JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. The petitioner Nos.1 to 16 are citizens of India and are doctors and officers associated with Chittaranjan National Cancer Institute. By eight (8) several registered deeds of Conveyance dated (i) 25th February, 1998 (ii) 22nd September, 1998 (iii) 23rd September, 1998 (iv) 24th November, 1998 (v) 30th December, 1998 (vi) 7th January, 1999 and (vii) 25th March, 1999 respectively, the petitioner Nos.1 to 16 purchased about 39 Cottahs of land at RS Dag No. 395, Mouza - Laskarhat. 2. The said land was originally owned by Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, both sons of Atul Chandra Mondal, in equal share and so recorded in the Record of Rights published under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. The said Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal appear to have sold the land to the vendors of the petitioners sometime in 1960. 3. According to the petitioners, the petitioners had caused searches to be conducted and also enquiries to be made from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector, South 24 Parganas, before purchase of the said land. Such searches and/or enquiries revealed that the vendors of the petitioners had clear marketable title and that the land was not under requisition or acquisition. It was only thereafter, that the petitioners went ahead with purchase of the said land. 4. By a letter dated 11th August, 1998, the Land Acquisition Collector, South 24 Parganas informed the petitioners that RS Dag No. 395 and 400 (Part of Mouza - Laskarhat) had not been acquired by the Department as per its office records. This information was supplied prior to execution of six of the deeds of Conveyance as stated in Para 10 of the writ petition. 5. After the petitioner purchased the said land, the petitioners applied for mutation. The Block Land and Land Reforms Officer at Kasba, Kolkata, after enquiry, allowed mutation of the names of the petitioners as owners of the said land, in the relevant records of the Government and issued-Mutation Certificates each dated 4th November, 1999 under section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 6. The Block Land and Land Reforms Officer at Kasba, Kolkata, after enquiry, allowed mutation of the names of the petitioners as owners of the said land, in the relevant records of the Government and issued-Mutation Certificates each dated 4th November, 1999 under section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 6. On 11th July, 2000, KMC (Kolkata Municipal Corporation) mutated the names of the petitioners in place of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal and started collecting taxes from the petitioners.' For amalgamation of the various plots, the petitioners had to give up 5 % of the total area of the land in favour of KMC. 7. Pursuant to the application made by the petitioners, the Additional District Magistrate being the respondent No. 11 issued Conversion Certificate to the petitioners for conversion of the land from agricultural land to residential land. 8. On 9th January, 2001, No Objection Certificate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was issued by the Competent Authority in favour of the petitioners. 9. On 5th March, 2001, KMC requested KMDA (Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority) to approve and issue the requisite No Objection Certificate, after which the petitioners entered into a Development Agreement with respondent No.17 for construction of a building. 10. On 15th May, 2001 sanction of the municipal plan was recommended in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners thereafter obtained house building loans for construction from the Chittaranjan National Cancer Institute. One such loan agreement has been annexed to the writ petition by way of sample. 11. The petitioners started building a boundary wall around the said land. On 31st July, 2001 KMDA demolished the boundary wall constructed by the Petitioners, whereupon the petitioners lodged a First Information Report. Even as late as on 11th December, 2001 the Competent Authority of KMDA in his letter to KMC referred to the petitioners as owners of the said land. 12. On 31st July, 2001 KMDA demolished the boundary wall constructed by the Petitioners, whereupon the petitioners lodged a First Information Report. Even as late as on 11th December, 2001 the Competent Authority of KMDA in his letter to KMC referred to the petitioners as owners of the said land. 12. It was only much later, on 29th January, 2003, that a notice in relation to Case No.1 of 2003 was issued under section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, purportedly in pursuance of a declaration dated 10th November, 1956 published in Calcutta Gazette dated 6th December, 1956 under section 6 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948, hereinafter referred to as the WBLDP Act, for updating the Record of Rights in favour of the Refugee and Rehabilitation Department of the Government of West Bengal. 13. On 14th May, 2005 the petitioners again obtained fresh certified copies of the Revenue Survey Record of Rights and the office of the Block Land Reforms Office issued certified copies indicating that Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal were still recorded as Raiyats/owners of the said land. In the Revenue Survey Records, the Government or any other authority was not shown to be in possession or to have any interest in the said land. 14. The petitioners contend that the Government had never taken possession of the land in question. Accordingly, the Deputy Secretary (Settlement), Land and Land Reforms Department by his note in File No.11-199-01/GE(M) advised the Block Land Reforms Officer (BLRO), the Sub-divisional Land Reforms Officer (SLRO) and Land Acquisition Collector to accept the ownership of the petitioners. 15. Two Affidavits in opposition have been filed on behalf of the State' Government, one by Sristidhar Santra, Additional Land Acquisition Officer, South 24 Parganas, which was affirmed on 5th Jant Kiry, 2007 and another by Tapas Kumar Biswas, Revenue Officer of the concerned Block Land and Land Reforms Office, which was affirmed on 9th December, 2005. 16. In Sristidhar Santras affidavit it is contended that the disputed land measuring 0.76 acre of RS Plot No. 395 of Mouza Laskarhat was acquired in Case No. LD-55 under the provisions of the WBLDP Act along with various other plots of Mouza Madurdaha, Mouza Nonadanga and Mouza Paschim Chowbanga, the total area being 265.20 ai-res, for the purpose of settlement of immigrants who had migrated into the State of West Bengal. 17. 17. A notification No. 7548 L dated 22nd April, 1955 was published in the Calcutta Gazette, under section 4 of the WBLDP Act. Subsequently declaration under section 6 of the WBLDP Act being Notification No. 19774 L dated 16th November, 1956 was published in the Calcutta Gazette. 18. According to the State respondents, after possession of the land was taken, the land was made over to the Refugee Relief & Rehabilitation Department on 15th January, 1957. A copy of the certificate of possession has been annexed to the affidavit of Tapas Kumar Biswas. 19. It appears that on or about 12th February, 1968, an award in respect of plot No.395 of Mouza Laskarhat was declared in favour of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, who were the recorded owners. The said recorded owners were awarded Rs. 103.90 for an area of 0.8 acre and Rs. 883.12 for an area of 0.68 acre. 20. Admittedly the aforesaid compensation was never paid to the recorded owners or to any one else on their behalf. According to the respondents payment could not be made to the awardees, as they did not appear. The amount was, according to the respondent, deposited by Cheque No.8351/26 dated 17th March, 1969 under Revenue deposit. A copy of the joint award is annexed to the affidavit of Srishtidhar Santra. 21. In the affidavit of Tapas Kumar Biswas, it is stated that only in 2002, the Refugee Relief & Rehabilitation Department informed the concerned officer of the West Bengal Land Reforms Department, of the acquisition. Till then the West Bengal Land Reforms Department had no knowledge of the acquisition. 22. Thereafter the Additional District Magistrate and District Land and Land Reforms Officer initiated Misc. Case No. 1 of 2003 under section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 for upgradation of the record of rights in respect of the entire 265.20 acres of land by insertion of Refugee Rehabilitation Department of the Government of West Bengal in place of the Mondal Brothers. Since no one appeared to oppose the rectification of the record of rights, the proceedings were disposed of ex parte and the Record of Rights was rectified. 23. Since no one appeared to oppose the rectification of the record of rights, the proceedings were disposed of ex parte and the Record of Rights was rectified. 23. By a letter dated 6th June, 2003, the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal informed the Additional District Magistrate and District Land and Land Reforms Officer, South 24 Parganas, that the Refugee Relief & Rehabilitation Department had relinquished an area of 109.94 acres of Mouza Laskarhat, Nonadanga and Madhurdaha in favour of the Land and Land Reforms Department, which had subsequently been transferred to KMDA for implementation of the Asian Gateway Project. The possession of the land was purportedly handed over to KMDA by a writ of possession executed on 26th September, 2005. 24. In the affidavit of the State respondents, it is contended that on actual field survey, the actual relinquished area was found to be 108.86 acres out of which the land relinquished by the Refugee Relief & Rehabilitation Department was 83.61 acres and the balance 25.25 was vested land. 25. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners submitted that the purported acquisition under the WBLDP Act had not been completed since an award as contemplated by section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had not been published. 26. Mr. Mukherjee referred to section 8 of the WBLDP Act, which provides as follows: "8(1) After making a declaration under section 6, the State Government may acquire the land and thereupon provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act) shall, so far as may be, apply." 27. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it stood at the material time provided as follows: "11. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it stood at the material time provided as follows: "11. Enquiry and award by Collector.-On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of - (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him." 28. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requires the Collector to enquire into the respective interests of the persons claiming the possession and to make an award under his hand. The Land Acquisition Collector is obliged to apportion the compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whose claims he has information, whether or not they have appeared before him. 29. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the photocopy of the purported award annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of the contesting respondent Nos.9 and 10, reveals that a joint award has purportedly been made in favour of Mondal brothers without any apportionment. 30. The judgement of the Supreme Court in W.B. Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta & Ors. cited by Mr. Banerjee no where states the requirement under section 11 to apportion compensation could be dispensed with or waived. The observation with regard to the duty of the Land Acquisition Collector, made in the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, are not applicable in this case. 31. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that the copy of the award shows that there is a note in the margin of the page to stop payment soon, as no verification had been made. Mr. Mukherjee submitted, and rightly, that an award meant an offer by the State acquiring the property to the deprived landlord. 32. Mr. 31. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that the copy of the award shows that there is a note in the margin of the page to stop payment soon, as no verification had been made. Mr. Mukherjee submitted, and rightly, that an award meant an offer by the State acquiring the property to the deprived landlord. 32. Mr. Mukherjee rightly pointed out that there is nothing on record to show that any communication was at all made to the Mondal brothers in respect of the acquisition whether under section 9 or under section 12 (2). 33. In the affidavit-in-opposition, it is stated that the Mondal brothers were not traceable and as such compensation could not be paid to them. The compensation had accordingly been deposited in the Treasury. There was admittedly no apportionment. The endorsement reveals that no verification was done. 34. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that verification as contemplated under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, is mandatory. Where there is no verification, there is non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the section and the entire proceedings are vitiated. 35. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that section 11A of the 1894 Act as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 provides as follows: "11A. Period within which an award shall be made.-The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that m a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation:-In computing the period of two years referred to in this section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by, an order of a Court shall be excluded.]" 36. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Amendment Act of 1984 came into force on 24th September, 1984. The period of two years from 24th September, 1984 expired on 24th September, 1986. The Land Acquisition proceedings lapsed on 24th September, 1986 because of default in making an award. 37. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Amendment Act of 1984 came into force on 24th September, 1984. The period of two years from 24th September, 1984 expired on 24th September, 1986. The Land Acquisition proceedings lapsed on 24th September, 1986 because of default in making an award. 37. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that it was not necessary for the writ petitioners to challenge the notification under section 4 or the declaration under section 6, as the said notification under the section 4 and the said declaration under section 6 lapsed by operation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended. 38. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that, the fact that the Mondal brothers continued to be recorded as owners in the records of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, as also the records of the Land Reforms Department, in itself shows that the land in question was never treated as acquired land. Accordingly the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities gave no objection for construction and Kolkata Municipal Corporation also sanctioned the building plan. 39. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the acquisition in this case was under the WBLDP Act, section 4 of the WBLDP Act requires a satisfaction. The notification under section 4, a copy of which is annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Nos. 9 and 10, does not record any satisfaction as required under section 4. However, it is not for this Court to adjudicate the question of validity of the notice under section 4 at this belated stage. In any case, the said notice is not under challenge. It is to be presumed that the Government was satisfied that the land was needed for a public purpose as defined in section 2(d) of the WBLDP Act. 40. Mr. Mukherjee cited Gopalpur Land Development Society v. State of West Bengal reported in 70 CWN 359 where A.N. Ray, J. held: "That where the satisfaction of the Governor is necessary for any order, the matter of satisfaction as far as the Governor is concerned is to be regulated in accordance with the business rules of the Government of West Bengal. A matter which has no validity in the eye of law cannot be rendered valid just because the parties have not in the past litigated upon it or there has been silence upon that question. A matter which has no validity in the eye of law cannot be rendered valid just because the parties have not in the past litigated upon it or there has been silence upon that question. On the question of whether the Government could cancel a notification for acquisition, if the Government had the power to acquire land, the Government had a fortiori a power to cancel such an acquisition. Apart from such implicit power it appears to me that there is specific power contained in section 11 of the Act to withdraw any power conferred on any company or any authority to execute any development scheme. In the present case no scheme has been prepared. It is also manifest in the present case that there has been no agreement as contemplated in section 10 of the Act. These two features are sufficient to clothe the Government with authority to exercise power under section 11 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948. Further, it is apparent that under the provisions of the General Clauses Act there is also power to amend, vary or rescind any order made. Such power is engrafted on the authority of the Government in order to enable the authorities to amend, vary or rescind orders which they have power to make. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Government has power to cancel the notifications. " 41. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that from records it was apparent that the State did not Claim any title or possession in respect of R.S. Dag No.395 for more than 50 years. The petitioners and/or their predecessor in interest retained possession of the land in question through out for about 50 years. The municipal records and the revenue records recorded the names of the Mondal brothers and thereafter the applications made by the petitioners for mutation of their names were allowed. These, records and the different permissions indicate that physical possession remained with the petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest during the entire period. 42. The original owners and/or their successors continued to pay revenue in respect of the land in question. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the municipal and the revenue records, that is the, Revenue Survey Record of Rights raises a presumption under section 44 (4) of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 of correctness. 42. The original owners and/or their successors continued to pay revenue in respect of the land in question. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the municipal and the revenue records, that is the, Revenue Survey Record of Rights raises a presumption under section 44 (4) of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 of correctness. Section 44(4) provides that every entry in the Records of Rights finally made under sub-section (2) shall be presumed to be correct. The petitioners proceeded on the basis of the presumption. 43. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the revenue authority and the municipal authorities had allowed the prayer of the petitioners for mutation which clearly indicates that the said authorities were also I satisfied that the petitioners were claiming verified title and possession I from persons whose names were already on record. The claim of the petitioners was upheld both by the revenue and the municipal authorities. 44. In addition, the Land Acquisition Officer had even issued a certificate to the effect that the land in question was not subject to acquisition, though the certificate has later been explained as an act of inadvertence. The question is, when the petitioners have altered their position to their disadvantage by reason of the alleged act of inadvertence; whether the petitioners are to suffer? 45. Mr. Mukherjee cited the State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal reported in (2000)3 SCC 460 where the Supreme Court held that where a property had been illegally acquired by the State under section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the possession of the State under such illegal acquisition would be from the date of taking over possession. The deprived owner can file a suit for recovery of possession treating the purported acquisition as nullity. There is no necessity to have the acquisition set aside. The suit, however, has to be filed within the period of limitation. The judgment is, however, not applicable in this case, since the owners have not filed any suit. The object and principles of land ceiling laws are also different from acquisition and requisition laws. 46. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that no effect was given to the purported acquisition. The land was never utilised for the purpose of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation or for the purpose of development. Even assuming that the acquisition was valid and legal, the State was required to recover and maintain its possession. 47. 46. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that no effect was given to the purported acquisition. The land was never utilised for the purpose of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation or for the purpose of development. Even assuming that the acquisition was valid and legal, the State was required to recover and maintain its possession. 47. As pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee, section 5A of the 1948 Act was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1955, which came into force on 21st September, 1955. In this case, the notification under section 4 was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 12th May, 1955. 48. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the purported acquisition was without notice, without any local publication and without any notification under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act to make a claim, as contemplated and without any notice of the award under section 12(2) and accordingly remained ineffective and inoperative. 49. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that if the State did not retain physical possession from 1956, it lost its right to recover possession after expiry' of 30 years in view of Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In view of section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right of the Government extinguished upon expiry of the period for institution of a suit. 50. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in view of Article 300A no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. Authority of law includes both procedural as well as substantive law. In the absence of apportionment of compensation, the owners cannot be deprived of property by joint award. In the absence of determination and apportionment, there is no award in the eye of law. 51. Mr. Mukherjee cited Rabindra Kumar Basu v. S.K. Banerjee reported in 63 CWN 851, where D.N. Sinha, J. held that in passing the award, the Land Acquisition collector was required to do all the things which were mentioned under section 11. Amongst other things, he was bound to apportion the compensation money amongst persons known or believed to be interested in the land. 52. In Biswamitra Shukla v. Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan reported in 74 CWN 349 cited by Mr. Mukherjee this Court held that an award without apportionment was an invalid award. Mr. Amongst other things, he was bound to apportion the compensation money amongst persons known or believed to be interested in the land. 52. In Biswamitra Shukla v. Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan reported in 74 CWN 349 cited by Mr. Mukherjee this Court held that an award without apportionment was an invalid award. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that in view of insertion of section 11A with effect from 24th September 1984, there can be no question of rectifying the award by making any apportionment at this stage. 53. Mr. Mukherjee also cited State of West Bengal v. Asiatic Investment Ltd. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 276 where a Division Bench inter alia observed that the making of an award could only be completed after apportionment of compensation among the different claimants. To quote the Division Bench:- "17. Making of the award will be complete only after apportionment of the compensation among the different claimants" 54. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that a Special Leave Petition from the judgment of the Division Bench in Asiatic Investments (supra) was dismissed by the Supreme Court by the following order: "We find no merit in this petition. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed." 55. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Supreme Court only modified the time for making over possession of the property. Where an appeal against a judgment and order of a Division Bench is dismissed by a judgment and order, the judgment and order of the High Court can be said to have merged with the judgment and order of the Supreme Court. However, where the appeal is merely dismissed without any discussion, the precedential value of the judgment is that of the Division Bench of the High Court. In any case, a judgment of the Division Bench is also binding on the Single Bench. 56. Mr. A.N. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the State submitted that after the notification under section 6 possession of the said land was taken and thereafter on 15th January, 1957 possession of the land was handed over to the Refugee Relief & Rehabilitation Department. Mr. Banerjee pointed out that the possession certificate was annexed to the affidavit of Tapas Kumar Biswas. 57. According to Mr. Banerjee the award in respect of entire land was declared on 12th February, 1968. Mr. Banerjee pointed out that the possession certificate was annexed to the affidavit of Tapas Kumar Biswas. 57. According to Mr. Banerjee the award in respect of entire land was declared on 12th February, 1968. The award in respect of Plot No. 395 of Mouza - Laskarhat was made in favour of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal who were the recorded owners. A copy of the award has been annexed to the affidavit of Srishtidhar Santra. An award of Rs. 103.90 was made for an area of 0.8 acre and Rs. 883.12 for an area of 0.68 acres. Mr.Banerjee submitted that payment could not be made to the awardees as they did not appear. The awarded amount was, therefore, by Cheque No. 8351/26 dated 17th March, 1969, placed under revenue deposit. A copy of the purported joint award has been annexed to the affidavit of Sristidhar Santra. 58. In the affidavit of Sristidhar Santra, it is alleged that Memo No. LA (S-186) dated 11th August, 1998 informing the petitioners that the land had not been acquired, had been issued due to inadvertence. It is admitted that the Office of the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer informed the petitioners that the land in question had not been acquired by the State. 59. Mr. Banerjee emphatically argued that it was significant that such information was sought on 11th August, 1998 admittedly after first set of purchase by petitioners. However, from the fact that the information was supplied by a Memo dated 11th August, 1998, it cannot be inferred that the information was first sought on that day. 60. In any case, admittedly information that the land was not under acquisition was supplied by the Land Acquisition Officer and admittedly six sets of purchases were effected subsequently. But for such certificates the petitioners would perhaps have not proceeded to purchase the land. The petitioners have altered their position to their detriment by reason of the representation made by the Land Acquisition Office which is now explained as an error. 61. Referring to a copy of Notification under section 4 of the WBLDP Act, a copy of the declaration under section 6 of the WBLDP Act and a copy of award in respect of RS Plot No. 395 in favour of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, made in February 1968, Mr. 61. Referring to a copy of Notification under section 4 of the WBLDP Act, a copy of the declaration under section 6 of the WBLDP Act and a copy of award in respect of RS Plot No. 395 in favour of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, made in February 1968, Mr. Banerjee argued that the land in question had been acquired strictly in accordance with law over 40 years ago, in land acquisition proceedings under the WBLDP Act. 62. Mr. Banerjee argued that since no one had appeared in Misc. Case No.1 of 2003 initiated by Additional District Magistrate and District Land and Land Reforms Officer under the provisions of section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 for upgradation of the Record of Rights in respect of the entire 265.20 acres of land, the proceedings were disposed of ex parte and the Record of Rights were corrected. No one has challenged the rectification of the Record of Rights in the appropriate forum. 63. Subsequently, by a letter dated 6th June, 2003 the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal informed the Additional District Magistrate and District Land and Land Reforms Officer, South 24 Parganas that the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department had relinquished a total area of 109.94 acres of Mouza Laskarhat, Madurdaha and Nonadanga in favour of the Land and Land Reforms Department, which was subsequently transferred' to KMDA for implementation of the Asian Gateway Project and the possession of the land was handed over to KMDA through a writ of possession on 26th September, 2005. On actual field survey, the actual relinquished land was found to be 108.86 acre, out of which the land relinquished by the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department was 83.61 acres and the balance 25.25 acres was vested land. 64. Mr. Banerjee took a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition in this Court inter alia contending that the petitioners had no locus standi to file the writ petition in this Court as they were admittedly subsequent purchasers. Mr. Banerjee argued that at the material time when the petitioners purchased the land the State Government had already become the absolute owner thereof. 65. Mr. Banerjee argued that the State became absolute owner of the land on 15th January, 1955 when possession was taken and handed over to the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department. Mr. Banerjee argued that at the material time when the petitioners purchased the land the State Government had already become the absolute owner thereof. 65. Mr. Banerjee argued that the State became absolute owner of the land on 15th January, 1955 when possession was taken and handed over to the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department. The land vested in the Government on and from that date. Mr. Banerjee further argued that the validity of the possession certificate could not be challenged after almost 50 years. 66. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the documents annexed by the petitioner reveal that the recorded owners Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, in whose favour joint award had been declared, had transferred the land in the year 1960, after publication of Notification and after delivery' of possession. Thirty eight years thereafter, the petitioners purchased the land from the purported transferees of Bholanath and Panchu Mondal. 67. Mr. Banerjee argued that transfer of Government land by Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal is void ab initio and neither the transferees of Panchu Mondal and Bholanath Mondal, nor the writ petitioners, could have acquired any right, title and interest in the said land by virtue of the alleged Deed of Transfer. Mr. Banerjee argued that the petitioners having purchased the land after publication of notification, the transfer is bad in law and they have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. In support of his arguments Mr. Banerjee cited : (i) Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 ; (ii) Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2009)10 SCC 689 ; (iii) Shanti Sports Club and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SC 433 ; (iv) U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 1170 ; (v) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. reported in (2008)9 SCC 177 ; 68. Mr. Banerjee argued that the original owners not having challenged the acquisition proceedings, the acquisition could not now be challenged by the writ petitioners. Since the original owners had not taken any objection to the validity of the notification under section 4 or the declaration under section 6, it was not open to the petitioners to now challenge the same. In support of his submissions, Mr. Since the original owners had not taken any objection to the validity of the notification under section 4 or the declaration under section 6, it was not open to the petitioners to now challenge the same. In support of his submissions, Mr. Banerjee cited the following cases:- (i) Smt. Somawanti and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 1963 SC 151 (Paras 19 and 23); (ii) State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 497 ; 69. Mr. Banerjee further argued that in any case, the writ petition must fail on the ground of delay alone, since the property had vested in the Government after possession of the land was taken on 15th January, 1957 and the proceedings were completed with declaration of award on 12th February, 1968. 