JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. This appeal, under Section 173 of M.V. Act, 1988 is directed against order dated 16.11.2007, passed by the learned Single Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, (Court No. 2), West Tripura, Agartala in a review application filed in connection with Case No. T.S.(MAC) 726 of 2003 and also against the original judgment and award dated 09.03.2007 passed in the same Motor Accident Claim case under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, 1988. Heard learned counsel, Mr. P. Gautam for the appellant, National Insurance Company Ltd. and learned counsel, Mr. S.K. Dutta for the claimant respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2, owner of the vehicle, chosen to remain absent. 2. Brajendra Nama Das, respondent No. 1 herein presented an application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala claiming compensation for the injuries and disablement suffered by him due to motor vehicle accident occurred on 10.06.2003 at about 15:00 hours at Khayerpur Bus stand at Assam Agartala road. It was alleged by the claimant-petitioner that he was standing on the road side and at that time, the offending vehicle No. TRT 1454 (jeep) knocked him down and as a result, he sustained injuries on his head, right leg, right eye etc. and was taken to G.B. Hospital where he was under treatment for a long period of time of about 3 months. He suffered disability due to the accident and the medical board assessed the disability to the extent of 40%. He was a mason by profession and was aged about 35 years at the time of accident. He used to earn Rs. 4,200/- per month. He lost his profession due to the accident and became 100% disabled. He claimed compensation of ` 16,63,200/- in all. 3. The owner of the vehicle, respondent No. 2 herein, on appearance, submitted a written statement admitting the accident and pleaded that the offending vehicle was insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. covering the risk on the date of accident and so liability of making payment of compensation if any, should vest on the insurance company. 4. 3. The owner of the vehicle, respondent No. 2 herein, on appearance, submitted a written statement admitting the accident and pleaded that the offending vehicle was insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. covering the risk on the date of accident and so liability of making payment of compensation if any, should vest on the insurance company. 4. A notice was sent to the insurance company (appellant herein) being the insurer of the vehicle under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and the insurance company on their appearance also put a written statement and also prayed for allowing them to take all defence under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. The tribunal based on the pleadings of the parties, formulated two issues namely:-- I. Whether the vehicle bearing No. TRT-1454 met an accident due to rash and negligent driving on 10.06.2003 at about 1500 hours and the claimant petitioner sustained any injury out of that accident, if so, to what extent? II. Whether the claimant petitioner is entitled to get any compensation, if so, what would be the quantum of compensation and who is liable to pay the compensation? 6. In course of trial, the claimant petitioner i.e. the respondent No. 1 herein examined himself as P.W. 1 and also proved certain documents such as copy of G.D. entry made in the P.S., discharge certificate of G.B. Hospital and disability certificate issued by the medical board etc. The respondent-owner of the vehicle adduced no evidence. Even the claimant petitioner was not cross examined on behalf of the respondent-owner. 7. The insurance company i.e., the appellant herein though made an application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act before the tribunal but no order was passed by the tribunal allowing the insurance company to take all defence as contemplated in Section 170 of M.V. Act. A careful perusal of the L.C. record shows that the insurance company after filing the application never insisted for passing order on the application filed under Section 170 of the M.V. Act. 8. The tribunal by judgment and award dated 09.03.2007 allowed the claim petition and awarded a compensation of Rs.5,91,000/- in favour of the petitioner. A careful perusal of the L.C. record shows that the insurance company after filing the application never insisted for passing order on the application filed under Section 170 of the M.V. Act. 8. The tribunal by judgment and award dated 09.03.2007 allowed the claim petition and awarded a compensation of Rs.5,91,000/- in favour of the petitioner. By that judgment the tribunal directed the owner of the vehicle i.e. the respondent No. 2 herein to make payment of the compensation on the ground that the owner of the vehicle did not submit the valid documents like registration certificate, driving license etc. at the time of trial. 