Judgment By Court-Being aggrieved by the order dismissing the writ petition in W.P.(L) No.4673 of 2008 dated 22.6.2011, the appellant-Bharat Coking Coal Limited has preferred this appeal. 2. The respondent was an employee of the appellant and was working as Personnel Officer at Mahuda Coal Washery. While functioning as Senior Welfare Officer at Bhagabandh Colliery of BCCL, the respondent was trapped and arrested by CBI Dhanbad for demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a workman on 8.10.1985 for allotment of quarter. The respondent was placed under suspension by an order dated 11.10.1985. A criminal case being RC No.19/1985 was registered by Central Bureau of Investigation, Dhanabd against the respondent before the Special Judge CBI, Dhanbad and by judgment dated 21.6.1996, the respondent was held guilty of charges levelled against him under Section 161 IPC and also under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and was also imposed a fine of Rs.500/-. The appeal preferred by the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1996 (R) was dismissed by this Court and in SLP (Cri) No. 4689 of 2003, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere with the finding of conviction but the sentence was reduced to one year. 3. After conviction of the respondent by the Special Judge CBI, Dhanbad, disciplinary action was initiated against the respondent and by order dated 26.4.2000, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and Disciplinary Authority, Coal India Ltd. dismissed the respondent from service. The respondent filed an application in Form 'N' before the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the same was registered as Application No.36(26)/2005-E-4 and the Controlling Authority by its finding dated 22.8.2007 held that since no separate order forfeiting the gratuity has been passed, the respondent is entitled to gratuity amounting to Rs.2,63,963/- 4. The Management preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Being aggrieved by the order not awarding interest on the gratuity amount in terms of the provisions contained in Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the respondent-employee also filed appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Management preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Being aggrieved by the order not awarding interest on the gratuity amount in terms of the provisions contained in Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the respondent-employee also filed appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority held that the “provisions of the Act stipulate that while forfeiting the gratuity amount on the ground of moral turpitude, the employer has to mention whether gratuity amount is to be forfeited wholly or partially but in the instant case, the management-Company has not passed such order mentioning specifically whether the gratuity amount is to be forfeited wholly or partially.” Pointing out that no separate order forfeiting the gratuity amount was passed by the Management, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal filed by the Management and directed the appellant for payment of gratuity amount of Rs.2,63,963/-. The appeal preferred by the employee was also dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant filed writ petition being W.P.(L)No.4673 of 2008. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding that merely because the respondent was involved in an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, that does not automatically mean that without any order of forfeiture, it will be presumed that the employer is entitled to forfeit the gratuity of the employee and that there ought to have been a separate order for forfeiture of gratuity and on those findings the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant-Management (Western Washery Zone of Bharat Coking Coal Limited) has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration the fact that on being convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, forfeiture of gratuity of an employee is automatic on account of conviction in a criminal case involving moral turpitude. Placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Y.P. Sarabhai Vs Union Bank of India and another [ (2006) 5 S.C.C. 377 ], it was submitted that an employee, having been dismissed on proved charges of misconduct, is not entitled to gratuity but only to provident fund amount. Placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Y.P. Sarabhai Vs Union Bank of India and another [ (2006) 5 S.C.C. 377 ], it was submitted that an employee, having been dismissed on proved charges of misconduct, is not entitled to gratuity but only to provident fund amount. Contending that in the light of the specific provisions contained in Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the gratuity amount is automatically forfeited in cases where the employee has been convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude, the learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Manohar Singh Neech(Tak) Vs. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Dhanbad-cum-Appellate Authority & Ors. 2004 (4) JCR 320 (Jhr). 8. The learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, the respondent has been convicted by the CBI Court for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which was confirmed by all the Courts upto the level of Hon'ble Supreme Court and such conviction certainly involve moral turpitude and because of his conviction, the gratuity amount is automatically forfeited and the authorities and learned Single Judge did not keep in view the well settled proposition and the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. 