JUDGMENT : SANJAY KAROL, J. 1. Appellant-convict Manohar Lal, hereinafter referred to as the accused, has assailed the judgment dated 27.9.2007, passed by Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, in Sessions Case No. 3-K/VII/2007, titled as State v. Manohar Lal, whereby he stands convicted of the offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-, and default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years, in relation to offence punishable u/s 376 of the Indian Penal Code; to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, and in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months, in relation to offence punishable u/s 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It is the case of prosecution that the accused was residing with his daughter, i.e. prosecutrix (PW-2) and son Munish Kumar (PW-3) in village Rumehar, Tehsil and District Kangra. Accused had three daughters and one son. His wife died sometime in the year 1995. He himself brought up the children. He got his two daughters married, after death of his wife. Thereafter, he started residing with the prosecutrix and his son. In the month of September, 2006, when menstruation period of prosecutrix stopped, on 21.9.2006, she approached her neighbour Sushma Devi (PW-4), Pradhan of Mahila Mandal, whom she called as "Chachi" and disclosed that for the last three years, she had been subjected to rape by her father, who also threatened her not to disclose the incident to any one, lest she be killed with a Drat. PW-4 immediately contacted Pushpa Devi (PW-5), engaged with Chinmay Social Organization as a Social Worker, in the social Justice Informal Legal Cell. Prosecutrix also narrated the incident to her neighbour Varsha Devi (PW-6). Prosecutrix was immediately taken to Police Post, Nagrota Bagwan, where report (Ex. PW-15/A) was lodged, which was forwarded to Police Station, Kangra, through HC Naresh Sharma (PW-18). SI Desh Raj (PW-20), Incharge Police Post, Nagrota Bagwan, recorded statement of the prosecutrix on 21.9.2006, on the basis of which FIR No. 374/06, dated 21.9.2006 (Ex. PW-19/A), under the provisions of Sections 376, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered at Police Station, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Accused was arrested. SI Desh Raj (PW-20), Incharge Police Post, Nagrota Bagwan, recorded statement of the prosecutrix on 21.9.2006, on the basis of which FIR No. 374/06, dated 21.9.2006 (Ex. PW-19/A), under the provisions of Sections 376, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered at Police Station, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Accused was arrested. Both he and prosecutrix were sent for medical examination. Accused was medically examined by Dr. H.S. Sohal (PW-7), who issued MLC (Ex. PW-7/B) and prosecutrix was got medically examined from Dr. Anju (PW-22), who issued MLC (Ex. PW-22/C). 3. During investigation, police recovered Drat (Ex. P-2), with which accused allegedly threatened the prosecutrix. Investigation further revealed that accused had been threatening his son Munish (PW-3), who also was aware of the fact that his sister was being subjected to rape by his father. Report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. PW-20/G) was obtained. 4. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime and as such challan was presented in the Court for trial. 5. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 376, 377& 506 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 6. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 22 witnesses and statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up a plea of innocence and false implication by interested witnesses, who deposed under police pressure. In defence, he examined his married daughter Neelam (DW-1). 7. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and other material placed on record, trial Court convicted the accused of offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 & 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal. 8. However, trial Court acquitted the accused of the offence punishable under the provisions of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. State has not filed any appeal against the judgment of acquittal qua this offence. 9. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 769 , the Apex Court has reiterated its earlier view and has held as under:- 11. 6. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. 9. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 769 , the Apex Court has reiterated its earlier view and has held as under:- 11. 6. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer J in Wheeler v. United States (159 U.S. 523). The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Suryanarayana Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 482 ). 10. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 4 SCALE 121 it was held as follows: 5. .....A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered u/s 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored'. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored'. The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness. 11. In State of H.P. Vs. Suresh Kumar @ DC, (2009) 7 JT 514 (1), the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the prosecutrix was ravished by the accused on 15.3.2000 which incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her sister later during the day. She also narrated the incident to her parents the following day and to the Doctors after the incident. Court accepted the statement of the sister, the parents and the doctors while holding the accused guilty. Importantly, the Apex Court reversed the finding recorded by the High Court wherein it was held that the statement of the prosecutrix being minor was not worthy of credence. 