Judgment This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to call for records of Misc.Nos.97/2011 and 98/2011 pending on the file of III Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad and quash the impugned order produced at Annexure-E. This petition coming on for preliminary hearing this day, the Court made the following: ORDER The question that falls for determination in this writ petition is, whether the proceedings initiated by the Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Corporation’) under S.31(1)(aa) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (in short ‘SFC Act’), on 15.09.2011, in Misc. Petition Nos.97 and 98 of 2011, on the file of the District Judge at Dharwad, are maintainable, in view of S.34(2) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. The brief facts relevant to decide this writ petition are the following: First respondent – Corporation has filed, on 15.09.2011, Misc. Petition Nos.97 and 98 of 2011, against the petitioner and respondent Nos.2 to 9, under S.31(1)(aa) of SFC Act, to pass an order for recovery by enforcing the personal guarantee offered in its favour. The petitions have been contested by filing statement of objections. I.A.No.2 was filed, under S.32(6) and (7) of SFC Act, to dismiss the petitions, on the ground that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to decide the petitions. The applications having been dismissed, this writ petition was filed for relief. In I.A.No.2, it was contended that the amount involved in each petition being more than Rs. 10,00,000/-, the jurisdiction lies with the ‘Debts Recovery Tribunal’ and ‘the Act’ being a subsequent and later legislation vis-à-vis the ‘SFC Act’, though both are Parliamentary Legislations, the later enactment having created a special forum called the Debts Recovery Tribunal, prevails and supersedes the SFC Act. It was stated that when S.34(2) of the Act is read along with S.46B of the SFC Act, it becomes clear that the Debts Recovery Tribunal established under the Act gets the jurisdiction and the District Judge conferred with the general jurisdiction under the SFC Act, cannot proceed with the cases. 3. It was stated that when S.34(2) of the Act is read along with S.46B of the SFC Act, it becomes clear that the Debts Recovery Tribunal established under the Act gets the jurisdiction and the District Judge conferred with the general jurisdiction under the SFC Act, cannot proceed with the cases. 3. Sri Aravind D. Kulkarni, learned advocate, contended that S.34 of the Act confers an overriding effect vis-à-vis other statute and a special forum – Debts Recovery Tribunal having been established, the District Judge, has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide Misc. Petition Nos.97 and 98 of 2011. He submitted that the dismissal of the I.As. filed in the said cases being illegal, impugned order is liable to be quashed and the relief prayed in the I.As. filed before the District Judge is required to be granted. 4. To answer the question, raised supra, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the two statutes. S.34 of the RDDB & FI Act, 1993, reads as follows: “34. Act to have overriding effect.— (1) Save as provided under subsection (2), the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (63 of 1951), the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984 (62 of 1984), [the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986) and the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989 (39 of 1989)].” (emphasis supplied) 5. Ss.31, 32 and 46B of the SFC Act, 1951 reads as follows: “31. Ss.31, 32 and 46B of the SFC Act, 1951 reads as follows: “31. Special provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation.— (1) Where an industrial concern, in breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof [or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation] or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, [then, without prejudice to the provisions of section 29 of this Act and of section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)] any officer of the Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply to the district judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the following reliefs, namely:— (a) for an order for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the [Financial Corporation] as security for the loan or advance; or [(aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety; or] (b) for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation; or (c) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board, where such removal is apprehended. (2) An application under subsection (1) shall state the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, the ground on which it is made and such other particulars as may be prescribed. *** *** *** 32. (2) An application under subsection (1) shall state the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, the ground on which it is made and such other particulars as may be prescribed. *** *** *** 32. Procedure of district judge in respect of applications under section 31.— (1) When the application is for the reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 31, the district judge shall pass an ad interim order attaching the security, or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise in his estimate an amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, together with the costs of the proceedings taken under section 31, with or without an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. [(1A) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (aa) of subsection (1) of section 31, the district judge shall issue a notice calling upon the surety to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why his liability should not be enforced.] (2) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 31, the district judge shall grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment and issue a notice calling upon the industrial concern to show cause, on a date to be specified in the notice, why the management of the industrial concern should not be transferred to the Financial Corporation. (3) Before passing any order under subsection (1) or subsection (2) [or issuing a notice under subsection (1A),] the district judge may, if he thinks fit, examine the officer making the application. [(4) At the same time as he passes an order under subsection (1), the district judge shall issue to the industrial concern or to the owner of the security attached a notice accompanied by copies of the order, the application and the evidence, if any, recorded by him calling upon it or him to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why the ad interim order of attachment should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed. (4A) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under subsection (1A) the district judge shall forthwith order the enforcement of the liability of the surety.] (5) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under subsections (2) and (4), the district Judge shall forthwith make the ad interim order absolute and direct the sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or confirm the injunction. (6) If cause is shown, the district judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) insofar as such provisions may be applied thereto. (6) If cause is shown, the district judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) insofar as such provisions may be applied thereto. (7) After making an investigation under subsection (6), the district judge may— (a) confirm the order of attachment and direct the sale of the attached property; (b) vary the order of attachment so as