ORDER : As both the writ applications involve common facts and questions of law, they are taken up together for disposal by this common order. 2. Susama Das is the petitioner in both the writ applications. She was elected as Panchayat Samiti Member (Samiti Sabhya) of Chikalakhandi Grama Panchayat in the election held on 17-2-2012 defeating Kumari Kabita Behera (opposite party No.1 in W.P. (C) No. 18405 of 2013) the only contesting candidate. On being so elected, she subsequently contested for the post of Chairman of Chhatrapur Panchayat Samiti. She was declared elected as Chairman of Chhatrapur Panchayat Samiti defeating Prativa Behera (opposite party No. 1 in W.P.(C) No. 18405 of 2013). Both Prativa Behera and Kumari Kabita Behera moved the Election Tribunal, i.e., Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chhatra-pur vide Election Petition No. 1 of 2012 and Election Petition No.2 of 2012 respectively challenging the election of Susama Das as Chairman of Chhatrapur Panchayat Samiti and Panchayat Samiti Member of Chikalakhandi Grama Panchayat on the ground that she (Susama Das) had given birth to her third child named Chinmaya Das after the cut off date, i.e., 21-4-1995. 3. Learned Election Tribunal, after hearing, dismissed the aforesaid election petitions obliging Kumari Kabita Behera and Prativa Behera to move the learned District Judge, Ganjam in Election Appeal No. 6 of 2012 and Election Appeal No. 7 of 2012 respectively for the redressal of their grievances regarding alleged illegal election of the present petitioner-Susama Das. Learned District Judge, Ganjam, after hearing, allowed Election Appeal No. 6 of 2012 and declared Kumari Kabita Behera (opposite party No. 1 in W.P. (C) No. 18405 of 2013) to have been elected, as she had polled second highest vote in the election for the post of Samiti Sabhya of Chikalakhandi Grama Panchayat and she was the only other candidate, who had contested. Election Appeal No. 7 of 2012 filed by Prativa Behera (opposite party No. 1 in W.P. (C) No. 18406 of 2013) was, however, allowed in part and the prayer of said Prativa Behera to the effect that she be declared elected as Chairman of Chhatrapur Panchayat Samiti was negatived. 4. Election Appeal No. 7 of 2012 filed by Prativa Behera (opposite party No. 1 in W.P. (C) No. 18406 of 2013) was, however, allowed in part and the prayer of said Prativa Behera to the effect that she be declared elected as Chairman of Chhatrapur Panchayat Samiti was negatived. 4. The findings in the Election Appeal No. 6 of 2013 in favour of Kumari Kabita Behera has been impugned by the present petitioner-Susma Das in W.P.(C) No. 18405 of 2013 and findings in Election Appeal No. 7 of 2013 filed by Prativa Behera has been impugned by said Susama Das in W.P.(C) No. 18406 of 2013. In both the writ applications, the issue involved is, whether the third child of Susama Das was born before the cut off date (21-4-1995) or after the cut off date. 5. It is the case of opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications (as election petitioners) that the third child of the petitioner-Susama Das was born after the cut off date, i.e., 21-4-1995. It was averred by them in the election petitions that the first child of the petitioner-Susama Das was born on 19-4-1989, second child was born on 26-7-1990 and the third child was born on 31-5-1996. They relied on the information provided by the Headmaster of Upper Primary School, Rikapalli, Chhatrapur NAC, Ganjam and claimed that the petitioner is disqualified to contest the election as per Section-45 (1) (v) of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959. 6. The petitioner, upon notice, filed her written statement stating therein that her third child was not born on 31-5-1996 and the correct date of his birth is 28-5-1994, which is before the cut off date, i.e., 21-4-1995. It was specifically averred that initially her (petitioners) third child was admitted in the Government U.P. School Kumarbegapalli on 5-7-1999 and the School Admission Register shows that the date of his birth is 28-5-1994. Subsequently, he was admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School and the school authority, having failed to record his correct date of birth, wrongly entered the date of birth as 31-5-1996, which remained uncorrected. Subsequently, he was admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School and the school authority, having failed to record his correct date of birth, wrongly entered the date of birth as 31-5-1996, which remained uncorrected. The petitioner, from her side relied on the original record of birth maintained in Community Health Centre (II) Municipentha, the Birth Certificate issued by the Medical Officer, which indicates that the third child of the petitioner was born on 28-5-1994, and the school admission register of Kumarbegapalli U.P. School among other documents. 7. Learned Election Tribunal, on assessment of the evidence and on going through the records and hearing the parties, accepted the contention of the petitioner so far as the date of birth of her third child on 28-5-1994 is concerned and dismissed both the election petitions. 8. Opposite party No. 1 in both writ applications preferred appeals before the learned District Judge, Ganjam. Learned District Judge, Ganjam also on thorough scrutiny of the evidence on record and after hearing the parties, set aside the findings of learned Election Tribunal and held that the date of birth of the third child of the petitioner to be 28-5-1994 is not free from suspicion and the date of birth as entered in the Rikapalli School in presence of the husband of the petitioner, which is 31-5-1996 is the correct date of birth. 