12. In Jetha Ram Vs. The State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 425 , the Apex Court has held as under:- 11. The High Court also rightly rejected the view of the trial court that as the evidence regarding other accused were not accepted and the case of the conspiracy set up by the prosecution rejected, the evidence regarding the appellant cannot be accepted. The State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 425 , the Apex Court has held as under:- 11. The High Court also rightly rejected the view of the trial court that as the evidence regarding other accused were not accepted and the case of the conspiracy set up by the prosecution rejected, the evidence regarding the appellant cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of P.Ws. 11 and 18 would indicate that they heard the name of the appellant being mentioned as one of the assailants at the time of the occurrence and repeated those names without actually seeing them. On a reading of the evidence, we are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. It appears that the witnesses stated that they not only saw but also relied on the version given by the other witnesses. It may also be noted that even taking that the witnesses relied on the version given by the persons at the scene immediately after the occurrence it is admissible as a relevant fact under the Evidence Act. 13. The Apex Court in Sukhar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 9 SCC 507 has held as under: 6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of resgestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act reads thus: Under the present Exception [to hearsay] an utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a carbrake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided, it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued. 14. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided, it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued. 14. Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) summarises the law relating to applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus: 1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous. 2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past. 3. The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and by-standers. In conspiracy, riot &c. the declarations of all concerned in the common object are admissible. 4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated. 15. This Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2791 considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act held thus: (SCC pp. 246-47, para 15) 15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible u/s 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae. 16. In another judgment in Rattan Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1996) 9 SCALE 258 this Court examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held thus (SCC p. 167, para 16) .....................The aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted u/s 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of murder. Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus: (a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact. (Emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during dead of the night, victim's identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence it is admissible u/s 6 of the Evidence Act. 17. In Balram Prasad Agrawal Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1996) 9 SCALE 118 , the Apex Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of J.D. Jain Vs. Management of State Bank of India and another, AIR 1982 SC 673 wherein a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in paragraph 10 of the Report has made the following observations: (AIR p. 676, para 10: SCC p. 148, paras 21 and 22) The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 18. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 18. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental, state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made'. 19. In Rameshwar Vs. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 , the Supreme Court has held that the previous statement of the raped girl to her mother, immediately after the occurrence, is not only admissible and relevant as to her conduct, but also constitutes corroboration of her statement under the provisions of section 157 of the Evidence Act. In order to come to the aforesaid conclusions, illustration (j) to section 8 of the Evidence Act was relied upon. In that case, the victim, named Purni, was 7/8 years old. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and believed. 20. Prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. If for some reason Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. [ State of Maharashtra Vs. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. [ State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 ]. 21. The Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 has held that:- ......The Courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a Court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? 21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault-it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. (Emphasis supplied) 22. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. In order to ascertain as to whether discrepancy pointed out is minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness is making the statement. [ State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Lekh Raj and Another, (2000) CriLJ 44]. 23. In the aforesaid decision itself the Court reiterated its earlier view taken in The State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2407 wherein it was held that:- A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give fight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures. (Emphasis supplied) 24. The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. N.K.-The Accused, , (2000) CriLJ 2205 has held that:- ......It is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cobweb of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females. It is the spurt in the number of unmerited acquittals recorded by criminal Courts which gives rise to the demand for death sentence to the rapists. The Courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women. (Emphasis supplied) 25. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dharkole @ Govind Singh and Others, AIR 2005 SC 44 the Apex Court has held that:- 9. ...Eye witnesses' account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dharkole @ Govind Singh and Others, AIR 2005 SC 44 the Apex Court has held that:- 9. ...Eye witnesses' account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be credit-worthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness-box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation. 10. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other. 11. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. [Emphasis supplied] 26. In Radhu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, , (2007) 12 SCC 57 , the Apex Court has held that "... Even if there is consent, the act will still be a 'rape', if the girl is under 16 years of age" and "There have also been rare instances where a parent has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make a false charge of a rape either to take revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case". 27. We shall now discuss the evidence in view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law. 28. It cannot be disputed, nor is it in dispute, that on 21.9.2006, on an application (Ex. PW-20/A), moved on behalf of the police, prosecutrix was produced for medical examination. Since no female relative was accompanying, her examination was deferred for the following day. On 22.9.2006, Dr. Anju (PW-22) examined the prosecutrix, who disclosed her age to be 14 years. As per statement of the doctor, prosecutrix was continuously raped for over a period of three years by her own father and last such incident took place on 9.9.2006. Prosecutrix informed the doctor that she had been subjected to sexual act, both through vagina as well as anal route. 29. On physical examination of the prosecutrix, the doctor observed as under: There is no injury mark seen anywhere on the body. Axillary and pubic hair are scantily developed, normal otherwise. Breasts normally developed, nipples normal. No semen stains seen on external genitalia & pubic hairs. Hymen not intact, no bleeding, no inflammation. Admits one finger easily. Vagina healthy. No laceration or injury marks seen. Labia majora and minora normal. No injury. Cervix nulliparous and healthy uterus nulliparous. External and sphincter normal. On P/R, anal sphincter grips finger normally. Breasts normally developed, nipples normal. No semen stains seen on external genitalia & pubic hairs. Hymen not intact, no bleeding, no inflammation. Admits one finger easily. Vagina healthy. No laceration or injury marks seen. Labia majora and minora normal. No injury. Cervix nulliparous and healthy uterus nulliparous. External and sphincter normal. On P/R, anal sphincter grips finger normally. (Emphasis supplied) After examining the report of the FSL, doctor opined that sexual intercourse could not be ruled out. 30. In Court, the doctor, an expert Gynaecologist, observed that one finger could easily be admitted inside the vagina. Absence of any traces of sexual intercourse, in the report of FSL, was explained by her as prosecutrix had taken bath after last such incident of assault, which took place 12 days prior to her examination and also that she had changed her clothes. Thus, possibility of prosecutrix being subjected to intercourse through her vagina is not ruled out. 31. The next question, which arises for consideration is the age of prosecutrix. On the date of her deposition in Court, i.e. 16.4.2007 prosecutrix states her age to be 15 years. Last incident took pace in the month of September, 2006, which means prosecutrix, on that date, was of 14 years 7 months. Significantly, accused in his statement, u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even feigns ignorance about the date of birth of his own daughter. Be that as it may, Dr. Suresh Thakur (PW-21), who proved the skiagram test; X-rays and his report (Ex. PW-21/A, 21/B, 21/C & 21/D), opines the age of the prosecutrix to be between 12 and 15 years. There is no scope of variation in the Radiological age. The witness has not been cross-examined at all. Thus the fact that prosecutrix was born on 2.10.1992 stands conclusively and undisputedly established through the testimonies of Ramesh Chand (PW-10), Panchayat Assistant, Gram Panchayat, Ramed, who proved certificate of age (Ex. PW-10/B) and Dev Raj Sharma (PW-14), who proved school record (Ex. PW-14/A). In both the documents, date of birth is recorded as 2.10.1992, which matches with the version of the prosecutrix and the medical evidence. Thus, the age of prosecutrix stands conclusively established by the prosecution to be less than 16 years. 32. As per the accused, he stands falsely implicated on the asking of Sushma Devi (PW-4), Pradhan of the area. In both the documents, date of birth is recorded as 2.10.1992, which matches with the version of the prosecutrix and the medical evidence. Thus, the age of prosecutrix stands conclusively established by the prosecution to be less than 16 years. 32. As per the accused, he stands falsely implicated on the asking of Sushma Devi (PW-4), Pradhan of the area. While cross-examining the witness, it is suggested by the accused that since children of Sushma are being supported by a voluntary organization, of which Pushpa Devi (PW-5) is a Member, and that there is a boundary dispute with Pushpa Devi, he stands falsely implicated by these persons. In order to establish such fact, accused has examined his daughter Neelam (DW-1) in Court. 33. We shall first deal with her testimony. In Court, she (DW-1) does state that Sushma Devi does not have good relations with her father, i.e. the accused. Significantly, this fact also stands admitted by the prosecutrix herself, according to whom her father used to restrain them from visiting her house. The cause of discord being a land dispute, but then significantly, there is nothing on record to establish such fact. Such suggestion put to Sushma Devi, stands categorically denied. In our considered view, the accused ought to have placed some material on record, highlighting the cause of animosity between him and the witnesses who testified against him, more so in the light of the fact that his own daughter, i.e. Neelam admits that her father used to consume alcohol. This witness was married in the year 1997. It has come on record through her testimony that at the time of death of her mother, prosecutrix was just three years of age. Thereafter, her father alone brought up both the prosecutrix and her brother. The witness admits that both the prosecutrix and PW-3 used to visit the house of Sushma, whom they called her as "Chachi" and "Dadi", for seeking advice, which fact accused did not appreciate. 