ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SAMARENDRA PRATAP SINGH) The Bihar State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”) has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal against the order, dated 24.10.2010, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 9392 of 1996, whereby, while quashing the order of punishment, dated 6.8.1997, a learned single Judge of this Court has directed the respondents to pay arrears of salary for the period of suspension and also writ petitioner’s salary until the date of his superannuation, because the writ petitioner superannuated during the pendency of the writ petition. Learned Single Judge further directed that the payment should be made within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The operative portion of the order of the learned Single Judge, contained in paragraph 21, is quoted hereinbelow:- “21. For the reasons aforementioned, I set aside the impugned order of punishment dated 6.8.1997, Annexure-27 with cost which is assessed at Rs.5,000/-,Petitioner be paid arrears of salary for the suspension period as also until the date of his superannuation as during the pendency of the writ petition he has attained the age of superannuation as early as possible, in any case within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order before the Managing Director of the Corporation”. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The appellant challenges both, the order of the learned Single Judge quashing the order of punishment and the order directing full back salary until the date of superannuation. 4. Elaborating his submissions, one by one, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted in just and proper manner. A writ Court is not to reassess evidence like an Appellate Court, which error, the learned Single Judge has committed, while setting aside the departmental proceeding. A Court should not substitute its own views and findings, in place of those, arrived at by the disciplinary authority, on a detailed appreciation of evidence. Further-more, even while holding that the departmental proceeding was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice, the learned Single Judge failed to consider whether it caused prejudice to the appellant in any manner. A Court should not substitute its own views and findings, in place of those, arrived at by the disciplinary authority, on a detailed appreciation of evidence. Further-more, even while holding that the departmental proceeding was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice, the learned Single Judge failed to consider whether it caused prejudice to the appellant in any manner. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that similar pleas, taken by the respondent No.6 in the past, in his earlier writ proceedings, were not entertained and not interfered with by the Court. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent no.6 submits that the learned Single Judge was correct in holding that the departmental proceeding was not conducted in accordance with law and Court can always interfere, if the Enquiry Officer has acted arbitrarily or with material illegality or in violation of the principles of natural justice. 6. The exercise of power of judicial review, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in matters concerning disciplinary proceeding, is, now, authoritatively settled. The Apex Court, in the case of Union of India & Ors vs Bodupalli Gopalswami, reported in (2011) 13 SCC 553, observed that while exercising power of judicial review, a writ Court would not interfere with the proceedings or the order of punishment unless the authority concerned had acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted perversely or arbitrarily. 7. In the case of Union of India & Ors vs Manab Kumar Gupta, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 535 , the Apex Court observed that while reviewing the order of disciplinary authority, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal and cannot make meticulous appraisal of evidence assuming unto itself the role of an appellate Court. Nonetheless, nothing would prevent the Court to interfere with a finding of the Enquiring Officer if the finding is perverse or arbitrary. Further-more, if the court finds that the finding is perverse or disciplinary authority has failed to consider relevant materials or had considered materials, which are not germane to the case, the Court would not hesitate in interfering with the report of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary proceedings. Further-more, if the court finds that the finding is perverse or disciplinary authority has failed to consider relevant materials or had considered materials, which are not germane to the case, the Court would not hesitate in interfering with the report of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary proceedings. Likewise, if disciplinary proceeding is conducted in violation of statutory rules or in infraction of the principles of natural justice, the Court in, exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, would be within its right to interfere with such findings and also the punishment based on such findings. 8. In the light of the principles and parameters laid down by Apex Court with respect to exercise of power of judicial review, we would, now, proceed to examine the order under appeal. We find that the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the infirmities in the departmental proceedings and have assigned the reasons for interfering with the finding of guilty and order of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. The learned Single Judge, in para 14 to 19 of the judgment, has dealt with the charges levelled against the writ petitioner. After considering the materials on record, the learned Single Judge, in para 14 of the judgment, held that the findings of the enquiry officer, holding the writ petitioner guilty of charge Nos.1 and 2, that he had violated set norms in making recommodation to the General Manager for disbursement of the sanctioned amount in favour of M/s Biscay Data Products Pvt. Ltd., appears to be misconceived inasmuch as the decision had already taken for disbursement at the level of General Manager and Managing Director. The learned Single Judge, similarly, found that other charges not only stale, but misconceived and not well founded. The learned Single Judge noticed that time and again, the writ petitioner made application not only to the enquiry officer, but also to the Managing Director to make payment of subsistence allowance as well as salary for the unpaid period as the same was required for his livelihood and to meet the legal expenses, but the writ petitioners