JUDGMENT This appeal by defendants under Section 100 of C.P.C. is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28/2/2004 passed by Additional District Judge, Sabalgarh, District Morena in Civil Appeal No. 31-A/2001; reversing the judgment and decree dated 15/10/2001 passed by Civil Judge, Class I, Sabalgarh in Civil Suit No. 33-A/1998; by which though on merits the trial Court has recorded positive findings in favour of plaintiffs; however, dismissed the suit while answering issue No. 4 as regards pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. First appellate Court has affirmed the findings of the trial Court on appeal by plaintiffs on merits of the suit as well as set aside the judgment of the trial Court on issue No. 4 relating to pecuniary jurisdiction. 2. Appeal is admitted on the following substantial question of law: 'Whether, the first appellate Court was justified reversing the findings of the trial Court as regards pecuniary jurisdiction ?' 3. Facts necessary for disposal of this appeal in a narrow compass are that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Pator and open land of house No.41 by stating themselves to be the owner of entire suit land ad-measuring 7 biswa falling in survey No.461, village Sabalgarh, Ward No.15 against defendants. Defendant No.3 Kalawati on 13/3/1995 had executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 in respect of the suit land. On the day of sale deed, defendant No.2 Babulal was residing in that Pator. Defendant No.1 Nathi and defendant No.2 Babulal and one Ramcharan are real brothers. The suit land was purchased by father of the plaintiffs Moti for his own residence in samwat 2015. There was an open land and Pator adjacent to the suit house of the ownership of Late Moti. Moti died 10 years preceding to the date of filing of instant suit. The plaintiff thereafter also purchased another open land adjacent to the suit land and constructed a house, where he used to live with his family and had also permitted defendant No. 2 Babulal to live therein. The house of the defendant No. 1 and his two brothers were on the western side of the suit house. Share of defendant No. 2 was sold by defendant No. 1 to one Murari Vaishya and ousted the defendant No. 2. The house of the defendant No. 1 and his two brothers were on the western side of the suit house. Share of defendant No. 2 was sold by defendant No. 1 to one Murari Vaishya and ousted the defendant No. 2. The plaintiff allowed Babulal to live in suit house where he was living with his family. As defendants tried to forcibly take possession of the suit property, though they had no right, title or interest over the same, plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants for declaration and injunction. During pendency of the suit, an amendment was brought seeking declaration of the alleged sale deed dated 13/3/1995 executed by defendant No. 3 Kalawati wife of Nathilal (defendant No. 1) in favour of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 as null and void. 4. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 by filing joint written statement have denied the plaint allegations. It is submitted that since the suit property is not registered in the name of the plaintiffs in the municipal records, the plaintiffs cannot claim title over the suit land. It is also submitted that description of suit property is absolutely vague. It is submitted that suit property belong to one Pathua and after his death, his daughter/defendant No. 3 Kalawati become the owner and came in possession thereof. Accordingly, she has executed the sale deed dated 13/3/1995 to defendant Nos. 4 and 5. Defendant No. 2 Babulal has filed written statement supporting the claim of the plaintiff. 5. Based on the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed issues and allowed the parties to lead evidence. The trial Court upon critical evaluation answered issue Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of the plaintiff, however, trial court dismissed the suit on the ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The first appellate Court on appeal at the instance of plaintiffs, re-appreciated the evidence on record. The first appellate Court has found that upon perusal of the Khasra Panchshala Ex. P/1 from Samwat 2021 to 2024, Ex. P/3 of Samwat 2015-2016, Ex. P/4 of Samwat 2025 and Ex. P/5 of Samwat 2041 to 2045, Trace Map, Ex. P/2, Khasra Ex. P/6 of year 1992-93, it is evident that the suit land falling in survey No. 1175 new number 461 is of the ownership of Nagar Palika by virtue of Patta in its name wherein the suit property is falling. P/4 of Samwat 2025 and Ex. P/5 of Samwat 2041 to 2045, Trace Map, Ex. P/2, Khasra Ex. P/6 of year 1992-93, it is evident that the suit land falling in survey No. 1175 new number 461 is of the ownership of Nagar Palika by virtue of Patta in its name wherein the suit property is falling. Thereafter in khasra of Samwat 2015 name of late Moti has been shown in possession of the Patore. There is no mention in the record that Moti has ever been dispossessed by the Nagar Palika from the suit land. As such, late Moti was found to be in possession of the suit property as per record. The first appellate Court has further found that the defendants failed to establish that the suit property belong to Pathua as there is no documentary evidence to that effect. Accordingly, the first appellate Court has found that the alleged sale deed dated 13/3/1995, said to have been executed by defendant No. 3 Kalawati in favour of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 as null and void. As such, the findings of the trial Court as regards, the merits of the claim of the plaintiffs was confirmed. On issue as regards pecuniary jurisdiction, the first appellate Court has discussed the matter in paras 24 to 26, wherein, the first appellate Court has found that the trial Court has committed error of law and fact while dismissing the suit on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction. It has been found that plaintiffs have sought declaration of sale deed dated 13/3/1995 as null and void. Admittedly, the plaintiffs were not party to the aforesaid sale deed and therefore, plaintiffs were not required to affix ad valorem court fees on the value of the sale deed shown. Instead fix court fees was rightly paid and affixed by the plaintiffs. As such the trial Court had pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 50,000/- to try the suit. Of course, if the plaintiffs were party to the sale deed, they were required to pay ad valorem court-fees in terms of Section 7(iv) (d) of the Court-fees Act, but that is not the case here and therefore, the trial Court has committed error of law having dismissed the suit for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. 50,000/- to try the suit. Of course, if the plaintiffs were party to the sale deed, they were required to pay ad valorem court-fees in terms of Section 7(iv) (d) of the Court-fees Act, but that is not the case here and therefore, the trial Court has committed error of law having dismissed the suit for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. At this stage, reference may also be made over to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh and others, (2010) 12 SCC 112 ; wherein; in para 7 ( AIR 2010 SC 2807 , Para 6) it has been held as below: '7. Whether the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not biding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently, A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fees on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17 (iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17 (iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem court fees as provided under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act.' 6. Thus, in the light of aforesaid judgment, if the person non-executant seeking declaration of a sale deed as null and void and the same is not binding on him, he is only required to pay the fix court fees whereas, in a case where a person/executant to the sale deed seeks cancellation of the sale deed as null and void, he is required to pay ad valorem court fees. 7. Having considered the judgments impugned and the record of the case, this Court is of the view that as regard merits of the claim of the plaintiff, both the Courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact which do not warrant any interference. As regards pecuniary jurisdiction, the first appellate Court has rightly reversed the findings of the trial Court. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not party to the alleged sale deed dated 13/3/1995. They merely sought a declaration that sale deed be declared as null and void and therefore, in the light of law laid down by Hon. Supreme Court in Suhrid Singh, ( AIR 2010 SC 2807 ) (supra), the plaintiffs were required to pay only the fix courts fees and therefore, the trial Court was having pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. Resultantly, the decree passed by the first appellate Court to the effect that defendants were restrained from dispossessing the plaintiffs is held to the fully justified. Accordingly, substantial question of law is answered in affirmative. Instant appeal at the instance of defendants is dismissed being sans merits. Appeal dismissed.