JUDGMENT Mr. S.S. Saron, J.:- This appeal has been filed by the appellant – wife against the judgment and decree dated 10.02.2014 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Batala (Exercising the Powers of District Judge, Gurdaspur). The joint petition filed by the parties under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (‘Act’, for short) seeking divorce on the ground of mutual consent has been dismissed as the appellant – wife withdrew the consent at the second motion for grant of divorce by mutual consent. However, the appellant has been directed to return the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs which she had received at the first motion for divorce to the respondent- husband within one month from 10.02.2014 failing which the respondent would be entitled to recover it by due process of law. The judgment and decree is assailed to the extent that the appellant has been asked to return the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs to the respondent. 2. The marriage between the parties was solemnised according to Sikh rites and ceremonies on 15.10.2010. After marriage, the parties lived together as husband and wife. From their marriage, they had a daughter namely Seerat. Soon after the marriage, disputes arose between the parties due to temperamental differences. They could not live together as husband and wife. Therefore, they decided to get their marriage dissolved by a decree of divorce by way of mutual consent. It was agreed that the minor daughter of the parties would remain in custody of the appellant. The respondent agreed to pay a sum of Rs.6.25 lacs to the appellant, i.e. Rs.1.75 lacs for the minor daugther and Rs.4.50 lacs for the appellant. This amount included the expenses of marriage, compensation and permanent alimony. All the dowry articles had been returned to the appellant. It was settled that the appellant could not raise any claim regarding movable and immovable property of the respondent. The appellant was also to withdraw her cases pending against the respondent. 3. The statements of both the parties were recorded at the first motion. Ravinder Pal Singh – respondent tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex.PW1/A in which it was inter-alia stated that the parties have settled all their disputes. Sukhdeep Kaur – appellant also tendered in evidence her affidavit Ex.PW2/B. She deposed on the same lines as that of her husband (respondent). The statements of both the parties were recorded at the first motion. Ravinder Pal Singh – respondent tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex.PW1/A in which it was inter-alia stated that the parties have settled all their disputes. Sukhdeep Kaur – appellant also tendered in evidence her affidavit Ex.PW2/B. She deposed on the same lines as that of her husband (respondent). She stated that she had filed a petition on the basis of mutual consent. The case was adjourned for six months to enable the parties to reconcile their differences. 4. At the time of recording the statements of the parties at second motion, the appellant stated that she does not want to get a decree of divorce by mutual consent and she wants to live with the respondent. She further stated that the amount received by her was her ‘Streedhana’ which was lying with her. The respondent was asked about his willingness to live with the appellant. He, however, stated that he was not ready to live with the appellant and wants a decree of divorce. His statement to this effect was also recorded. He further stated that he was entitled to get back the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs which he had been induced to pay by the appellant on the pretext of getting a decree of divorce. According to the learned trial Court, there was a lot of argument over the issue of returning Rs.6.25 lacs back to the respondent. The appellant contested the issue by stating that the amount received by her was her ‘Streedhana’. The learned trial Court after considering the contentions of both the parties held that the petition for grant of divorce was filed on the basis of mutual consent and that it was agreed between the parties that the appellant would receive Rs.6.25 lacs as “permanent alimony and compensation including expenses of marriage”. Therefore, when the appellant did not want to get a divorce, the terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties are not binding on the parties and the appellant was liable to return the money that had been taken according to the terms of the compromise. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs has been received by the appellant towards her ‘Streedhana’, besides, she wanted to live with the respondent. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs has been received by the appellant towards her ‘Streedhana’, besides, she wanted to live with the respondent. A reference has been made to the statement of the appellant recorded before the learned trial Court on 10.02.2014 copy of which has been placed on record as Annexure P.3 (Colly). It is inter alia also mentioned in the statement that in fact the appellant is willing to live with the respondent, however, the respondent has thereafter filed a petition (Annexure P.2) under Section 13 of the Act for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion. 6. Learned counsel for the appellnat has strongly relied on the case, Deepak Kumar v. Poonam Rani, [2011(5) Law Herald (P&H) 646 : 2012(1) Marriage L.J. 219] : 2012(5) RCR (Civil) 479 to contend that where a joint petition under Section 13-B of the Act had been filed and the wife had received the entire consideration for settlement and thereafter, she unilaterally withdrew her consent, the petition was dismissed. 7. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the matter. The only dispute is whether the appellant is entitled to retain the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs which she had received in consequence of the settlement reached at between the parties for grant of divorce by mutual consent in terms of Section 13-B of the Act. A perusal of the joint petition filed under Section 13-B of the Act, which has been placed on record as Annexure A.1 shows that it was inter-alia pleaded by the parties that both the petitioners had decided to move a petition for divorce by mutual consent, besides, it was settled that the minor daughter would remain in custody of the appellant who was her natural mother. It was further agreed that the respondent was to pay a sum of Rs.6.25 lacs (out of which Rs.1.75 lacs for minor child and Rs.4.50 lacs for the appellant) in the shape of demand draft which would include expenses of marriage, compensation and permanent alimony as decided by the respectables. It is further stated that all the dowry articles had been returned to the appellant by the respondent and at present no due was pending against each other. It is further stated that all the dowry articles had been returned to the appellant by the respondent and at present no due was pending against each other. It was also settled that the appellant would not raise any claim regarding movable and immovable property of respondent and she would withdraw her cases pending in any competent court of law against petitioner No.1. 