JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- The application for setting aside the judgment filed on 14.11.2011 is brought at the instance of the applicant/appellant on a plea that after the death of the appellant, his legal representative had been brought on record, but she did not know the counsel to whom the case had been entrusted, had died and, therefore, she did not take steps to have it duly represented in the court at the time when the matter was brought for hearing. I would have taken this circumstance of a want of representation as appropriate if it was a case of recent origin and a case has been disposed of otherwise than on merits. The case came up for hearing along with yet another case in RFA No.2118 of 2003 and it was examined and it had been directed to be considered jointly since common facts and law existed. 2. The appeals projected a point for consideration regarding the character of property held by Chanan Singh-the appellant in RFA No.1662 of 1982. While his contention was that the property purchased by him which was acquired later in respect of which an adjudication for apportionment under the Land Acquisition Act was sought by the daughter-in-law claiming the property to be a joint family property in which her deceased husband had a share, I have examined the character of property with reference to the document brought on record, namely of a wealth tax assessment where the property purchased in the name of Chanan Singh had been shown as joint family property. When I found that the case had been disposed of on merits, requested the counsel to advance arguments to show that the judgment suffers from any vice that could normally be a ground for recall or review of the judgment. The argument before me was that there was an application for reception of additional evidence and if the same had been considered, the court would have come to a different conclusion. I was prepared to examine the document as well and the counsel points out to me that in relation to some other dispute with reference to two shops, the contention of the son of Chanan Singh was that it belonged to him absolutely and shown as such in tax returns. I was prepared to examine the document as well and the counsel points out to me that in relation to some other dispute with reference to two shops, the contention of the son of Chanan Singh was that it belonged to him absolutely and shown as such in tax returns. The contest was against Chanan Singh and the court held that notwithstanding the property assessment in the name of son Ranbir Singh, the property was still shown to be the property of Chanan Singh. This adjudication appears to have lasted upto the Supreme Court where two shops were held to be a separate property of Chanan Singh in which the son Ranbir Singh did not have a share. The counsel would argue that a similar line of reasoning could have been adopted and even a property standing in the name of Ranbir Singh as per tax assessment was treated as a separate property of Chanan Singh. The agricultural lands which were acquired were also required to be so treated. 3. The change in character of a property of a separate property as HUF does not require any formal document of transfer than any document that would manifest an intention to impress a separate property with character of joint property as HUF property. Such a document was available on record which was an important piece of evidence such as a wealth tax and return which was surely very material to treat the property as HUF property and allow for apportionment in favour of daughter-in-law claiming through her husband. So long as the earlier adjudication with reference to two shops did not require an adjudication with reference to the agricultural lands nor was it an issue in earlier judgments, the additional document would not provide any assistance for the appellant to be cited as a precedent which could have a binding value on the contesting respondent, namely, the widow of the son Ranbir Singh. I do not think the additional document of what is sought to be brought could have made any difference to the adjudication already made on 14.11.2011. 4. It will be a sheer judicial wastage of time to reopen the case and allow for luxury of fresh arguments at the instance of all parties. I make the dismissal of the application at the stage of admission itself. 5. The application is dismissed.