JUDGMENT : D. Dash, J. 1. The State in this appeal has called in question the order of acquittal dated 06.01.1996 passed by the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Jajpur acquitting the Respondent of the charge under Section 366 & 376 IPC in S.T. Case No. 403 of 1994. The informant has also filed the above noted revision challenging the legality & propriety of the said order of acquittal. Therefore, both have been heard together for their disposal by this common Judgment. The case of the prosecution in short is that on 30.06.1993, at about 8.00 pm in the night when the victim had gone to the backyard of her house to wash her hands after taking meal, the Respondent came dragged her holding hands & took her to Chadheidhara Chhaka. At that place one boy named Happy, the helper & driver of a truck were there with a loaded truck. The Respondent thereafter took the victim girl in that truck to Rourkela & they arrived there at 4.00 am. At Rourkela, the helper, driver & that Happy when went to take meal, the Respondent took the victim to the cabin of the truck, made her naked & committed rape on her. It is further alleged that after the helper, driver & said Happy came back, they all again proceeded to Rajgangpur & reached around 1.00 am in the night. The goads were then unloaded. So the driver, helper & Happy again went to take meal, when the Respondent again committed rape upon the victim. After the unloading while the truck was retuning, the Respondent took the victim girl to the loader portion & repeated the penetrative sexual assault upon her. The truck reached Jajpur Road on the next day around 9.00 pm when the driver, helper & Happy went to take meal & there again the Respondent committed rape on the victim girl. Police personnels had come there but left when the victim girl disclosed that she was the sister of the Respondent. Thereafter, the victim was taken to village Jhatimunda & kept in the house of one Babula Munda where they stayed for three days. During their stay the Respondent several times raped her. Then, they stayed in the house of that driver at Gedia for two more days where also she was raped. Thereafter, the victim was taken to village Jhatimunda & kept in the house of one Babula Munda where they stayed for three days. During their stay the Respondent several times raped her. Then, they stayed in the house of that driver at Gedia for two more days where also she was raped. Next, they stayed in the house of one Bhikari for four days where the said act was repeated by Respondent. Lastly, it is alleged that the Respondent left the victim in her house & went away. On 20.07.1993, the F.I.R was lodged by the father of the victim (who is the revision Petitioner). So the case was registered & investigation commenced. On completion of the same, the Respondent was placed for trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 366 & 376 IPC, which he faced. 2. Prosecution in order to bring home the charges against the Respondent examined twelve witnesses when the defence took the plea of complete denial & the present case to have been foisted since he refused to marry the victim. 3. The victim girl has been examined as P.W. 11. P.W. 1, 2, 3 & 4 have not supported the case of the prosecution in any manner. P.W. 5 is the father of the victim girl where as P.W. 6 is the mother. P.W. 8 is none other than the brother of P.W. 5. Doctor examining the victim is cited as P.W. 10. 4. The Trial Court after discussing the evidence in detail & upon their analysis has finally arrived at a conclusion that prosecution has failed to establish the charge under Section 366/376 IPC Upon scrutiny of the evidence & other circumstances as those emanate, it has been held that the case is one of consent. 5. Learned Counsel for the State submits that the appreciation of evidence as done by the Trial Court is not proper. According to him, the solitary testimony of P.W. 11 ought to have been accepted to fasten guilt upon the Respondent. His contention is that the evidence of P.W.11 is trustworthy & reliable & the same establish the charges. He also submits that such evidence of P.W.11 has received corroboration from the evidence coming out of the lips of her parents & brother. His contention is that the evidence of P.W.11 is trustworthy & reliable & the same establish the charges. He also submits that such evidence of P.W.11 has received corroboration from the evidence coming out of the lips of her parents & brother. He contends that the Trial Court erred in law by holding it to be a consensual sexual act & accordingly it ought not to have recorded an order of acquittal of the Respondent. He further submits that the appreciation of evidence is wholly perverse in as much as the trustworthy evidence of P.W.11 has been discarded without any justifiable reason & the conclusion as regards her consent is without any basis. Learned Counsel for the informant has reiterated the above submission. Learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that if evidence of P.W. 11 is given a plain reading it goes