34. From the conjoint reading of testimonies of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5, it is clear that accused is an agriculturist and was close to the local MLA, who, quite often, used to visit him. Significantly, false implication on account of political rivalry is not one of the defences. We do not find the testimony of this witness of any help to the accused or his defence having been probabilized. Significantly, false implication on account of political rivalry is not one of the defences. We do not find the testimony of this witness of any help to the accused or his defence having been probabilized. 35. Before we proceed to examine the testimony of prosecutrix and other witnesses, we shall deal with the recovery of weapon of offence, so effected by the police. Rakesh Kumar (PW-13) has not supported the prosecution at all. According to PW-20, accused led the police party, in the presence of Rakesh Kumar and got recovered Drat, which was seized by the police. We find that PW-13 has not disclosed true version in Court with regard to recovery. He is relative of the accused. Be that as it may, on this count, we find testimony of SI Desh Raj (PW-19) to be inspiring in confidence, who has not only proved the factum of recovery but also statement of Rakesh Kumar to have been correctly recorded by him during the course of investigation. 36. Can it be said that Sushma Devi (PW-4), out of animosity, falsely deposed against the accused in Court. Having minutely examined her testimony, we find it not to be so. The witness, to our mind, appears to have deposed truthfully. She categorically states that prosecutrix narrated the incident to her, whereafter she informed Maya Devi, Pushpa Devi and Mamta and matter was reported to the police. We find this version of hers to be fully corroborated not only by the prosecutrix, with whose statement we shall deal herein later, but also by Pushpa Devi, a social worker. 37. According to Pushpa Devi (PW-5), she was telephonically informed by Sushma Devi about the incident. She, as a social worker, is working in the social justice informal legal cell (Chinmaya Mission), a social organization. Prosecutrix also disclosed to her that she had been subjected to rape by her father for over a period of three years. Only when her menstruation stopped, she revealed such fact to others. On a query put to the prosecutrix as to why such fact was not disclosed earlier, prosecutrix informed that her father used to threaten to kill her with a Drat. Also, her brother was threatened in the same manner. Significantly, witness denies that prosecutrix was tutored by Sushma Devi. At least this witness is not hostile to the accused. On a query put to the prosecutrix as to why such fact was not disclosed earlier, prosecutrix informed that her father used to threaten to kill her with a Drat. Also, her brother was threatened in the same manner. Significantly, witness denies that prosecutrix was tutored by Sushma Devi. At least this witness is not hostile to the accused. She is a social worker and has been engaged in a social activity and making women aware of their rights. We find this version to have fully corroborated the version of prosecutrix, whose testimony, in any event, we find to be absolutely inspiring in confidence. 38. According to the prosecutrix, accused used to do "galat kaam". She clarifies "galat kaam" means committing rape. Continuously she was subjected to rape for three years by her father, who used to send her brother outside the house and after bolting the door from inside commit such acts. Her father used to threaten her with a Drat and ask her not to disclose such fact to any one. Even prior to the matter being reported to the police, her father subjected her to rape and her menstruation periods had stopped for about two months. She disclosed the incident to Pushpa Devi and Sushma Devi, who are her paternal aunts, whereafter matter was reported to the police. Though in cross-examination, witness admits to have been brought up by her father, who also used to cook meals for her, but however we find that on the question of sexual assault she has stuck to her original version and it cannot be said that testimony of this witness stands shaken in any manner. From her testimony it can be inferred that accused was an alcoholic and a chain smoker, which fact is also objected by her. Significantly, prosecutrix, in cross-examination, has deposed as under: ........It is correct that when my father came to know that my menstruation period has stopped and the days are over so my father threatened me that in-case of any thing adverse I would be killed by cutting into pieces........ 39. From the line of cross-examination of the prosecutrix, accused wants the Court to believe that prosecutrix is a tutored witness. Prosecutrix admits that presently she is being looked after and maintained by Mahila Mandal. She is staying at Chandigarh. 39. From the line of cross-examination of the prosecutrix, accused wants the Court to believe that prosecutrix is a tutored witness. Prosecutrix admits that presently she is being looked after and maintained by Mahila Mandal. She is staying at Chandigarh. We find testimony of prosecutrix to be consistent with her initial statement and the facts so narrated by her to PW-4 and PW-5. Except for a minor improvement that her father used to rape her after sending her brother away and bolting the door from inside, which fact is not so recorded in her initial statement, with which she was confronted, there is no variation, improvement, exaggeration or embellishment in her testimony in Court. As such, it cannot be said that prosecutrix is a tutored witness. 