JUDGMENT N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. Regular Civil Suit No. 182 of 1998 instituted by the appellant-plaintiff against the defendant-tenant came to be decided on 10th June, 2003 by learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (J.D.), Jamnagar, who passed decree for eviction of the tenant under Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Against that judgment and decree, the tenant preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 68 of 2003 which was allowed on 7th July, 2006 by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar, who in turn set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Present Civil Revision Application under Sec. 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Act' for sake of brevity) was thus filed by original plaintiff-landlord and is directed against the said judgment and order dated 7th July, 2006 in the aforesaid Regular Civil Appeal. 2. The suit was instituted on 2nd May, 1998 by the applicant-plaintiff for decree of eviction. Initially it was on the ground of arrears of rent. As per the case of the plaintiff-landlord, the suit premises known as Mahadev Har House was rented out to the defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 800/-. The suit notice terminating the tenancy was issued (Exh. 51). The plaint was subsequently amended as per Exh. 14 application filed on 30th March, 1998 and allowed on 3rd February, 1999. It was pleaded that the tenant was allotted a residential house being Quarters No. 34, Block No. B-3 in the Bedeshar area as per allotment letter dated 4th August, 1998 and it was further stated that the tenant had assumed possession thereof. Accordingly, by the said amendment a ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act came to be inserted that because of allotment of the said house, the landlord was entitled to get the possession. 2.1. The defendant filed his first written statement at Exh. 12 to the plaint as originally filed. Thereafter, additional written statement was filed at Exh. 23 to the amended plaint (Exh. 17). In the additional written statement (Exh. 23), the defendant denied that he had acquired alternative accommodation. 2.1. The defendant filed his first written statement at Exh. 12 to the plaint as originally filed. Thereafter, additional written statement was filed at Exh. 23 to the amended plaint (Exh. 17). In the additional written statement (Exh. 23), the defendant denied that he had acquired alternative accommodation. It was contended that the house allotted to him was a Government quarters as he was in Government service; that the same was required to be handed over back on the event of his transfer or at the time of retirement from service. The tenant contended that he had never gone to permanently stay there. He contended that the allotment of the said quarters did not furnish a ground to the landlord for eviction. 2.2. The trial Court framed issues at Exh. 24. Issue No. 3 as to whether the plaintiff proved that the defendant-tenant had acquired alternative suitable residential accommodation after the coming into operation of the Bombay Rent Act, came to be decided in affirmative in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. The rest of issues namely that whether the tenant was in the arrears or whether the suit notice was legal and valid, came to be decided against the plaintiff-landlord. The trial Court passed the decree for eviction on the ground of acquisition of suitable alternative residential accommodation. 2.3. The lower appellate Court reversed the decree passed by the trial Court. With reference to said ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) the lower appellate Court reasoned that the quarters allotted to defendant- tenant was taken back by the authorities. It further weighed with the lower appellate Court that the tenant had not gone to reside in the said Government quarters and that the same was sealed by the authorities at one point of time. It further reasoned that the ground of acquiring of suitable alternative accommodation arose pending the suit, which was not available at the beginning, nor it survived at the time of passing of decree. The lower appellate Court further held that the ground was added only by subsequent amendment after institution of the suit. Thus, by taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects and observing further that the ground of acquirement of suitable alternative residential accommodation by the tenant was created pending the suit and it also came to an end pending the suit, it held that the decree of eviction was not sustainable. 3. Thus, by taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects and observing further that the ground of acquirement of suitable alternative residential accommodation by the tenant was created pending the suit and it also came to an end pending the suit, it held that the decree of eviction was not sustainable. 3. Assailing the reasoning of the lower appellate Court, learned Advocate Mr. R.C. Kakkad for the applicant submitted that it was permissible to plead the ground of availability of alternative accommodation under Sec. 13(1)(l) by me tenant by seeking amendment after filing the suit. In that regard, he relied on the decision of this Court in Jayalakshmi T. Pandya v. Shantilal C. Modi, 1995 (2) GLH 806 . It was further submitted by learned Advocate for the applicant that it was not a necessary requirement that the alternative premises needed to be acquired on permanent basis. Once the suitable alternative accommodation was available to be occupied by the tenant, decree under Sec. 13(1)(l) ought to have been passed, as was rightly passed by the trial Court, he submitted. 3.1. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Shah for the respondent-tenant submitted that the Government quarters was allotted to the tenant which was only because of he was in service and in any case, the allotment was not to continue after his retirement. He submitted that the quarters could be said to be available for temporary period during the service tenure of the tenant in the Government. Learned Advocate for me respondent further highlighted that the quarters allotted subsequently sealed by the Public Works Department Authority and the possession thereof was taken back; that me tenant had not stayed there using it as residence. With reference to all these, it was submitted that the allotment of Government quarters, therefore, did not amount to acquiring of alternative accommodation within the purview of Sec. 13(1)(l) and it was not an "acquisition" for the purpose of said ground for eviction. It was submitted that the quarters allotted where the tenant did not go to reside could not be termed as 'alternative residence'. Learned Advocate for the respondent in me next submitted that family of the tenant consisted of himself-the husband, wife, two sons of marriageable age and one daughter, and therefore the allotted quarter would not be said to be suitable. 4. Learned Advocate for the respondent in me next submitted that family of the tenant consisted of himself-the husband, wife, two sons of marriageable age and one daughter, and therefore the allotted quarter would not be said to be suitable. 4. The only point falls for consideration is whether ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act is made out. Under Sec. 13(1)(l) the tenant incurs liability to be evicted from the rented premises he is shown to have acquired or allotted alternative suitable accommodation. The provision reads as under: "Sec. 13(1)(l):--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence." 4.1. In view of above provision, the landlord is entitled to seek a decree for possession of the premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant, after coming into operation of the Act, has built or acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence or has been allotted such residence. 4.2. Also may be noticed at the outset the following observations on the applicability of Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Act, from decision in Dolatrai Harjivan Bibodi v. Dr. Kantilal Sukhlal Shah, 1977 GLR 848 , this Court observed thus: "In the present context, however, the dispute is as regards those provisions where the landlord is given a right to eject the tenant on the specific ground enacted under Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Control Act that the tenant after the coming into operation of the Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. The tenant's protection was, therefore, deemed to come to an end because he no longer required the original premises for his residential purpose, and therefore, the Legislature accommodated this limited right of the landlord to get back his property, once it is proved that the tenant after the coming into operation of the Act had built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. The tenant could never be expected to sit tight on his premises even after he has acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted other suitable residence. The tenant could never be expected to sit tight on his premises even after he has acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted other suitable residence. A just balance of the competing right is achieved by the Legislature by enacting this right of me landlord when this necessary statutory condition is fulfilled of acquisition of vacant possession or allotment of suitable residence by me tenant by this own building me same or otherwise after the Act has come into operation." 5. Before proceeding further, the reasoning of the lower appellate Court that the ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) was after institution of the suit and it was inserted by amending the plaint may be adverted to. A direct answer to this comes from decision of this Court in Jayalakshmi (supra). In that case, the landlord had instituted me suit initially on the ground of non-user under Sec. 13(1)(k) and the ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) was added by way of amendment. This Court held that it was permissible. In Paragraph 22, the Court ruled that in a suit for possession between the landlord and tenant, the cause of action arises on service of notice terminating the tenancy and the rest are only the grounds for possession as required by Secs. 12 and 13 of me Act. It was observed that adding one more ground to the same cause of action cannot be said to be a change of cause of action. The Court further held that, "it is now well settled that pending suit between a landlord and tenant for possession after the notice terminating tenancy, any number of grounds can be added if they are based on subsequent events which had occurred after the filing of the suit.". Thus, the reasoning of the lower appellate Court on the said count does not hold good in law and me plaintiff incorporating a ground of tenant having acquired alternative accommodation on the basis of such subsequent event is permissible and it would not have any debilitating effect. It was permissible to the landlord to plead and establish the same. This is clear from a literal reading and plain meaning of Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Act, as it provides that if a tenant acquires alternative suitable accommodation at any time after the Rent Act has come into force, it becomes a ground to seek decree of eviction for the landlord. 5.1. This is clear from a literal reading and plain meaning of Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Act, as it provides that if a tenant acquires alternative suitable accommodation at any time after the Rent Act has come into force, it becomes a ground to seek decree of eviction for the landlord. 