clear, cogent and consistent in her deposition. Clearly she has deposed that accused removed her Salwar and put his “private part” in her “private part”. It is an act of rape. We find her testimony to be absolutely inspiring in confidence, not even requiring any corroboration. Though medical evidence fully corroborates her testimony. 36. In any event, testimony of the prosecutrix, stands fully corroborated by PW-3, who while fully supporting the version of prosecutrix, states that accused had called the prosecutrix, through his son, and thereafter sent him to purchase toffees from a shop. This prosecutrix told her. Though, this version was not got recorded by this witness in her statement (Mark DA) with which she was confronted, but however, this fact alone would not render the prosecution case to be false, for the reason that prosecutrix herself has withstood the test of severe cross-examination on all counts. Also, on the question of crime, for which accused stands charged, this witness has corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix. She explains that prosecutrix returned home after about an hour and a half. Though she admits that her relations with Pradhan Bishan Dass (PW-4) are cordial, but clarifies that they are same with all the villagers. She denies having falsely implicated the accused on the behest of Pradhan Bishan Dass. In fact, why should she do so. No grandmother would put the honour of her grandchild at stake only on the asking of a third person and that too without any malice/animosity/or absence of motive or personal gain. 37. She denies having falsely implicated the accused on the behest of Pradhan Bishan Dass. In fact, why should she do so. No grandmother would put the honour of her grandchild at stake only on the asking of a third person and that too without any malice/animosity/or absence of motive or personal gain. 37. Here, we must observe that both the prosecutrix and her grandmother admit that there are about 30-50 houses in the mohalla, the place where crime took place, but then absence of neighbours on the spot, at the relevant time, stands fully explained, as according to the prosecutrix none was present in the street at the relevant time. People were either sleeping in their homes or had gone to the fields. It be only observed that crime took place in a village where in the month of June, when normally, during day time, people rest and prosecutrix has explained that when she cried accused gagged her mouth. Significantly, none was present in the house of the accused at that time. 38. Pradhan Bishan Dass (PW-4) has supported the prosecution and corroborated the version of the prosecutrix and her grandmother. According to him, PW3 came to his house and informed him that prosecutrix stood raped by the accused. He met the prosecutrix in her house, who also narrated the incident to him. He telephonically informed the police at Police Post, Pandoga. Police immediately arrived at the spot and conducted the necessary investigation. In his presence, police seized incriminating articles vide Memos (Ex. PW-4/B & Ex. PW-4/C). The witness stands extensively cross-examined on the question of animosity, which he allegedly harboured against the accused. We do not find his testimony, in Court, to be shaken in any manner. 39. We find testimony of police officials and particularly the Investigating Officer (PW-15) not to be shattered in any manner. He has deposed the manner in which he conducted and completed the investigation and recovered the incriminating articles. Also, he got the prosecutrix and the accused medically examined. 40. Dr. Ashwani Sharma (PW-6) has testified about the ability of the accused in performing sexual intercourse. He has deposed the manner in which he conducted and completed the investigation and recovered the incriminating articles. Also, he got the prosecutrix and the accused medically examined. 40. Dr. Ashwani Sharma (PW-6) has testified about the ability of the accused in performing sexual intercourse. No marks of injury were found on the penis of the accused, but then this fact alone, in the teeth of otherwise clear, convincing and cogent evidence on record, which establishes the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime, beyond reasonable doubt, cannot be said to be a circumstance sufficient enough to render the prosecution case to be false or untrue. 41. Not only oral testimony of the witnesses but also medical evidence clearly establishes that prosecutrix, who was just 11 years of age at the time of commission of crime, was subjected to rape by the accused. 42. Thus, from the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix (who is a minor). 43. It cannot be said that the accused stands falsely implicated or that conviction is without any legal evidence. 44. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity, incorrect and incomplete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 45. While dealing with the issue on affording aid, assistance and help to the victim of rape the Apex Court in Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum versus Union of India and others, (1995) 1 SCC 14 issued the following directions:- “15. In this background, we think it necessary to indicate the broad parameters in assisting the victims of rape. (1) The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation. It is important to have someone who is well acquainted with the criminal justice system. In this background, we think it necessary to indicate the broad parameters in assisting the victims of rape. (1) The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation. It is important to have someone who is well acquainted with the criminal justice system. The role of the victim’s advocate would not only be to explain to the victim the nature of the proceedings, to prepare her for the case and to assist her in the police station and in court but to provide her with guidance as to how she might obtain help of a different nature from other agencies, for example, mind counselling or medical assistance. It is important to secure continuity of assistance by ensuring that the same person who looked after the complainant’s interests in the police station represent her till the end of the case. (2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since the victim of sexual assault might very well be in a distressed state upon arrival at the police station, the guidance and support of a lawyer at this stage and whilst she was being questioned would be of great assistance to her. (3) The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to representation before any questions were asked of her and that the police report should state that the victim was so informed. (4) A list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept at the police station for victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose own lawyer was unavailable. (5) The advocate shall be appointed by the Court, upon application by the police at the earliest convenient moment, but in order to ensure that victims were questioned without undue delay, advocates would be authorised to act at the police station before leave of the court was sought or obtained. (6) In all rape trials anonymity of the victim must be maintained, as far as necessary. (7) It is necessary, having regard to the Directive Principles contained under Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some, for example, are too traumatized to continue in employment. (6) In all rape trials anonymity of the victim must be maintained, as far as necessary. (7) It is necessary, having regard to the Directive Principles contained under Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some, for example, are too traumatized to continue in employment. (8) Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the Court on conviction of the offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board whether or not a conviction has taken place. The Board will take into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if this occurred as a result of the rape.” 46. State is directed to take appropriate action in that regard. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.