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2014 DIGILAW 618 (AP)

Deccan Chronicles Holdings Ltd. v. DRT, Hyderabad

2014-04-29

ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA, M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

body2014
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed in I.A. No. 779 of 2013 in S.A. No. 167 of 2013, dated 14th March, 2013 by the respondent No. 1 Tribunal and consequently to direct the respondent No. 2 Bank to maintain status quo on the secured assets of the petitioner pending final disposal of S.A. No. 167 of 2073. We need not burden this order replicating/duplicating the facts inasmuch as the chequered history of lis involved in this writ petition has already been explained in the earlier proceedings. 2. This writ petition had been initially listed before this Court on 19th March, 2014, on which date, we disposed of it to the following effect: "The petitioner has questioned the docket order dated 14th March, 2014 in SA No. 167 of 2013 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad, the respondent No. 1 herein, whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 10.00 crores out of which a sum of Rs. 5.00 crores shall be deposited within four weeks from the date of the order and the balance amount of Rs. 5.00 crores shall be deposited within a period of four weeks thereafter. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the quantum of claim involved in the matter is uncertain and, therefore the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal be stayed. He further submits that in order to show the bona fides that the petitioner is interested in repaying the entire amount, it is ready and willing to deposit a sum of Rs. 1.00 crore by way of demand draft in favour of the respondent-Bank by tomorrow itself. He further submits that the time for deposit of the balance amount may be extended. After hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner and keeping in view the observations made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal that the 'contentions raised by both the parties are intriguing questions which are to be dealt with and decided after a thorough enquiry in the main SA', we direct the petitioner to deposit a demand draft for Rs. 1.00 crore with the respondent-Bank by tomorrow i.e., 20th March, 2014. The petitioner shall also deposit a sum of Rs. 4.5 Crores on or before 31st May, 2014 and another sum of Rs. 4.5 crores on or before 31st July, 2014. 1.00 crore with the respondent-Bank by tomorrow i.e., 20th March, 2014. The petitioner shall also deposit a sum of Rs. 4.5 Crores on or before 31st May, 2014 and another sum of Rs. 4.5 crores on or before 31st July, 2014. In the meantime, the respondent-Bank is restrained from taking any coercive steps to recover the amount and to take any action against the petitioner in running the printing press. If the petitioner is already in possession of the secured assets, it shall not be dispossessed in the meantime. It is made clear that in case the petitioner fails to pay the amount in compliance with the aforementioned direction, the respondent-Bank is at liberty to disposed off proceed in accordance with law. The writ petitioner is accordingly disposed of. Miscellaneous Petition, if any, pending consideration shall stand closed. No order as to costs." 3. Aggrieved thereby, the second respondent-Bank carried the matter to Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 8471 of 2014. The Apex Court through its order dated 4th April, 2014, observed as follows: "Leave granted. We have heard Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. It, is not disputed before us that the impugned order, which amounts to allowing the writ petition, has been passed by the High Court without giving any notice to the appellant (respondent No. 2 before the High Court). On this short ground, the impugned order is set aside. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8304 of 2014, titled Deccan Chronicles Holdings Limited v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent (petitioner therein) is given liberty to apply to the High Court for consideration of the matter on 7th April, 2014. If the appellant (respondent No. 2 therein) desires to remain present before the High Court, it may do so. Civil Appeal is allowed as above with no order as to costs." In view thereof, this writ petition is posted before us for de novo consideration. 4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the respondent No. 2 Bank has granted short term loan facilities from time-to-time to the petitioner. Civil Appeal is allowed as above with no order as to costs." In view thereof, this writ petition is posted before us for de novo consideration. 4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the respondent No. 2 Bank has granted short term loan facilities from time-to-time to the petitioner. On default, a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued by the respondent No. 2 Bank on 25th October, 2012; thereby calling upon the petitioner to pay the entire amounts within a Period of 60 days on the ground that the said account has been classified as NPA (Non Performance Asset). Thereafter, the possession notices were issued by the respondent No. 2 Bank on 7th January, 2013, 8th January, 2013 and 9th January, 2013 respectively; however, the possession notice issued to the principal borrower company states about the outstanding amount of Rs. 50,25,51,229.51 whereas the notices issued to the guarantors (who were shown as the Applicant Nos. 2 to 4 in the main S.A.) demanding payment of an amount of Rs. 95,17,75,263.25 and for that reason the respondent No. 2 Bank itself is not sure about what are the amounts recoverable from the petitioner company and that the passing of interim orders for deposit of an amount of Rs. 10 crores within a specified period is without jurisdiction and opposed to Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Further, the DRT did not give any reasons while passing the said conditional stay orders. Thus, the present writ is confined only to the passing of the conditional orders calling upon the petitioner Company for deposit of a sum of Rs. 10 crores as a condition for grant of interim stay. 5. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act contemplates that the DRT after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, should pass necessary orders. It was further contended that as per Section 17(5) of the Act contemplates that the DRT has to dispose of the application within a period of 60 days from the date of making of such application and hence in lieu of the mandatory requirements of Section 17 of the Act, the orders passed by the DRT is without jurisdiction. 6. It was further contended that as per Section 17(5) of the Act contemplates that the DRT has to dispose of the application within a period of 60 days from the date of making of such application and hence in lieu of the mandatory requirements of Section 17 of the Act, the orders passed by the DRT is without jurisdiction. 6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 Bank submitted that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands. The respondent No. 2 has already taken physical possession of the property on 15th May, 2013 as per the orders of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Criminal M.P. No. 123/13 under Section 14 of the Act. However, the petitioner company got a writ petition filed in the name of the employees union, i.e., Writ Petition No. 14938 of 2013 wherein initially the respondent No. 2 was restrained from taking physical possession of the properties, however, when Writ Appeal No. 679 of 2013 came to be filed by the respondent No. 2 the petitioner herein has given an undertaking dated 11th November, 2013 agreeing to vacate and hand over the physical possession of the properties by the end of 28th February, 2014. On the basis of the said undertaking given, Writ Appeal No. 679 of 2013 came to be disposed off by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 11th November, 2013. Against the said orders, a review petition filed by the petitioner company was also dismissed. Notwithstanding the orders in the said writ appeal, the petitioner herein has also filed Writ Petition No. 5286 of 2014 challenging the vires of Section 2(1)(o) of the SARFAESI Act. However, the said Writ Petition is admitted but the petitioner was not successful in getting any interim orders of "status quo". Having been not successful in any of the attempts to stall the proceedings, the petitioner came up with the present writ petition which is otherwise not maintainable under law. 7. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 Bank that there is a alternative remedy provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and therefore the writ jurisdiction should not have been invoked by the petitioner and hence prayed to dismiss the present writ petition with costs. 7. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 Bank that there is a alternative remedy provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and therefore the writ jurisdiction should not have been invoked by the petitioner and hence prayed to dismiss the present writ petition with costs. He pointed out that when a statutory Forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3413 . 8. Having heard the learned Counsel on either side and having gone through the material on record, we limit out consideration to adjudging the interlocutory application while admitting the writ petition. 9. As the primary objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 Bank is with respect to the maintainability of the writ petition, it is just and appropriate to decide the same at the threshold. 10. For better understanding and resolving of the question of law relating to maintainability, it is just and necessary to have a look at the relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the rules framed thereunder, which are reproduced below: "Section 17--Right to Appeal-- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may by prescribed] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this Sub-section. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management of the business of the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditors as invalid and restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the business to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. (4) If the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 to recover his secured debt. (5) Any application made under Sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time-to-time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making such application made under Sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed off by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in Sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made thereunder." Section 18--Appeal to Appellate Tribunal-- (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal [under Section 17, may prefer an Appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an Appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no Appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may for the reason to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose off the Appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and rules made thereunder. The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 13. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose off the Appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and rules made thereunder. The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 13. Fees for applications and Appeals under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act-- (1) Every application under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 or an Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 shall be accompanied by a fee provided in the Sub-rule (2) and such fee may be remitted through a crossed demand draft drawn on a Bank or Indian Postal Order in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal or the Court as the case may be, payable at the place where the Tribunal or the Court is situated. (2) The amount of fee payable shall be as follows: Before adverting to the legal position, it will be pertinent to see the finding given by the DRT on the said aspect. The DRT under the impugned order held that there are "intriguing questions which are to be dealt with and decided after a thorough enquiry in the main S.A. However, in the meanwhile, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the quantum of claim involved in the matter which is uncertain......" 11. As per Section 13(3) of the Act, what has been contemplated is that the DRT, "after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the evidence produced by the parties come to the conclusion", the entire measures which have been take by the Authorised Officer of the respondent No. 2 Bank needs to be reverted back and even the physical possession if taken need to be restored to the borrower. Further, as per Section 17(5), the said Securitization Appeal needs to be disposed of within 60 days and that a proviso has also been added to Sub-section (5) wherein if the DRT thinks it fit to further extend the time beyond the period of 60 days, the reasons need to be recorded. Therefore what has been contemplated under Section 17 is the entire process has to be dealt with expeditiously. 12. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Etc. Therefore what has been contemplated under Section 17 is the entire process has to be dealt with expeditiously. 12. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Etc. Etc., AIR 2004 SC 2371 , held in the following manner: "59. We may like to observe that proceedings under Section 17 of the Act, in fact are not Appellate proceedings. It seems to be a misnomer. In fact it is the initial action which is brought before a Forum as prescribed under the Act, raising grievance against the action or measures taken by one of the parties to the contract. It is the stage of initial proceedings like filing a Suit in Civil Court. As a matter of fact proceedings under Section 17 of the Act are in lieu of a Civil Suit which remedy is ordinarily available but for the bar under Section 34 of the Act in the present case. We may refer to a decision of this Court reported in Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 , where in respect of original and Appellate proceedings a distinction has been drawn as follows: "...There is a basic distinction between the right of Suit and the right of Appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a Suit of civil nature and unless one's choice. It is no answer to a Suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue, A Suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the Suit. But the position in regard to Appeals is quite the opposite. The right of Appeal inheres in no one and therefore and Appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of Appeal is described as a creature of statute." 60. The requirement of pre-deposit of any amount at the first instance of proceedings is not to be found in any of the decisions cited on behalf of the respondent. All these cases relate to Appeals. That explains why the right of Appeal is described as a creature of statute." 60. The requirement of pre-deposit of any amount at the first instance of proceedings is not to be found in any of the decisions cited on behalf of the respondent. All these cases relate to Appeals. The amount of deposit of 75% of the demand, at the initial proceeding itself sounds unreasonable and oppressive more particularly when the secured assets/the management thereof along with the right to transfer such interest has been taken over by the secured creditor or in some cases property is also sold. Requirement of deposit of such a heavy amount on basis of one sided claim alone, cannot be said to be a reasonable condition at the first instance itself before start of adjudication of the dispute. Merely giving power to the Tribunal to waive or reduce the amount, does not cure the inherent infirmity leaning one-sidedly in favour of the party, who, so far has alone been the party to decide the amount and the fact of default and classifying the dues as NPAs without participation/association of the borrower in the process. Such an onerous and oppressive condition should not be left operative in expectation of reasonable exercise of discretion by the concerned authority. Placed in a situation as indicated above, where it may not be possible for the borrower to raise any amount to make the deposit, his secured assets having already been taken possession of or sold, such a rider to approach the Tribunal at the first instance of proceedings, captioned as Appeal, renders the remedy illusory and nugatory. 