to release a portion of the property from attachment and direct the sale of the remainder of the attached property; (c) release the property from attachment; (d) confirm or dissolve the injunction; [* * *]; [(da) direct the enforcement of the liability of the surety or reject the claim made in this behalf; or] (e) transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or reject the claim made in this behalf: Provided that when making an order under clause (c) [or making an order rejecting the claim to enforce the liability of the surety under clause (da) or making an order rejecting the claim to transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation under clause (e)], the district judge may make such further orders as he thinks necessary to protect the interests of the Financial Corporation and may apportion the costs of the proceedings in such manner as he thinks fit: Provided further that unless the Financial Corporation intimates to the district judge that it will not appeal against any order releasing any property from attachment [or rejecting the claim to enforce the liability of the surety or rejecting the claim to transfer the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation], such order shall not be given effect to, until the expiry of the period fixed under subsection (9) within which an appeal may be preferred or, if an appeal is preferred, unless the High Court otherwise directs until the appeal is disposed of. (8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908) for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. (8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908) for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. [(8A) An order under this section transferring the management of an industrial concern to the Financial Corporation shall be carried into effect, as far as may be practicable, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the possession of immovable property or the delivery of movable property in execution of a degree, as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder.] (9) Any party aggrieved by an order [under subsection (4A), subsection (5)] or subsection (7) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the High Court, and upon such appeal the High Court may, after hearing the parties, pass such orders thereon as it thinks proper. (10) Where proceedings for liquidation in respect of an industrial concern have commenced before an application is made under subsection (1) of section 31, nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the Financial Corporation any preference over the other creditors of the industrial concern not conferred on it by any other law. [(11) The functions of a district judge under this section shall be exercisable— (a) in a presidency town, where there is a city civil court having jurisdiction, by a judge of that court and in the absence of such court, by the High Court; and (b) elsewhere, also by an additional district judge [or by any judge of the principal court of civil jurisdiction].] [(12) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that any court competent to grant an ad interim injunction under this section shall also have the power to appoint a Receiver and to exercise all the other powers incidental thereto.] *** *** *** 46B. Effect of Act on other laws.—The provision of this Act and of any rule or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.” (emphasis supplied) 6. S.34 of the Act consists of two parts. SubS.(1) deals with the overriding effect of the Act, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. Said subsection makes an exception as regards matters covered by subS.(2). SFC Act, 1951 has been specifically mentioned therein. SubS.(2) is of considerable importance for the present case. A bare reading of the provision therein makes it clear, that it is intended to be in addition to and not in derogation of the statutes enumerated therein, which includes the SFC Act, 1951. Thus, it becomes clear, that a Bank or a Financial Institution established under the provisions of the statutes enumerated therein, has the option to proceed either under ‘the Act’ or under the modes of recovery permissible under the relevant Act/s. 7. S.31 of SFC Act is a special provision for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation. The provision therein enables a Financial Corporation to apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the reliefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (c). Clause (aa) was inserted by Act 43 of 1985, with effect from 21.08.1985 i.e., for enforcing the liability of any surety. When an application is made under S.31, the procedure to be followed by the District Judge has been provided in S.32. The provision of ‘the Act’ does not enable the Financial Corporation to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal for enforcing liability of any surety, in the manner provided in S.31(1)(aa) of the SFC Act. 8. When an application is made under S.31, the procedure to be followed by the District Judge has been provided in S.32. The provision of ‘the Act’ does not enable the Financial Corporation to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal for enforcing liability of any surety, in the manner provided in S.31(1)(aa) of the SFC Act. 8. In Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 455 , in the matter of interpretation of statutes and principles of construction, while considering a question whether the proceedings for recovery initiated by U.P. Financial Corporation under the Uttar Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, on 06.01.2001, are maintainable in view of S.34(2) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, it has been held as follows: “11. It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid", Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 (SCC p.284, para 16). 12. In D.R Venkatachalam vs. Dy. Transport Commr., AIR 1977 SC 842 , it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 13. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 13. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515 ]. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88 . In State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah, (1996) 10 SCC 619 , the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. 14. Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) 1 QB 878, "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) 1 QB 878, "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C., 1963 AC 557, where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p.664 I) "This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".] Therefore, the High Court's conclusions holding proceedings under the U.P. Act to be in order are indefensible.” Recourse can be taken for recovery of dues by the Corporation, to the provisions of the SFC Act, 1951, since there is specific mention of it, in S.34(2) of The RDDB & FI Act, 1993. 9. The special provision for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporations has been provided under S.31 and the procedure which the District Judge should follow to decide the application under S.31 has been provided in S.32. The District Judge, within the limits of whose jurisdiction, the industrial concern carries on business on the whole or a substantial part of its business alone can decide the matters as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation Ltd., vs. S.K.K. Kulkarni, AIR 2009 SC 1713 . In view of the above, the applications filed before the District Judge being devoid of merit, have rightly been dismissed and hence, no interference with the impugned order is called for. Petition being devoid of merit is rejected.