9. Subsequent thereto the owner of the vehicle, respondent No. 2 herein, filed application before the tribunal on 23.03.2007 praying for review of the judgment and award dated 09.03.2007 in respect of direction about payment of compensation and after hearing both side the tribunal by order dated 16.11.2007 modified its earlier direction and directed the insurance company i.e. appellant herein to make payment of the compensation with interest thereon. Order passed by the tribunal reviewing its earlier order dated 09.03.2007 reads as follows:-- This is a petition for review of the award dated 09.03.2007, passed in T.S. (MAC) 726 of 2003, asking the owner Shri Lalit Debnath to indemnify the liability of Rs. 5,91,000.00 with 6% interest w.e.f. 18.12.2003, to be paid within 2(two) months else to pay interest 8% per annum. It is contended that the aforesaid offending vehicle No. TRT-1454, Jeep was insured with the National Insurance Co. Ltd., vide Policy No. 101705/31/02/6702360 and was valid w.e.f. 26.12.2002 to 25.12.2003. The accident occurred on 10.06.2003, when the said policy was valid. It is further contended that as the vehicle was duly insured with the aforesaid insurer having 3rd party risk, it is the insurer to effect payment to the injured. Notice was served upon the insurer to raise any objection but no objection raised. It appears that the liability to the owner was asked to indemnify as the owner failed to submit documents of registration, driving licence etc. It is contended that a 3rd party is not to suffer for any breach of condition between the contractual party i.e., the insurer and the owner. It appears that the liability to the owner was asked to indemnify as the owner failed to submit documents of registration, driving licence etc. It is contended that a 3rd party is not to suffer for any breach of condition between the contractual party i.e., the insurer and the owner. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in : 2004 ACJ 785, 2001 ACJ 843 Supreme Court,: 2001 ACJ 1077 Gauhati High Court, : 2004 ACJ 2007 Gauhati High court has been relied upon. Considered. I find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the review petitioner. Accordingly, the review petition is allowed. The liability to indemnify, therefore, lies with the insurer instead of the owner. It is directed that the insurer is to effect payment of the award along with interest specified above. However, it is for the insurer to recover the amount from the owner for breach of condition, if any. The claimant has prayed for an order of reviewing the rate of interest. But in a review petition such prayer cannot be considered and thus disallowed. Furnish a copy of this order free of cost to the respective parties. The petition is thus disposed of. 10. Since the tribunal directed the insurance company i.e. the appellant herein to make payment, aggrieved thereby, the insurance company filed the present appeal. 11. Learned counsel, Mr. Gautam appearing for the appellant-insurance company advanced two fold arguments. Firstly, that the owner of the vehicle since failed to produce the registration certificate and driving license of the driver of the alleged offending vehicle, the tribunal should not have reviewed its earlier order and should not have directed the insurance company to make the payment. Secondly, the calculation of compensation was not correctly made by the tribunal. The petitioner suffered 40% disability whereas the tribunal held that the disability was 100% and hence awarded an exorbitant amount as compensation. 12. Learned counsel, Mr. Dutta appearing for the respondent No. 1 (injured claimant) submitted that the appeal itself is not maintainable since no liberty was granted to the insurance company under Section 170 of the M.V. Act. The insurance company was simply a notice as required under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act and so the insurance company cannot maintain an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation etc. under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. The insurance company was simply a notice as required under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act and so the insurance company cannot maintain an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation etc. under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. The next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Dutta is that the insurance of the vehicle covering 3rd party risk is not in dispute. So it is the primary obligation of the insurance company to satisfy the award irrespective of the owner produced driving license, registration certificate, etc. of the vehicle or not. The insurance company cannot shirk its responsibility of making payment of compensation to a 3rd party raising technical plea of non production of driving license before the tribunal. If the insurance company so feel aggrieved, they may take appropriate action against the owner for violation of any terms of contract but the 3rd party cannot be made to sufferer for the same. 13. The insurance company was not made respondent in the claim case filed by the claimant petitioner i.e. the respondent No. 1 herein. The tribunal only sent a notice under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act to facilitate the insurance to remain present at the time of adjudication of the claim since the vehicle was insured covering the risk on the date of accident. So according to law, settled by now, the insurance company cannot take all defence as contemplated in Section 170 of the M.V. Act except what have been prescribed in Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. No doubt the insurance company filed application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act seeking permission of the tribunal to take all defence but no order was passed by the tribunal on that petition. 