62. As indicated earlier, the position of the Appeal under Section 17 of the Act is like that of a Suit in the Court of the first instance under the Code of Civil Procedure. No doubt in Suits also it is permissible, in given facts and circumstances and under the provisions of the law to attach the property before a decree is passed or to appoint a receiver and to make a provision by way of interim measure in respect of the property in Suit. But for obtaining such orders a case for the same is to be made out in accordance with the relevant provisions under the law. There is no such provision under the Act. 63. But for obtaining such orders a case for the same is to be made out in accordance with the relevant provisions under the law. There is no such provision under the Act. 63. Yet another justification which has been sought to be given for the requirement of deposit is that the secured assets which may be taken possession of or sold may fall short of the dues therefore such a deposit may be necessary. We find no merit in this submission too. In such an eventuality the recourse may have to be taken to Sub-section (10) of Section 13 where a petition may have to be filed before the Tribunal for the purpose of making up of the short fall. 64. The condition of pre-deposit in the present case is bad rendering the remedy illusory on the grounds that (i) it is imposed while approaching the adjudicating authority of the first instance, not in Appeal, (ii) there is no determination of the amount due as yet (iii) the secured assets or its management with transferable interest is already taken over and under control of the secured creditor (iv) no special reason for double security in respect of an amount yet to be determined and settled (v) 75% of the amount claimed by no means would be a meager amount (vi) it will leave the borrower in a position where it would not be possible for him to raise any funds to make deposit of 75% of the undetermined demand. Such conditions are not alone onerous and oppressive bat also unreasonable and arbitrary. Therefore, incur view, Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, what has been contemplated by the Act under Section 17 of the Act is in respect of the first measure or first meaningful remedy provided by the Legislature and thus the nomenclature which is used as "Appeal" is a misnomer. Thus, what has been contemplated by the Act under Section 17 of the Act is in respect of the first measure or first meaningful remedy provided by the Legislature and thus the nomenclature which is used as "Appeal" is a misnomer. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the DRT itself has given a finding that there are intriguing questions which are required to be dealt with and which have to be decided after inquiry in the main S.A. and further in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, and also quantum of the claim involved which is uncertain, hence DRT decided to grant the stay of all further proceedings in pursuance of the measures taken by the respondent Bank under Section 13(4) of the Act on condition. However, the condition of deposit of Rs. 10 crore has been added for grant of the said stay which is being questioned by the present petitioner in the present writ petition. 13. It will be further pertinent to note that if in given case, there would have been half a dozen interlocutory orders passed by the DRT and if the Appeal needs to be preferred against all the I.As. there may be a case where the total amount due to be paid to the Bank by the appellant is less than the Court-fee amount at the Appellate stage. Further the said Rule 13 of the Security Interest Enforcement Rules can be traced out to Section 49 of the APCF and SV Act wherein it has been provided that on Appeal, the same Court-fee need to be paid as was paid in the Court of the first instance. The said Section 49 of the APCF and SV Act contemplates the payment of Court-fee on a regular Appeal to be preferred under Section 96 of CPC or as the case may be. In case of Appeals against the interlocutory orders, ad valorem Court-fee is required to be paid as contemplated under the Act in Sch. II of the said APCF and SV Act. Such distinction has not been made in Rule 13 of the Securitization Enforcement Rules. Therefore the only remedy which is applicable to the petitioner to challenge the said order is by way of filing a writ petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India as the case may be. 14. Such distinction has not been made in Rule 13 of the Securitization Enforcement Rules. Therefore the only remedy which is applicable to the petitioner to challenge the said order is by way of filing a writ petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India as the case may be. 14. Further, the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. case (supra) has declared pre-deposit at the time of filing of an Appeal under Section 17 as ultra vires and opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The said circumstance also stares at the remedy of Section 18 to be resorted to at the interlocutory stage. 