5.1. In Champaklal Chhotalal v. Parvatiben Kuberbhai, 1994 (1) GLR 713 , the Court observed that in the Bombay Rent Act there are certain provisions which give right to the landlord for getting a decree for possession on happening of certain events. It was stated that Sec. 13(1)(e) is one such provision when the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the premises. Sec. 13(1)(k) is also a provision which comes into play in the event the tenant does not occupy the suit premises without any reasonable cause for a period of six months. Once these events contemplated as ground for eviction occur, it is not considered necessary that they should continue till the time of passing the decree. The Court then stated that similar would be the case under Sec. 13(1)(l) of me Bombay Rent Act. In that case, point was similar as it was urged that me quarters acquired by me tenant had been already surrendered by him. 6. Turning now to the facts on record, mere was no gainsaying that the Government quarters described above was allotted to the defendant-tenant. The tenant was a Government servant serving as Dresser, In-charge Medical Officer, Employees State Insurance Scheme. By virtue of order dated 4th August, 1998 (Exh. 39), he was allotted me quarters. On record was a possession receipt (Exh. 40) bearing out me fact that he had obtained the possession of me said Government quarter. The possession receipt dated 10th August, 1998 (Exh. 40) contained the signature of the defendant who received the possession as well as of the officer who handed over possession. It appears that the quarters was sealed on 8th September, 1999. It was due to recovery notice issued to the tenant. It was stated that me recovery notice was challenged by the tenant in me Court and the outcome was in his favour. But men he afterwards handed over back possession of me quarters (Exh. 41). 6.1. The plaintiff gave his evidence (Exh. 46) and spoke about the tenant having acquired suitable alternative accommodation being Government quarters. It was stated that me recovery notice was challenged by the tenant in me Court and the outcome was in his favour. But men he afterwards handed over back possession of me quarters (Exh. 41). 6.1. The plaintiff gave his evidence (Exh. 46) and spoke about the tenant having acquired suitable alternative accommodation being Government quarters. The plaintiff got produced from the competent officer the allotment letter (Exh. 39), possession letter (Exh. 40) and possession receipt (Exh. 41). The defendant in his evidence (Exh. 56) accepted me factum of allotment and having received the possession. He further stated that they were using the said quarters for temporary purpose and occasionally for staying overnight. However, he asserted that they had never gone to reside mere. He further stated that said quarters was later sealed; on 16th August, 1999 he complained that it was wrongly sealed behind his back and that the household materials were lying in the quarters. The tenant did not get the possession thereafter and ultimately on 28th January, 2002 the possession was given back. The receipt (Exh. 41) showing giving back of the possession mentioned amongst other details that the possession was voluntarily handed over. The facts on record were suggestive that as the conduct on part of the tenant in not going to reside in the allotted quarters was self-willed, his handing over possession was also voluntary. Defendant further stated in his evidence that it was not possible to accommodate his large family even in the rented premises, which was an insufficient accommodation. 6.2. Posing here, it may be noted that the Government quarters allotted had one drawing room, one bed room, a kitchen and facility of latrine-bathroom with furniture and fixtures. This was not in dispute and was accepted by the tenant in his cross-examination (Exh. 56). On the other hand, the rented possession comprised of a single room of the size of 8" x 6", an Osri, and a kitchen, as was admitted by the tenant (Exh. 56). Therefore, the allotted quarters was having better facilities and convenience in terms of accommodation compared to the rented premises. The contention on behalf of the tenant that the allotted quarters was not a suitable accommodation, therefore, could not be countenanced. 7. A ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) stands established once it is shown that the tenant has acquired suitable residence. 56). Therefore, the allotted quarters was having better facilities and convenience in terms of accommodation compared to the rented premises. The contention on behalf of the tenant that the allotted quarters was not a suitable accommodation, therefore, could not be countenanced. 7. A ground under Sec. 13(1)(l) stands established once it is shown that the tenant has acquired suitable residence. As already noted, it is not necessary that at the time of passing of decree in the suit, he must be continued to be in possession. It is the event of a tenant acquiring suitable alternative accommodation creates a liability in law for him to be evicted from the rented premises, correspondingly giving right to the landlord to obtain possession. Whether the acquisition of alternative accommodation is temporary or that the same was not permanently acquired is also not a valid defence to resist decree for eviction once the factum of acquisition is established on evidence. 7.1. The Government quarters allotted to the defendant-tenant was an accommodation available to him where he could have gone to stay. What is important is that the alternative accommodation is acquired by the tenant of his own right and that the same was available to be occupied by him. Intention of the tenant not to go to reside to the alternative suitable residence acquired is irrelevant. What matters is the factum of alternative accommodation acquired or allotted, which is suitable, and the event of such acquisition or allotment. This Court in Pranjivandus Khusaldas v. Dhanuben Wd/o. Devchand Jamnadas, 2001 (4) GLR 3157 held that shifting to alternative accommodation is not the requirement of Sec. 13(1)(l). It held that even acquisition of possession is not necessary. 7.2. In the present case, the ingredient of suitability of the alternatively acquired accommodation stands satisfied on facts. In Champaklal Chhotalal (supra), examining the said aspect, the Court observed that the tenant must have acquired suitable accommodation and that the word "residence" used in the provision of Sec. 13(1)(l) means the resident where the tenant can settle down. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: "These observations are good and are made in the background of the facts of that case. Even applying those principles here also, when the quarters is allotted to the Railway employee by the Railway he acquires a right to possess. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: "These observations are good and are made in the background of the facts of that case. Even applying those principles here also, when the quarters is allotted to the Railway employee by the Railway he acquires a right to possess. His possession cannot be taken away without following the procedure as contemplated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Therefore, the defendant No. 2 has a right to occupy the said quarters. Not only that, he did occupy and used the same for a period of four years. It is the case of defendant No. 2 that he used it only whenever he returned from duty during midnight. Assuming that to be correct, what is to be seen is whether the quarters which was allotted to defendant No. 2 was suitable for his residence alongwith his family or not. If that is so, he has acquired the possession of the suitable residence. The test would be that whether it has been done with the object of settling down. When a person is serving he has to settle down there, and therefore, when the residence is provided by the master or the employer it is with a view to see that the employee settles down there for his employment. When the quarters was given to defendant No. 2 at Udhna it was for the purpose of his settling down at Udhna." (Para 20) 7.3. Another decision of this Court in Chandrakanta M. Deshpande v. Vasantrao B. Toke, 1996 (1) GLR 248 also answer, the issue in its following observations: "However, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that allotment of quarters by the employer or master is only for a limited period of service, and therefore, the tenant who has been allotted quarters as an employee in connection with his employment will have to vacate the same on termination of service or on attaining the age of superannuation. It is, therefore, contended that such an allotment to tenant by the master is not a protected tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act, and therefore, such an allotment by the employer to the employee for a limited purpose of service could not be said to be a suitable residence allotted to the tenant warranting rigours of the provisions of Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. This submission runs counter to the spirit of Sec. 13(1)(l). Therefore, it cannot be accepted." 7.4. The Court in Chandrakanta Deshpande (supra) stated on the object of the provision that me Legislature intended that me tenant should not have two accommodations available. He cannot be allowed to stick to two premises simultaneously. The Court stated that if me existing tenant acquires the rented premises, it could be made available to a needy one. It was observed that if the intention of the Legislature was to emphasise that the acquisition or allotment of the alternative accommodation was not permanent, then Sec. 13(1)(l) would have been enacted with a different phraseology. It was observed that the only emphasise was on the suitability of the premises and not on the permanency. 8. Recapitulating the factual aspects emerging from the record, the tenant had of his own right got the Government quarters which was allotted to him, of which he took possession also but did not went to reside there for the reasons best known to him. It was accepted in the evidence by the tenant that he was using the same occasionally and temporarily but never stayed permanently. Compared to the rented premises the allotted quarters had more accommodative facilities. The allotment of the quarters was "acquisition" of suitable alternative accommodation within the meaning and for the purpose of the Section. Thus, the event necessary for operation of Sec. 13(1)(l) and creating a liability on the tenant to be evicted from the premises occurred in the facts of the case. Whether he did not go to stay in the allotted quarters or whether the same was not available at the time of passing of decree does not alter the legal liability to evict. 8.1. In view of position of law highlighted above informed by the facts and evidence on record of the case, the decree passed by the trial Court was justified. When the lower appellate Court reversed the decree, it materially erred in law by not applying the principles and the rigours of Sec.13(1)(l) in its true construction and compass. The decision rendered by the lower appellate Court could not be said to be conforming to law and it did not apply the principles of law correctly to the established facts. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the lower appellate Court warrants interference. 9. The decision rendered by the lower appellate Court could not be said to be conforming to law and it did not apply the principles of law correctly to the established facts. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the lower appellate Court warrants interference. 9. For the foregoing discussion and reasons, impugned judgment dated 7th July, 2006 delivered by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 68 of 2003 is required to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside. The decree of eviction passed by the trial Court is maintained, subject to however, modification that time to hand over the possession which was three months in the decree of the trial Court shall stand substituted upto 15th September, 2014. The defendant shall continue to pay the amount of rent to be paid as mesne profit until the possession is handed over. Revision Application is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute in the terms above. Registry shall send back the Record and Proceedings.