ORDER Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 30.11.2012 in O.A. No. 173 of 2011 (R) passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna (Circuit Court at Ranchi) in and by which the Original Application filed by the applicant – petitioner herein challenging order of termination dated 08.02.2010 and the speaking order dated 04.02.2011, has been dismissed, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Substitute Bungalow Peon was approved on 18.05.2009 by the General Manager, S.E., Railway, Kolkata. Thereafter, the Declaration No. PD/E/580/Subs. BPeon/Offer of Apptt. dated 25.05.2009 was issued from the Office of the Deputy Chief Personnel Officer which contained the terms and conditions of the appointment. After medical examination, the order of his engagement was issued and the petitioner assumed duty on 25.06.2009. A showcause notice dated 07.01.2010 was issued to the petitioner for his unauthorized absence from duty from 04.12.2009. The petitioner submitted his reply on 18.01.2010 and the order of termination from service was issued on 08.02.2010. The petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 215 of 2010 (R) which was disposed of vide order dated 29.10.2010 directing the respondent no. 5 to consider the representation of the applicant and pass a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law. The respondent no. 5 passed speaking order dated 04.02.2011 rejecting the claim of the petitioner for reinstatement in service with back wages. Challenging orders dated 08.02.2010 and 04.02.2011, the petitioner preferred O.A. No. 173 of 2011 (R) which has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 30.11.2012. 3. Contending that the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 is stigmatic as it contains imputations against the petitioner however, no regular departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner, it is submitted that it is liable to be quashed. It is further submitted that the petitioner was engaged under respondent no. 5 who issued showcause notice to him and passed the impugned order of termination dated 08.02.2010 and thus, he became the complainant as well as the adjudicator himself. It is thus, submitted that, the order of termination has been passed in complete violation of the rules of natural justice. Alleging judicial impropriety, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, while in O.A. No. 215 of 2010 (R) vide order dated 29.10.2010 the respondent no. It is thus, submitted that, the order of termination has been passed in complete violation of the rules of natural justice. Alleging judicial impropriety, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, while in O.A. No. 215 of 2010 (R) vide order dated 29.10.2010 the respondent no. 5 was directed to pass a reasoned and speaking order, in the impugned order dated 30.11.2012 the learned Tribunal has held that a detailed order was not required. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (2010) 8 SCC 220, (1984) 2 SCC 578 and (2000) 3 SCC 588 . 4. Mr. Jalisur Rahman, J.C. to S.C. Rly, appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that, appointment of the petitioner was on the condition that he would serve on probation for a period of three years and during the period of probation his services may be terminated after giving 14 days' notice without assigning any reason. It is further submitted that, the order of termination is not stigmatic and the reasons mentioned in the order do not form the foundation for dismissal. 5. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that he fell ill on 05.12.2009 and he remained under treatment of Dr. Subir Kumar Ghosh till 24.01.2010. Annexing a copy of the certificate issued by the Doctor, he sent the information of his illness however, a showcause notice dated 07.01.2010 was issued by the respondent no. 5 for unauthorized absence from duty. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner completed continuous service of more than 120 days and thus, he attained temporary status of a temporary Railway Servant and therefore, under Rule 1515 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual VolumeI without holding a regular departmental enquiry, the petitioner could not have been terminated from service. Relying on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Union of India and Others Vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi”, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 220 and “Nar Singh Pal Vs. Union of India and Others”, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 588 it is submitted that, the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 is stigmatic as it alleges fabrication of documents etc. and thus it is punitive in nature. This contention is liable to be rejected. Mahaveer C. Singhvi”, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 220 and “Nar Singh Pal Vs. Union of India and Others”, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 588 it is submitted that, the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 is stigmatic as it alleges fabrication of documents etc. and thus it is punitive in nature. This contention is liable to be rejected. The petitioner was appointed as Substitute Bungalow Peon on probation. The declaration dated 25.05.2009 signed by the petitioner stipulated that the petitioner would remain on probation for a period of three years and during the period of probation, his service was liable to be terminated after giving 14 days' notice without assigning any reason. The petitioner was issued a showcause notice dated 07.01.2010 for his unauthorized absence from duty from 04.12.2009 and after considering his reply dated 18.01.2010, the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 has been passed. Moreover, in compliance of order dated 29.10.2010 in O.A. No. 215 of 2010 (R), the representation of the petitioner has been considered by respondent no. 5 and the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by order dated 04.02.2011. The alleged imputations in the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 would indicate that the respondent no. 5 has only recorded the facts appearing from the record of the case. 7. In “Union of India and others Vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi” (supra), it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if no enquiry is held or contemplated and the allegations are merely a motive for passing the order of termination/discharge of the probationer even without giving him a hearing, the same would be a valid order. In so far as, the contention that a regular departmental proceeding should have been initiated, we are of the opinion that in view of the declaration dated 25.05.2009, the respondents were not required to hold regular departmental proceeding. The petitioner was issued a showcause notice dated 07.01.2010 to which he replied on 18.01.2010. In “Kunwar Arun Kumar Vs. U.P. Hill Electronics Corporation Ltd. and others”, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 191 , it has been held that the appointing authority is entitled to terminate the service in terms of letter of appointment without holding any enquiry and in such a situation, the order of termination would not be stigmatic. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner worked only for 162 days between the period 25.06.2009 to 04.12.2009. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner worked only for 162 days between the period 25.06.2009 to 04.12.2009. The learned Tribunal has rightly held that acquiring status of a regular employee on completion of three years of continuous service is not automatic. Till the time the employee acquires regular status, the employee would continue to be subject to the terms and conditions of the engagement. In “Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali”, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 428, in the context of an employee appointed on a purely temporary basis and under the terms and conditions of the service, the employee was to remain on probation for a period of one year, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under, “Where the short history of the service of the probationer appointed in a temporary post clearly showed that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service and that was why even though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him and in these circumstances, if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the probationer it could not be said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of Article 311, when the appointing authority had the right to terminate the service without assigning any reasons. In such a case even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency might be the motive or the inducing factor which influenced the employer to terminate the services of the employee a power which the employer undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the employee such a power flowed from the contract of service, termination of service could not be termed as penalty or punishment.” 8. Relying on the decision in “Arun Chaubey Vs. Union of India and others”, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 578 it is contended that since the respondent no. 5 has issued showcause notice and passed the order of termination also, the order of termination dated 08.02.2010 has been passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. In “Arun Chaubey Vs. Union of India and others”, (supra) the appellant was working as a permanent government servant and the showcause notice was issued to him on 12 charges of gross indiscipline. In “Arun Chaubey Vs. Union of India and others”, (supra) the appellant was working as a permanent government servant and the showcause notice was issued to him on 12 charges of gross indiscipline. In the said case, the departmental enquiry was dispensed with holding that it was not practicable to hold such an enquiry whereas, in the case in hand, the petitioner was only a probationer and the charges against him was of unauthorized absence. Moreover, the plea taken by the petitioner pales into insignificance as the Tribunal itself directed the respondent no. 5 to consider the representation of the petitioner and pass a speaking order. 9. Adverting to the contention that while dismissing the Original Application, the learned Tribunal committed judicial impropriety by observing that a detailed order was strictly not required, it is found that in paragraph no. 11, the learned Tribunal has simply noticed the terms and conditions of engagement of the applicant wherein it has been provided that his service could be terminated on 14 days' notice on either side without assigning any cause at any point of time in terms of Rule 301 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. I (1987 edition). Thus, the observation of the learned Tribunal that a detailed order was strictly not required cannot be construed as an instance of judicial impropriety merely because in the earlier proceeding in O.A. No. 215 of 2010 (R) the learned Tribunal had directed the respondent no. 5 to pass a reasoned and speaking order. 10. In the result, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal and accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.