request remained unheeded. The learned Single Judge further noticed that in spite of the order of this Court, dated 28.11.1996, passed in L.P.A. No. 434 of 1996, salary, with respect to the month of April, 1996, till the date of issuance of impugned order, was not paid. 9. The learned Single Judge further noticed that in spite of the order of this Court, dated 28.11.1996, passed in L.P.A. No. 434 of 1996, salary, with respect to the month of April, 1996, till the date of issuance of impugned order, was not paid. 9. The learned Judge accordingly held that failure of the Corporation to pay subsistence allowance to the writ petitioner, until suspension of the writ petitioner was revoked in compliance of the orders of the High Court, dated 28.11.1996, passed in L.P.A. No.434 of 1996, Annexure-11, and denial of payment of salary with effect from April, 1996, till the date of issuance of the impugned order of compulsory retirement, dated 6.8.1997, vitiated the proceedings. The learned Single Judge also came to the finding that the respondent Corporation ought not to have punished the writ petitioner and held him guilty for acting on proposals, which stood approved by higher authority. The learned Single Judge observed that the action of the disciplinary authority was arbitrary and did not give adequate opportunity to the petitioner to contest the proceeding. 10. This Court, in exercise of its power under Letters Patent Jurisdiction, does not exercise power of regular appeal. The Court merely has to examine if the order suffers from error of record or has been passed in violation of statutory provisions or otherwise has caused any injustice to a party. Further-more, in a given case, if two views are possible and the view taken by a learned Single Judge is one of the two possible views, the appellate court would desist from interfering in such matter simply because the alternate view could be a better view. We find that the view, taken by the learned Single Judge, in quashing the order of punishment as well as the enquiry proceeding, is a reasonably possible view and the same cannot be said to be unreasonable or contrary to law and, thus, the order, which the learned Single Judge has passed and which stands impugned in this appeal, does not call for interference. 11. In the result, and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any fault in the order of learned Single Judge quashing the order of punishment and departmental proceeding. 12. 11. In the result, and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any fault in the order of learned Single Judge quashing the order of punishment and departmental proceeding. 12. This takes us to the next issue; whether the learned Single Judge committed an error in directing payment of arrears of salary for the suspension period and also salary until the date of superannuation, because, as already indicated above, the writ petitioner-respondent No.6 superannuated during the pendency of the writ petition. 13. The issue, in question, seems to be the more contested than the previous one. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously assailed the order of the learned Single Judge directing payment of arrears of full salary not only till the time of passing of the impugned order of punishment, but also until the date of retirement. 14. The case of the appellant Corporation is that the writ petitioner joined bar just after the order of compulsory retirement passed on 6.8.1997 and he was, thus, gainfully employed and, hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have directed payment of full arrears of salary until the date of the writ petitioners superannuation. 15. In short, the case of the Corporation is that the writ petitioner is not entitled to back wages from 6.8.1997, (i.e. the date of punishment) up to 31.3.2004, i.e., the date of superannuation. In support of his submissions, the appellant has relied upon the decisions in (i) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs S.C. Sharma, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 363 , paras 9 and 16; (ii) Novartis India Ltd. State of W.B., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 124 , para 22 and (iii) Metropolitan Transport Corporation vs V.Venkatesan, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 601 . 16. It is relevant to state herein that though the appellant had not made, either in its counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge or in the memorandum of appeal before this Court, any specific averments that respondent No.6 had joined bar on being compulsorily retired, the employee very fairly admits that he did join bar, but it was in August, 1998, i.e., one year after passing of the order of compulsory retirement on 6.8.1997. This apart, the said assertion of the respondent No.6 has not been controverted by the appellant. Thus, the appellants entitlement to payment of full salary, at least, till August, 1998, is not in dispute. 17. This apart, the said assertion of the respondent No.6 has not been controverted by the appellant. Thus, the appellants entitlement to payment of full salary, at least, till August, 1998, is not in dispute. 17. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (who is respondent No.6 in this appeal) submits that he did not have income from any other source and, as such, it had become necessary for him to be enrolled in bar to sustain himself. He further submits that the writ petitioner joined bar at the advanced age of 52 years and could pick up only small practice as is the case in the majority of cases of persons, who join bar late in their life. The writ petitioner did not have any regular income as he was neither a Government counsel nor a Counsel for any Board or Corporation or a retained counsel of any private or public undertaking or had any business. The little that he earned from the legal profession was much less than the emoluments he would have earned, had he not been suspended or compulsorily retired. He next submits that service of the Financial Corporation was not pensionable and the same made the living more difficult forcing the writ petitioner, time and again, to depend upon friends and relatives for financial support. On these premises, the appellant submits that he would be entitled to full salary as was directed by learned Single Judge. In support of his submissions, the writ petitioner has relied upon decisions in (i) Union of India vs Madhusudan Prasad, reported in (2004)1 SCC 43 , paras 5 & 6; (ii) Roop Singh Negi vs Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009)2 SCC 570 , para 24 and (iii) Deepali gundu Surwase vs Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) & Ors, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 . 