70. In support of the argument that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, Mr. Banerjee cited the following judgments:- (i) Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 ; (ii) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (2008)4 SCC 695 ; (iii) Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors reported in (2000)2 SCC 48 ; (iv) Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 234 (v) State of T.N. and another v. Krishnan and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 497 ; 71. Refuting the argumer. A Mr. Mukherjee that the petitioners were in possession of the land, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department had been in possession since the date of the possession certificate i.e. 15th January, 1957. In support of his ; submission that the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department had been in possession of the land in question, Mr. Banerjee cited the following decisions :- (i) Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 (Para 34, 35); (ii) Govt. of A. P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar reported in (2005)1 SCC 558 (Para 14); (iii) Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors. reported in (2009)10 SCC 501 (Para 39, 40) 72. Mr. Banerjee submitted, and rightly, that the manner in which possession was taken was not material. of A. P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar reported in (2005)1 SCC 558 (Para 14); (iii) Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors. reported in (2009)10 SCC 501 (Para 39, 40) 72. Mr. Banerjee submitted, and rightly, that the manner in which possession was taken was not material. If the document showed that possession had been taken, that was final. In this context, Mr. Banerjee cited the following cases:- (i) P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (2005)12 SCC 489 ; (ii) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta and Ors. reported in (2009)8 SCC 339 ; (iii) Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr. reported in (1995)5 SCC 335 . 73. Mr. Banerjee finally submitted that about 109.94 acres acquired in excess of requirement for settlement of refugees who had crossed over from East Bengal after the partition of India, remained unused. These surplus unused lands were returned to the Land and Land Reforms Department which subsequently handed over the land to KMDA (Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority) for the Asian Gateway Project which is also a public purpose. Mr. Banerjee argued that land acquired for one public purpose can be used for another public purpose. In support of his argument, Mr. Banerjee cited the following cases (i) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta and Ors. reported in (2009)8 SCC 339 ; (ii) Govt. of A.P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar reported in (2005)1 SCC 558 (Para 14); (iii) Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. v. Jain School Society reported in AIR 2004 SC 850; (iv) Gulam Mustafa and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (1976)1 SCC 800 . 74. Mr. Banerjee submitted that it is a well settled principle of law that mutation does not create or extinguish any right and the State is not bound by mutation. In support of his submission, Mr. Banerjee cited Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 . Mr. Banerjee submitted that a public notice was given for correction of Record of Rights in accordance with law. Nobody has challenged the correction before the appropriate forum. 75. In support of his submission, Mr. Banerjee cited Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 . Mr. Banerjee submitted that a public notice was given for correction of Record of Rights in accordance with law. Nobody has challenged the correction before the appropriate forum. 75. Mr Banerjee submitted that the impression ought to be created that the petitioners would not have purchased the property but for the information supplied by the respondents is factually incorrect since the first two purchases had been made earlier. In any case, for wrong information given by an Officer by mistake, a valid acquisition cannot become invalid. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Banerjee cited Assistant Custodian Evacuee Property and Ors. v. Brij Kishore Agarwala and Ors. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2325 . Mr. Banerjee rightly submitted that wrong information given by Government employees and/or Government officials does not invalidate an acquisition which is otherwise valid. The question is whether there was at all any valid acquisition in this case. 76. Distinguishing the judgment of the Division Bench for The State of West Bengal v. Asiatic Investment Limited reported in (2009)4 CHN 276 cited by Mr. Shaktinath Mukherjee, Mr. Banerjee submitted that in the aforesaid case the award was not set aside only on the technical ground of the award not having been apportioned, but since the award had been passed after expiry of 2 years from the date of declaration, after the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. 77. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in W.B. Housing Board and Ors. v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta and Ors. reported in AIR 1997 SC 2745 (Para 7), Mr. Banerjee submitted that the Land Acquisition Collector was under no duty to make a revenue enquiry to find out who was the actual owner. He simply went by records available with him. Without knowing the definite share he could not have apportioned it. Mr. Banerjee submitted that since under Proviso (a) of section 8(1) of the WBLDP Act, land had already vested in the State, the proceedings could not lapse under section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, which could not apply. 78. Mr. Banerjee submitted that it was settled position of law that once property vested, the same could not be divested. If land vested by operation of any law, the provisions of section 11A could not be attracted. 78. Mr. Banerjee submitted that it was settled position of law that once property vested, the same could not be divested. If land vested by operation of any law, the provisions of section 11A could not be attracted. Mr. Banerjee' cited:- (i) Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 31 : AIR 1996 SC 122 ; (ii) U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 1170 (Para 3) (iii) Pratap and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 1296 (Para 11, 12, 13). 79. Mr. Banerjee finally submitted that this is a fit case for rejection of the writ petition, having regard to the consistent views taken by the Supreme court in similar cases. Mr. Banerjee cited the judgments of the Supreme Court in:- (i) Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NOT, Delhi and Ors. reported in (2009)10 SCC 501 (Para 42) (ii) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta and Ors. reported in (2009) 8 SCC 339 (Para 51); (iii) Smt. Somawanti and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 1963 SC 151 (Paras 19 and 23); (iv) Parag Construction v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008)16 SCC 198 (Paras 27, 28, 31 to 37, 40). 80. The arguments advanced by Mr. Banerjee have been reiterated by Mr. P.S. Basu, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 KMDA and by Mr. Soumen Das Gupta appearing for Khadim Industries Ltd, the applicants in CAN 7814 of 2008 and CAN 1173 of 2010 for inter alia addition of Khadim Industries Ltd. as respondent in the writ petition. 81. Mr. Basu elaborated on the submission of Mr. Banerjee that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed since the writ petitioners lacked locus standi to file the writ petition, and argued that the writ petition was barred by delay. 82. Mr. Basu emphatically argued that the land in question had been acquired way back in 1955-56 under the West Bengal Land (Development and Planning) Act, 1948 for an important public purpose, i.e. rehabilitation of refugees from erstwhile east Pakistan, now Bangladesh. 83. Mr. 82. Mr. Basu emphatically argued that the land in question had been acquired way back in 1955-56 under the West Bengal Land (Development and Planning) Act, 1948 for an important public purpose, i.e. rehabilitation of refugees from erstwhile east Pakistan, now Bangladesh. 83. Mr. Basu submitted that the entire acquisition was concluded under the Land Acquisition Act of 1891 in the year 1968 when an award was made and the awarded amount was deposited under a Revenue deposit, as per law. 84. Mr. Basu also argued that the recorded owner not having questioned the infirmity, if any, in the acquisition, the present petitioners cannot be allowed to do so. 85. Mr. Basu reiterated Mr. Banerjees submission that the sale deeds were void, ab initio. He argued that it was a settled principle of law that in a Land Acquisition proceeding, the person having lawful interest in the land in question would be entitled to challenge the proceedings and no one else. 86. Mr. Basu emphatically argued that there being delay of 37 years after the date of passing of the award, the writ petition was liable to be rejected on that ground alone. Even after the date of registration of the sale deeds, there has been delay of about seven years in filing the writ petition. 87. Mr. Basu reiterated Mr Banerjees submission that the land had vested in the State. He also submitted that once land had vested the same could not be divested. Mr. Basu argued that even if the State authorities decide to release the land, it would have to be put on public auction. The erstwhile owners cannot get it back. Mr. Banerjee had, however argued that if surplus land were to be sold, the recorded owners would have to be given the first chance to purchase the same. 88. Mr. Basu cited Delhi Administration and Ors. v. Madan Lai Nangia and Ors. reported in (2003) 10 SCC 321 where the Supreme Court held that it is only a person who has an interest in the land who can challenge acquisition. When a challenge is made to an acquisition at a belated stage, then even if the court is inclined to allow such a belated challenge, it must first satisfy itself that the person challenging acquisition has title to the land. 89. When a challenge is made to an acquisition at a belated stage, then even if the court is inclined to allow such a belated challenge, it must first satisfy itself that the person challenging acquisition has title to the land. 89. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court observed that writ petitioners in the writ petition has not even stated when they acquired title. In this case, the respondent authorities acknowledged the title of the writ petitioners to the land in question and accordingly allowed mutation as also conversion of the land from agricultural land to shali. It cannot be said that the petitioners have no interest in the land. 90. In support of his submission that acquired land cannot be reconveyed to earlier owner and must have to be put to auction Mr. Basu cited State of Kerala and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. reported in (1997)5 SCC 432 . In State of Kerala v. Bhaskaran Pillai (supra) where the Supreme Court held that Executive order for sale of unused land to the erstwhile owner was not in consonance with the provisions of the Kerala Government Land Assessment Act, 1960 as such unused land had to be put to auction. The judgement was rendered having regard to the special provisions of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960 and has no application to this case. 91. In support of his submission that the writ petition should not have been entertained on the ground of delay Mr. Basu cited State of Maharashtra v. Digambar reported in (1995)4 SCC 683 . 92. Mr. Basu also emphatically argued that land acquired for one public purpose could be used for a different purpose. After rehabilitation of refugees, the excess land was handed over to KMDA on 26th September, 2003. In doing so the State acted within the scope of its powers. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Basu cited Delhi Administration and Ors. v. Madan Lal Nangia and Ors. reported in (2003)10 SCC 321 and Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in AIR 1999 SC 436 . 93. In Delhi Administration v. Madan Lai Nangia (supra) the issue was whether property which had vested in the custodian of Evacuee Properties could be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a different public purpose. The judgment has no application in this case. 94. reported in AIR 1999 SC 436 . 93. In Delhi Administration v. Madan Lai Nangia (supra) the issue was whether property which had vested in the custodian of Evacuee Properties could be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a different public purpose. The judgment has no application in this case. 94. Even though the application of M/s. Khadim Industries India Ltd. for addition as respondent has not been allowed, Mr. Soumen Dasgupta appearing on behalf of Khadim Industries Ltd. was heard at length and he filed exhaustive written submissions which were taken on record. There being some repetition of arguments, the arguments are not recorded in details, to avoid prolixity. 95. Mr. Dasgupta reiterated that the writ petitioners lacked locus standi to challenge the acquisition. In support of his submission that the petitioners lacked locus standi, Mr. Dasgupta cited (1) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors., reported in (2008)9 SCC 177 ; (2) A.P. Nayar and Ors. v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2006)9 SCC 453 ; (3) Shanti Sports Club &Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2009)15 SCC 705 ; (4) Delhi Administration and Ors. v. Madan Lai Nangia and Ors. reported in (2003)10 SCC 321 . 96. Mr. Dasgupta also referred to the definition of locus standi as given in Whartons Law Lexicon, 14th Edition and Black Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. 97. Mr. Dasgupta next submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of his argument, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. reported in (2000)2 SCC 48 ; (2) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (2008)4 SCC 695 ; (3) State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D. R. Laxmi. & Ors. reported in (1996)6 SCC 44 5 . 98. Citing Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. reported in (2008)9 SCC 177 and Vikram Singh Junior High School v. District Magistrate (Fin. & Rev.) & Ors. reported in (2002)9 SCC 509 , Mr. Dasgupta next argued that wrong entry in Record of Rights, failure to update Government records and mutation of subsequent buyer would not invalidate the acquisition. 99. reported in (2008)9 SCC 177 and Vikram Singh Junior High School v. District Magistrate (Fin. & Rev.) & Ors. reported in (2002)9 SCC 509 , Mr. Dasgupta next argued that wrong entry in Record of Rights, failure to update Government records and mutation of subsequent buyer would not invalidate the acquisition. 99. Mere wrong entry in the Record of Rights, by reason of inaction of the Government and consequential failure to update records-would not, in itself invalidate an acquisition which is otherwise valid. It is well settled that mutation only raises a presumption of ownership which is rebuttable. Mutation does not confer title as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vikram Singh Junior High School (supra). 100. However, in Meera Sahni (supra) the mutation was found to be invalid in view of the special provisions of the Delhi (Restriction on Transfer) Act) 1972. 101. However taking into account the conduct of the respondents as a whole for about fifty years, it may reasonably be inferred that they had no interest in the land purchased by the petitioner and they accordingly allowed the acquisition to lapse and thereafter themselves accepted that the land was not under acquisition. It is apparent that possession, if at all, of the land in question was only on paper. The Government was not in actual possession. There was no concrete plan to use the land in question and accordingly the application of the petitioners for mutation was allowed by KMC as well as the Revenue authorities. In response to queries, the land acquisition authorities were informing prospective purchasers that the land was not under acquisition. 102. Mr. Dasgupta next argued that subsequent purchasers who had purchased property after acquisition cannot challenge the acquisition. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Dasgupta cited ; (1) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. reported in (2008)9 SCC 177 ; (2) State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal & Ors. reported in (1996)7 SCC 269 ; (3) Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) By LRS. reported in (1996)8 SCC 259 . 103. Mr. Dasgupta next argued that even before making an award, Government could, in case of urgehcy, take possession. In the instant case, possession having already been taken under the WBLDP Act on the ground of urgency, section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act did not apply. reported in (1996)8 SCC 259 . 103. Mr. Dasgupta next argued that even before making an award, Government could, in case of urgehcy, take possession. In the instant case, possession having already been taken under the WBLDP Act on the ground of urgency, section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act did not apply. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1995)6 SCC 31 : AIR 1996 SC 122 ; (2) Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors. reported in (1996)6 SCC 424 ; (3) Haripada Majumdar and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 78 CWN 327; (4) Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors: v. State of U.P and Ors. reported in (1993)4 SCC 369 ; 104. Mr. Dasgupta next argued that failure to apportion the award could not invalidate the acquisition. In this context, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) Ganesh Nayak and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. reported in 65 CWN 908; (2) Rabindra Kumar Basu v. S. K. Banerjee & Ors. reported in 63 CWN 851; 105. Mr. Dasgupta emphatically argued that the WBLDP Act and The Land Acquisition Act were complementary to each and other and not repugnant to each other. In support of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) Nurul Huq Mali & Ors. v. State of West Bengal reported in 56 CWN 183 (2) Md. Taha & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 69 CWN 801. 106. It is, however, not the petitioners case that there is repugnancy between the WBLDP Act and the Land Acquisition Act. The proposition that there is no repugnancy between the two Acts, is well settled. The submissions are therefore redundant. 107. Mr. Dasgupta next argued that the prayers in the writ petition were contrary to the prayer in the demand for justice and the writ application was liable to be dismissed on that ground. In support of his submission, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) P.R. Murlidharan & Ors. v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar & Ors. reported in (2006)4 SCC 501 . (2) State of Haryana & Anr. v. Chanan Mai & Ors. reported in (1977)1 SCC 340 . 108. Reiterating the submission of Mr. Banerjee and Mr. In support of his submission, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) P.R. Murlidharan & Ors. v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar & Ors. reported in (2006)4 SCC 501 . (2) State of Haryana & Anr. v. Chanan Mai & Ors. reported in (1977)1 SCC 340 . 108. Reiterating the submission of Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Basu that excess land acquired for one public purpose can be used for a different public purpose, Mr. Dasgupta cited : (1) Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (1976)1 SCC 800 . (2) Collector of 24 Parganas & Ors. v. Lalit Mohan Mullick & Ors., reported in (1986)2 SCC 138 . 109. Relying on Anukul Chandra Ghose & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 73 CWN 260, Mr. Dasgupta argued that in the absence of any precise format of the language of the Notification under sections 4 and 6 of the WBLDP Act, the language of the declaration or the expression used in the Notification would not matter. 110. Since Khadim Industries Ltd. has been permitted to make submissions at length at the time of final hearing of the writ petition, this Court does not deem it necessary to consider the question of whether Khadim Industries Ltd. is a necessary or proper party or not at this stage. The judgements referred to by Mr. Dasgupta on this issue in the written arguments submitted in Court are, therefore, not dealt with. 111. There is no limitation for filing a writ petition and the High Court is not debarred from entertaining a delayed writ petition. However, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary, the Courts have often declined relief in a writ petition on the ground of delay. 112. There is no hard and fast rule as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves the writ petition after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches, but such discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably as held by the Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. reported in (2013)1 SCC 353 cited by Mr. Pramit Ray appearing with Mr. Shaktinath Mukherjee. 113. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. reported in (2013)1 SCC 353 cited by Mr. Pramit Ray appearing with Mr. Shaktinath Mukherjee. 113. Whether the Court would entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding the delay, or reject the writ application on the ground of delay, would depend upon various factors, including the gravity of the impugned action, the extent of the injury caused to the writ petitioner by the impugned action, the reasons for the delay, whether the delay has resulted in crystalization of third party rights and interests, whether any vested right has accrued to the respondent by reason of delay and whether grant of relief will upset, and/or unsettle settled things. 114. To quote the Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. (supra) "If the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay". 115. In H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984)2 SCC 337 : AIR 1984 SC 866 the Supreme Court condoned delay of 30 years in approaching the Court, where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of property was under challenge. 116. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra) cited by Mr. Basu the Supreme Court held:- "19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a persons entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct. 20. 20. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a court of equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd thus: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy. ........... 23. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blame-worthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." 117. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra) the Supreme Court found there had been unexplained delay of 20 years in filing the writ petition. In Parag Construction (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee the Supreme Court found:- "46.........It cannot be disputed that the Government had finalised the Scheme on 6-3-1996 and 7-3-1996. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra) the Supreme Court found there had been unexplained delay of 20 years in filing the writ petition. In Parag Construction (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee the Supreme Court found:- "46.........It cannot be disputed that the Government had finalised the Scheme on 6-3-1996 and 7-3-1996. It is difficult for us to believe that the appellant-petitioners asserting their title over the land and who are in the construction business themselves as the builders, could not and did not have the idea about the Scheme dated 15-4-1996. It is also surprising that the appellant-petitioners have come to know about the Scheme, etc. only when the counter-affidavit came in the suit in reply to their injunction application. It is also difficult to believe that the appellant-petitioners had no idea, whatsoever, about the TPS, the draft of which was sanctioned as far back as on 26-9-1962. We find that the TPS was finalised on 7-7-1978 and right from 1972 to 1978, the proceedings before the arbitrator were in progress. If the appellant-petitioners claimed to have come on the property by way of auction-purchaser in the year 1981, which included Final Plot No.22, it cannot be believed that the appellant-petitioners would have no idea about the state of affairs regarding the Scheme, which was already finalised in 1978. 47. There i a clear reference to the Town Planning Scheme II of Borivali in the certificate dated 24-9-1981 which is a basic document of the appellant-petitioners............" 118. In view of its aforesaid finding on facts, the Supreme Court was convinced that the appellant petitioners had maintained a sinister silence right from 1983 till 2006, when they ultimately filed the writ petition, and accordingly the Supreme Court held that the writ petition was belated. The judgment in Parag Construction is clearly distinguishable on facts. 119. In Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme court rejected the contention of the writ petitioners that there had been no delay, having regard to the particular facts of the case observing. "14..........No doubt, the appellants had filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings, but the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 8-4-1985 holding that the Calcutta High Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. "14..........No doubt, the appellants had filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings, but the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 8-4-1985 holding that the Calcutta High Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Thereafter, till 1987 the appellants did not challenge the acquisition proceedings and the writ petition was filed by it before the Rajasthan High Court which had the territorial jurisdiction in the matter and the same was withdrawn which was again filed within the next four months thereof, meaning thereby, during the interregnum the appellants slept over the matter. However, the appellants have not been able to give any explanation for the same." 120. In In Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated and reaffirmed the proposition laid down in its earlier judgment in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) reported in (1996)11 SCC 501 that where there was inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings had become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. When there is inaction, lethargy and indolence the respondents can be said to have waived their objection to the acquisition. The proposition is well settled, However in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there was inordinate delay, unexplained inaction, lethargy or indolence on the part of the writ petitioners. Whether all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings has become final or not, is in issue. 121. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme Court held: "....It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme Court held: "....It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction, has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle, Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defects equity has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of school playground and roads in the development plan and may reason therefore, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above. " 122. In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine delay defeats equity. The doctrine was, however, applied in the particular facts of the case where the land owner had not only refrained from challenging the acquisition notification, but had filed application for the execution of the award, but later, filed a writ petition challenging the notification under section 126(4) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 read with section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 21 years after the issuance of the notification and 16 years after the award had been passed. The proposition that delay defeats equity is well established. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. 123. In Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (supra) cited by Mr. The proposition that delay defeats equity is well established. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. 123. In Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee, the writ petitioners had filed the writ petition praying for quashing of notifications under section 4 and under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 almost seventeen years after the date of passing of the award, after seeking enhancement of the compensation amount by making a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, without questioning the notices under sections 4 and 6 and after accepting payment of the compensation amount. 124. In State of Tamil Nadu v. L. krishnan (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition challenging a Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, on the ground of vagueness of public policy, filed four years after the Declaration under section 6 of the said act. The Supreme Court held that there had been laches, since there was no explanation for the delay and the ground of vagueness had not been taken in the objection under section 5A or immediately after the Declaration under section 6. 125. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that delay In passing of the award was not fatal to the acquisition in view of section 48A inserted by the Tamil Nadu State Legislature and applicable in the State of Tamil Nadu, which provided for compensation for damages suffered as a consequence of delay beyond two years in making an award. Moreover, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider section 11 A, which was not applicable in the year 1982/1983. 126. In State of Rajasthan v. D. R. Laxmi (supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta, the Supreme Court held that, when there was inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps in the land acquisition proceedings had become final the Court should avoid quashing notifications even though the Court, no doubt has power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to quash the notification under section 4(1) and the Declaration under section 6. 127. There can be no doubt that the Court might decline discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. 127. There can be no doubt that the Court might decline discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. This proposition is well settled by inter alia the judgments referred to above as well as the judgments in Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in (1996)11 SCC 698 , cited on behalf of the respondents/Khadim Industries Ltd. reported in (2002)2 SCC 49. 128. In this case, as argued by Mr. Mukherjee the petitioners have neither challenged the notification under section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 nor challenged the declaration No. 19774-L-Dev dated 16th November, 1956, under section 6 of the said Act. It may be noted that there is no prayer in the writ petition for setting aside and/or quashing either the said notification under section 4 or declaration under section 6 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948. 129. Mr. Mukherjee emphatically argued that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed, as making of an award had not been completed even after two years from the date of enforcement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The State was not in possession of the land in question and the respondents never treated the land in question as acquired land. The petitioners were lawful owners of the land in question with all the rights of a lawful owner which included the right to construct a building thereon. It is the alleged wrongful interference with this right, that has given rise to this writ application. 130. An important question in this writ petition is, whether land sought to be acquired way back in 1955-56 under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, for the specified purpose of resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who were constrained to immigrate into West Bengal from erstwhile East Bengal/ East Pakistan, which had not been utilised for the aforesaid purpose for almost 50 years, could be transferred to KMDA in 2003 and then allotted to Khadim Industries Limited in connection with the Asian Gateway Project as alleged by KMDA. There can be no dispute that the purported allotment to Khadim. Industries Ltd. was made in 2005. The writ petition was filed in 2005. 131. There can be no dispute that the purported allotment to Khadim. Industries Ltd. was made in 2005. The writ petition was filed in 2005. 131. In this case we do not find that there has been any negligence or laches on the part of the petitioners. The petitioners have acted bona fide, and purchased the land in question after necessary searches as well as enquiries from the Land Acquisition Office, which revealed the land was not under acquisition. There was also written communication to the petitioners to that effect. Mutation Certificates were issued and even building plans processed for sanction. It is the case of the petitioners that the acquisition had lapsed and the petitioners purchased the land long thereafter. 132. For about five years after the purchase of the land in question the petitioners exercised rights of ownership without any interference from the State respondents. When the rights were interfered with, the petitioners approached Court. It would cause grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioners if the writ petition is rejected on the ground of delay, just because a purported award was purportedly made in 1968. Whether the purported award was, at all, an award is in issue. In my view there was no delay on the part of the petitioners, who invested their lifes savings and even incurred loans to acquire land for their own residential purpose, after clearance from the authorities concerned. 133. The next issue, which falls for consideration of this Court is, whether the petitioners are disentitled to any relief from this Court just because they purchased the land in question after the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the WBLDP Act were issued, as argued by Mr. Banerjee, Mr. Basu and Mr. Dasgupta. 134. In Meera Sahniv. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Dasgupta, the prime issue was whether in view of the provisions of the Delhi (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972 read with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, transfer of land made by the original owner by registering a sale deed, on the basis of which mutation was also granted, could be accepted as legal and valid transfer, despite the fact that such land had been acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for public purpose. 135. 135. The Supreme Court held that transfer of land in respect acquisition proceedings had been initiated was void and would not bind the Government in view of the specific provisions of Delhi (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972 and in particular section 4 and 8 thereof which provides as follows:- "4. Regulation on transfer of land in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been initiated. - no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the Scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the Central Government under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), the Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section 48 of the Act." "8. Restrictions on registration of transfer of land -Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force, where any document required to be registered under the provisions of clause (a) to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), purports to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof referred to in section 4, no registering officer appointed under that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor produces before such registering officer a permission in writing of the competent authority for such transfer. " 136. The Judgment in Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and does not lay down any general proposition that a subsequent purchaser can never complain against or file a writ petition challenging any illegal action on the part of the respondents. 137. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Sports Club and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) was also rendered in the context of the special provisions of the Delhi (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. 137. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Sports Club and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) was also rendered in the context of the special provisions of the Delhi (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. The Supreme Court held:- "It is trite to say that once the land is acquired by following due process of law, the same cannot be transferred by the land owner to another person and that any such transfer is void and is not binding on the State. A transferee of the acquired land can, at best, step into the shoes of the land-owner and lodge claim for compensation." 138. The proposition of law which emerges from the judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and Ors. (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Dasgupta, is that after a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is published in the Gazette, any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the State. The transferee at best steps into the shoes of the owner, and therefore cannot challenge the notification under section 4, when the owner had not done so, and that too after possession had been taken on the ground of urgency under section 17, and a pumping station had been constructed to drain out flood water, whereupon the land had vested in the State. The judgment is to be construed having regard to the circumstances in which it was rendered. In Mahavir and anr. v. Rural Institute Amravati (supra) the Supreme Court observed that a sale after notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not bind the State. The judgment was rendered in the facts of the case. 139. In Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme Court was considering the validity of the provisions of section 2 of the Land Acquisition (U.P Amendment I and Validation) Act 1991, inserting the proviso to section 17(4) of the Land I Acquisition Act (as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh). 140. None of the judgments referred to above are an authority for the proposition that a transferee who purchases property after initiation of acquisition proceedings can never question any illegal action taken by I the authorities in relation to the property in question. 141. 140. None of the judgments referred to above are an authority for the proposition that a transferee who purchases property after initiation of acquisition proceedings can never question any illegal action taken by I the authorities in relation to the property in question. 141. It is well settled that the State is not bound by any sale made by I the original owner, after notification under section 4(1) of the Land I Acquisition Act, 1894. However, the transferee steps into the shoes of I the owner, and is entitled to exercise, the rights which the original owner I could have exercised had the land not been transferred. The transferee I cannot claim independent right by virtue of the transfer, to do something I the original owner could not have done. Thus, where the notice under I section 4 or the declaration under section 6 of the WBLDP Act had not I been questioned by the original owner, a transferee cannot question the I same, as the original owner had waived his right, if any, to do so. 142. However, as Mr. Mukherjee pointed out, the petitioner is not I questioning the validity of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings I by notification under section 4 or the declaration under section 6. It is I the case of the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings were never I completed. The award, if any, was not in accordance with law, there being I no apportionment. In any case, payment had been stopped with the B endorsement that the verification had not been done. 143. This is not a case of surreptitious transfer or a speculative I purchase. The petitioners purchased the land in question after getting I clearance from the Land Acquisition Office of the State. The petitioner I were clearly informed that the land was not under acquisition. 144. The main questions in issue in this writ application are (i) I whether the land in question had at all been acquired in accordance with I law or whether the acquisition proceedings had lapsed with effect from I 24th September, 1986 as argued by Mr. The petitioner I were clearly informed that the land was not under acquisition. 144. The main questions in issue in this writ application are (i) I whether the land in question had at all been acquired in accordance with I law or whether the acquisition proceedings had lapsed with effect from I 24th September, 1986 as argued by Mr. Mukherjee and (ii) whether land I subjected to acquisition proceedings, initiated under the special I provisions of the WBLDP Act, for the specific purpose of resettlement of I immigrants who had to migrate into West Bengal from erstwhile East I Bengal and/or East Pakistan, for reasons beyond their control, could be kept unutilized for decades and then transferred to Khadim Industries Ltd. purportedly in connection with the Asian Gateway Project. The issues are dealt with together for convenience. 145. It is well settled that in exercise of its power of eminent domain the State can acquire land for public purposes. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been enacted to provide for acquisition of lands for public purpose and for companies. 146. However, with the independence of India specific requirements for land arose for which many statutes had to be enacted, which carved out an exception to the procedure of acquisition and the mode of computation of compensation provided under the Land Acquisition Act. 147. Ordinarily, land acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and other similar laws relating to acquisition may be utilised for a different public purpose. There can be no doubt that excess land acquired for the purpose of widening of a road or construction of a flyover or bridge may be used to set up a park as part of beautification project or may be used for setting up public conveniences, dispensaries, offices, pumping stations or for any-other public purpose. 148. The proposition that land acquired for one public purpose may be used for a different public purpose finds support from the judgements of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Datta & Ors. (supra), Government of A.P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar (supra), Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Jain School Society (supra) and Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Dasgupta and in Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) cited by Mr. Basu. (supra), Government of A.P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar (supra), Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Jain School Society (supra) and Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Dasgupta and in Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) cited by Mr. Basu. 149. All the aforesaid judgements were rendered in relation to acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act and/or similar state statutes which enable the state to acquire any land needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose and provides for compensation at market value plus solatium and interest. 150. However, where land is acquired under a special statute which provides for discriminatory compensation for a specific public purpose, the use of that land for a different public purpose, for which the State would have had to take recourse to the ordinary land acquisition laws, and pay higher compensation would amount to colourable exercise of statutory power. 151. None of the judgments cited by the respective counsel appearing for the respondents or for Khadim, except the judgment in Collector of 24-Parganas v. Lalit Mohan Mallick reported in (1986)2 SCC 138 : AIR 1986 SC 622 , cited by Mr. Dasgupta, relate to the WBLDP Act and are, therefore not applicable in this case. In Lalit Mohan Mallick (supra) the Supreme Court found that the public purpose for which the acquired land was going to be used was related to the main purpose of settlement of refugees. 152. With the partition of India, a new problem arose of settlement and rehabilitation of a large number of immigrants who migrated into West Bengal in India from East Pakistan and their settlement necessitated large tracts of land. 153. The WBLDP Act has been enacted for acquisition of land for the public purpose specified in various sub-sections of section 2, that is, the settlement of immigrants who had to migrate into the State of West Bengal for reasons beyond their control, the establishment of towns, model villages and agricultural colonies; the creation of better living conditions in urban and rural areas and; the improvement and development of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and industries. 154. 154. The notification under section 4 is required to specify the particular purpose for which acquisition is necessary, as held by a Division bench of this Court in Gouripada Bandopadhya v. S. Banerjee, Secretary Government of West Bengal reported in AIR 1953 Cal 704 . 155. Section 2(d) of the WBLDP Act, which defines public purpose is set out herein below "2(d) "public purpose" includes- (i) the settlement of immigrants who have migrated into the [State] of West Bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control, (ii) the establishment of towns, model villages and agricultural colonies, (iii) the creation of better living conditions in urban and rural areas, and (iv) the improvement and development of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and industries; [but does not include a purpose of the Union;] 156. The public purpose specified in the notification must necessarily have a direct relationship with the public purposes specified in section 2(d). Thus, the acquisition of property for a company which agreed to employ immigrants in its factories to be erected on acquired land was, held by this Court, not to be a public purpose under the 1948 Act. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in S.K. Jamaluddin & Ors. v. State of West Bengal reported in 65 CWN 357. 157. The definition of public purpose in section 2(d) is not exhaustive but an inclusive definition. However, the said Act cannot be invoked for any public purpose other than a public purpose related to settlement of immigrants etc. as specified in the various sub-sections of section 2(d). 158. In Collector of 24-Parganas v. Lalit Mohan Mallick (supra), cited by Mr. Dasgupta, the Supreme Court upheld acquisition in a case where notification under section 4 of the WBLDP Act was issued for the settlement of displaced persons, but the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department subsequently allotted land to a society for establishment of a hospital for crippled children. 159. The Supreme Court found that providing a hospital for disabled and crippled children was one of the various kinds of amenities for displaced persons in the process of their rehabilitation. The establishment of a hospital was, thus, a public purpose related to the main purpose of settlement of refugees. 160. 159. The Supreme Court found that providing a hospital for disabled and crippled children was one of the various kinds of amenities for displaced persons in the process of their rehabilitation. The establishment of a hospital was, thus, a public purpose related to the main purpose of settlement of refugees. 160. Section 4A of the WBLDP Act which was incorporated by amendment provides that any person interested in any land within a notified area, might, within 30 days from the date of issue of the notification, specifying the area to be a notified area, object to the acquisition of the land in which he is interested. Such objection is to be made to the collector in writing. 161. In this case, since section 4A was incorporated well after expiry of one month from the date of notification under section 4, declaring the area in question to be a notified area, the land owners could not have had any opportunity to object to the acquisition as argued by Mr. Mukherjee. However, that is not material to the issues involved in this wit petition. 162. Section 5 of the WBLDP Act provides as follows: "5. Preparation and sanctioning of development scheme. (1) The [State] Government may direct the prescribed authority, to prepare, in accordance with the rules, a development scheme in respect of any notified area and thereupon such scheme shall be prepared accordingly and submitted, together with such particulars as may be prescribed by the rules, to the [State] Government for its sanction: [Provided that no scheme shall be necessary for acquisition of land for the public purpose specified in sub-clause (I) of clause (d) of section 2], (2) A development scheme submitted to the [State] Government under subsection (1) [may after taking into consideration any report submitted under sub-section (2) of section 4A, be sanctioned] by it either without any modification or subject to such modifications as it may deem fit. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section or any rules made under this Act or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, any development scheme prepared, approved or sanctioned by the State Government before the commencement of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning (Amendment) Act, 1957 shall be deemed to be and to have always been a scheme duly sanctioned under sub-section (2)." 163. Section 5 contemplates a scheme for acquisition of land for the purposes specified in Clause (d) of section 2. Of course, no scheme is necessary for acquisition of land for the purpose specified in sub-clause (i) of Clause (d) of section 2, that is, the purpose of resettlement of refugees. In the instant case, the process of acquisition of land having been started for the specific purpose of re-settlement of immigrants who had to migrate into West Bengal for reasons beyond their control, the land in question could not be used for general public purposes, not having a discernible link with one of the public purposes specified in section 2(d). Land acquired for the specific purpose for re-settlement of refugees/ displaced persons cannot be used for a purpose not related to settlement of refugees and/or providing better amenities for them. 164. From the language and tenor of section 5 of the WBLDP Act, it is patently clear that a scheme shall be necessary for acquisition of land for public purposes specified in Sub-clauses (ii), (iii), (iv) of Clause (d) of section 2 of-the 1948 Act. The provision clarifies that no scheme shall be necessary for acquisition of land for the public purpose specified in sub-clause (i) of Clause (d) of section 21. 