15. The judgment relied on by the Counsel for respondent No. 2 in United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3413 is not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that in the said case the Supreme Court was dealing with the matter wherein on the issuance of the notices under Section 13(2) of the Act and possession notices under Section 13(4) of the Act, principal borrower has directly approached and filed the writ petition without seeking alternate remedy of filing an Appeal under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, under those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that when there is an alternate remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be resorted to. Further, the Supreme Court of India at para 46 of the said judgment did not foreclose the very maintainability of the writ petition but has held in the following manner: "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or it agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of Banks, Financial Institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within, any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari Vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 SC 556 ; Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, AIR 1999 SC 22 and Harbanslal Sahnia and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 2120 , and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order." 16. Therefore keeping in view the finding of the Tribunal that 'there are intriguing question of fact which are to be dealt with and decided in the S.A. after a thorough inquiry...." and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation case and Harbanslal Sahani's case referred to above in the extracted para, we are of the prima facie view that the present writ is maintainable. 17. Coming to the second aspect, of the matter, it is to be seen that the Debts Recovery Tribunal while disposing off the interlocutory application, as an interim measure, until the S.A. is finally disposed of, to protect the interest of the respondent No. 2 Bank as well as the petitioner, directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 10.00 crores in two installments within a time frame, and directed the respondent Bank to defer all further proceedings in respect of the schedule premises pursuant to the possession notices dated 7th January, 2013, 8th January, 2013 and 9th January, 2013, and in event of the petitioner failing to pay the amounts, as directed, gave liberty to the respondent No. 2-Bank to proceed further in accordance with law. 18. Further, it needs to be seen that the DRT having given a finding that there are intriguing question of facts which need to be decided after thorough inquiry in the main Securitization Appeal and further as the quantum of claim is uncertain, was right in granting the conditional order for deposit of Rs. 10 crores. 19. 18. Further, it needs to be seen that the DRT having given a finding that there are intriguing question of facts which need to be decided after thorough inquiry in the main Securitization Appeal and further as the quantum of claim is uncertain, was right in granting the conditional order for deposit of Rs. 10 crores. 19. Since the above order, passed by the Tribunal, being an equitable order protects the interest of both the petitioner and the respondent No. 2-Bank, pending disposal of the S.A. before it, we are of the considered opinion, that no interference is warranted therewith. The DRT in its discretion and wisdom has imposed condition for depositing some amount and it seems such condition of depositing amount has also been accepted by the Bank, having not challenged the said order. 20. Intrinsically, this Court disposed of the writ petition on 19th March, 2014, accepting the reasoning given by the DRT, and gave further opportunity to the petitioner and extended time to deposit the amount. The Apex Court declined to go into merits of the aforesaid order; however, it set aside the same on the ground that no notice was issued to the respondent No. 2 while disposing of the writ petition. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has not complied with the impugned order. However, before us, it is stated that the petitioner is ready and willing to deposit the amount as directed to be deposited by the Tribunal. In view of the same, it is not necessary for us to appraise the contention of the petitioner that the DRT has no jurisdiction to impose such condition. As discussed supra, in order to protect the interest of the respondent No. 2-Bank, in our considered view, it is just and necessary to direct the petitioner to deposit some amount, pending disposal of the case and to do complete justice. Perhaps, it also evinces bona fides on the part of the petitioner. In the event of the petitioner failing to comply with the order, the respondent No. 2 can chalk out the liberty given to it proceedings in accordance with law. Having gone through the material on record, we do not see any valid ground to take a different view than the one taken by us previously. In the event of the petitioner failing to comply with the order, the respondent No. 2 can chalk out the liberty given to it proceedings in accordance with law. Having gone through the material on record, we do not see any valid ground to take a different view than the one taken by us previously. In view thereof, pending disposal of the writ petition, we direct the petitioner to deposit a demand draft for Rs. 1.00 crore with the respondent Bank on or before 5th May, 2014. The petitioner shall also deposit a sum of Rs. 4.5 crores on or before 5th June, 2014 and another sum of Rs. 4.5 crores on or before 7th July, 2014. In the meantime, the respondent-Bank is restrained from taking any coercive steps to recover the amount due and to take any action against the petitioner in running the printing press. It is made clear that if the petitioner is already in possession of the secured assets, it shall not be dispossessed of in the meantime. It is further made clear that in case the petitioner fails to pay the amount in compliance with the aforementioned direction, the respondent-Bank would be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. Accordingly, the WPMP is ordered. Registry is directed to list the main writ petition for final hearing on 14th July, 2014.