18. The crux of the submissions of the appellant is that consequent to the quashing of the order of termination, payment of back wages would not be a matter of right. He next submits that even if it is necessary to direct payment of back wages, the same shall still be declined if the employee was gainfully employed during the relevant period. He next submits that even if it is necessary to direct payment of back wages, the same shall still be declined if the employee was gainfully employed during the relevant period. In support of his submission, as already noticed, the appellant has relied upon the following decisions; (i) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs S.C. Sharma, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 363 , paras 9 and 16; (ii) Novartis India Ltd. State of W.B., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 124 , para 22 and (iii) Metropolitan Transport Corporation vs V.Venkatesan, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 601 . 19. Before I take up the rival submissions of the parties for consideration, it would be relevant to notice the order of learned Single Judge with respect to payment of back salary. The direction of the learned Single Judge is to make payment of arrears of salary for the period of suspension and also payment of salary of the writ petitioner-respondent No.6 until the date of his superannuation which took place on 31.3.2004. 20. The issues before us are (i) whether the respondent No.6 is entitled to payment of full salary for the period under suspension till the date of his superannuation e.g. 31.3.2004 or till August, 1998, the time, when he joined bar; (ii) If the respondent No.6 is entitled to full salary only till August, 1998, then, to what emoluments would he be entitled from 1.4.1998 to 31.3.2004, because he claimed that being a new comer, his income was minimal. 21. In order to appreciate the issue, which arises for consideration, it would be necessary to notice the law in this context. 22. The Apex Court, in the case of Novartis India Limited Vs State of West Bengal, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 124 , while considering the case of workmen, who were dismissed without holding enquiry, observed that various circumstances shall be considered before a Court directs payment of back wages. It would be apt to quote paragraph 22 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- “22. It is also trite that for the purpose of grant of back wages, conduct of the workman concerned also plays a vital role. Each decision, as regards grant of back wages or the quantum thereof, would, therefore, depend on the fact of each case. Back wages are ordinarily to be granted, keeping in view the principles of grant of damages in mind. Each decision, as regards grant of back wages or the quantum thereof, would, therefore, depend on the fact of each case. Back wages are ordinarily to be granted, keeping in view the principles of grant of damages in mind. It cannot be claimed as a matter of right”. 23. The Apex Court, in the case of U.P. State Brassware Corpon. Ltd. V. Uday Narain Pandey, reported in (2006)1 SCC 479 , while following the decisions of Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya Shankar Rai, reported in (2005)5 SCC 124 , and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 363 , observed that no precise formula can be laid down as to the circumstances, whereunder payment of entire wages should be allowed. The Apex Courts observations read as follows:- “A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that principle is applied, the functions of an Industrial Court shall lose much of their significance. Although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result, but now, with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago, namely, when the workman was retrenched. The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the globalization, privatisation and outsourcing, is evident”. No precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of entire back wages should be allowed. Indisputably, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It would, however, not to be correct to contend that it is automatic. It should not be granted mechanically only because on technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination is found to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. While granting relief, application of mind on the part of the Industrial Court is imperative. It should not be granted mechanically only because on technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination is found to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. While granting relief, application of mind on the part of the Industrial Court is imperative. Payment of full back wages cannot be the natural consequence”. 24. The Apex Court, in Metropolitan Transport Corporation vs. V. Vekatesan, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 601 , observed that in the recent past, there is shift in legal trend and reinstatement with back wages would not be automatic and appropriate in all cases, when the order of termination is held to be bad. Paragraph 20 of the judgment is quoted below:- “20. We recently observed in Jasbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg.Board that in the recent past there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long time of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that the relief of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is held to be in contravention of the prescribed procedure”. 25. Explaining the ambit and scope of gainful employment, the Apex Court further observed that income earned as an advocate from legal profession would be treated as income from gainful employment inasmuch as the term gainful employment would include “self employment”. In such circumstances, if income, earned from self employment, or from pursuit of legal profession, is less than the emoluments, which the employee would have earned, the employer cannot take a stand that nothing further is to be paid. The law mandates that reasonable deductions needs to be made, while determining back wages. The Apex Court, in paragraph 23 of its judgment, in Metropolitan Transport Corporation (supra), observed as follows:- “23. In this view of the matter, reasonable deduction needs to be made while determining the back wages to which the respondent may be entitled. Taking overall facts and circumstances of the case and all other aspects including the aspect that he was enrolled as an advocate from 12-12-2000 to 15-6-2004, in our considered view, demand of justice would be met if the respondent is awarded back wages in the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs instead of Rs.6,54,766”. 26. Taking overall facts and circumstances of the case and all other aspects including the aspect that he was enrolled as an advocate from 12-12-2000 to 15-6-2004, in our considered view, demand of justice would be met if the respondent is awarded back wages in the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs instead of Rs.6,54,766”. 26. The Apex Court, in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors (supra), observed that on quashing of an order of punishment, an employee would be generally entitled to payment of full back wages. 27. The Apex Court, in the case of J K Synthetics vs. K.P. Agrawal, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 433 , observed that the decision, relating to back wages payable on illegal retrenchment/termination, may have no application, where the termination (dismissal), removal or compulsory retirement, is by way of punishment for misconduct in a departmental enquiry and the Court confirms the finding regarding the misconduct, but only interferes with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and, thus, reduces the punishment resulting into reinstatement of an employee. In these cases, the Court, in effect, is not holding that the employer was not in the wrong and that the delinquent had not acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee. In such circumstances, the Court can either direct reinstatement or make a direction for nominal lump sum compensation. In such cases, where continuity is directed, it will be only for the purposes of pensionary or retirement benefits and not for other benefits like increment or promotion. 28. In A.P.SRTC vs S. Narsagoud, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 212 , the Apex Court observed that if a Court finds it necessary to award back wages, the back wages should be awarded, fully or partially, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Any income, received by an employee, during the relevant period on account of alternative punishment, would be a relevant factor to be taken into account, while awarding back wages. The Apex Court, in paragraph 18, observed as follows:- “18. Coming back to back wages, even if the court finds it necessary to award back wages, the question will be whether back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if so the percentage). That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Apex Court, in paragraph 18, observed as follows:- “18. Coming back to back wages, even if the court finds it necessary to award back wages, the question will be whether back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if so the percentage). That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Any income received by the employee during the relevant period on account of alternative employment or business is a relevant factor to be taken note of while awarding back wages, in addition to the several factors mentioned in Rudhan Singh and Uday Narain Pandey. Therefore, it is necessary for the employee to plead that he was not gainfully employed from the date of his termination. While an employee cannot be asked to prove the negative, he has to at least assert on oath that he was neither employed nor engaged in any gainful business or venture and that he did not have any income. Then the burden will shift to the employer. But there is, however, no obligation on the terminated employee to search for or secure alternative employment. Be that as it may.” 29. The Apex Court, in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra), observed that in order to be entitled to back wages, an employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial burden is on him to prove that he was not gainfully employed. Once he has placed his materials in support of his case, the onus shifts to the employer to prove that the case is otherwise. 30. In Metropolitan Transport Corporation (supra), the Apex Court has observed that one would not be entitled to full back wages if he has been gainfully employed for the period, in question, and if it is found that the employee had not been earning the same emoluments that he had been receiving at the time of his termination and/or that he had been earning a lesser amount, necessary deduction, in appropriate ratio, has to be made, while determining the back wages. 31. The issue of payment of back wages was, once again, a subject of consideration in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra). 31. The issue of payment of back wages was, once again, a subject of consideration in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra). The Apex Court, upon considering conspectus of decisions including those cited by the appellant, observed that in case of wrongful termination, reinstatement, with continuity of service with back wages, is the normal rule subject to the rider that the employee was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, the primary burden is on him to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he or she had been drawing prior to the termination of service. The Apex Court held that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies upon the person, who makes the positive averments with respect to its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. 32. Thus, once the employee is able to show that he was not employed or lowly employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and had been receiving the same or substantially similar emoluments. 33. The law, relating to payment of full salary or back wages consequent to the quashing of order of termination, was laid down succinctly in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) & Others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , wherein the Apex Court opined that on account of passing of the order of removal, the source of income of an employee dries up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities and the family is deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintances to avoid starvation. The denial of full back wages to an employee, who has wrongly been punished, would amount to indirectly punishing the employee and rewarding the employer. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintances to avoid starvation. The denial of full back wages to an employee, who has wrongly been punished, would amount to indirectly punishing the employee and rewarding the employer. The relevant extract of para 22 of the judgment of Apex Court is quoted hereinbelow for easy reference:- “22…………… The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer, would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments”. 