165. By necessary implication, existence of a scheme shall be necessary for acquisition of land for the purposes specified in any other Sub-clauses of Clause (d) of section 2, other than sub-clause (i). In this case there was no scheme framed under section 5 of the WBLDP Act. 166. Section 6 provides that when a development scheme is sanctioned under sub-section (2) of section 5 and the State Government is satisfied that any land in notified area for which such scheme has been sanctioned, is needed for the purpose of executing such scheme, a declaration to the effect that such land is needed for a public purpose shall, unless already made in pursuance of section 7, be made by the State Government. 167. When the State Government is satisfied, after taking into consideration any report submitted under sub-section (2) of section 4A that any land in the notified area is needed for the public purpose specified in sub-clause (i) of Clause (d) of section 2, a declaration to the effect that such land is needed for said purpose shall be made by the State Government. After making a declaration under section 6 the State Government might acquire the land whereupon the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would apply. 168. Section 7 of the WBLDP Act provides:- "7. Special provision in case of urgency. In cases of urgency, if in respect. of any notified area the [State] Government is satisfied that the preparation of a development scheme is likely to be delayed, the [State] Government may, at any time, make a declaration under section 6, in respect of suck notified are or any part thereof though no development scheme has either been prepared or sanctioned under section 5" 169. Section 8 of the WBLDP Act as amended by West Bengal Act, 23 of 1955 provides as follows: "8. Application of Act I of 1894 subject to special provision of compensation. Section 8 of the WBLDP Act as amended by West Bengal Act, 23 of 1955 provides as follows: "8. Application of Act I of 1894 subject to special provision of compensation. [(1)] [After making a declaration under section 6] the [State] Government may acquire the land and thereupon the provisions of the Land Acquisition Ad, 1894 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act shall, so far as may be apply: I Provided that - (a) if in any case the [State] Government so directs, the Collector may, at any time after a declaration is made under section 6, take possession, in accordance with the rules, of any beel, baor, tank or other watery area, or [any waste or arable land] in respect of which the declaration is made and thereupon such land shall vest absolutely in the [Government] free from all encumbrances; (b) in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired in pursuance of this Act the market value referred to in clause first of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the said Act shall be deemed to be the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 for the notified area in which the land is included subject to the following conditions, that is to say,- if such market value [in relation to land acquired for the public purpose specified in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of section 2] exceeds by any amount the market value of the land on the 31st day of December, 1946, on the assumption that the land had been at that date in the state in which it in fact was on the date of publication of the said notification, the amount of such excess shall not be taken into consideration. (2) When the amount of compensation has been determined under sub-section (1), the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out in section 11 of the said Act, [and the amount referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23 of the said Act shall also be included in the award]." 170. (2) When the amount of compensation has been determined under sub-section (1), the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out in section 11 of the said Act, [and the amount referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23 of the said Act shall also be included in the award]." 170. In terms of Clause (b) of section 8(1) of the WBLDP Act, if a piece of land is acquired for settlement of immigrants, the owner is to get compensation not exceeding the value of the land as on 31.12.1946 whereas if the land is required for any other public purpose, the owner is to get market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1). 171. The difference in compensation in cases of acquisition for settlement of refugees, which is not to exceed market value as on 31.12.1946 also shows that such cases of acquisition have separately been classified on the basis of public purpose. This necessarily implies that land acquired for the public purpose of resettlement of refugees cannot be used for any other public purpose, for it could never have been the legislative intent to enable the State to deprive a land owner of legitimate compensation by acquiring excess land, ostensibly for the public purpose of settlement of refugees, upon payment of compensation that is virtually' illusory and then utilise it for other purposes for which higher compensation would have been payable. 172. On a conjoint reading of sections 6(1) and 6(la), it is clear that land can only be acquired for the purposes specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of section d of section 2 of the WBLDP Act. When a development scheme is sanctioned under sub-section 2 of section 5 and the State Government is satisfied that any land in the notified area for which such scheme has been specified is needed for the purpose of executing such scheme, a declaration to the effect that such land is needed for a public purpose might be made. On a conjoint and careful reading of the various provisions of the WBLDP Act, there can be little doubt that power of acquisition under the said act can only be exercised for the limited purposes of the said act and in the manner prescribed in the said act. On a conjoint and careful reading of the various provisions of the WBLDP Act, there can be little doubt that power of acquisition under the said act can only be exercised for the limited purposes of the said act and in the manner prescribed in the said act. Unlike the Land Acquisition Act under which land may be acquired when land appears to be needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, acquisition of land under the WBLDP Act, is subject to satisfaction of the State Government that land is needed or likely to be needed for specific public purposes as mentioned in section 2(d) of the WBLDP Act. 173. As held by A.N. Ray, J., in Gopalpur Land Development Society v. State of West Bengal (supra), there is a distinction between the words "it appears" and the words "is satisfied". There is a gulf of difference between the Governor being satisfied and it appearing to the Governor that an order should be made for a particular purpose. 174. Where the condition precedent for exercise of power is satisfaction of the Government, that land is needed or likely to be needed for the specific purpose as specified in the notice of acquisition and the Act also provides for differential compensation, the land acquired for that specific purpose can not be used for any other purpose. 175. Section 9 of the said WBLDP Act provides:- "9. Power to dispose of land acquired under the Act. - (1) Where the State Government decides to lease or sell any land acquired in pursuance of this Act, the person or persons from whom the land was so acquired shall, in such manner as the State Government may direct, be offered a prior right to take on lease or to purchase the land on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State Government. (2) If, in any case, two or more persons claim to exercise a right offered under sub-section (1), the right shall be exercisable by such of the claimants as the State Government may determine after such inquiry as it thinks fit." 176. (2) If, in any case, two or more persons claim to exercise a right offered under sub-section (1), the right shall be exercisable by such of the claimants as the State Government may determine after such inquiry as it thinks fit." 176. Land acquired for the purpose of resettlement of refugees under the WBLDP Act, upon payment of lower compensation, if unutilized or in excess would have to be disposed of in the manner provided in section 9 of the WBLDP Act, for it could never have been the legislative intent that land should be acquired under the special provisions of the WBLDP Act, by specific declaration of the purpose, upon satisfaction of the Governor of the requirement for that purpose, at lesser compensation, and then be kept in reserve for years and used for an altogether different public purpose, not relatable to any of the purposes specified in that special act, for which land would ordinarily have to be acquired under a different law upon payment of higher compensation. 177. In this case it appears that the land of the petitioners was not acquired at all section 11 required the Collector to make an award under his hand of (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation, which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation amongst all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. 178. Thus, irrespective of whether the owners appeared or not it was incumbent upon the Land Acquisition Collector to apportion the compensation. In Rabindra Kumar Basu v. S.K. Banerjee & Ors. (supra) this Court held:- "The Scheme of the Act, therefore, is as follows: After hearing the respective claims of the persons interested in the compensation money, the Land Acquisition Collector must make an award under section 11. In that award he must do all the things that are mentioned in section 11, which has been quoted above. Amongst other things, he is bound to apportion the compensation money among all the persons known or believed to be 'interested in the land, of whom or whose claims he has information, whether or not they have appeared before him." ........... Amongst other things, he is bound to apportion the compensation money among all the persons known or believed to be 'interested in the land, of whom or whose claims he has information, whether or not they have appeared before him." ........... "In my opinion, the Land Acquisition Collector is entirely in error in his interpretation of the law. Under section 11 of the said Act it is the bounden duty of the Collector to apportion the compensation. There is no question of any of the parties interested asking for it. This has been laid down by the Privy council in the case of Parag Narain v. The Collector of Agra (1) 36 C.W.N. 579. Lord Russell stated as follows :- "As their Lordship read the Act, the duty of the Collector under section 11 of the Act is to make an award in regard to three matters, viz., (1) the area of the land included in the award; (2) total compensation to be allowed for that land, and (3) apportionment of that compensation among all the persons interested in that land...........each award should contain within its four comers the fixing of value of the land with which it deals, and the apportionment of that value between various persons interested in that land." In this case there can be no doubt that the Land Acquisition Collector failed to discharge his statutory duty to apportion the compensation amongst the claimants. " "Whether a matter is complicated or not, it is the bounden duty of the Collector to make an apportionment, upon such materials as he is able to gather. The Act gives him power to collect information and compel the parties to give information. If the apportionment is agreed upon between the parties, then of course he is saved from computation of it. But if there is no agreement, then he has got to make apportionment to the best of his ability, upon the materials before him or such as he can gather, by exercising of the powers given by the Act. Without an apportionment, he cannot compel the parties to apply for the matter to be referred to Court under section 18. What he can lo however, is, if the apportionment is complicated and beyond his capacity to determine, to refer the matter to Court himself under section 30 of the Act. That he has not done in this case. Without an apportionment, he cannot compel the parties to apply for the matter to be referred to Court under section 18. What he can lo however, is, if the apportionment is complicated and beyond his capacity to determine, to refer the matter to Court himself under section 30 of the Act. That he has not done in this case. Without any apportionment of the compensation money he has acted under section 31(2) of the Act and made a deposit in Court. Indeed, none of the ingredients in sub-section (2) of section 31 are satisfied. Since there has been no apportionment, there can be no dispute regarding it." "The short position therefore, is as follows: The Land Acquisition Collector, in making his award under section 11, failed Vo-perform his statutory duty, inasmuch as he did not apportion the amount of the compensation between the parties. Next, he made an error in depositing the money under section 31(2) of the Act with the C.I. Tribunal. It follows therefore, that the so-called joint award made by the Collector dated 5th November, 1958 must be set aside." 179. As observed above, in State of West Bengal v. Asiatic Investment Ltd. (supra) a Division Bench of this Court categorically held that making of the award would be completed only after apportionment of the compensation among the different claimants. As a Single Bench, this Bench is bound by the decision of the Division Bench. This Court is, therefore, constrained to hold that making of the award has not been completed in this case. In any case, as pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee, there is an endorsement of stop payment in the award and another endorsement that verification not done which also shows that the making of the award was not complete. 180. In Ganesh Nayak v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta this Court found that there had been apportionment of compensation though the apportionment may have been erroneous. The judgement is distinguishable. 181. Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Collector was obliged to make an award in the manner prescribed in section 12. Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides as follows:- "12. Dasgupta this Court found that there had been apportionment of compensation though the apportionment may have been erroneous. The judgement is distinguishable. 181. Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Collector was obliged to make an award in the manner prescribed in section 12. Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides as follows:- "12. Award of Collector when to be final - (1) Such award shall be filed in the Collectors office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made." 182. Pursuant to the orders of this Court, the entire records were produced. In this case, there is apparently no notice of the award to the owners of the land. If the owners of the land could not be personally served, they should at least have been put to notice of the award by newspaper insertion and/or publication in the gazette which also was not done. The owners were thus not offered compensation. On the other hand as pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee there was an endorsement in the award of "stop payment" and "verification not complete" which makes it clear that no award was finally made. The award was never completed. The purported award relied upon by the respondents is no award in the eye of law. In any case, there was, on the face of the award, no apportionment. The award was, therefore, not a valid award, the statutory requirements of sections 11 and 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, not having been complied with. 183. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which came into effect on and from 24th September, 1984 casts an obligation on the Land Acquisition Collector to make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration, and where the declaration was made before commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, within two years from the date of its commencement, failing which the entire proceedings for the acquisition would lapse. 184. 184. When an award becomes time barred, the land acquisition proceedings lapse in view of section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Singareni Collieries Company Limited v. Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao and Ors. reported in (2013)8 SCC 789 , cited by Mr. Pramit Roy. 185. Ordinarily, after a declaration is made under section 6 of the WBLDP Act, the State Government might acquire the land and thereupon all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would apply except for provisions inconsistent with the WBLDP Act. In respect of any matters specifically covered by any provisions of the WBLDP Act, the relevant provisions of the WBLDP Act would apply, and not the corresponding provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 186. Once an award becomes final and notice of the award is issued in accordance with section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Collector might take possession under section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, and once such possession is taken the land would vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. 