14. During course of trial before the tribunal, the insurance company never insisted the tribunal to pass an order on the application filed under Section 170 of the M.V. Act. It is rather found that the owner of the vehicle, respondent No. 2 herein, appeared and submitted their written statement which was considered by the tribunal and issues were framed considering the written statement. While the prayer of the insurance company made under Section 170 of the M.V. Act was not allowed and/or permitted by the tribunal, the insurance company has no authority to challenge the award. While the prayer of the insurance company made under Section 170 of the M.V. Act was not allowed and/or permitted by the tribunal, the insurance company has no authority to challenge the award. I would like to refer here the decision of the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. V. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors. reported in: 2002 ACJ 1950 in paras. 14,15 and 16 of the judgment. The Apex Court has observed thus:-- 14. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of 1988 Act clearly indicates in what manner Sub-section (2) of Section 149 has to be interpreted. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 provides that no insurer to whom the notice referred to in Sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in Sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be. The expression 'manner' employed in sub-section (7) of Section 149 is very relevant which means an insurer can avoid its liability only in accordance with what has been provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 149. It, therefore, shows that the insurer can avoid its liability only on the statutory defences expressly provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of 1988 Act. We are, therefore, of the view that an insurer cannot avoid its liability on any other grounds except those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of 1988 Act. 15. It is relevant to note that the Parliament, while enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in sub-section (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If the Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in sub-section (2) of Section 149. If the Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in sub-section (2) of Section 149. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the statutory defences which are available to the insurer to contest a claim are confined to what are provided in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of 1988 Act and not more and for that reason if an insurer is to file an appeal, the challenge in the appeal would confine to only those grounds. 15. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta & Ors. reported in (2011) 10 SCC 509 , the Apex Court in Paras. 17 to 20 has observed thus:-- 17. Section 170 of the Act does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment. Nor does it contemplate the insurer, if he is already impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants, making any application seeking permission to contest the matter on merits. Section 170 proceeds on the assumption that a claim petition is filed by the claimants, or is registered suo motu by the tribunal, with only the owner and driver of the vehicle as the respondents. It also proceeds on the basis that in such a proceeding, a statutory notice would have been issued by the tribunal to the insurer so that the insurer may know about its future liability in the claim petition and also resist the claim, on any of the grounds mentioned in section 149(2). 18. Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. 18. Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. Section 170 provides that if during the course of such inquiry, the tribunal finds and satisfies itself that there is any collusion between the claimant and the owner/driver or where the owner/driver has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may suo motu, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of the claim, who was till then only a notice, shall be treated as a party to the proceedings. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner. 19. Therefore, where the insurer is a party-respondent, either on account of being impleaded as a party by the tribunal under section 170 or being impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants in the claim petition voluntarily, it will be entitled to contest the matter by raising all grounds, without being restricted to the grounds available under section 149(2) of the Act. The claim petition is maintainable against the owner and driver without impleading the insurer as a party. 20. When a statutory notice is issued under section 149(2) by the Tribunal, it is clear that such notice is issued not to implead the insurer as a party-respondent but merely to put it on notice that a claim has been made in regard to a policy issued by it and that it will have to bear the liability as and when an award is made in regard to such claim. Therefore, it cannot, as of right, require that it should be impleaded as a party-respondent. But it can however be made a party-respondent either by the claimants voluntarily in the claim petition or by the direction of the Tribunal under section 170 of the Act. Whatever be the reason or ground for the insurer being impleaded as a party, once it is a party-respondent, it can raise all contentions that are available to resist the claim. 