to show as to how they went from place to place, stayed in different places for days together & lastly have returned to the village. According him all these when seen with the conduct of P.W.11 that at no point of time she did open her mouth in speaking about said objectionable act of the Respondent before anybody although she had all the opportunity when it is also not stated that she-was put under fear, a clear case of consent is made out & the Trial Court has thus rightly acquitted the Respondent. Thus he urges that the order of acquittal is not liable to be interfered with being based on just & proper appreciation of evidence, 6. In the backdrop of above submissions, its apposite to take note of the power of this Court in interfering with an order of acquittal in seisin of an appeal as also in a revision against the Judgment of acquittal. It has been held in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka; (2014) 57 OCR 1044 that the High Court in an appeal under Section 378Cr.P.C. is entitled to reappraise the evidence & put the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court to test but the same is permissible only if the Judgment of the Trial Court is perverse. Relying the case of Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & ors – Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh; (2009) 10 SCC 639, it has been held that the word "perverse" in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean 'against weight of evidence'. Relying the case of Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & ors – Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh; (2009) 10 SCC 639, it has been held that the word "perverse" in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean 'against weight of evidence'. In K. Prakashan v. P.K. Survenderan; (2008) 1 SCC 258 , it has also been held that the Appellate Court should not reverse the acquittal merely because another view is possible on evidence. It has been clarified that if two views are reasonably possible on the very same evidence, it cannot be said that prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt (Ref.:- T. Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu; (2006) 1 SCC 401 ). Further, the interference by Appellant Court against an order of acquittal is held to be justified only if the view taken by the Trial Court is one which no reasonable person would m the given circumstances, take (Ref.:- Bhima Singh v. State of Haryana; (2002) 10 SCC 461). 7. The extent & ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the context of exercise thereof is that the High Court in its revisional power do not ordinarily interfere with Judgments of acquittal passed by the Trial Court unless there has been manifest error of Law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the Trial Court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. The High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside the order of acquittal, if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial (Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh; (1988) 7 SCC 223). 8. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial (Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh; (1988) 7 SCC 223). 8. Bearing the above principles of law in mind this Court is now called upon to reappraise the evidence let in by prosecution. The F.I.R. Ext. 1 has been lodged by the father of the P.W.5. The medical evidence comes on this score of age of the victim girl to be above fourteen years & below sixteen years. The doctor has been examined as P.W. 10. During her cross-examination she has stated that her finding is subject to plus minus two years variation. The prosecution has proved the school leaving certificate, Ext. 4. This has not been accepted by the Trial Court, in view of interpolation that was found with corrections remaining unexplained. In such state of affairs of evidence, the Trial Court has not accepted the age of the victim as projected by prosecution. This Court find no fault with it & rather it's found to be in consonance with available evidence on being properly analyzed. 9. Next coming to the question of establishment of charge under Section 376 IPC, it appears that the Trial Court has gone for elaborate discussion of evidence. In this connection the evidence of P.W. 11 is most important. It is the settled position of law that sole testimony of the victim can form the foundation for recording conviction provided of course the same is found to be wholly trustworthy & thus found safe to be relied upon. In the present case admittedly P.W.11 & the Respondent are closely known to each other. It is the evidence of P.W.5 that P.W. 6 who is the mother said that P.W. 11 was forcibly taken by this Respondent. However, P.W. 6 says not to have stated so to P.W. 5 & she states that here daughter was missing & the villagers told the Respondent to have taken her. Thus there remains divergence in the evidence of P.W. 5 & 6 on the material aspect of victim's leaving. The victim girl, P.W. 11 has stated that on 