187. Once an award of compensation is made and possession is taken under section 16, the land vests in the State absolutely and forever, free from all encumbrances, irrespective of whether such possession is symbolical possession on paper or actual possession. 188. Proviso (a) to section 8(1) provides that in case the Government so directs, the Collector may, at any time after a declaration is made under section 6, take possession in accordance with the Rules, of inter alia any' waste or arable land in respect of which the declaration is made and thereupon such land shall vest in the Government, free from all encumbrances. 189. The aforesaid proviso carves out an exception to the general rule that ordinarily in cases of acquisition under the WBLDP Act, possession might only be taken as per the provisions of section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, after the collector has made an award under section 11 of the said Act, upon compliance with the requisites of section 7 to 15A of the said Act, to the extent applicable. 190. 190. However, implicit in exercise of power under proviso (a) to section 8(1), before an award of compensation is made, is the satisfaction of the Government of the urgency of the public purpose necessitating possession of the land for its utilization. For land to vest under provision (a) to section 8(1), the possession necessarily has to be actual physical possession, whatever be the mode of possession, as long as the possession is in accordance with the rules, but not symbolical possession or mere possession on paper by issuance of a possession certificate. There must be real urgency and not mere recording of urgency on paper. 191. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. reported in (1976)1 SCC 700 , relied upon in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) By LRS. (supra), the Supreme Court found on facts that it could not be accepted that the taking and giving of possession was only on paper and not on the spot. Bhagwati, J., speaking for himself and Untwalia J, that is the majority, had held : "we think it is enough to state that when Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking symbolical possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Not would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down as absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down as absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tahsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waster and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession." 192. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) represented by LRS (supra), the two judge Bench found the land had been acquired for development of the city, a large chunk of buildings had been constructed and the disputed land had been set apart for a park. In the context of the aforesaid facts the Court held : "9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses winged by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land. " 193. The judgment of the Supreme Court in P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka (supra), cited by Mr. Banerjee was rendered in the particular facts of that case. The Court relied upon the earlier larger Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (supra) wherein the Supreme Court had observed that how possession could be taken would depend on the nature of the land. It appears that the attention of the Supreme Court was not drawn to the majority judgment delivered by Bhagawati J. holding "when Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. It appears that the attention of the Supreme Court was not drawn to the majority judgment delivered by Bhagawati J. holding "when Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking symbolical possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Civil Procedure Code. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough." 194. In National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta and Others (supra) cited by Mr. Banerjee, the Supreme Court held : "16. It is a well-settled proposition of law that in the event possession of the land, in respect whereof a notification had been issued, had been taken over, the State would be denuded of its power to withdraw from the acquisition in terms of section 48 of the Act. Whether actual or symbolic possession had been taken over from the landowners is essentially a question of fact. Taking over of possession in terms of the provisions of the Act would, however, mean actual possession and not symbolic possession. The question, however, is as to whether the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court that physical possession, indeed, had been taken over by the collector is correct or not. 195. In the Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (supra) the Supreme Court also held that it was well settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, and even if the land was not used for the purpose for which it had been acquired the land owner would not get any right to ask for reverting the land in him and restitution of possession. The judgment was rendered in the context of section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act which provides that when the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. In this case section 16 of the Land Acquisition is not applicable, since possession has not been taken under the said section. 196. In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. In this case section 16 of the Land Acquisition is not applicable, since possession has not been taken under the said section. 196. In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal & Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta the Supreme Court found:- "9. It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration under section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26-9-1986 and for Survey No.2/11 award was made on 31-8-1990. Possession having already been undertaken on 24-11-1981, it stands vested in the State under section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been made within two years under section 11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31-8-1990 does note render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to section 11-A of the Act." 197. In Mahalakshmi Ammal (supra), the Supreme Court found on facts that there was stay of proceedings and therefore the limitation of two years for making an award was not attracted in view of the Proviso to section 11A. The aforesaid judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. 198. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) By LRS. (supra), cited by Mr. Dasgupta, that the land in question stood vested in the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and divested from its owners was rendered in the back drop of the facts of the case, in the context of whether the owners could have obtained an injunction against the Board in a suit. 199. In A.P. Nayar and Ors. v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and Ors. (supra) the appellants claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, one Gopal Dass had purchased the land in question from Sharauddin by a registered Sale Deed dated 7th May, 1955. The claim was resisted on the plea that the lands in question vested in the Government in 1949, itself much before the alleged sale deed was executed by Sharauddin in favour of Gopal Das. The claim was resisted on the plea that the lands in question vested in the Government in 1949, itself much before the alleged sale deed was executed by Sharauddin in favour of Gopal Das. The land had in the meanwhile been leased to the respondent Society and the society was in possession thereof. This defence was upheld by the High Court which held that the appellants had only right to receive compensation for the acquisition. 200. In the appeal from the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court found that the land in question was held in co-ownership by one Sharauddin and ors. The co-owners had migrated to Pakistan on partition, but Sharauddin continued to be a non-evacuee. On 13th September, 1948, a notification under section 3 of the Evacuee Acquisition Act was issued. On 29th May, 1955. the Competent Officer declared that the entire land had vested in the Custodian free from all encumbrances and liabilities. On 12th July, 1958 Najmuddin, Mohinuddin and Wahabuddin, the sons of Sharauddin filed a claim before the Competent Officer. The Competent Officer by his order dated 10th October, 1958 held that l/3rd of the properties involved including Khasra No. 167, belong to the heirs of Sharauddin and 2/3rd was evacuee share and framed a partition scheme and subsequently adopted it. The society was formed on 29th October, 1959 and allotted 60 acres of land including 2 bighas in Khasra No. 167. The allotment was made on 6th June, 1972. Physical possession was handed over to it on 13th June, 1972 and mutation was effected on 7th May, 1979. 201. The Supreme Court noticed that the award passed as early as on 7th May, 1962 was not challenged by the heirs of Sharauddin. They also accepted the separation and Gopal Dass attempted to get the position unsettled only in the year 1979, even though he claimed that he had obtained title and possession of this land by virtue of the sale dated 18th May, 1955. The Court found there was no reason why he had not made any attempt to assert his right till 1979. 202. In Amit Kumar Shaw and Anr. v. Farida Khatoon and Anr. reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403 the Supreme Court held that transferee pendente lite was bound by the final decree in the suit. The Court found there was no reason why he had not made any attempt to assert his right till 1979. 202. In Amit Kumar Shaw and Anr. v. Farida Khatoon and Anr. reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403 the Supreme Court held that transferee pendente lite was bound by the final decree in the suit. The judgment has no application in this case as there was no transfer during the pendency of any suit. 203. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court held:- "4. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner has purchased the property covered by the notification under section 4(1) after it was published and, therefore, its title is a void title. It has no right to challenge the acquisition proceeding much less the award. The Division Bench of the High Court has exhaustively reviewed the case-law to negate the claim of the petitioner. We do not find any illegality in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference. 5. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed" 204. In Somawanti and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court held: "The scheme of the Act is that normally the provisions of s. 5A have to be complied with. Where, in pursuance of the provisions, objections are lodged, these objections will have to be decided by the Government. For deciding them the Government will have before it the Collectors proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the declaration that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company is not to be made by the Government arbitrarily, but on the basis of material placed before it by the Collector. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 5A make the decision of the Government on the objections final while those of sub-section (1) of section 6 enable the Government to arrive at it; satisfaction. Sub-section (3) of section 6 goes further and says that such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. Sub-section (3) of section 6 goes further and says that such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. (27) It is, however, argued by learned counsel that the conclusiveness or finality attached to the declaration of Government is only as regards the fact that the dand is "needed" but not as regards the question that the purpose for which the land is needed is in fact a public purpose or what is said to be a company is really a company. Sub-section (1) does not effect a dichotomy between "need" and "Public purpose or a company". There is no justification for making such a dichotomy. By making it, not only will the language of the section be strained but the purpose of the law will be stultified. The expression must be regarded as one whole and the declaration held to be with respect to both the elements of the expression. (28) The Government has to be satisfied about both the elements contained in the expression "needed for a public purpose or a company". Where it is so satisfied, it is entitled to make a declaration. Once such a declaration is made sub-section (3) invests it with conclusiveness. That conclusiveness is not merely regarding the fact that the Government is satisfied but also with regard to the question that the land is needed for a public purpose or is needed for a company, as the case may be. " 205. In this case, the petitioners are neither questioning the initiation of the acquisition proceedings and/or in other words, the notice under section 4 or the Declaration under section 6 nor are the petitioners challenging the award. It is the case of the petitioners that the acquisition was not proceeded with, and the same lapsed. 206. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratap and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. It is the case of the petitioners that the acquisition was not proceeded with, and the same lapsed. 206. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratap and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (supra) has been rendered in the context of repeal of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 after extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to the State of Rajasthan and the enactment of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act), with a view to amend the provisions of the Principal Act and to provide for certain transitory and special procedure for the disposal of pending and present proceeding as well as payment of compensation. 207. The Supreme Court found that the amendments or the extension of the Central Act did not have the effect, in law or otherwise of divesting the State of ownership of the land which had already been vested in it. The provisions of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act were, therefore, not attracted, even if it be assumed that the award had not been passed within the stipulated period. The judgment is distinguishable. 208. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court held : "It is settled law that after the notification under section 4(1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case, notification under section 4(1] was published on March 24, 1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on July 5, 1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under section 6 was published, later on July 8, 1973. Admittedly power under section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under section 5A and on service of the notice under section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under section 17 [2] free from all encumbrances. Admittedly power under section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under section 5A and on service of the notice under section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under section 17 [2] free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation of section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a notification under section 48(1) is published in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition, section 11 A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The notification under section 4(1) and the declaration under section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under section 48(1) was published and the possession are surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land after the notification under section 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under section 6 was published. The next question is: whether the respondent is entitled to compensation and, if so, from what date and at what rate? The original owner has the right to the compensation under section 23(1) of the Act. Consequently, though the respondent acquired no title to the land, at best he would be entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and claim payment of the compensation, but according to the provisions of the Act." 209. The judgment in Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (supra) has been rendered in relation to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, where possession had been taken under section 17(4) of the said Act, dispensing with enquiry under section 5A, and upon notice under section 9, since there was acute urgency for construction of a pumping station house to drain out flood waters. The Supreme Court held that section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, did not apply in such a case and the acquisition did not lapse. The Supreme Court held that section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, did not apply in such a case and the acquisition did not lapse. After incorporation of section 17(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with effect from 24th September, 1984, the Land Acquisition Collector is obliged to tender 80% of the compensation assessed by him to the persons interested, before taking possession under section 17. 