Judgment Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. After hearing Mr. B.D. Konwar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. B. Gogoi, the learned standing counsel for the Finance Department, I am of the opinion that the sole question which falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioners can invoke the principles of legitimate expectation to claim the relief. The controversy arose on the following facts and circumstances. The petitioner No. 1 is an association of All Assam Heads of Department Ministerial Officers, while the petitioner No. 2 is the President of the Association. The remaining petitioners are members of the Association and they, having a common grievance, are joining together to file this writ petition. In the early part of 1960, the Government of Assam introduced a scheme for training Assistants drawn from various Heads of Departments, District and Subordinate Offices for training in Accounts. This scheme was revised in the year 1965 whereunder the trainees on completion of the training ware entitled to the following: "(i) With credit (75% and above) - 2 (two) advance increments and a cash reward of Rs. 100/-; (ii) Grade-I (60% and above but less than 75%) - 2 (two) advance increments. (iii) Grade-II (45% and above but less than 60% - 1 (one) advance increment" 2. The scheme was amended by the State Government from time to time, but the grant of advance increments was continued with a rider that the benefit of advance increments shall not be admissible in cases where passing of the Account training was made a condition precedent for holding the post which the incumbent has been allowed to hold. It would appear that the Director of Accounts and Treasuries has till now conducted training for 16(sixteen) batches of Assistants from Heads of Department and 26 batches of Treasury Assistants. In the year 1998, the Finance Department of the Government of Assam wanted to review the continuance of the scheme of advance increment and opined, inter alia, that such short tern training does not result in perfection of Accounts works in the offices and doubted the usefulness of such training. After several exchange of correspondences between the Finance Department and the Directorate of Accounts and Treasuries, the practice was stopped by the Government vide the letter dated 14.6.2000 of the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam, Finance Estt. (A) Department (Annexure-VIII). After several exchange of correspondences between the Finance Department and the Directorate of Accounts and Treasuries, the practice was stopped by the Government vide the letter dated 14.6.2000 of the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam, Finance Estt. (A) Department (Annexure-VIII). As a result, the 14th batch of the trainees from the Heads of Departments, District and Subordinate Offices were not given the advance increments. However, after considerable delay, this 14th batch of trainees were given the benefits vide the letter dated 1.4.2004 of the Under Secretary, Finance Estt. (B) Department, Govt. of Assam. However, the trainees belonging to the 15th and 16th batches, which include the petitioners herein, were denied of the advance increments, which were resented by them. This prompted the petitioners to file this writ petition for directing the respondent authorities to award the advance increments. 3. A short affidavit is filed by the Department of Public Health Engineering (PHED) through the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, PHED wherein it is stated that the petitioner No. 20 (Shri Kumud Ch. Pathak) is serving as U.D. Assistant under the establishment of the Chief Engineer, PHED, Henggrabari, and is drawing a special pay of ` 100/- along with his salary after passing the departmental Accounts training in Grade-I as the trainee of the 15th batch. Curiously, no further comment is made by the answering respondent. Is he contesting the writ petition? I do not know. The affidavit filed by the Finance Department is equally short and does not seem raise objection against the prayer made in the writ petition. The case of the Finance Department is that as per the provision of Rule 15 of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service Rules, 1973, every L.D.A. (Jr. Assistant) and U.D.A. (Sr. Asstt) shall undergo such training and pass such departmental examination as prescribed by the appointing authority and that as such training is a pre-condition for promotion to the next higher post, the question of granting advance increments to the petitioners does not arise. Similarly, contends the Finance Department, as per Rule 18 of Assam Treasury (Establishment) Service rules, 1993, a member of service in the cadre of Junior Accounts Assistant shall be required to undergo such training and pass the departmental examination as the Government may prescribe from time to time, and there is, therefore, no provision of advance increment in the service rules. 4. 4. It is contended by Mr. B.D. Konwar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, that when the requirement of undergoing Accounts training has not been incorporated in the relevant service rules, the withdraw of incentives like advance increment without amending the scheme is arbitrary and unjust. According to the learned counsel, while introducing special pay in the letter dated 1.4.2004, the Government has not expressly withdrawn or amended the provision of awarding advance increments under the scheme of 1965 and the same is still in force; he government without making proper evaluation of the scheme of training, it cannot withdraw such a scheme denying the past benefits abruptly and without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected persons. The manner in which the benefits were given to the trainees of the 14th batch, and were denied to the petitioners, who also stand on equal footing with them, smacks of hostile discrimination; equal should be treated equally. He, therefore, urges that the benefit of advance increments should be extended to the petitioners. The impugned decision is, however, sought to be justified by Mr. B. Gogoi, the learned standing counsel for the Finance Department, by maintaining that when Accounts training is made the condition precedent for promotion to the next higher post, advance increments cannot be granted to the petitioners. 