30.06.1993, Respondent took her to Chadheidhara Chhaka when the father & her mother with others were there in the house. Thus there remains divergence in the evidence of P.W. 5 & 6 on the material aspect of victim's leaving. The victim girl, P.W. 11 has stated that on 30.06.1993, Respondent took her to Chadheidhara Chhaka when the father & her mother with others were there in the house. This has been stated also by the P.W. 1 but curiously enough P.W.1 did not raise any hullah when the Respondent dragged her holding her hand which she admitted during the cross-examination. It is also not stated that P.W. 11 was put to any kind of fear. The fact is extremely difficult to be believed that in presence of her family members in this house from their backward the Respondent took P.W. 11 when she did not try to, resist in any manner nor did raise any hullah, more so when it is also not forthcoming from her evidence that she was in any way put under threat of any kind or gagged etc. She was first taken to Chadeidhara Chhaka which is a busy place & from that Chhaka, they boarded a truck & sat in the cabin of the truck which also cannot happen without one's own participation or action more particularly when it is not stated that P.W. 11 was forcibly pushed or held or thrown to the truck's cabin or on the loader side. It is the evidence of P.W. 11 that they were sitting first in cabin with others when also she has not stated to have asked or requested anyone to help & come to her rescue as she was being forcibly taken by the Respondent. Her evidence is that the truck proceeded for a long distance for considerable time. One more interesting lecture of the victim's version as it appears is that they were all also in truck. This appears to be quite absurd as to how they could remain without taking any food or drinking water. This shows that their further movements are being suppressed by P.W. 11. All these when are taken into consideration give sufficient indication that it is case where the victim followed the Respondent & had the desire as such. The truck after leaving Chadheidhara Chhaka went to Rourkela where it is stated that when others went to take meal, the Respondent committed sexual intercourse upon the victim. It is said to have been repeated time & again. The truck after leaving Chadheidhara Chhaka went to Rourkela where it is stated that when others went to take meal, the Respondent committed sexual intercourse upon the victim. It is said to have been repeated time & again. But the victim has not made any protest in this regard. Victim girl was examined by the I.O., P.W.10 on 30.07.1993 who has stated to have ascertained in course of investigation that the victim girl & the Respondent are blood relations & P.W.11 used to call him 'Dada'. It is further stated that there was an earlier proposal for marriage but that did not materialize because of the close relationship. This reveals that Respondent & victim were having prior relationship with each other but their marriage was not solemnized due to above objection. It is also the evidence of the victim P.W.11 that they went to the house of different persons at different places, stayed for days together where the Respondent repeatedly committed rape upon her. Interestingly, the prosecution has not chosen to examine Babula Munda & the other in whose house the victim & Respondent stayed. It is not stated by the victim that at any point of time, anywhere she had, raised any objection or tried to escape or even inform anybody about such repeated sexual assault upon her by the Respondent. The victim still has remained silent without any disclosure when she is not stating that she was always being kept under close watch by the Respondent although during her stay in those houses to prevent her from disclosing. Thus a case of consent as found by the Trial Court is not wholly ruled out & that conclusion cannot be said to be ill founded or perverse in the sense the Trial Court without any evidence has arrived at that. For the aforesaid discussion, the solitary testimony of P.W. 11 is not found to be trustworthy so as to be accepted & safely relied upon to hold the Respondent's complicity for above offence, when also there remains no such corroborative evidence. For the aforesaid discussion, the solitary testimony of P.W. 11 is not found to be trustworthy so as to be accepted & safely relied upon to hold the Respondent's complicity for above offence, when also there remains no such corroborative evidence. Therefore, this Court on reappraisal of evidence find no reason to accord any disagreement with conclusion of the Trial Court as regards failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the charge under Section 366 & 376 IPC so as to be interfered in this appeal & also no such exceptional case is made out for interference in exercise of revisional power. Therefore, the order of acquittal needs no interference either in exercise of power under Section 378 or Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Resultantly, the revision & the appeal stand dismissed.