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2014 DIGILAW 62 (PNJ)

Harpal Singh v. Gram Panchayat

2014-01-10

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

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Judgment MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR, J. (Oral) The matrix of the facts and material, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant revision petition and emanating from the record, is that the land in dispute is Shamlat deh of Gram Panchayat of village Kona, Tehsil Kalka, District Panchkula. Petitioners-plaintiffs Harpal Singh son of Rachan Singh and others (for brevity “the plaintiffs”), claiming themselves to be its owners being Khewatdar/proprietors, have instituted the civil suit (Annexure P1) for a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the defendants-respondents Gram Panchayat of village Kona, BDPO and State of Haryana through its Collector (for short “the defendants”) from interfering in their ownership and possession of the property in dispute. They have also filed an application for ad interim injunction, invoking the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 CPC. The defendants contested the suit, filed written statement (Annexure P6), reply to the stay application and prayed for their dismissal. 2. Taking into consideration the material on record, the trial Court dismissed the injunction application filed by the plaintiffs, vide impugned order dated 9.11.2012 (Annexure P7). 3. Aggrieved thereby, the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed as well, by virtue of impugned order dated 20.11.2013 (Annexure P8) by the appellate Court. 4. The petitioner-plaintiffs still did not feel satisfied and preferred the present revision petition to challenge the impugned orders, invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners-plaintiffs, having gone through the record with his valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petition in this context. 6. Ex facie, the arguments of learned counsel that the disputed land is a shamlat deh & the ancestors of plaintiffs were proprietors/cosharers in the estate and since they became proprietors/coowners and in joint possession of the land in question, so, the trial Court as well as appellate Court have committed legal mistake to dismiss their injunction application, are not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well. 7. As is evident from the record that the land in dispute is a shamlat deh and the Gram Panchayat has been described its owner in the revenue record. The kind of land is shown as Tibba and Choe (non-cultivable). 7. As is evident from the record that the land in dispute is a shamlat deh and the Gram Panchayat has been described its owner in the revenue record. The kind of land is shown as Tibba and Choe (non-cultivable). The revenue record, in which, the Gram Panchayat has been depicted as owner of the disputed land, was never challenged by the plaintiffs. If they are claiming their ownership, then, they ought to have filed the proceedings before the Collector for deciding the question of title, as contemplated under Section 13A of The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 as applicable to Haryana (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”). 8. As indicated hereinabove, the Gram Panchayat is described as owner in the column of ownership in the relevant revenue record and kind of land is mentioned as Tibba and Choe (non-cultivable). In that eventuality, in the absence of decision of question of title in favour of the plaintiffs by the Collector, such land would be deemed to have been vested in the gram panchayat, as envisaged under section 2 (g) of the Act. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled. 9. An identical question cam to be decided by a Division Bench of this Court in case Balbir Singh and others v. The Joint Director, Panchayats, Punjab and others in CWP No.4437 of 1988, decided on 21.11.2013. While interpreting the similar provisions, it was ruled as under (para 16): “A cogent and meaningful reading of Section 2(g), Section 3 and 4 of the Act would reveal that all land described as 'shamilat deh' came to be vested in Gram Panchayat and only such 'shamilat deh' is excluded, from vesting in a Gram Panchayat, if the conditions contained therein are complete. Therefore, in order to claim the ownership of the land in dispute it was incumbent upon the petitioners to prove by cogent evidence that the land in question falls within the ambit of pointed exclusion clauses of either Section 2(g), Section 3 or 4 of the Act and not otherwise. They have miserably failed to prove any of the indicated conditions to exclude ownership of the Gram Panchayat from the land in dispute. In that eventuality, such land would be deemed to have been vested in the Gram Panchayat by operation of law. They have miserably failed to prove any of the indicated conditions to exclude ownership of the Gram Panchayat from the land in dispute. In that eventuality, such land would be deemed to have been vested in the Gram Panchayat by operation of law. Moreover, the mere fact that the land in dispute has been described as 'Banjar Qadim' in the revenue record is indicative of the fact that it was not in actual cultivating possession of the petitioners. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in cases Gram Panchayat, Village Chaura, Block Sanaur, Tehsil & District, Patiala vs. State of Punjab and others, 2012(2) PLJ 251 and Gram Panchayat Gulalta vs. State of Haryana and others, 2012(2) PLJ 254 that such 'Banjar Qadim' land would not vest in the persons recorded in its possession. On the contrary, it would be deemed to have been vested in the Gram Panchayat. The ratio of law laid down “mutatis mutandis” is complete answer to the problem in hand.” 10. Therefore, the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. 11. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that the gram panchayat, being owner of the suit land, has already carved out and allotted the plots to the scheduled casts/scheduled tribes category/poor persons, who are living below poverty line, in pursuance of the scheme of the State of Haryana. Therefore, the trial/appellate Courts appear to have examined the matter in the right perspective, negated the claim of plaintiffs in this respect and have recorded the cogent grounds in the impugned orders. Such orders, containing the valid reasons, cannot legally be set aside, in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless & until, the same are perverse and without jurisdiction. Since, no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for petitioners, so, the impugned orders (Annexures P7 and P8) deserve to be and are hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 12. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. 12. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of civil suit, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant revision petition filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs is hereby dismissed as such. 14. Needless to mention that nothing recorded hereinabove, would reflect on the merits of the civil suit, in any manner, during the trial, as the same has been so observed for the limited purpose of deciding the present revision petition only.