Judgment : Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed against the order dated 29.7.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla in case No. 109-3 of 2011/2002. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that on 14.3.2000 respondent No.1 inspected the shop of respondent No.2 at about 12.30 P.M. Respondent No.1 after disclosing his identity being Food Inspector, issued him a notice declaring his intention to take the sample of Bisleri packed drinking water for the purpose of analysis and purchased 3x1 ltr bottles of Bisleri packed drinking water on payment of Rs.36/- as a sample for analysis. The sample bottles were labelled and wrapped into thick paper with the help of gum. A paper slip, bearing code and Sr. No. LHA Shimla S-1/3533, was affixed with gum from bottom to top of each sample. This paper slip was signed by the Local Health Authority, Shimla and was issued to him. The samples were fastened with strong thread and sealed with sealing wax. At least four seal impressions were put on each bottle and all the knots were covered with seal. Signatures of accused were taken in such a manner that it covered wrapper and paper slip. Rajesh Kumar and Ashok Kumar were present throughout whole of the process. Punchnama was prepared by the Food Inspector on the spot which was signed by the accused, witnesses and by him. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst Kandaghat alongwith memo in form-VII in a sealed packet through Ashok Kumar, Peon. A copy of memo form-VII alongwith impression of seal used to seal the sample was sent separately in a sealed letter to the Public Analyst Kandaghat through Ashok Kumar under intimation to Local Health Authority, Shimla. The remaining two parts of the sample alongwith two copies of memo form-VII were deposited with the Local Health Authority, Shimla in a sealed packet for record. The Public Analyst Kandghat on analysis found the sample not in accordance with rule-49 (28) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules vide report No. 182 dated 22.9.2001. The remaining two parts of the sample alongwith two copies of memo form-VII were deposited with the Local Health Authority, Shimla in a sealed packet for record. The Public Analyst Kandghat on analysis found the sample not in accordance with rule-49 (28) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules vide report No. 182 dated 22.9.2001. The report was received by him from Local Health Authority, Shimla vide letter No. F-195-44 dated 27.11.2001 as the certification mark of Bureau of Indian Standards has not been mentioned on the label whereas sale of packaged drinking water except under the Bureau of Indian Standards Certification is prohibited. The Chief Medical Officer, Shimla District was empowered to give written consent under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act vide notification No. HFW-B (A) 2-1/82-II-Part dated 14.3.2000 to launch prosecution. He placed the report of Public Analyst and other documents of the case before the Chief Medical Officer, Shimla. He gave written consent to launch prosecution against Sanjeev Kumar son of Sagli Ram, Shop No. 18, Chini Banglow, Kufri, Shimla in the court of law. Thereafter, he filed the complaint in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla. 3. Notice of accusation was issued to the accused on 30.3.2002. Accused was hereby directed to furnish his personal bond and surety bond in the sum of Rs. 3,000/-each to the satisfaction of the Court on 26.9.2002. Notice of accusation was put to respondent No.2 on 2.3.2005. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. An application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was filed by the accused. The application preferred by the accused was allowed by the trial court on 19.7.2006. Thereafter, Radha Agencies was impleaded as accused. The Chief Judicial Magistrate has recorded the statement of Sanjeev Kumar before allowing the application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 13.6.2006. Thereafter, notice of accusation was put to Anand Parkash, i.e. respondent No.3 on 7.8.2008. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. An Application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was filed by respondent No.3 Anand Parkash for impleading petitioner M/s Triputi Food and Beverages, SCF 17, Sector-1, Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P. through its proprietor Lalita Rani. The application preferred by respondent No.3 was allowed by the trial court on 3.12.2008 whereby M/s Triputi Food and Beverages was impleaded as accused No.3. The application preferred by respondent No.3 was allowed by the trial court on 3.12.2008 whereby M/s Triputi Food and Beverages was impleaded as accused No.3. Notice of accusation was put to petitioner on 28.9.2012. Petitioner filed an application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 13.12.2012 for impleadment of Asian Lak Health Foods Limited being the manufacturer. It is clarified that M/s Triputi Food and Beverages was impleaded through its proprietor Smt. Lalita Rani. Trial Court dismissed the application preferred by the petitioner under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 29.7.2013. According to the trial court, provisions of section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act could not be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial. Trial court has also returned a finding that petitioner Smt. Lalita Rani could not prove the bill mark ‘X’ and mark ‘Y’ while appearing as AW-1. Hence, the present petition. 4. It would be relevant at this stage to note for completion of facts that statement of AW-1 Smt. Lalita Rani was recorded by the trial court on 23.7.2013. Statements of PW-1 L.D. Thakur, PW-2 Naresh Kumar, PW-3 Ashok Kumar and PW-4 Rajesh Kumar were also recorded by the trial court. 