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2014 DIGILAW 608 (MAD)

G. v. Lakshminarayanan VS M. E. Devarajan (Deceased)

2014-03-07

N.KIRUBAKARAN

body2014
Judgment : 1. The appellants are before this court challenging the order of learned Appellate Court declining to extend the time to file cross appeal. 2. The suit in O.S.No.6703 of 2004 was filed by the petitioners against the respondents seeking permanent injunction. Another suit O.S.No.988 of 2005 was filed by the father of the respondents seeking mandatory injunction, for damages and permanent injunction. The suit filed by the petitioners herein was decreed and the suit filed by the respondents was dismissed. Therefore, the respondents filed appeal suits in A.S.Nos.136 and 137 of 2007. The petitioners took out an application seeking extension of time to file cross appeal under Order 41 Rule 22 and the said application was dismissed. The said order is challenged before this court. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the cross appeal filed by the petitioners have to be taken on file as the appeal has not been disposed of and as the points raised therein are required to be considered at the time of disposal of the appeal. Consequently he relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Mahadev Govind Charge & others vs. The Special and Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka reported in 2011(4) CTC 620 and particularly relying upon paragraphs 21, 22 and 57 of the judgement contended that Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC provides the court below to extend the time for filing cross objection/cross appeal. Therefore, the order of the trial court is liable to be set aside and the revision has to be allowed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the petitioners raised only the legal points namely jurisdiction and court fees and the same are to be raised at the earliest point of time, whereas, the petitioners took their own sweet time and tried to file the petition to receive cross appeal only when the matter was posted for argument. He would further submit that even before the trial court, the same application was filed and was dismissed. Thereafter on revision, this court also confirmed the dismissal order. Therefore, the question of going into the said facts further again does not raise. 5. He would further submit that even before the trial court, the same application was filed and was dismissed. Thereafter on revision, this court also confirmed the dismissal order. Therefore, the question of going into the said facts further again does not raise. 5. De hors of the legal points on merits, this court is bound to note that the party, who approached this court in 2004, still is unable to get the finality of the case and the said proceedings are dragged on at the lower appellate stage itself for the past seven years without disposal. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the appeal was numbered on 13.3.2007 and notice was served on the petitioners herein for the hearing on 13.4.2007. On 13.4.2007, vakalath was filed on behalf of the petitioners. As per Order 41 Rule 22, time limit for filing cross appeal is one month from the date of service of the notice or from the date of first hearing. In this case, the first hearing date was on 13.4.2007 and the time is deemed to have expired on 13.5.2007. In view of the intervention of the summer holidays, the matter was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents on 30.6.2008. Thereafter the matter has been adjourned only for argument on the side of the petitioners till 14.7.2008. Reply argument for the petitioners was heard on 15.7.2008. Thereafter, the respondents were heard on 16.7.2008 and the matter has been posted on 24.7.2008 for judgement. On 24.7.2008 the petitioners filed CMP.No.1184 of 2008 to reopen the case. 6. It is seen that the respondents fairly said no objection on 25.7.2008 and thereafter, the case was posted on 28.7.2008 for filing the xerox copy of the judgement. On 30.7.2008 there was no representation on the side of the petitioners inspite of the fact that the counsel for the respondents was present. Therefore, the matter was posted for judgement on 5.8.2008. On 5.8.2008 the matter was reopened and called for clarification on 20.8.2008 and 8.9.2008. The Original plaintiff M.E.Devarajan died and steps were taken to bring the legal heirs on record. After following all the formalities, the matter was posted for argument on 12.1.2009. On 19.2.2009, though the learned counsel for the respondents was present and there was no representation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Original plaintiff M.E.Devarajan died and steps were taken to bring the legal heirs on record. After following all the formalities, the matter was posted for argument on 12.1.2009. On 19.2.2009, though the learned counsel for the respondents was present and there was no representation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. When the matter was posted for argument on 6.7.2009, the petition to receive cross objection was filed and thereafter notice was ordered and after enquiry, the Trial Court dismissed the said application. The order of the Trial Court is sustainable in view of the Order 41 Rule 22 of C.P.C. The categorical declarations were made by the Supreme Court in Mahadev Govind Charge & others vs. The Special and Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka reported in 2011 (4) CTC 620 at paragraph 55 of the judgement, which is usefully extracted as follows: "55. If we examine the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code in its correct perspective and in light of the above stated principles then the period of limitation of one month stated therein would commence from the service of notice of the day of hearing of Appeal on the Respondent in that Appeal. The hearing contemplated under Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code normally is the final hearing of the Appeal but this rule is not without any exception. The exception could be where a party Respondent Appears at the time of admission of the Appeal, as a caveator or otherwise and argues the Appeal on merits as well as while passing of interim orders and the Court has admitted the Appeal in the presence of that party and directs the Appeal to be heard finally on a future date actual or otherwise, then it has to be taken as complete compliance of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code and thereafter, the Applicant who has Appeared himself or through his pleader cannot claim that period mentioned under the said provision of the Code would commence only when the Respondent is served with a fresh notice of hearing of the Appeal in the required format. If this argument is accepted it would amount to travesty of justice and inevitably result in delay while causing serious prejudice to the interest of the parties and administration of justice. If this argument is accepted it would amount to travesty of justice and inevitably result in delay while causing serious prejudice to the interest of the parties and administration of justice. Such interpretation would run contra to the legislative intent behind the provisions of Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code which explicitly contemplate that an Appeal shall be heard expeditiously and disposed of as far as possible within 60 days at the admission stage. All the provision of Order 41 of the Code have to be read conjunctively to give provisions of Order 41 of the Code have to be read conjunctively to give Order 41, Rule 22, its true and purposive meaning. Having analytically examined the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22, we may now state the principles for its applications as follows: (a) Respondent in an Appeal is entitled to receive a notice of hearing of the Appeal as contemplated under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code; (b) The limitation of one month for filing the Cross-Objection as provided under Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code shall commence from the date of service of notice on him or his pleader of the day fixed for hearing the Appeal. (c) Where a Respondent in the Appeal is a caveator or otherwise puts in appearance himself and argues the Appeal on merits including for the purposes of interim order and the Appeal is ordered to be heard finally on a date fixed subsequently or otherwise, in presence of the said Respondent/Caveator, it shall be deemed to be service of notice within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 22. In other words the limitation of one month shall start from that date." From the above it is clear, limitation for filing cross objection is one month from the date of the service of notice on the respondents in the appeal namely, the petitioners herein. Whereas in this case, the petitioners were served on 13.4.2007. Therefore, the time ended on 13.5.2007. For more than two years, the petitioners were in deep slumber and woke up suddenly only on 6.7.2009 and filed the petition for cross appeal. The petitioners cannot take their own sweet time to file the cross appeal according to their whims and fancies, especially to drag on the proceedings. Therefore, the time ended on 13.5.2007. For more than two years, the petitioners were in deep slumber and woke up suddenly only on 6.7.2009 and filed the petition for cross appeal. The petitioners cannot take their own sweet time to file the cross appeal according to their whims and fancies, especially to drag on the proceedings. As the facts narrated above would undoubtedly make it very crystal clear that the petitioners intended to prolong the matter by misusing and abusing the provisions of law. 7. The suit is of the year 2004 and it was disposed of on 18.12.2006. Thereafter the appeal suit was filed in 2007 and for the past seven years, no progress is made deliberately by the acts of the petitioners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-55 categorically stated, if the delay is caused by invoking Order 41 Rule 22, it would cause serious prejudice to the interest of the parties and administration of justice. Serious prejudice was caused to the respondents herein due to the conduct of the petitioners by taking out the petition to receive cross appeal at the fage end of the proceedings. This court is able to see that almost in every case, attempts are being made by filing unnecessary applications/petitions to drag on the proceedings indefinitely. This kind of practice should be deprecated. 8. No doubt as per the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 57, it has been held that Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. provides the court to grant extension of time on its discretion and condone the delay in the interest of justice, provided reasonable or sufficient cause in seeking relief of the court to file Cross Objection beyond the statutory period of one month. In paragraph-7 of the affidavit filed before the lower appellate court, it has been stated that when the petitioners met his counsel and discussed about the merits of the case, he refreshed his memory that cross appeal could be preferred against the orders passed by the trial court for disallowing the petitioners to file additional written statement. When the Statute mandates, the action should be taken in the same manner only. Even discretion is available to the court to extend the time. However no reasonable cause has been given and the delay is a deliberate. When the Statute mandates, the action should be taken in the same manner only. Even discretion is available to the court to extend the time. However no reasonable cause has been given and the delay is a deliberate. Therefore, the lower appellate court was right in dismissing the application to extend the time to file the cross appeal. 9. Even before the trial court an application was filed to file additional written statement after examination of PW1 regarding court fee and jurisdiction and the said application was also dismissed stating that those points should have been raised at the earliest point of time. The said dismissal order was also confirmed by this court in CRP.No.479 of 2006. It is also one of the points which is in favour of the respondents. Therefore, the revision fails and the same dismissed. No costs. Consequently the connected M.P.No.1 of 2010 is also dismissed. 10. Causing delay to dispose of the matter at every stage right from the Trial Court, the petitioners have to be slapped with heavy costs. However, due to judicial restraint, this court does not award any costs. Considering the fact that the appeal suit was pending from 2004 itself, it is appropriate to direct the Lower Appellate Court to dispose of the appeal on or before 30.6.2014.