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court, later in the judgment in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) considering a large number of decisions, including the cases on which the appellant has placed reliance, namely, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra), Novartis India Limited (supra) and Metropolitan Transport Corporation (supra), on the issue of payment of back wages, observed, in paragraph 38, as follows:- “38. The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are: - 38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.3. 38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employee to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments”. 35. It would, thus, appear from the principle laid down by the Apex Court, in paragraph 38 of the judgment in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), that in cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages would be normal rule. Once the employee shows that he was not gainfully employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and had been receiving the same and substantially similar emoluments. The said principle would also hold good, where an employee shows that he was under employment and his income was much less than what he would have received, had order of punishment not passed against him. In such cases also, the onus would shift to the employer to specifically plead and establish that the employee had been receiving the same or substantially similar emoluments to avoid payment of full salary. 36. In such cases also, the onus would shift to the employer to specifically plead and establish that the employee had been receiving the same or substantially similar emoluments to avoid payment of full salary. 36. However, the principle, relating to back wages being payable on illegal retrenchment/ termination, may have no application, where the termination (dismissal), removal or compulsory retirement is by way of punishment for misconduct in a departmental enquiry and the Court confirms the finding regarding the misconduct, but only interferes with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and, thus, reduces the punishment resulting into reinstatement of an employee. In these cases, the Court, in effect, is not holding that the employer was not the wrong and that the delinquent had not acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee. In such circumstances, the Court can either direct reinstatement or make a direction for nominal lump sum compensation and where continuity is directed, it may be only for the purposes of pensionary or retrial benefits and not for other benefits like increment or promotion. 37. In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, we would consider the order of learned Single Judge directing payment of arrears of salary to the writ petitioner for the period of suspension until the date of superannuation. 38. We have already noticed that it is not the case of the appellant that the writ petitioner was gainfully employed or had any other business during the suspension period. Nothing has been brought on record by the appellant to controvert the submissions of the writ petitioner that he was not gainfully employed prior to his joining the bar on 19.8.1998. 39. Hence, the writ petitioner would be entitled to payment of full salary up to 19.8.1998 and we direct the appellant Corporation accordingly to pay the same expeditiously and not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, failing which the appellant Corporation shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% pendentilite. 40. 39. Hence, the writ petitioner would be entitled to payment of full salary up to 19.8.1998 and we direct the appellant Corporation accordingly to pay the same expeditiously and not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, failing which the appellant Corporation shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% pendentilite. 40. The conclusion, which we have reached and the direction which we have given above, take us to the next stage and we are required to determine whether the writ petitioner would be entitled to full wages from the date of his joining at the bar, i.e. 19.9.1998, till the date of his superannuation i.e., 31.3.2004, and if not, what would be the amount payable if the respondents-appellant is not able to establish that the writ petitioner had been earning similar emoluments, if not more. 41. The case of the appellant is that consequent upon compulsory retirement, respondent No.6 joined bar and, as such, he would not be entitled to salary as he was gainfully employed. 42. On the other hand, the case of respondent No.6 is that he got enrolled as an Advocate on 19.8.1998 and he was not in any gainful employment prior to that. He did not have income from any business either. He was neither a government lawyer nor a retained lawyer for any Corporation/Board/Company. He joined bar, under compulsion, after long years of service and at the advanced age of 51-52 years. He could earn only a nominal income, which was not enough for a decent living, and at times, he had to look towards his well-wishers and family members for support. 43. The Corporation has not brought any material on record as to the income of the appellant earned from legal profession. On the other hand, it is the specific assertion of respondent No.6 is that he got enrolled as an Advocate after compulsorily retirement, on 19.8.1998, at an advanced age of about 52 years and was not a retained lawyer or even in the panel of lawyers of any Board/Corporation/Company or the State. As the matter is of the year 1996, we are not inclined to remand the same to the learned Single Judge, at this late stage, to quantify the amount. 44. As the matter is of the year 1996, we are not inclined to remand the same to the learned Single Judge, at this late stage, to quantify the amount. 44. The learned Single Judge has directed full payment of arrears of salary for the period of suspension and also the salary until the date of superannuation on 31.3.2004. It is not the case of the appellant that respondent No.6 was under any gainful employment till he joined bar in August, 1998. Respondent No.6 would be indisputably entitled to full salary till August, 1998. However, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we direct that the Corporation shall pay full salary to respondent No.6 from August, 1998, till the date of his superannuation, i.e. 31.3.2004, minus 20% as set off against income that respondent No.6 can be reasonably held to have earned from the legal profession. 45. The order of learned Single Judge, directing payment of full salary until the date of retirement, is modified to the extent indicated above. 46. With the aforesaid modification in the order of learned Single Judge, this appeal stands disposed of. I.A. Ansari, J. - I agree.