5. Petitioner Smt. Lalita Sharma has appeared as AW-1 on 23.7.2013. According to her, her husband was doing the business at Parwanoo. He died on 1.1.2010. Thereafter, she was the sole proprietor of M/s Triputi Food and Beverages. She had purchased the bottles from Asian Lak Health Foods Limited, Ludhiana vide mark ‘X’. She has also placed on record copy of sales tax form ST-XXV mark ‘Y’. She again reiterated that the products were purchased from Asian Lak Health Foods Limited vide Bill No. 443 dated 31.5.2001. She has prayed for impleading Asian Lak Health Foods Limited as additional accused. She has also placed on record copy of communication made vide Ex.AW-1/A. 6. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that initially respondent No.2 was made accused. He moved an application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for impleading Radha Agencies as accused, on the basis of which M/s Radha Agencies was impleaded as accused through Anand Parkash. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that initially respondent No.2 was made accused. He moved an application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for impleading Radha Agencies as accused, on the basis of which M/s Radha Agencies was impleaded as accused through Anand Parkash. Anand Parkash, i.e. respondent No.3 also moved an application under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, on the basis of which petitioner was impleaded as accused on 3.12.2008. Notice of accusation was also put to Smt. Lalita Rani. She has pleaded not guilty and claimed trial as per order dated 28.9.2012. 7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander vs Delhi Administration, (1975) 1 SCC 866 have held that sale under section 2 (xiii) is wide enough to include every kind of seller, and a manufacturer as well as distributor can sell. Each such seller can incur the liability under section 7 and be prosecuted for it. The description “vendor” in section 14 cannot affect the liability under section 7. A sale of an article of food by a “manufacturer, distributor, or dealer” is a distinct and separable offence. Section 14 was not meant to carve out an exemption in favour of a distributor or a manufacturer who sells articles of food, found to be adulterated, irrespective of the question whether any warranty was given for them. Their Lordships have further held that it is true that the manufacture of an adulterated article of food for sale is also an offence under section 7 of the Act. But neither section 7 nor section 14 of the Act bars trial of several offences by the same accused person, be he a manufacturer, a distributor, or a seller, referred to as “the vendor” in section 14 of the Act. Section 20-A itself lays down that, where the Court trying the offence is itself satisfied that a “manufacturer, distributor, or dealer” is also concerned with an offence”, for which an accused is being tried, the necessary sanction to prosecute will be deemed to have been given. Another reason seems to be that such a power enables speedy trial of the really guilty parties. Their Lordships have further held that section 20-A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. Another reason seems to be that such a power enables speedy trial of the really guilty parties. Their Lordships have further held that section 20-A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. A separate trial would require written consent under section 20 unless it is a complaint by a purchaser who can rely on section 12. The addition of an accused under section 20-A constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of sanction under section 20. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. Although, we are not concerned in the appeals before us with the prosecution of the manufacturer, M/s. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain, yet, we find that one of the questions framed for consideration and decided by the Delhi High Court relates to the meaning and scope of Section 20A of the Act. We may mention that a statement has been made at the Bar that the manufacturer has also been acquitted. We do not know whether this acquittal was on the ground that the manufacturer cannot be impleaded under Section 20A of the Act after the trial is concluded by the acquittal of the two accused. It is clear that Section 20A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. A separate trial would require a "written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or of a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority", unless it is a complaint by a purchaser, other than a Food Inspector, who could rely upon Section12 of the Act. But, an addition of an accused under Section 20A of the Act constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under Section 20 (1) of the Act. 12. We are not impressed by the argument that adistributor could only be prosecuted for selling without giving a warranty to a vendor which is a separate offence under S. 14 of the Act. It is clear from Section 14 itself that a manufacturer as well as a distributor can sell. The definition of "Sale", given in S. 2, sub-sec. (xiii) of the Act, is wide enough to include every kind of seller. It is clear from Section 14 itself that a manufacturer as well as a distributor can sell. The definition of "Sale", given in S. 2, sub-sec. (xiii) of the Act, is wide enough to include every kind of seller. Every seller can be prosecuted of an offence created by Section 7 of the Act which prohibits a sale as well as distribution of an adulterated article of food. The mere fact that, for the purposes of Section 