16. In the case of Joshphine James V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. Whatever be the reason or ground for the insurer being impleaded as a party, once it is a party-respondent, it can raise all contentions that are available to resist the claim. 16. In the case of Joshphine James V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. reported in: 2013 ACJ 2418, the Supreme Court referring to its earlier judgment in Nicolletta Rohtagi (supra) and Shila Datta (supra) in Para 17 and 18 of the judgment observed thus:-- 17. The said order was reviewed by the High Court at the instance of the appellant in view of the aforesaid decision on the question of maintainability of the appeal of the Insurance Company. The High Court, in the review petition, has further reduced the compensation to Rs. 4,20,000/- from Rs. 6,75,000/- which was earlier awarded by it. This approach is contrary to the facts and law laid down by this Court. The High Court, in reducing the quantum of compensation under the heading of loss of dependency of the appellant, was required to follow the decision rendered by three judge Bench of this Court in Nicolletta Rohtagi's case, 2002 ACJ 1950 (SC) and earlier decisions wherein this Court after interpreting Section 170(b) of the M.V. Act, has rightly held that in the absence of permission obtained by the Insurance Company from the Tribunal to avail the defence of the insured, it is not permitted to contest the case on merits. The aforesaid legal principle is applicable to the fact situation in view of the three judge bench decision referred to supra though the correctness of the aforesaid decision is referred to larger bench. This important aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment and the said approach is contrary to law laid down by this Court. 18. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Insurance Company is not entitled to file appeal questioning the quantum of compensation awarded in favour of the appellant for the reasons stated supra. In the absence of the same, the Insurance Company had only limited defence to contest in the proceedings as provided under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. Therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court on 13.1.2012 reducing the compensation to Rs. 4,20,000/- under the heading of loss of dependency by deducting 50% from the monthly income of the deceased of Rs. Therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court on 13.1.2012 reducing the compensation to Rs. 4,20,000/- under the heading of loss of dependency by deducting 50% from the monthly income of the deceased of Rs. 5,000/- and applying 14 multiplier, is factually and legally incorrect. The High Court has erroneously arrived at this amount by applying the principle of law laid down in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation,: 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC), instead of applying the principle laid down in Radhika Gupta's case, 2010 ACJ 758 (SC), regarding the multiplier applied to the fact situation and also contrary to the law applicable regarding the maintainability of appeal of the Insurance Company on the question of quantum of compensation in the absence of permission to be obtained by it from the Tribunal under Section 170(b) of the M.V. Act. In view of the aforesaid reason, the High Court should not have allowed the appeal of the Insurance Company as it has got limited defence as provided under section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. Therefore, the impugned judgment and award is vitiated in law and hence, is liable to be set aside by allowing the appeal of the appellant. 17. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the series of judgments, it is eminently clear that the insurer as a noticee has no locus standi to challenge the award passed by the tribunal, questioning its legality inasmuch as the noticee does not have the status or right to carry out an appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act beyond the grounds prescribed under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. 18. The insurance company though made application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act before the tribunal but at no point of time, the tribunal allowed the insurance company to take all defence. The insurance company, therefore, cannot maintain an appeal challenging the award passed by the tribunal in respect of the quantum of compensation arrived by the tribunal. 19. It is not disputed that the vehicle was insured with the insurance company covering 3rd party risk. Only plea of the insurance company is that the driving license was not produced by the owner of the vehicle and other documents of the vehicle also not placed. 19. It is not disputed that the vehicle was insured with the insurance company covering 3rd party risk. Only plea of the insurance company is that the driving license was not produced by the owner of the vehicle and other documents of the vehicle also not placed. It is not at all disputed that it was an insurance covering 3rd party risk and so the insurance company is responsible to make good the award passed by the tribunal. The review order clearly shows that the insurance company was noticed before passing the review order but no objection was raised by the insurance company at the time of passing the review order. 20. I, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and the appeal stands dismissed. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.