31-5-1996, being a date after the cut off date, i.e., 21-4-1995, learned District Judge, Ganjam answered the issue in affirmative so far as the election dispute is concerned and allowed the appeals. 9. Both parties before the Election Tribunal adduced oral and documentary evidence. So far as the age of third child of the present petitioner-Susama Das is concerned, the issue revolves round basically the documentary evidence adduced by the parties. While the opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications, namely, Kumari Kabita Behera and Prativa Behera (petitioners in the election petition) tried to prove that the third child of the present petitioner-Susama Das (opposite party No. 1 in the election petition) was born on 31-5-1996, the petitioners attempt was to prove that her third child was born on 28-5-1994. The oral testimony on either side is basically explanatory and justification of the documentary evidence adduced. The oral testimony on either side is basically explanatory and justification of the documentary evidence adduced. I have to find out as to how far the present opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications, namely, Kumari Kabita Behera and Prativa Behera (petitioners before the Election Tribunal) have been successful in proving the date of birth of third child of the present petitioner-Susama Das to be 31-5-1996. 10. As in both the election petitions same set of evidence have been produced by both the election petitioners to prove the age of third child of the present petitioner-Susama Das, said documentary evidence are described, as they are exhibited in Election Petition No. 2 of 2012. Ext. 1 is the Admission Register of Rikapalli U.P. School commencing from 1998-1999. Ext.1/a is the Admission SI. No. 1911 dated 2-7-2001 relating to the admission of third child of Susama Das. Ext.2 is the Certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education Odisha in respect of third child of Susama Das. Ext. 3 is the letter dated 1-5-2012 issued by the Office of the Registrar of Birth and Death-cum-Medical Officer in-charge, Community Health Centre-II, Muncipentho, District-Ganjam showing that no birth registration had been made in favour of Chinmaya Das (third child of petitioner-Susama Das) for the year 1994 to 1996 as per the office record. We are not concerned with Exts. 4 and 5, as those are the documents relating to birth of first child and second child of the petitioner-Susama Das. Ext. 7 is the affidavit sworn by Pradip Kumar Das, husband of petitioner Susama Das on 30-3-2012 showing the statement of Pradip Kumar Das regarding change of date of birth of his third child from 31-5-1996 to 28-5-1994. This Court is however, concerned with Ext. 1, Ext.1/a and Ext.2 so far as proving the factum of age of the third child of the petitioner-Susama Das is concerned. 11. Ext. 1 has been proved by the Headmaster of U.P. School, Rikapalli (P.W.1) so also Ext. 1/a. According to P.W.1, Ext. 1 is the Admission Register of Rikapalli U.P. School commencing from the educational year 1998-1999 and the same is maintained in the official capacity. Ext.1/a is the admission SI. No. 1911 dated 2-7-2001 relating to admission of third child of Susama Das and as per the record, Pradip Kumar Das had admitted Chinmaya Das. At that time, one Panchanan Achary was the Headmaster. Ext.1/a is the admission SI. No. 1911 dated 2-7-2001 relating to admission of third child of Susama Das and as per the record, Pradip Kumar Das had admitted Chinmaya Das. At that time, one Panchanan Achary was the Headmaster. As per Ext. 1/a, the date of birth of third child of Susama Das is 31-5-1996. P.W.1 has further stated that the date of birth of a student is entered in the admission register as per the version of the parents. This evidence of P.W.1 gets corroboration from the evidence of present petitioner Susama Das (D.W.1) on the point that her husband Pradip Kumar Das had admitted her third child in Class-I of Rikapalli U.P. School. Pradip Kumar Das, who was examined as D.W.4 in paragraph-17 of his evidence, has testified that he admitted his third child in Rikapalli School without obtaining the Transfer Certificate from Kumar Begapalli School and also he signed in the School Admission Register. Thorough scrutiny of Ext. 1 also shows that one Pradip Kumar Das has signed in the admission register in the column meant for parents and he has put his signature in English. 12. No objection is raised or could have been raised by Miss Deepali Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner as regards the admissibility of Ext. 1 on the ground that the same is not an official record or a public register inasmuch as it is an admitted fact that such an entry, regarding date of birth, of third child, i.e., 31-5-1996 in that register, i.e., Ext. 1 is explained to be wrongly made under certain compulsions by the petitioners husband himself, though such explanation is prevaricating. It is, however, argued by Miss Deepali Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner that once such wrong entry regarding date of birth was made in the admission register vide Ext. 1. It was necessarily carried forward to the Matriculation Certificate vide Ext. 2 and steps have been taken by the petitionerss husband to get the date of birth corrected by applying to the Board of Secondary Education, Odisha through proper channel, which is assailed by the counsel for the opposite party No. 1 to be an action to obviate the disqualification attached to the petitioner-Susama Das under Section 45 (1) (v) of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite parties in both the writ applications relies on some decisions of this Court and submits that the Matriculation Certificate is a more authentic and more reliable document. (see Chandrakanti Jena v. Banalata Jena and others, 2004 (Supp) OLR 335 : (2004 AIHC 1365 (Ori); Ch. Sudhakar Reddy v. T. Kesab Reddy and others, 111 (2011) CLT 709 : (AIR 2011 (NOC) 282 (Ori)). 14. Ext. 1 is a document admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. To render a document admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry, that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record, secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and thirdly, it must have been made by public servant in discharge of his offical duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. Honble Supreme Court in the case of Biratmal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796 in paragraph-14 of the judgment has held that, if the entry in the ScholarsRegister regarding the date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value, but, if it is given by a stranger or by someone else, who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. 15. So far as Ext. 1 is concerned, the same is a public register and Ext. 1/a is an entry in a public Register or record, i.e., School Admission Register of a Government U.P. School. Secondly, the entry in question throws light on the fact in issue, i.e., date of birth of the third child of petitioner-Susama Das. Thirdly, the entry has been made by the Headmaster of the concerned school in due discharge of his official duty. All the three ingredients of Section-35 of the Evidence Act having been satisfied, Ext.1 and Ext.1/a are held to be admissible in evidence. Learned lower appellate court, on thorough discussion of the materials on record, has rightly held that the date of birth recorded in the said documents vide Ext. All the three ingredients of Section-35 of the Evidence Act having been satisfied, Ext.1 and Ext.1/a are held to be admissible in evidence. Learned lower appellate court, on thorough discussion of the materials on record, has rightly held that the date of birth recorded in the said documents vide Ext. 1 has evidentiary value inasmuch as the entry regarding the date of birth of the petitioners third child in Ext.1 has been made on the basis of the information given by the present petitioners husband Pradip Kumar Das, who himself has admitted such fact in his evidence and there is further material to show that Pradip Kumar Das has signed the register vide Ext.1 in English at the time of admission of his third child. Taking into consideration all the aspects, it was held by the learned lower appellate court that the date of birth entered in the school admission register of Rikapalli U.P. School vide Ext. 1 and carried forward to the Matriculation Certificate vide Ext.2 is the correct date of birth of the petitioners third child, and such third child having taken birth after the cut off date, i.e., 21-4-1995, the petitioner (respondent before the lower appellate court) is disqualified. 16. Miss Deepali Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned lower appellate court, being a Judge of fact could not have ignored the general tendency of people to lower the age of the boy or a girl at the time of his/her admission so that later in life he or she would have an advantage while seeking public service etc. She relies on the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha and others, AIR 1965 SC 282 to substantiate her contention. 17. In the aforesaid case, question of age of the appellant was the issue. The appellant had asserted that he was born on October, 15, 1935, whereas the respondents had asserted that he was born on October, 15, 1937. After discussing oral evidence, and documentary evidence including the reasoning of the High Court on the issue of age, Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded to discuss Ext.2, Ext. 8 and Ext. The appellant had asserted that he was born on October, 15, 1935, whereas the respondents had asserted that he was born on October, 15, 1937. After discussing oral evidence, and documentary evidence including the reasoning of the High Court on the issue of age, Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded to discuss Ext.2, Ext. 8 and Ext. 18 adduced in that case, which are admission register of Aurangabad Town School, where the appellant had taken his admission as a student, the application made by the appellant for the post of Sub-Inspector showing his date of birth and the Certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board for his passing the Matriculation examination respectively. Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled in favour of admissibility of the school admission register under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, but refused to accept the date of birth mentioned in the school admission register and the certificate issued by Board of Secondary Examination as correct date of birth, as it was suggested that incorrect statement was made at the request of the person regarding the date of birth of the appellant, who had admitted him to the school. The request was also made, it is suggested, to make him appear two years younger than what he really was, so that later in life he would have an advantage while seeking public service for which a minimum age of eligibility is prescribed. 18. Taking into consideration all the aforesaid aspects, Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-20 of the judgment held thus: .............The appellants case is that once this wrong-entry was made in the admission register it was necessarily carried forward to the Matriculation Certificate and was also adhered to in the application for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police. This explanation was accepted by the Election Tribunal but was rejected by the High Court as untrustworthy. However much one may condemn such an act of making a false statement of age with a view to secure advantage in getting public service, a judge of facts cannot ignore the position that in actual life this happens not infrequently. We find it impossible to say that the Election Tribunal was wrong in accepting the appellants explanation. However much one may condemn such an act of making a false statement of age with a view to secure advantage in getting public service, a judge of facts cannot ignore the position that in actual life this happens not infrequently. We find it impossible to say that the Election Tribunal was wrong in accepting the appellants explanation. Taking all the circumstances into consideration we are of opinion that the explanation may very well be true and so it will not be proper for the court to base any conclusion about the appellants age on the entry in these three documents vide Ext. 2, Ext. 8 and Ext. 18. 19. The fact in the present case can however be distinguished. The aforesaid presumption regarding the popular tendency cannot be drawn in the present case inasmuch as the admission in Rikapalli U.P. School was made entering the date of birth of third child of the present petitioner as 31-5-1996 in presence of the Childs father Pradip Kumar Das and such a fact is an admitted one, though the date of birth is stated to be incorrectly reflected and explanation has been given for such incorrect reflection of the date of birth. The case Biratmal Singhvi ( AIR 1988 SC 1796 ) (supra) applies squarely to the facts of the present case, as the date of birth of the third child of the petitioner has been entered in Ext. 1 as per version of the Childs father and not a stranger. 20. Both the parties have adduced positive evidence. The election petitioners (present opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications) have adduced positive evidence to show that actual date of birth of the third child of the petitioner Susama Das is 31-5-1996. The petitioner-Susama Das, on the other hand, by adducing positive evidence, has tried to prove that the date of birth of her third child is 28-5-1994. There being positive evidence from both the sides, there is evidence of competing probabilities on record. The learned Election Tribunal, without attaching much importance to the evidence adduced by the election petitioners, accepted the date of birth of third child of the petitioner as 28-5-1994 on the basis of entry made in Ext. A, as that was the first school. There being positive evidence from both the sides, there is evidence of competing probabilities on record. The learned Election Tribunal, without attaching much importance to the evidence adduced by the election petitioners, accepted the date of birth of third child of the petitioner as 28-5-1994 on the basis of entry made in Ext. A, as that was the first school. Learned lower appellate court, however, has painstakingly scanned evidence from both the sides and has come to the finding that there are many suspicious features so far the evidence adduced by the petitioner-Susama Das to show the date of birth of her third child as 28-5-1994 is concerned. Let me find out whether the evidence adduced by the petitioner is more probable to displace the evidence adduced by the election petitioners (present opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications). 21. Ext. A is the Transfer Certificate issued by the Headmaster, U.P. School, Kumar Begapalli on 20-3-2012. Said certificate has been obtained for the purpose of Census report. At the time of leaving the school, the petitioner is shown to be reading in Class-IV and the date of his leaving the school is mentioned as 1-1-2003. On the other hand, Ext.1, the admission register of Rikapalli U. P. School shows that third child of the petitioner Susama Das was admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School on 2-7-2001. According to Pradip Kumar Das (husband of the present petitioner Susama Das), his third child was admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School in Class-I without any Transfer Certificate. It is suspicious as to how a student continued in two schools from 2-7-2001 up to 1-1-2003, the date of leaving Kumar Begapalli U.P. School. Further, the Transfer Certificate has been obtained on 20-3-2012 for the purpose of Census, though by that time, the Census was already over. On 1-1-2003, third child of the petitioner Susama Das was reading in Class-IV, but on 2-7-2001, he was admitted in Class- I in Rikapalli U.P. School as per Ext. 1. Such a fact would also go to show that the assertion of the petitioner and her husband that their third child was transferred and admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School, when he was reading in Class-II is not correct. This certificate vide Ext.A shows that the third child of petitioner-Susama Das is shown to have read in two schools at a time and the document vide Ext. This certificate vide Ext.A shows that the third child