210. In any case, a judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided and not for what may logically be deduced from it. The judgement rendered in the context of section 17(1) and section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, in the specific facts and circumstances of the case where actual physical possession of the land had been taken and the land had been utilised by constructing a pump house for draining out flood waters, would not apply in this case, where, at best, symbolical possession had been taken under the provisions of the WBLDP Act and not under section 17(L) or 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 211. In Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was not required to decide and did not decide the issue of the effect of section 11A in case of acquisition under the WBLDP Act where the actual physical possession had not been taken for about fifty years and the possession, if at all, was symbolical, on paper, as in this case. Atleast so far as the land purchased by these petitioner is concerned, the petitioners were informed by the Land acquisition authorities that the land was not under acquisition. The judgment in Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (supra) is therefore not applicable and does not operate as a precedent against the petitioners. In any case, the petitioners have not challenged the notification and the declaration under sections 4 and 6 respectively of the WBLDP Act as observed above. Nor have they questioned the legality of the mode in which initial possession was taken. The petitioners claimer to have stepped into the shoes of the original purchasers after the acquisition proceedings lapsed. 212. In any case, the petitioners have not challenged the notification and the declaration under sections 4 and 6 respectively of the WBLDP Act as observed above. Nor have they questioned the legality of the mode in which initial possession was taken. The petitioners claimer to have stepped into the shoes of the original purchasers after the acquisition proceedings lapsed. 212. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Satyendra Prasad Jain and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) was rendered in an appeal against a judgment and order of the High Court, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant owners for a writ of mandamus on the Land Acquisition Collector to make and publish the award in respect of the land acquired from the owners for the purpose of development and construction of a "Mandi" of the Agriculture Market Samiti, hereinafter referred to as the Samiti. 213. In Satyendra Prasad Jain (supra) notification had been issued under section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 applying section 17(4) of the said Act on the ground of urgency of public purpose. An earlier writ petition filed by the appellant owners, challenging the acquisition had been dismissed by the High Court. After the High Court upheld the acquisition invoking section 17(4) in view of its finding of urgency of public purpose, possession of the land of the appellant owners was taken. A special leave petition from the judgement of the High Court was dismissed. 214. However, about two years after possession was taken, the Samiti resolved to exclude the land of the appellant owners from acquisition, after which the appellant owners filed the writ petition claiming an award of compensation. 215. The High Court however dismissed the writ petition, rejecting' the contention of the appellant owners that the land had vested in the State and holding that the necessity of making an award within two years from the date of notification under section 4 as mandated by section 11A could not be dispensed with, merely because possession had been taken under section 17(1). 216. In appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of tin High Court. The Supreme Court held : '14. There are two judgements of this Court which we must note. 216. In appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of tin High Court. The Supreme Court held : '14. There are two judgements of this Court which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan it was held that Government could not withdraw from acquisition under section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma it was held that: (SCC p. 152, para 8) ... after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification. 15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under section 11. Upon the taking of possession, the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what section 16 states. The provisions of section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions Of section 11-A, lapse. When section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. When section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition under section 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. 16. Further, section 17(3-A) postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it under section 17(1). Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation." 217. The judgement in Learned Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, which is reported in (1970)2 SCC 149 was rendered long before the incorporation of section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, had no occasion to consider the effect of non-compliance of section 11A in a case where possession had been taken under section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 218. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan reported in (1993)2 SCC 84 the Supreme Court held that once possession had been taken under section 17, it was not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition under section 48. Section 11A was not in issue. In this case too, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the effect of non-compliance of section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 219. In Awadh Bikari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) I the Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court that a defective I award which complied with all the requisites of the earlier directions of I the Court would not invite the wrath of section 11A of the Land I Acquisition Act, 1894. Referring to and following Satendra Prasad Jain I and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors. Referring to and following Satendra Prasad Jain I and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors. (supra) the Court held that in a case where I the Government had taken possession under section 17(1) it was not I open to withdraw from the acquisition under section 48, and section 11A would not apply. 220. Whether section 11A would be attracted in a case where possession had been taken under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act fell for consideration in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011)9 SCC 354 . There was a difference of opinion between A.K. Ganguly, J. and Swatanter Kumar, J. While Swatanter Kumar, J. held that once possession was taken, the land vested in the Government absolutely, free from encumbrances and could not be re-vested, in the land owners, A.K. Ganguly, J. found that the observation in Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of U.P. (supra) that where emergency provisions under section 17 were invoked, section 11A would not apply, was an incidental finding not strictly in issue. The issue has been referred to a Larger Bench. 221. The power under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is a special power in cases of urgency. As per the majority view in Balwanl Narayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat & Ors. (supra). Section 17 of the Act I contemplates the taking of actual possession of the land. There can be no question of taking symbolic possession or possession on paper. The judgment in P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (supra) was rendered by a Two Judge Bench whereas the judgment in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (supra) was rendered by a larger I Three Judge Bench. Section 17(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act inserted I with effect from 24th September, 1984 requires the collector to tender payment of 80 percent of the compensation for such land as estimated I by him to the persons interested therein before taking possession of the I same unlike proviso A to section 8 of the WBLDP Act. 222. As observed, the proviso (a) to section 8(1) postulates actual taking of physical possession and it is only when actual physical possession is taken that the land would vest. 222. As observed, the proviso (a) to section 8(1) postulates actual taking of physical possession and it is only when actual physical possession is taken that the land would vest. Even if it is assumed that I section 11A would not apply in a case where possession is taken under section 8 of the WBLDP Act., it will have to be actual physical possession and not possession on paper as in the instant case. 223. In this case, the State did not take actual possession of the land of the petitioner even though the State took actual physical possession of vast tracts of land acquired by the same notification for refugee rehabilitation. 224. As observed above, the Government or any other authority was not shown in the revenue records to be in possession or to have interest in the land in question. By a letter dated 11th August, 1998, the Land Acquisition Collector informed the petitioners that the land in question had not been acquired. In the affidavit of Tapas Kumar Biswas filed on behalf of the State there is a clear assertion that it was only in 2002 that Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department informed the West Bengal Land Reforms Department of the acquisition. Till then the Land Reforms Department had no knowledge of the acquisition. 225. Sometime thereafter the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department purported to relinquish 109.94 acres of land including the land of the petitioners in favour of the Land and Land Reforms Department. The Land and L-and Reforms Department purported to transfer the land to KMDA right of possession purporting to make over possession of the land to KMDA by a right of possession executed on 26th September, 2005. 226. The land acquisition proceedings had lapsed as no final award was made. The state therefore did not treat the land in question as acquired land, did not update the land revenue records and even informed the petitioners in writing that the land in question was not under acquisition. After communication in writing from the Land Acquisition Office that the land was not under acquisition, the petitioners executed six Deeds of Conveyance. The deeds were registered. The petitioners applied for mutation. Mutation certificates were issued. Permission for conversion was granted. Even sanction of building plan was recommended. After communication in writing from the Land Acquisition Office that the land was not under acquisition, the petitioners executed six Deeds of Conveyance. The deeds were registered. The petitioners applied for mutation. Mutation certificates were issued. Permission for conversion was granted. Even sanction of building plan was recommended. In 2001 the KMDA for the first time demolished the boundary wall constructed by the petitioners, and in 2003 notice of mutation was issued. It would be gross injustice to throw out the writ petition at the inception, only because the petitioner purchased the land after the notification and the declaration were issued and more so, when the petitioners had acted on the representation of the State that the land was not under acquisition. 227. In Parikh Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case found that there was no merit to challenge the acquisition and accordingly dismissed the appeal before it. The judgment is clearly distinguishable and has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 228. In proceedings for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, possession is ordinarily taken after an award is made and only in cases of exceptional urgency, possession is taken under section 17(11 in which case the land vests in the Government. Section 17(3A) casts an obligation on the acquiring authority to tender 80% of the Compensation assessed, to persons interested. This is not a case where possession has either been taken under section 16 or under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 229. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (supra) was rendered in the context of acquisition under the (Hyderabad) Land Acquisition Act which is similar to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 230. A judgment is to be construed in the background of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment was rendered and sentences or even parts from- the judgment cannot be considered out of context. 231. In Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. reported in (1996)6 SCC 44 , a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held:- "9............It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. 231. In Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. reported in (1996)6 SCC 44 , a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held:- "9............It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates - [i] findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; [ii] statements of the principles of laui applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and [iii] judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified ' by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete derision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents......." 232. In this case, the notifications were issued under sections 4 and 6 and the possession was taken by issuance of a possession certificate. Possession, if at all, was only symbolical possession. The land was never utilized. The award was never completed. The proceedings lapsed under section 11A and was so treated by the respondent authorities. The land was never treated as acquired land and almost for about 55 years after the alleged symbolical possession was taken. The land was transferred to KMDA for an entirely different purpose. This transfer was admittedly after the petitioners executed the Deeds of Conveyance. As purchasers the petitioners have stepped into the shoes of the owner and are entitled to all acts which the owners could have taken had they not transferred their interest in the property. 233. The petitioners have rightly moved the writ petition to protect their ownership rights. As observed above, the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed since there was no final award, valid in the eye of law. 233. The petitioners have rightly moved the writ petition to protect their ownership rights. As observed above, the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed since there was no final award, valid in the eye of law. Land acquired under the special provisions of the WBLDP Act by specific declaration of the purpose, upon satisfaction of the Governor of the requirement for that purpose, at lesser compensation, cannot be kept in reserve for years and used for an altogether different public purpose not relatable to any of the public purpose specified in that special Act. 234. For the reasons discussed above, the writ petition is allowed. 235. It is declared that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question, covered by the eight deeds of conveyance referred to above, under the WBLDP Act lapsed long before execution of the said deeds of conveyance in favour of the petitioners. 236. The respondents are restrained from interfering with the ownership or possession of the petitioner of the land in question or from giving effect and/or further effect to the purported transfer of the said land to KMDA. 237. However, this order will not prevent the respondents from initiating fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with law and taking possession of the said land, should the same be needed for the Asian Gateway Project. In the event any acquisition proceedings are initiated, the petitioner shall be entitled to claim compensation in accordance with law. Photostat certified copy of this judgment and/or order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously, subject to compliance with the requisite formalities. Later:- Status quo with regard to the property in question shall be maintained by the parties for a period of six weeks from date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. Photostat certified copy of this judgment and/or order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously, subject to compliance with the requisite formalities. Writ petition allowed.