Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana v. 7 Star Distilleries
2014-01-10
K.U.CHANDIWAL
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Heard extensively. 2. By this application, the appellant has urged for permitting amendment to the plaint being R.C.S.No.3/2004 in terms of schedule of amendment annexed as Annexure "C" and expected further consequential order. The appellant has also sought leave to produce Deed of Assignment dated 31.12.2012 including annexures thereto as additional evidence. 3. The appellant, as a plaintiff has questioned judgment and order dated 28.3.2012 of the learned District Judge, Kopargaon dismissing R.C.S. No. 3/2004 filed by the appellant for infringement of copy right in its label "Bhingari Santra". The appellant approached this Court by Civil Application No. 4450 of 2012 in First Appeal No. 734 of 2012 and by order dated 10.5.2013, this Court (Coram: S.Y. Gangapurwala, J.) rejected the request of the appellant for temporary injunction, however, the first appeal was to be heard finally in the week commencing from 29.7.2013. In between, feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order rejecting the injunction, the appellant approached Honourable Supreme Court and by its order dated 26.8.2013 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) 25879/2013, Honourable Supreme Court requested High Court to decide the appeal within a period of six weeks from its order i.e. 26.8.2013, without granting any further adjournment to any of the parties. 4. The nature of amendment, to which reference is given by learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant/plaintiff, will not change the scenario or primarily will not cause prejudice to the contesting respondents/defendants. The amendment sought by the appellant/plaintiff is to bring the subsequent development on record, as the Deed of Assignment has taken place on 31.12.2012, while the judgment and order of the learned District Judge is dated 28.3.2012 and the appeal before this Court is lodged on 25.4.2012. It appears, the Deed of Assignment dated 31.12.2012 could not be pointed to this Court when the matter was argued on 10.5.2013, though its copy was annexed by the respondents/defendants. 5. The Honourable Supreme Court in the three judges judgment, in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders, reported in (1975) 1 Supreme Court Cases 770, while dealing with the aspect of amendment, particularly in Rent Control legislation, observed in para 4 as under: "4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The Motor & General Traders, reported in (1975) 1 Supreme Court Cases 770, while dealing with the aspect of amendment, particularly in Rent Control legislation, observed in para 4 as under: "4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly looked this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 6.
The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 6. The Honourble Supreme Court in the five judges judgment in Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1953 (L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd., and another Vs. Messrs. Jairdine Skinner and Co.) decided on 22.1.1957, reported in AIR 1957 SC 358, in para 16 dealt with the legal position flowing from Order VI Rule 17 and effect of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Apex Court directed, what are the parameters to be applied while entertaining the application for amendment. 7. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant pointed that by virtue of amendment, new cause of action is not asserted. No suit, if contemplated would be barred; the amendment would not change the nature of suit. What is sought to be brought on record is a continuity in the transaction of the appellant with Shri Vishwanath Kale, who has expired on 8.11.2006. 8. Mr. Dixit, learned Senior Counsel read the text in Deed of Assignment and says, it has retrospective effect from 1986-1987 or 1998, which would eclipse or defeat rights of the defendants. 9. In reality, Deed of Assignment will have to be considered by Court, if the amendment is allowed. It would be open for Court to observe to its legal effect and enforceability of such document. The defendants, in such situation have a right to file additional written statement and raise available defences including challenging assignment deed. 10. It cannot be said, at this stage, that the appellant desires to wipe out effect of decree, as the decree itself is dismissal of appellant's suit which is questioned before this Court. If the order seeking amendment is made, it will not cause any prejudice to the defendants, as indicated herein above. 11. The legal position was again explained by the Honourable Supreme Court in North Estern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur V. Bhagwan Das (D) by L.Rs., reported in AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2139 (1) : (2008 ALL SCR 1469). Paragraphs 12, 14, 15 thereof read as under: 12.
11. The legal position was again explained by the Honourable Supreme Court in North Estern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur V. Bhagwan Das (D) by L.Rs., reported in AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2139 (1) : (2008 ALL SCR 1469). Paragraphs 12, 14, 15 thereof read as under: 12. Though the general rule is that ordinarily the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is not admitted but Section 107 C.P.C., which carves out an exception to the general rule, enables an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Nevertheless, the additional evidence can be admitted only when the circumstances as stipulated in the said rule are found to exist. The circumstances under which additional evidence can be adduced are: (i) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, (clause (a) of sub-rule (1) or (ii) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within the knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, (clause aa, inserted by Act 104 of 1976) or (iii) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. (clause (b) of sub-rule (1)). 14. Again in K. Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors. a Constitution Bench of this Court while reiterating the afore-noted observations in Parsotim's case (supra), pointed out that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' but also for 'any other substantial cause'.
14. Again in K. Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors. a Constitution Bench of this Court while reiterating the afore-noted observations in Parsotim's case (supra), pointed out that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment', it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Thus, the question whether looking into the documents, sought to be filed as additional evidence, would be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, has to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits. 15. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil Vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil & Ors. which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. 12. Taking conspectus of above situation, amendment to the plaint, as sought by the appellant is allowed. The appellant to pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. Fifty thousand) each to respondent Nos.1 and 2 within fourteen days and necessary amendment to the plaint be carried within fourteen days. Amendment can be effected in this Court, as the entire record is before this Court. Its copy be served upon the respondents or their Advocates.
The appellant to pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. Fifty thousand) each to respondent Nos.1 and 2 within fourteen days and necessary amendment to the plaint be carried within fourteen days. Amendment can be effected in this Court, as the entire record is before this Court. Its copy be served upon the respondents or their Advocates. Defendants are at liberty to file additional written statement. 13. Application allowed accordingly to the extent, as above. Application allowed.