8. The said pleadings evidently establish that the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs was paid as expenses of marriage, compensation and permanent alimony as had been decided by the respectables. In this view of the matter, the statement dated 10.02.2014 (Annexure P.3) of the appellant that the amount received by her was her ‘Streedhana’ is not tenable and contradictory to the stand which has been taken in the joint petition (Annexure A.1) filed by the parties. The benefit of the amount which the appellant received for the grant of divorce and on failure of the respondent to consent for divorce though legal would nevertheless entitle the respondent to receive the amount back. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this regard is also apposite and the same reads as under: “144. Application for restitution. — (1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled in any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modifiction of the decree or order. Explanation.— For the purposes of sub-section (1) the expressions “Court which passed the decree or order shall be deemed to include.— (a) where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance; (b) where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the Court of first instance which passed such decree or order; (c) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for resitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).” 9. A perusal of the above inter alia shows that where an order is varied or reversed in an appeal, revision or other proceedings or is set aside or is modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall on the application of any party entitled in any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such order. Even otherwise the jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every Court and is to be exercised whenever the justice of the case so demands. A litigant cannot use the process of Court so as to surreptitiously obtain a benefit on the representation to do a certain act and thereafter retract from the representation that had been given but at the same time retain the benefit by taking a different, changed and a contradictory stand. The appellant – wife having received an amount of Rs.6.25 lacs on the representation that she agrees to give divorce at the time of first motion of the proceedings of the joint petition but later on her refusal for divorce at the second motion, though legal, would necessarily imply that the benefit of Rs.6.25 lacs that she received on her representation for divorce is to be refunded and restored. Therefore, the amount which has been received by the appellant in consequence of the statements made at the first motion is liable to be restored to the respondent. In case she has any claim towards her ‘Streedhana’, she can make such a claim in a Court of law by resorting to appropriate proceedings but it would be impermissible to allow the appellant to take the amount in a surreptitious manner on the representation that she is willing to give divorce and thereafter, retract from the same by taking a different stand that the amount was received by her towards ‘Streedhana’. 10. The case of Deepak Kumar v. Poonam Rani, (supra), referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the learned counsel has relied upon the following observations: “Learned counsel points out that the money has been given to her as per the settlement and now she has also married to yet another person. He states this to explain as to why the wife is not even present inspite of service. In my view, it is even irrelevant that wife is not present for Section 23 which sets out the powers of the Court is explicit in its words in the opening of the Section itself, which starts with the words “in any proceeding under this Act where defended or not”. It means that the fact that the respondent does not defend the action or does not contest the proceeding shall have (sic.) not be relevant for a Court to pass appropriate orders. In Sanjeeta Dass v. Tapan Kumar Mohanty, [2010(6) Law Herald (SC) 3822 : 2011(1) Marriage L.J. (SC) 427] : (2010) 10 SCC 222 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court disapproved the granting of divorce decree merely on the ground that the husband was willing to shell out a sum of Rs.10 lacs as “life term maintenance” for the wife and for the expenses of marriage of their daughter. The Court said “The law does not permit the purchase of a decree of divorce for considerations, with or without the consent of the other side”. Dr. Virendra Kumar points out in the article (supra) that “even if the proceedings would have been initiated under Section 13B, instead of Section 13 of the Act of 1956 (sic. The Court said “The law does not permit the purchase of a decree of divorce for considerations, with or without the consent of the other side”. Dr. Virendra Kumar points out in the article (supra) that “even if the proceedings would have been initiated under Section 13B, instead of Section 13 of the Act of 1956 (sic. 1955), the inducement of the wife to agree to divorce by exempting her to receive in return a sum of ten lacs, would not have been (sic.) made the divorce decree valid in the eyes of law”.” 11. A perusal of the above shows that the husband therein had contended that he had given money to his wife towards permanent settlement. Thereafter, she had married another person. It was stated by the husband that the wife was not present in spite of service, therefore, he was entitled to a decree for divorce. It was held that the law does not permit the purchase of a decree of divorce for consideration with or without consent of the other side. The wife in the said case had not appeared for giving her consent for divorce, it was held that dissolution of marriage cannot take place by mere agreement. There is no dispue with the said proposition. In the present case, it is not the husband who is stating that since he has paid Rs.6.25 lacs to the appellant, therefore, he is entitled to a decree of divorce. It is the appellant – wife who is stating that since she has received an amount of Rs.6.25 lacs, she is entitled to retain the same towards her ‘Streedhana’. Therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is inapplicable to the facts of the present case and the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant on the strength of the same is totally misconceived, besides, being baseless. 12. In the circumstances, we find that the learned trial Court has rightly ordered the amount of Rs.6.25 lacs be refunded to the appellant and in case she was not willing for grant of divorce. 13. Consequently, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/-. ---------0.B.S.0------------