14, the person who could be the last seller, in the sense that he sells to the actual consumer, is described as "the vendor", could not affect a liability for an offence under Section 7 of the Act of a sale of an article of food which is found to be adulterated. A sale of an article of food by a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer" is a distinct and separable offence. Section 14 was not meant to carve out an exemption in favour of a distributor or a manufacturer who sells articles of food, found to be adulterated, irrespective of the question whether any warranty was given for them. It is true that the manufacture of an adulterated article of food for sale is also an offence under Section 7 of the Act. But, neither Sec. 7 nor Section 14 of the Act bars trial of several offences by the same accused person, be he a manufacturer, a distributor, or a last seller, referred to as " the vendor" in Section 14 of the Act. 13. We are also unable to accept as correct a line ofreasoning found in AIR 1966 Punj. 421 (supra) and Food Inspector. Palghat Municipality v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills. 1974 FAC p. 534 (Cri. Appeal Nos. 222, 223, 225 to 227/73 etc. etc. decided on 3-7-1974) = (1975 Cri LJ 479) (Ker) and in P. B. Kurup v. Food Inspector, Malappuram Panchayat, 1969 Ker LT 845 that, in every case under the Act, there has to be initially a prosecution of a particular seller only, but those who may have passed on or sold the adulterated article of food to the vendor, who is being prosecuted, could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under Section 19 (2) has been pleaded and shown to be substantiated. Support was sought for such a view by referring to the special provisions of Section 20A and Section 19 (2) and Section 20 of the Act. A reason for Section 20A seems to be that the prosecution of a person impleaded as an accused under Section 20A in the course of a trial does not require a separate sanction. Section 20A itself lays down that where the Court trying the offence is itself satisfied that a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer is also concerned with an offence", for which an accused is being tried, the necessary sanction to prosecute will be deemed to have been given. Another reason seems to be that such a power enables speedy trial of the really guilty parties. We are in agreement with the view of the Delhi High Court that these special provisions do not take away or derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law which enable separate as well as joint trials of accused persons in accordance with the provisions of the Sections 233 to 239 of Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, there seems no logically sound reason why if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently impleaded, under Section 20A of the Act, he cannot be joined as a co-accused initially in a joint trial if the allegations made justify such a course. 19. In our opinion, considering the character of the offence and the nature of the activities of manufacturers and distributors, who generally deal in bulk, and of the ordinary vendor, who sells particular items to the consumer, the common link, which could provide the unity of purpose or design so as to weave their separate acts or omissions into one transaction, has to be their common intention that a particular article, found adulterated, should reach the consumer as food. Ignorance of the fact of adulteration is immaterial. In order to justify a joint trial of accused their common object or intention to sell the article as food is enough. In such a case of a strict liability created by statute for safeguarding public health, the mental connection between the acts and omissions of the manufacturer, the distributor, and the last vendor would be provided simply by the common design or intention that an article of food, found to be adulterated, should reach and be used as food by the consumer. Each person dealing with such an article has to prove that he has shown due care and caution by taking prescribed steps in order to escape criminal liability. Otherwise, if one may so put it, a mens rea shared by them is presumed from a common carelessness exhibited by them. Again, a sale at an anterior stage by a manufacturer or distributor to a vendor, and the sale by the vendor to the actual consumer could be viewed as linked with each other as cause and effect. 20. We think that the activities of the manufacturer, the distributor, and the retail seller are sufficiently connected, in such a case of sale of an article of food found to be adulterated, by a unity of purpose and design, and, therefore, of a transaction, so as to make their joint trial possible in a suitable case. But, at the same time, we think that, where a joinder of several accused persons concerned with dealing in different ways with the same adulterated article of food at different stages is likely to jeopardise a fair trial, a separate trial ought to be ordered. It is not proper to acquit or discharge an accused person on this ground alone. The ordering of a separate trial in a case where prejudice to an accused from a joint trial is apprehended, is enough. Indeed, we can go even further and say that ordinarily, they ought to be separately tried. But, a joint trial of such accused persons is not ab initio illegal. It can take place in suitable cases. 