5. The fact that there had been consistent past practice of granting advances increment(s) to the Assistants of Heads of Departments and Treasury Assistants, etc., is not in dispute. In fact, the last of such trainees who were awarded the advance increments was of the 14th batch. That the petitioners have passed the requisite departmental examinations of Accounts training is also not in dispute. However, the source of resentment of the petitioners is the letter dated 14.6.2000 of the Finance Department addressed to the Director of Accounts and Treasuries, Assam stating that "as per Govt. resolution taken on the reports of A.P.C.'s there is no provision for grant of advance increment to the assts. For undergoing Accounts training in the Directorate of Accounts and Trreasuries". This consistent past practice has now been abruptly withdrawn. Is this permissible in law? The answer is a firm "No". The petitioners do have the legitimate expectation that the past consistent practice of granting advance increments would also be extended to them as well. For undergoing Accounts training in the Directorate of Accounts and Trreasuries". This consistent past practice has now been abruptly withdrawn. Is this permissible in law? The answer is a firm "No". The petitioners do have the legitimate expectation that the past consistent practice of granting advance increments would also be extended to them as well. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is explained by the Apex Court in J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134 in the following manner: "26. The basic principles in this branch relating to "legitimate expectation" were enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (AC at pp. 408-09) (commonly known as CCSU case). It was observed in that case that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been terminated by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. The procedural part of it relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. In the above case, Lord Fraser accepted that the civil servants had a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted before their union membership was withdrawn because prior consultation in the past was the standard practice whenever conditions of service were significantly altered, Lord Diplock went a little further, when he said that they had a legitimate expectation that they would continue to enjoy the benefits of the trade union membership, the interest with regard to which was protectable. An expectation would be based on express promise or representation or by established past action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and unambiguous. An expectation would be based on express promise or representation or by established past action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and unambiguous. It could be a representation to the individual or generally to a class of persons." 6. In Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. UOI, (2012) 11 SCC 1 , the Apex Court, after reviewing the previous decisions, culled out the following principles of legitimate expectation: "188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of this Court. Suffice it to observe that the following principles in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation are now well established: 188.1. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right. 188.2. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness. The doctrine arises out of principles of natural justice and there are parallels between the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. 188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so. 188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation and anticipation cannot amount to an assertable expectation. Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable. 188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefits must give way to public interest and me doctrine of legitimate expectation would not be invoked which would block public interest for private interest." 7. In other words, the benefits of advance increments heretofore consisted granted to others similarly situated employees cannot be denied to the petitioner unless there is an overriding public interest to negate the same. After all, such denial will be unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory and will fall foul of the fundamental right of equal protection of law guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution. After all, such denial will be unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory and will fall foul of the fundamental right of equal protection of law guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution. In M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) 7SCC592, the Apex Court considered and earlier decision in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3SCC 499 and in para 44 (p. 612) of the Report held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation had been judicially recognised. It operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. In J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134 , it was stated that both doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation require satisfaction of the same criteria and arise out of principle of reasonableness. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that this writ petition succeeds. The respondent authorities are, therefore, directed to grant advance increments to the petitioners who completed the training in Accounts as per the scheme of 1965 and as amended from time to time and continued up to the 14th batch of the trainees. The direction shall be implemented by them within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. No costs. Petition Allowed.