40. In fact we find that her version stands fully corroborated by her brother Munish Kumar (PW-3), according to whom his father used to give him beatings and force him to go outside and close the door from inside to commit "galat harkat" with his sister. Even according to this witness, accused used to give beatings both to him and the prosecutrix and threatened to kill them with a Drat and axe if such acts were disclosed to any person. This witness in his unrebutted testimony has deposed as under: ...............It is correct that my father threatened my sister in September, 2006 that in-case of any obstacle created by her then she would have been killed by cutting into pieces. It is correct that I do not like that my father takes liquor....... 41. In the instant case testimony of the prosecution witnesses is found to be wholly reliable. Hence there was no need for the prosecution to have examined the other independent witness in whose presence the prosecutrix had narrated the incident. Quality and not quantity of evidence matters. It is not the case of prosecution either that these independent witnesses were actually witnesses to the occurrence of the incident. In the event of credible evidence already on record there was no need for the prosecution to have multiplied the number of witnesses. 42. We are taking this view by relying upon the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Gurminej Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 214 . In the event of credible evidence already on record there was no need for the prosecution to have multiplied the number of witnesses. 42. We are taking this view by relying upon the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Gurminej Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 214 . In the said report the Court has also held that dropping a witness on the specious plea that he was won over without laying the foundation therefor is generally to be frowned upon. But each case has to be considered on its separate facts. If the accused does not object to the statement of the Prosecutor to the effect that the witness was won over or that the accused does not take measure for examining such witness in the Court, the Court would not allow the accused, more so, at the stage of appeal, to take up the plea of trial being fatal due to non examination of a witness. 43. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 2235 , the Apex Court held as under:- 14. In State of H.P. v. Gian Chand [2000 (1) SCC 71] Justice Lahoti speaking for the Bench observed that the Court has first to assess the trustworthy intention of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined. 44. At least, it is not the case of accused that his son was tutored against him by PW-4. Thus, why would be falsely depose against his own father. He also has deposed the truth. 45. We find that version of prosecutrix stands independently corroborated by Varsha Devi (PW-6), a resident of the same village. Prosecutrix had also disclosed the factum of being subjected to rape by her father. 46. From the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix (a minor) and also criminally intimidated her. 47. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. 46. From the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix (a minor) and also criminally intimidated her. 47. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 48. While dealing with the issue on affording aid, assistance and help to the victim of rape the Apex Court in Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 14 issued the following directions:- 15. In this background, we think it necessary to indicate the broad parameters in assisting the victims of rape. (1). The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation. It is important to have someone who is well acquainted with the criminal justice system. The role of the victim's advocate would not only be to explain to the victim the nature of the proceedings, to prepare her for the case and to assist her in the police station and in court but to provide her with guidance as to how she might obtain help of a different nature from other agencies, for example, mind counselling or medical assistance. It is important to secure continuity of assistance by ensuring that the same person who looked after the complainant's interests in the police station represent her till the end of the case. (2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since the victim of sexual assault might very well be in a distressed state upon arrival at the police station, the guidance and support of a lawyer at this stage and whilst she was being questioned would be of great assistance to her. (3) The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to representation before any questions were asked of her and that the police report should state that the victim was so informed. (3) The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to representation before any questions were asked of her and that the police report should state that the victim was so informed. (4) A list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept at the police station for victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose own lawyer was unavailable. (5) The advocate shall be appointed by the Court, upon application by the police at the earliest convenient moment, but in order to ensure that victims were questioned without undue delay, advocates would be authorised to act at the police station before leave of the court was sought or obtained. (6) In all rape trials anonymity of the victim must be maintained, as far as necessary. (7) It is necessary, having regard to the Directive Principles contained under Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some, for example, are too traumatized to continue in employment. (8) Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the Court on conviction of the offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board whether or not a conviction has taken place. The Board will take into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if this occurred as a result of the rape. 49. State is directed to take appropriate action in that regard. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.