23. We do not interpret Kadiri Kunhahammad's case (AIR 1060 SC 661) (supra) to mean that a joint trial of accused persons is obligatory in every case where a catenation of facts, said to constitute separate but related or cognate offences, can be viewed as one transaction. The question whether there should be a joint or separate trial in a case should be determined on the facts of that case and the requirements of justice there. As pointed out by this Court in ( AIR 1973 SC 2246 = 1973 Cri LJ 1453) (supra) the special provisions of Section 20A are only enabling and do not give rise to a mandatory duty. They do not bar either a separate or a joint trial of an accused person if other conditions are satisfied. As pointed out by this Court in ( AIR 1973 SC 2246 = 1973 Cri LJ 1453) (supra) the special provisions of Section 20A are only enabling and do not give rise to a mandatory duty. They do not bar either a separate or a joint trial of an accused person if other conditions are satisfied. Similarly, Section 239 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, which is reproduced as Section 223 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, is only an enabling section. No doubt it has to be shown that the requirements of Section 239 (d) have been fulfilled whenever this provision is sought to be utilised.” 8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Limited vs. State of M.P. and others, (1995) 6 SCC 62 have held that Magistrate has power to proceed against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer if during the course of trial evidence adduced before the court discloses that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence. Their Lordships have held as under: “7. A reading of Section 20-A clearly indicates that during the course of the trial for any of the offence under the Act alleged to have been committed by any person, if the evidence adduced before the Court discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then the Court has been empowered, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) of S.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Code') to treat as if the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer is being proceeded against under Section 20 of the Act, as originally instituted thereunder. The concept of vendor and vendee is known to civil law and passing of the title in the goods is alien to the prosecution for an offence under the Act. It cannot, therefore, be introduced in a trial for the offence under the Act. The Act advisedly made a person who sells adulterated article of food liable to be prosecuted for the offence of adulteration of the article of food. It cannot, therefore, be introduced in a trial for the offence under the Act. The Act advisedly made a person who sells adulterated article of food liable to be prosecuted for the offence of adulteration of the article of food. During the trial when it comes to the notice of the Magistrate, from the evidence adduced, that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of that article of food, which is the subject -matter of adulteration, is also concerned with the offence, then the court has been empowered to proceed against such manufacturer, distributor or dealer as if prosecution has initially been instituted against him under S.20 of the Act. In fact, for general offences, S.319(1) of the Code empowers the Court where during the course of enquiry or trial of an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, to proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. In view of the language of Section 20-A of the Act, whatever is contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to proceed at a trial against any person, i.e., the original accused and against others mentioned in Section 20-A. In other words, joint trial for the same offence is permitted. The object appears to be that in a case where common evidence discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence for which the prosecution was launched against a person from whom the article of food was purchased, to avoid multiplicity of prosecution and also keeping in view the doctrine of autrefois acquit the Legislature introduced S.20A to have joint trial. 8. The further contention that Laxmi Narain being adealer of the appellant, Section 20A has no application, as it speaks of trial of a person not being, inter alia, a dealer, has no merit, as the section has mentioned about trial of commission of the offence by any person; and, if that person be not the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, Section 20A permits trial of such manufacturer, distributor or dealer also, along with the person already before the court. So, the fact that the person being tried is a dealer would not make the section non-operational.” 9. So, the fact that the person being tried is a dealer would not make the section non-operational.” 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Parkash Shivparkash vs K.I. Kuriakose and others, (1999) 8 SCC 633 have held that the trial for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act begins when under section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate asks the accused whether he pleads guilty or not. The evidence can be adduced only after recording the plea of the accused. Exercise of the power under section 20-A before the evidence was adduced is premature and without jurisdiction. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. Section 319 of the Code empowers the Court to proceed against any person who is not being made an accused already, if it appears from the evidence collected in the inquiry or trial of an offence that such person has committed an offence for which he could be tried together with the already arraigned accused. One of the differences between Section 319 of the Code and Section 20-A of the Act is that, while in the former even if it appears to the Court from the evidence (either during inquiry or trial of the offence), that another person is to be tried along with the already arraigned accused, then the Court can proceed against that other person, while in the latter the satisfaction of the Court that such manufacturer (distributor or dealer) is also concerned with that offence must be gathered from "the evidence adduced before it during the trial". In other words, the power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked until the trial begins and after the trial ends. 9. When does the "trial" begin as for an offence under the Act? The word "trial" is not defined either in the Act or in the Code. However, the Code has distinguished the trial from inquiry as could be noted from Section 2(g) of the Code wherein the word "inquiry" is defined thus : "Inquiry means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court." 10. The term "trial" cannot be given a fixed meaning to be applied in all cases uniformly. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in which the term is employed in a particular provision of any statute. The term "trial" cannot be given a fixed meaning to be applied in all cases uniformly. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in which the term is employed in a particular provision of any statute. This Court has said in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 389 : 1957 SCR 279 : (1957 Cri LJ 567) thus (Para 6 of AIR, Cri LJ) : "The words 'tried' and 'trial' appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words 'tried' and 'trial' have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration." 12. The above scrutiny of the relevant provisions reveals that the trial of the offences under the Act begins when the Magistrate asks the accused whether he pleads guilty or not as envisaged in Section 251 of the Code, if the Magistrate opts to hold summary trial. Hence, evidence in a trial under the Act can be adduced only after recording the plea of the accused as envisaged in the said section. Thus, it is clear that a Magistrate can implead any person under Section 20-A of the Act only after reaching the stage envisaged in Section 254(1) of the Code. 16. Thus the position is clear that power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial. In the present case, the Magistrate has chosen to exercise the power prematurely and hence the action is without jurisdiction. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of the Magistrate. However, we make it clear that this judgment will not preclude the Magistrate from considering the question afresh at the appropriate stage.” 10. In the present case, the Magistrate has chosen to exercise the power prematurely and hence the action is without jurisdiction. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of the Magistrate. However, we make it clear that this judgment will not preclude the Magistrate from considering the question afresh at the appropriate stage.” 10. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Joginder Pal Mann vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 698 has held that the proviso to section 14 further provides that a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer, distributor or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer under this section. 11. In the instant case, the trial court, as noticed above, has put the notice of accusation to respondent No.2 Sanjeev Kumar on 7.8.2006. Notice of accusation was put to respondent No.3 on 7.8.2008. Notice of accusation was put to the petitioner Smt. Lalita Rani on 28.9.2012. Trial court has framed the following point for determination on 3.1.2013: “Whether Asian Lak Health Foods Limited, Sector-2, Parwanoo being Manufacturer and Supplier is liable to be arrayed as co-accused, as alleged? …OPA accused No.3. 12. Trial court has already recorded the statement of AW-1 Smt. Lalita Rani. She has categorically deposed in her statement while appearing AW-1 that she has purchased the bottles from Asian Lak Health Foods Limited vide mark ‘X’. Copy of sales tax form ST-XXV is mark ‘Y’. She has also placed on record copy of communication dated 4.10.2002. It is evident from the combined reading of mark ‘X’ and statement of AW-1 Smt. Lalita Rani that the petitioner had been purchasing bottles of Bislery from Asian Lak Health Foods Limited, Ludhiana. There is complete misreading of evidence by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ex.AW-1/A has been duly proved in accordance with law. Trial court has erred in law by making observation that the application was pre-mature. Trial court has misread the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 1999 (8) SCC 633 . The moment, notice of accusation was put to respondent No.2 on 7.8.2006, respondent No.3 on 7.8.2008 and to the petitioner on 3.12.2008, trial has commenced. Trial court has erred in law by making observation that the application was pre-mature. Trial court has misread the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 1999 (8) SCC 633 . The moment, notice of accusation was put to respondent No.2 on 7.8.2006, respondent No.3 on 7.8.2008 and to the petitioner on 3.12.2008, trial has commenced. The trial has already commenced and the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 has also been recorded by the trial court. 13. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove , petition is allowed. Order dated 29.7.2013 is set aside. Asian Lak Health Foods Limited, Ludhiana-Chandigarh Road, Near Kohara, V.P.O. Jandiali-141112, District Ludhiana (Pb.) through its authorized representative is impleaded as co-accused in case No. 109/3 of 11/2002. The record of the case be sent forthwith to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla is directed to decide the matter within a period of three months from today. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.