JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral) 1. The applicant, by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seek to quash the charge-sheet dated 28.11.2013, summoning order dated 16.01.2014 and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 238 of 2014, State vs. Mohd. Kamil, under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC, pending the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar. 2. A charge-sheet was submitted against the applicant for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC. A compounding application being CRMA No. 1989 of 2014 is filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the applicant Mohd. Kamil supported by the affidavit of Mohd. Zakir (injured). Injured persons/victims Mohd. Zakir and Mohd. Fazil are present in person, duly identified by their counsel, Mr. M. A. Khan, Advocate. Injured persons/victims Mohd. Zakir and Mohd. Fazil said that they have resolved their disputes with the intervention of some elderly persons and made a prayer to permit them to compound the offences alleged against the accused-applicant. A settlement-deed has also been filed as Annexure No. 1 to the present petition. Applicant Mohd. Kamil is also present in person, duly identified by Mr. B. S. Parihar, Advocate. 3. Whereas offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC are compoundable offences within the Scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C., offence under Section 324 of IPC are not. The question, which arises for consideration of this Court is- whether the victims/injured persons should be permitted to compound the offence punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC or not? 4. Learned counsel for the applicants drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as below: “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 5. The instant case is squarely covered by the above ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The obvious reply to the question posed above is in the affirmative in view of the ruling of Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra). Hon’ble Apex Court also permitted compounding of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC in the case of Dimpy Gujral vs. Union Territory though Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)]. 6. A reference may also be had to the decision of Narendra Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 *, in this regard. 7. Compounding Application No. 1989 of 2014 is thus allowed. As a consequence of the same, the charge-sheet dated 28.11.2013, summoning order dated 16.01.2014 and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 238 of 2014, State vs. Mohd. Kamil, under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC, pending the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar, are hereby quashed qua applicant. 8. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties.