Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—These two writ petitions have been filed by Mahendra Kumar Sharma, who was working on the post of Lower Division Clerk with respondent University of Rajasthan. 2. In writ petition no.450/2002, petitioner has challenged order dated 13.09.2001, by which respondent-University declined to grant him benefit of pension. It is prayed that respondent be required to pay him pension and other retiral benefits with effect from 11.06.2000. 3. In writ petition no.6888/2002, he has prayed for quashment of order dated 10.06.1997 by which he was placed under suspension on account of his detention in police custody for more than 48 hours in connection with investigation conducted by Anti Corruption Bureau and order dated 02.02.2001 accepting his resignation from service with effect from 01.02.2001. 4. Petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk (for short, ‘LDC’) on 26.04.1979 and confirmed as such on 26.04.1982. A case was registered by Anti Corruption Bureau under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on allegation of illegalities committed by petitioner and certain others in Post Graduation Medical Course Examination, 1997. He was placed under suspension for his remaining under custody for more than 48 hours by the Anti Corruption Bureau. The order of his suspension was passed on 10.06.1997 with effect from 03.06.1997 as per Ordinance 357-C-1 (c) of the University Hand Book Pt.II, which provides for suspension of a University employee, who is detained in custody. 5. Petitioner submitted an application to the respondents on 11.03.2000 for voluntary retirement. He submitted applications requesting the respondents to decide his earlier application for voluntary retirement and also for revoking his suspension, on 17.10.2000 and 02.12.2000. He thereafter submitted a letter of resignation from service to the respondents on 30.12.2000. The respondents accepted his resignation letter by order dated 02.02.2001 with effect from 01.02.2001. Eventually, the trial of criminal case in connection with petitioner, culminated into his acquittal by judgment dated 28.01.2011 of learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Jaipur, in Regular Criminal Case No.16/2005. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application 28.02.2001 requesting the respondents to decide his pension case. The respondents by order dated 13.09.2001 denied him to grant pension. He has relied on judgment of this court in Dr. Prem Puri Goswami vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2010 (1) WLC 133 = 2010(1) RLW 134. Submissions in Writ Petition No.6888/2002:- 6. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application 28.02.2001 requesting the respondents to decide his pension case. The respondents by order dated 13.09.2001 denied him to grant pension. He has relied on judgment of this court in Dr. Prem Puri Goswami vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2010 (1) WLC 133 = 2010(1) RLW 134. Submissions in Writ Petition No.6888/2002:- 6. Shri D.S. Poonia, learned counsel for petitioner, argued that petitioner submitted an application dated 11.03.2000 for voluntary retirement as per Section-IV of the Pension Scheme. Petitioner completed satisfactory service of 18 years and 2 months. As per that Regulation, at the relevant time, the qualification of service for pension was 15 years. Petitioner was therefore entitled to pension. The respondents never decided his application and kept the same in abeyance. According to clause (b) of Regulation 17, supra, an employee who has given notice for seeking voluntary retirement under clause 17(a) may presume acceptance of the notice of retirement and such retirement shall be effective automatically unless an order in writing to the contrary is issued by the competent authority and served upon the employee prior to expiry of period of notice. It is argued that the respondents never rejected the application dated 11.03.2000 of the petitioner for voluntary retirement within the stipulated period of notice is ninety days. No communication to that effect was served upon the petitioner within the notice period and, therefore, on expiry of such period, the notice would become effective and the petitioner would be taken to have voluntarily retired. He has relied on judgment of this court in Nathu Lal Meena vs. State and Others – 2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 619. 7. It is contended that petitioner has received information from the respondents under the Right to Information Act, that letter dated 31.10.2000 sent by the Assistant Registrar (Estt.II) of the respondent University, to the Secretary, Bar Council of Rajasthan, Jodhpur, in which the respondents conveyed to the Bar Council that petitioner has submitted his resignation from the service on 11.03.2000 and the matter is under consideration for VRS as per the conditions. 8. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that since respondent admitted that as late as 31.10.2000 the request of petitioner for VRS was still pending consideration. 8. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that since respondent admitted that as late as 31.10.2000 the request of petitioner for VRS was still pending consideration. That would mean that they did not take any decision on his application dated 11.03.2000 seeking voluntary retirement for as many as seven months and, therefore, the same would be deemed to have been accepted. In this connection, learned counsel has relied upon judgment of this court in Dr. S.C. Mathur vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others – 2007 (4) WLC 359 = RLW 2007(4) Raj. 3197, and that of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. Sayed Muzaffar Mir – 1995 Supp (1) SCC 76. 9. It is argued that petitioner had to submit letter of resignation on account of harassment by respondents. Petitioner was under sheer frustration as order of revocation of his suspension was not passed and therefore he submitted representation for voluntary retirement. Respondents, in that state of mind of petitioner, called him in the office of Vice-Chancellor and assured him that his pension case would be finalized if he resigns from service. Misled by assurance given by respondents, petitioner submitted resignation under duress and compulsion. It was not a voluntary resignation, therefore, acceptance of resignation in the facts of the case, would be arbitrary exercise of powers by respondents and would tantamount to dismissal of his services. Learned counsel, in support of his argument relied on a division bench judgment of this court in Devi Dayal Gupta vs. Sambhar Salt Limited – RLR 2008(3) 421. Submissions in Writ Petition No.450/2002 - 10. Learned counsel for petitioner argued that suspension of petitioner ought to have been revoked in view of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, which have been adopted by respondents. Petitioner submitted several representations to respondents for issuance of order of revocation of his suspension and respondents have thus violated Rule 54 of the Rules as also the Circulars issued by them from time to time. 11. It is argued that resignation is restricted to such employee, who has not completed qualifying period of service for voluntary retirement. In the present case, there was no question for petitioner to submit resignation unless respondents gave him false assurance, therefore, action of respondents is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. It is argued that resignation is restricted to such employee, who has not completed qualifying period of service for voluntary retirement. In the present case, there was no question for petitioner to submit resignation unless respondents gave him false assurance, therefore, action of respondents is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, learned counsel for petitioner has relied on judgment of this Court in Shanker Pushkarna vs. Union of India – RLW 2009(1) 761. 12. It is submitted that petitioner has been finally acquitted in criminal case and there was no departmental enquiry pending against him, thus there is no blot on his service career. His co-delinquents, namely, Shri A.Q. Khan and Shri M.L. Pahadia were reinstated in service. Learned counsel in support of his argument, has relied on judgment of this court in Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan – RLR 2003 (2) 214. 13. It is therefore prayed that the writ petitions be allowed as prayed for. 14. Per contra, Shri G.K. Garg, learned senior counsel associated with Ms. Anita Agarwal, appearing for respondent University, argued that petitioner was suspended with effect from 03.06.1997 as he had remained in police custody for more than forty eight hours in connection with criminal case by virtue of provisions contained in the University Ordinance. Petitioner submitted an application on 11.03.2000, in subject matter whereof he used words “resignation on the post of LDC, Central Office”. In its last line, he mentioned that due to mental harassment, he was compelled to submit resignation from the service of University, with effect from 26.04.2000 and thereafter in the next sentence he stated that period from 11.03.2000 to 26.04.2000 may be treated as notice period for voluntary retirement. This letter does not satisfy the requirement of Ordinance 376F-I read with Regulation 17 of Pension Scheme, and, therefore, there is no question of deemed acceptance of voluntary retirement on expiry of 90 days there-from. Since the petitioner resigned from service unconditionally vide letter dated 30.12.2000, which was accepted by respondents vide order dated 02.02.2001, there was no question of grant of pension or pensionary benefits to him. Since the petitioner resigned from service unconditionally vide letter dated 30.12.2000, which was accepted by respondents vide order dated 02.02.2001, there was no question of grant of pension or pensionary benefits to him. While in Writ Petition No.450/2002, prayer of petitioner is for quashment of order dated 13.09.2001 and for direction to respondent to sanction him pension and pensionary benefit with effect from 11.06.2000, which were rejected holding him to have resigned from service unconditionally and thus he was not entitled to pensionary benefits. In Writ Petition No.6888/2002 he made contrary prayer. He has prayed for quashment of suspension order dated 10.06.1997 and setting aside acceptance of resignation with direction to respondents to grant him salary for the intervening period. Two writ petitions filed with contradictory prayers cannot be maintained. 15. It is argued that even otherwise conjoint letter of resignation as well as voluntary retirement dated 11.03.2000 with prayer to make such voluntary retirement effective from 26.04.2000, does not satisfy requirement of notice period of three months. Period from 11.03.2000 to 26.04.2000 falls short of three months according to provisions of Section 376-I read with 380 and Regulation 17 of the Pension Scheme. In fact, petitioner thereafter again, on his own showing, submitted letter dated 02.12.2000 for his reinstatement in service by revoking order of suspension. Petitioner cannot be, therefore, permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. 16. It is contended that if notice of three months was not given by petitioner while submitting application on 11.03.2000 and the notice period was confined only from 11.03.2000 to 26.04.2000. He cannot now request that he should be taken to have voluntary retired with effect from 11.06.2000, on expiry of ninety days from 11.03.2000. It is argued that as per Ordinance 376F-I of the University Ordinance, if an employee submits an application for premature retirement at least three months in advance of the date from which he desires to retire, the permission may be refused in the case where employee is under suspension or where he is facing disciplinary proceedings or where there is a prosecution lodged/contemplated by the University in a court of law against concerned employee. Similar is the requirement under Regulation 17 of the Pension Scheme. Thus, the respondents are fully empowered to withhold permission of voluntary retirement of an employee when he is under suspension or facing disciplinary proceedings or criminal trial. Similar is the requirement under Regulation 17 of the Pension Scheme. Thus, the respondents are fully empowered to withhold permission of voluntary retirement of an employee when he is under suspension or facing disciplinary proceedings or criminal trial. Petitioner was fully aware of the situation and as such he did not press for request of his voluntary retirement. He accepted the subsistence allowance even after 26.04.2000 and for that matter even after 11.06.2000. He continued to receive the subsistence allowance till he resigned from service. His request for resignation was accepted vide order dated 02.02.2001 with effect from 01.02.2001. Petitioner himself was anxious to get resignation accepted so that he may join legal profession. 17. It is contended that petitioner was never pressurized or compelled to submit resignation or any kind of harassment was caused to him. It is argued that cited judgments are wholly distinguishable because the cited judgments are on the question of deemed acceptance of voluntary resignation where communication of refusal has not been conveyed to the employee within the notice period, but in present case petitioner himself abandoned the request for voluntary retirement by continuously accepting the subsistence allowance upto the date of resignation, and making request for revocation of suspension and reinstatement in service twice thereafter on 17.10.2000 and 02.12.2000. The request of voluntary retirement could not be deemed accepted because suspension could have not been revoked as he was placed under suspension for his remaining under detention for more than forth-eight hours and on account of facing criminal trial. In fact, in the alleged application seeking voluntary retirement, the words 'voluntary retirement' have been mentioned in the caption, and in main body of application, request was for resignation was coupled with notice for voluntary retirement. Said application was, therefore, rightly termed as application for resignation by the authorities. 18. Learned counsel in support of argument, has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Rakesh Kumar – (2001) 4 SCC 309 , and argued that resignation from service or post entails forfeiture of past service. Regulation 26A of the Pension Scheme provides forfeiture of past service in the case of resignation. Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in UCO Bank and Others vs. Sanwarmal – (2004) 4 SCC 412 to the same effect. 19. It is therefore prayed that writ petitions be dismissed. 20. Regulation 26A of the Pension Scheme provides forfeiture of past service in the case of resignation. Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in UCO Bank and Others vs. Sanwarmal – (2004) 4 SCC 412 to the same effect. 19. It is therefore prayed that writ petitions be dismissed. 20. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 21. Petitioner initially filed Writ Petition No.450/2002 praying for quashment of order dated 13.09.2001. It was by this order that respondents declined him to pay pension and pensionary benefits taking him to have already retired from service with effect from 11.06.2000, alleging that stand of respondent University was that petitioner resigned from service. He then filed Writ Petition No.6888/2002 challenging order of suspension dated 10.06.1997 with prayer that same be declared illegal, non-est and void-ab-initio and challenged order dated 01.02.2001 thereby his resignation was accepted. Two writ petitions make different nature of prayers, but objection that they cannot be maintained together, cannot be accepted because it is open to petitioner to make both such prayers. I shall therefore first deal with question whether petitioner can be deemed to have retired from the service. Before proceeding to examine the validity of order accepting his resignation and treating him to have continued in service. 22. Admittedly, petitioner was under suspension when petitioner submitted application dated 11.03.2000 for resignation. In that application he stated that in identical criminal cases registered by Anti Corruption Bureau relating to irregularities in admission to MBA, the University employees have been prosecuted in the court, but they are being allowed to continue on regular basis and petitioner has been forced to bear mental harassment. Therefore he submitted resignation with effect from 26.04.2000 with the prayer that this period from 11.03.2000 till 26.04.2000 may be treated as notice period. Petitioner thereafter on 17.10.2000 requested for revocation of suspension on the ground that according to Rule 54 of the RSR, if departmental proceedings are not initiated or charge-sheet has not been filed within two years, the suspended employee should be reinstated. He then again requested for same relief by filing application dated 02.12.2000. Petitioner thereafter on 17.10.2000 requested for revocation of suspension on the ground that according to Rule 54 of the RSR, if departmental proceedings are not initiated or charge-sheet has not been filed within two years, the suspended employee should be reinstated. He then again requested for same relief by filing application dated 02.12.2000. Regulation 17 of the Pension Scheme provides that retiring pension shall be granted to an employee who seeks voluntary retirement and is permitted to retire from service after he has given at least three months previous notice in writing to the appointing authority, after completing 15 years of qualifying service. 23. Perusal of the above Regulation 17 would make it clear that a retiring pension shall be granted to an employee who seeks voluntary retirement and he is permitted to retire after he has given three months notice in writing to the appointing authority after he has completed 15 years of qualifying service. Clause (b) thereof further provides that an employee, who has given notice for seeking retirement under regulation 17(a) may presume acceptance of the notice of retirement shall be and the retirement shall be effective automatically unless an order in writing to the contrary has been issued by the competent authority and served upon him before the expiry of the period of notice. It goes therefore without saying that for notice seeking voluntary retirement to be effective and retirement taking place would require such notice to be in conformity with that person. There are three conditions for a valid notice – (1) that an employee should have completed 15 years of qualifying service, (2) that he should apply for voluntary retirement and (3) he has given at least three months previous notice in writing to the appointing authority. Application of petitioner dated 11.3.2000 though satisfies first of these three conditions, namely, that petitioner had completed 15 years of qualifying service before submitting said application. But then, application cannot be said to have satisfied other two requirements because the application was primarily for resignation from the service, though at the same time in the last sentence of the application the petitioner had requested that the period from 11.3.2000 to 26.4.2000 should be treated as notice period. But then, application cannot be said to have satisfied other two requirements because the application was primarily for resignation from the service, though at the same time in the last sentence of the application the petitioner had requested that the period from 11.3.2000 to 26.4.2000 should be treated as notice period. In last two sentences, the petitioner had requested that (1) his resignation may be made effective from 26.4.2000 and (2) that period from 11.3.2000 to 26.4.2000 may be treated as notice period for voluntary retirement. The application was thus not for voluntary retirement simplicitor but it was a mixed of both - resignation and voluntary retirement and that it did not give clear notice of three months. The law is well settled that despite the pendency of disciplinary proceedings if a notice for voluntary retirement has been served by the employee, he can withdraw that request within notice period but if the employer has not conveyed the request to withhold the permission to retirement voluntarily within the notice period, on expiry of the period of notice, notice shall be presumed to have been accepted and the employee shall stand retired automatically on expiry of notice period. But in this case the notice of voluntary retirement being defective for afore-stated reasons, the petitioner having thereafter twice requested the respondents for his reinstatement in service by revocation of suspension and by continuously receiving the subsistence allowance till his resignation was accepted, an order dated 2.2.2001 with effect from 1.2.2001, not only there was no deemed acceptance of the notice for retirement, the petitioner also acquiesced in the fact of his continuation in the service of the respondents, albeit, under sus-pension. The first prayer of the petitioner therefore deserves to be declined. 24. Adverting now to the question whether action of the respondents in accepting resignation of the petitioner is legally sustainable in law, the petitioner subsequent to his submitting the application dated 11.03.2000, 17.10.2000 and 02.12.2000 submitted one more application to the Registrar of the respondent-University on 30.12.2000 resigning from service with effect from 01.01.2001. It is this application of the petitioner which has been accepted by the Registrar vide order dated 02.02.2001 with effect from 01.02.2001 in terms of his prayer. It is this application of the petitioner which has been accepted by the Registrar vide order dated 02.02.2001 with effect from 01.02.2001 in terms of his prayer. Though the petitioner argued and also sought to substantiate his submissions that such resignation was submitted by the petitioner out of frustration upon being pressurized by administrative Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor who called him in his office and conveyed that VRS of the petitioner has been orally sanctioned but to his utter shock and surprise, the Registrar of the respondent University accepted his letter of resignation from service, not sufficient foundation has been laid in the pleadings or otherwise supported by the documents to show as to what kind of pressure. What kind of coercion and duress was he subjected to, that forced him to submit the letter of resignation, has not been detailed out. Petitioner has not even named the officer, who pressurized him in the office of the Vice Chancellor. The pleadings of the Writ Petition No.6888/2002 are in this respect absolutely ambiguous and vague. It is though a fact that the petitioner was under suspension at the time when he submitted letter of resignation but as has been argued by respondent, petitioner himself wanted his resignation to be accepted at the earliest so as to take up the legal profession and therefore it was accepted by the respondent. Even if therefore co-delinquent of the petitioner was later on reinstated in service, that cannot make the order of respondent accepting his resignation, illegal. 25. Moreover, the letter of the Assistant Registrar of the respondent University addressed to the Bar Council dated 31.10.2000 conveying that the petitioner has resigned from service on 11.03.2000 and that the matter is under consideration for VRS as per the conditions, does not in any manner improve the case of the petitioner because resignation and the fact about resignation and voluntary retirement come together in his application dated 11.03.2000. Even if the respondents have been in their communication to the Bar Council, permissibly because in response to the letter of the Bar Council where the petitioner had applied for enrollment as an Advocate have conveyed that the case of the petitioner for VRS was under consideration, that would not afford any basis to this court to hold that notice of the petitioner for voluntary retirement should be deemed accepted on expiry of period of three months. Even otherwise, the notice was defective in the first place. The prayer in the notice was not categorical for voluntary retirement as it was also at one place described as voluntary retirement and at two places the request was for resignation. Secondly, clear notice of three months was not given and notice period fell short by 43 days. Thirdly, petitioner thereafter by application dated 17.10.2000 requested for his reinstatement thus acquiescing in the fact of his continuation with the respondent even beyond three months from the date of submission of such notice and fourthly he accepted the subsistence allowance, thus considering that he still continued in service of the respondent, though under suspension but still continued. Petitioner even after acceptance of law of resignation submitted on an application dated 12.03.2000 to the Registrar of the respondent University requesting for payment of pensionary benefits, gratuity and arrears of salary on the premise that he had worked with the respondent for as many as 23 years. Ordinance 376F of the University Ordinances provides that a permanent whole time employee of the University shall compulsorily retire on having attained the age of 60 years on the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years. However, a whole time permanent teacher of the University who attains the age of 60 years on or after 1st January may be re-employed upto 30th June subject to the conditions that the pay of such teacher shall be the pay last drawn and re-employed teacher shall not be promoted to the next higher post during the period of re-employment. 26. 26. Ordinance 376F-I provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Ordinance 376-F, the appointing authority may permit a University employee, who has not attained the age of 60 years but who has rendered at-least 20 years continuous service in the University to retire pre-maturely on his request submitted at least 3 months in advance of the date from which he desires to retire, provided that such permission may be refused – (i) if the concerned University employee is under suspension, (ii) if a disciplinary proceeding for imposition of a major penalty is contemplated or is pending against the concerned employee and the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case is of the view that such disciplinary proceeding might result in imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from service, and (iii) if a prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched by the University in a court of law against the concerned employee. Clause (2) of Ordinance 376F-I enumerates the retirement benefits which may be granted to an employee who retired prematurely. Clause (3) of ordinance 376F-I provides that the authority competent to accept a request for premature retirement may in deserving cases, entertain a request for such retirement submitted less than three months in advance of the date from which the employee desires to retire and also permit an employee to withdraw his request for premature retirement before the same is accepted. But Regulation 26 of the Pension Scheme contained in Chapter-3 thereof, provides that resignation from service may entail forfeiture of past service. Clause (b) of this Regulation provides that the resignation of an appointment to take up, with proper permission, another appointment whether permanent or temporary, service in which counts in full or in part, may not be taken as resignation from service. 27. Since in the present case, besides the notice being defective and the petitioner was under suspension facing criminal trial, the respondents cannot be faulted if they did not act on said notice. Even if it is assumed that the notice was not defective and that clear notice of three months was served upon the respondents, they would still be well within their right to decline permission because the petitioner was under suspension and was facing criminal prosecution. It is another matter that now he has been acquitted. 28. Even if it is assumed that the notice was not defective and that clear notice of three months was served upon the respondents, they would still be well within their right to decline permission because the petitioner was under suspension and was facing criminal prosecution. It is another matter that now he has been acquitted. 28. The facts of the case in Devi Dayal Gupta, supra, were entirely different. In that case the appellant submitted conditional letter of resignation from service by enclosing the Cheque in lieu of one month's notice with an intention to prevent falsification of accounts. The Joint Secretary to the Government of India ordered not to take any action on the letter of resignation till the matter was examined. The appellant then submitted another application to the Joint Secretary expressing his gratitude for directing enquiry and further requested of being relieved of additional charge. Accordingly, the appellant was relieved of additional charge. The enquiry committee though did not find any substance in the compliant but accepted resignation of the appellant on the premise that he did not withdraw the letter of resignation and did not express any contrary intention in writing before it was accepted. In those facts, this court held that acceptance of resignation of the appellant amounted to removal which being arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal, is violative of the Rules concerned but also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 29. A coordinate bench of this court in Shanker Pushkarna, supra, was dealing with a case in which the employee concerned, who had completed 22 years of service, resigned and claimed benefit of pension. This court held that the pension scheme was introduced by the Bank after acceptance of the resignation by the petitioner and prior to pension scheme, there was actually no difference in resignation and voluntary retirement. There did not exist any provision for forfeiture of past service, on acceptance of the resignation. The word 'resignation' used in Regulation 22(1) for qualifying service for the purpose of pensionary benefits was restricted only to those who have rendered less than qualifying service therefore the appellant cannot be deprived of the pensionary benefits. But, in the present case there was very much the provision of forfeiture of past service upon resignation very much existed on the date on which the petitioner submitted such resignation. 30. But, in the present case there was very much the provision of forfeiture of past service upon resignation very much existed on the date on which the petitioner submitted such resignation. 30. This court in Sohan Lal Soni vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2007(2) RLW 1044, was dealing with the case where government servant had resigned after completing 12 years of service and then filed writ petition with the prayer that resignation be treated as voluntary retirement. On considera-tion of number of Supreme Court judgments, it was held that the government servant, who retire voluntarily and those who resigns from service are two different and distinction classes and regulated by separate rules. Effect and consequence thereof relinquishment of service by these two modes are entirely different. So resignation can be tendered irrespective of period of service rendered and its acceptance depends on discretion of the employer, whereas for voluntary retirement, employee is required to render requisite period of service, which is his right and entitles him to receive retiral benefits. 31. The Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India and Another vs. Cecil Dennis Solomon and Another – (2004) 9 SCC 461 , was dealing with the case where certain employees of the bank resigned from service and received the superannuation benefits under the contributory provisions and gratuity schemes. The Reserve Bank Pension Regulation, 1990 were later introduced, which provided for the benefit of pension to those, who retire voluntarily. Rejecting the argument that both – resignation and voluntary retirement, involved voluntary acts and therefore they be treated alike for grant of pension, the Supreme Court in para no. 10 and 11 of the report, held as under: “10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions "superannuation", "voluntary retirement", "compulsory retirement" and "resignation" convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Thus both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it an only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retrial benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retrial benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank vs. P.K. Mittal AIR 1989 SC 1083 , on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as there was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the employer. In Union of India vs. Gopal Chand Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301 , it was held in the case of a judge of the High Court having regard to Art. 217 of the Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of his own violation, chooses. But where there is a provision empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer can exercise the power. 11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam – AIR 1978 SC 17 , while the Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his wish, there is a corresponding right of the government servant to voluntarily retire from service. Voluntary retirement is a condition of service created by statutory provision whereas resignation is an implied term of any employer- employee relationship. 32. The Supreme Court in UCO Bank and Others vs. Sanwar Mal – (2004) 4 SCC 412 , while rejecting the arguments that forfeiture of past service in the event of acceptance would amount to penalty made an elaborate discussion on the question of distinction between these two modes of relinquishment of service, which is as under: “9. ... The word "resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in common parlance. ... The word "resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment (sic is the same) but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions "resignation" and "retirement" have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently It constitutes a complete code by itself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship between voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting resignation vis-a-vis voluntary retirement and acceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations disqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claiming pension, the respondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees. The view we have taken in support by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Ceil Dennis Solomon. Before concluding we may state that Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the fund. The view we have taken in support by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Ceil Dennis Solomon. Before concluding we may state that Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the fund. Such employees have received their retiral benefits earlier. The Pension Scheme, as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence, there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The Pension Scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criterion, the Scheme disentitles such category of employees as are out of it.” 33. In Union of India and Others vs. Braj Nandan Singh – (2005) 8 SCC 325 , again the Supreme Court was called upon to examine Rule 26 of the CCA Rules, as to forfeiture of service benefits on resignation, and their Lordships in para 5 held as under:- “5. ........... Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, Sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned Counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement to pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement to pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded form the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) an (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision shall be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the learned Counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rule (l) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as qualified in Rule 49. The said rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement.” 34. The Supreme Court in Sheel Kumar Jain vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and Others – (2011) 12 SCC 197 held that since voluntary retirement, unlike resignation, does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead qualifies for pension, the appellant to whom the 1995 Scheme applied cannot be said to have resigned from service and as such the person voluntarily retiring may not be entitled to pension under Scheme in question. 35. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in both the writ petitions. The writ petitions, being devoid of merit, are hereby dismissed. A copy of this order be also placed on the file of Writ Petition No.6888/2002.