JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.:- The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction in order to restrain the defendants from interfering in his peaceful possession over the land measuring 42 kanals 8 marlas, situated within the revenue estate of village Mundsa, Tehsil and District Jhajjar and also from cutting the trees from the aforesaid land. The suit was decreed in the following terms: - “It is ordered that the suit of the plaintiff stand decreed. However, with no order as to cost. The trees in dispute though have been got planted by defendants, but certainly over the part of the land of plaintiff. Hence, a decree of permanent injunction in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants is hereby passed restraining the defendants from interfering in peaceful possession or plaintiff over the property in dispute of para No.1 of the plaint. The defendants are further restrained from uprooting/ cutting the trees in dispute mentioned in demarcation report Ex.P1 except on conducting the valuation of those trees and by paying 25% of the said valuation to the plaintiff in lieu of utility of the land of plaintiff for growing those trees. A decree of mandatory injunction is also required to be passed in case in hand and in the same also passed by directing the defendants to conduct the process of valuation within two months from the date of this judgment and to up-root such trees from the land of plaintiff within three months of this judgment.” 2. The plaintiff filed appeal against the judgment and decree of trial Court which was allowed and the appellate Court passed the following decree: - “It is ordered that the appeal is allowed. Relief granted in part by learned trial Court is hereby expanded and appellant is held entitled for the decree of his suit in entirety. Appellant/plaintiff is also held entitled for the costs throughout. There is no order as to costs.” 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Courts below have committed error of law in relying upon the report of the local commissioner, who was not appointed in the present case. He has also submitted that plaintiff has been given relief with regard to the protection of the trees from being cut by the appellant from the land which does not belong to him. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. He has also submitted that plaintiff has been given relief with regard to the protection of the trees from being cut by the appellant from the land which does not belong to him. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. The finding recorded by the learned Ist Appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff reads as under: - “Reverting back to the evidence led by appellant plaintiff, he himself stepped in the witness box as PW1 and has tendered his affidavit Ex.PW1/A and has thereby deposed that he has planted Safeda, Surs and Neem trees in his land about 15-20 years back which Irrigation Department started uprooting. He got disputed land demarcated and as per demarcation report Ex.P1, trees are standing over his land, therefore, respondents have no right, title or interest in said trees. Appellant also got examined Sh. Phool Kumar, Assistant O/o DC, Jhajjar to prove demarcation report Exh.P1 and PW2 by bringing the official record established the genuineness of Exh.P1. Perusal of Exh.P1 goes to show that AC, IInd Grade, Sub Tehsildar, Matanhail vide his order dated 9.1.2007 directed Haridas retired Naib Tehsildar to visit the spot as Local Commissioner and make a demarcation report of suit land. He accordingly visited the spot and prepared rough sketch plan of site indicating clearing the encroachment made by Haryana State Government through Irrigation Department over the land belonging to the appellant/plaintiff. In his report (Exh.P1), Loal Commissioner has give all minute details regarding demarcation carried by him at the spot and appended a specific note at the bottom of report clarifying that there are four eucalyptus (safeda in common parlance) trees, one Shisham tree and one Kikar tree are standing in Killa No.42/2 belonging to plaintiff and that Irrigation Department is claiming rights over these trees whereas land belongs to the applicant Azad Singh. From the above discussion, it is clear that there are trees standing over the land belonging to appellant plaintiff. Learned trial court by passing impugned judgment ahs although held the appellant owner of suit land but not held him entitled for trees planted thereupon for the reason that he has failed to prove trees over the spot were planted by himself or by his ancestors. Learned trial court by passing impugned judgment ahs although held the appellant owner of suit land but not held him entitled for trees planted thereupon for the reason that he has failed to prove trees over the spot were planted by himself or by his ancestors. Since trees were admittedly standing over the land of appellant/plaintiff Azad Singh, therefore, trial Court held him entitled for 20% valuation of these trees in view of utility of land. The evidence goes to show that trees are there for last about 15-20 years in the exclusive land of appellant plaintiff. They are, thus grow up trees. The roots of a grown up tree draws its feed from a large sphere of surrounding land and not merely from the point where its stump is actually standing. Thus, it is the irrigation and other nutrients supplied by the appellant plaintiff to his fields which have actually nourished the trees under reference. This Court is of the view that even if it is presumed that Forest Department has planted and nurtured trees planted over the land owned by the plaintiff, even then defendants would not become the owner of the trees. Support in this regard can well be drawn from the observations held in case-laws Divisional Forest Officer Vs. Mohd. Hanif 2009(2) RCR (Civil); Panni Lal Vs. Med Singh – 1987 PIJ 56; State of Haryana & Others Vs. Shadi (died) through his LRs – 2003(1) PIJ 90; Ghasi Ram Vs. Arun Kumar – 2006(2) SI J 1192; and State of Haryana & Others Vs. Satnam Singh & Another – 2000 (2) All instant judgments 497. The crux of all these case laws is that trees always belong to the land owners and not to the planter. It gives a complete answer to all the objections raised on behalf of the respondents. For the reasons discussed above, appellant plaintiff has a good case for getting a decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants not to interfere into his peaceful possession over suit-land as well as trees standing over it. Resultantly, appeal is allowed. Relief is granted in part by learned trial Court is hereby expanded and appellant is held entitled for the decree of this suit is entirety. Appellant/plaintiff is also held entitled for the costs throughout. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. Trial Court record be sent back alongwith a copy of this judgment to record-room.” 5. Resultantly, appeal is allowed. Relief is granted in part by learned trial Court is hereby expanded and appellant is held entitled for the decree of this suit is entirety. Appellant/plaintiff is also held entitled for the costs throughout. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. Trial Court record be sent back alongwith a copy of this judgment to record-room.” 5. From the pleadings of the aforesaid finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Court, I am not in agreement with the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant that local commissioner has not been examined as required under Order 26 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 because the defendant could have asked for the examination of the said local Commissioner, who had demarcated the land. The Ist Appellate Court has decided the case in principle that once the trees are grown on the land of an individual it goes with the owner of the land and in that regard, the law laid down by this Court has been extensively cited. No other point has been raised. 6. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any merit in the present appeal as no question of law much less substantial is involved in it. Consequently, the present appeal is hereby dismissed. Hence, the application for condonation of delay is also hereby dismissed.