of petitioner-Susama Das is shown to have read in two schools at a time and the document vide Ext. A has been obtained on 20-3-2012 to obviate the disqualification attached to her (petitioner) under Section 45 (1) (v) of the Panchayat Samiti Act. Ext. B, the Birth Certificate issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death-cum-Medical Officer-in-charge, CHC-II, Muncipentho, Ganjam was issued on 26-7-2006. According to Pradip Kumar Das D.W.4, as he was contesting for the post of Sarpanch of Podapadar Grama Panchayat in 2007, the said certificate was obtained at that time. This document cannot be said to have any probability to displace the evidence vide Ext. 1 and Ext. 2. The other document, i.e., admission register of Kumar Begapalli U.P. School vide Ext. C has been proved by the Headmistress-in-charge of Government U.P. School, Kumar Begapalli (D.W.2). In cross-examination, D.W.2 has testified that Ext. C does not contain any seal and signature of the Headmaster, S.I. of Schools on the front page so also no certificate is appended on this Ext. C and the same does not carry any page-mark. She has further testified that the first page of Ext. C has been corrected without any initial and there is no year written in Ext. C after the year 2002. In paragraph-5 of her cross-examination, D.W.2 has testified that as per the rule, in every year, a new admission register is being made. Ext. C shows that the front page of the register has been corrected without any initial. There is no page-mark. 24 numbers of old sheets are there in the register and 22 sheets are new papers stitched subsequently and there is no seal and signature of D.I. of Schools in Ext. C in any page. All the aforesaid features make Ext. C a suspicious document. Besides, the aforesaid features and facts, the learned lower appellate court has disbelieved the explanations of the petitioner-Susama Das and her husband so far as the reason of admission of their third child at Rikapalli U. P. School showing her date of birth as 31-5-1996 is concerned. All the aforesaid features make Ext. C a suspicious document. Besides, the aforesaid features and facts, the learned lower appellate court has disbelieved the explanations of the petitioner-Susama Das and her husband so far as the reason of admission of their third child at Rikapalli U. P. School showing her date of birth as 31-5-1996 is concerned. In the counter affidavit, it is asserted by the petitioner-Susama Das that the School authority of Rikapalli U.P. School failed to record the correct date of birth of her third child and the date of birth was wrongly entered as 31-5-1996 which remains uncorrected by oversight and want of proper information. In her evidence, however, she has testified that her husband Pradip Kumar Das readmitted her third child in Rikapalli Government U.P. School on 2-7-2001 and the Headmaster of the school advised that the child should be admitted in Class-I and he put his date of birth as 31-5-1996 in the Rikapalli U.P. School register, as her third child was found over-aged to be admitted in Class I. Such prevaricating explanation has been taken note of by the learned lower appellate court to add to the suspicion so far as the date of birth entered in Kumar Begapalli U.P. School as 28-5-1994 is concerned. In view of such suspicious features in the evidence adduced by the petitioner, the same cannot be held to be more probable that the evidence adduced by opposite party No. 1 in both the writ applications. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned lower appellate court in the present case, has illegally taken into consideration the weaknesses in the evidence of the returned candidate, i.e., the present petitioner to hold that the case of the adversary, i.e., election petitioners has been proved. And such an approach by the learned lower appellate court is against the established principle of law. Perusal of the lower appellate court judgments in both the appeals show that learned court below has not at all approached the evidence in the manner as alleged by the counsel for the petitioner. He has discussed evidence adduced by both the parties and while assessing the evidence of the election petitioners, he has taken into consideration those pieces of present petitioners evidence, which support the election petitioners. He has discussed evidence adduced by both the parties and while assessing the evidence of the election petitioners, he has taken into consideration those pieces of present petitioners evidence, which support the election petitioners. For example, the election petitioners have asserted that husband of petitioner Susama Das got his third child admitted in Rikapalli U.P. School. Such fact has been admitted by Susama Das (D.W.1) and her husband (D.W.4) in their evidence. Learned lower appellate court has taken into consideration such evidence adduced by the present petitioners, which in fact support the election petitioners. The approach by the learned lower appellate court in reassessing the evidence cannot therefore be found to be faulty, as he has followed the well established norms of appreciation of evidence. 23. Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts and discussions and especially a thorough discussion of the materials available on record by the learned lower appellate court, I do not find any infirmity or patent error in the findings arrived at by the learned lower appellate court. 24. Accordingly, the writ applications are found to be devoid of any merit and the same are dismissed. Petition dismissed.