9. Inspite of repeated notices, the respondent has not entered his appearance. At the stage of the Interlocutory Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (I.A. No. 1161 of 2013), substituted service was effected on the respondent by publication of notice in the newspapers. Inspite of substituted service effected in the Interlocutory Application, the respondent has not entered appearance. The respondent had not entered his appearance in the Writ Court also. Therefore, the substituted service effected in the stage of the Interlocutory Application is deemed to be sufficient service in this Letters Patent Appeal. 10. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the materials on record. 11. Admittedly, when the respondent was functioning as Senior Welfare Officer, Bhagabandh Colliery, he was trapped and arrested by the CBI, Dhanbad for demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a workman on 8.10.1985 for allotment of quarters. The respondent was placed under suspension vide order dated 11.10.1985. In the criminal case, the respondent was convicted for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The respondent was placed under suspension vide order dated 11.10.1985. In the criminal case, the respondent was convicted for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After disciplinary proceedings, the respondent was dismissed from service with effect from 26.4.2000. 12. The Controlling authority as well as the Appellate Authority under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act seem to have passed the impugned orders mainly on the ground that all the dues like provident fund and pension had been paid to the respondent. 13. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as per the service conditions, rest of the dues (provident fund and also the pension being contributory) have been paid by the Management to the respondent. While passing the orders, the Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority did not seem to have kept in view that the payment of provident fund and also the pension were only paid because of the contribution made by the employee himself. 14. Admittedly the respondent was trapped and arrested by the CBI Dhanbad for demanding and accepting illegal gratification from an employee on 8.10.1985. The conviction of the respondent for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act for receiving illegal gratification is certainly a conviction involving moral turpitude. 15. Section 4(6)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act stipulates that the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act, which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. We are of the view that in terms of Section 4(6)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, when there is a conviction for the offence involving moral turpitude, the gratuity is automatically forfeited. We are also fortified by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in the case of Manohar Singh Neech(Tak) Vs. The Regional Labour Commissioner(Central) Dhanbad- cum- Appellate Authority & Ors. 2004 (4) JCR 320 (Jhr). In the said case, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the employee and directed payment of gratuity on the ground that there was no specific or separate order for forfeiting the gratuity and thus ordered the payment of the gratuity. The Regional Labour Commissioner(Central) Dhanbad- cum- Appellate Authority & Ors. 2004 (4) JCR 320 (Jhr). In the said case, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the employee and directed payment of gratuity on the ground that there was no specific or separate order for forfeiting the gratuity and thus ordered the payment of the gratuity. The writ petition filed by the Management was allowed by the learned Single Judge holding that in terms of Section 4(6)(b) of the Act, when the employee was guilty of misconduct involving moral turpitude, the employee automatically forfeited his right of Payment of Gratuity . In the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the employee, confirming the order passed by the learned single Judge, the Division Bench held as under: “3.It is argued on behalf of the appellant that unless there was a separate proceeding leading to forfeiting the gratuity that may be paid, the appellant would be entitled to gratuity whatever might be the misconduct for which he was dismissed from service. We find it difficult to accept the submission. In our view, the learned single Judge has rightly interpreted the scope of Section 4, sub-section (6)(b) of the Act, and has rightly come to the conclusion that in view of the misconduct, the appellant was found guilty of and the order of dismissal which was upheld by the Division Bench, he was not entitled to claim gratuity. It was contended that the appellant was acquitted in a criminal case, as can be seen from Annexure 5, the order in Revision and, in view of that, gratuity could not be denied. We find no merit of this submission. It is not for us to comment on the nature of judgment of the proceeding in the revisional court, but the mere fact that he was acquitted in a criminal case does not at all affect the dismissal from service for gross misconduct automatically disentitling him to gratuity in terms of the Act.” 16. The learned single Judge as well as the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act did not keep in view the scope of Section 4(6)(b) of the Act that when the services of the employee is terminated after conviction for the offence involving moral turpitude especially for illegal gratification the employee automatically forfeits his right to the payment of gratuity. 17. 17. We are of the view that having regard to the conviction of the respondent, the appellant-Management was not required to pass a separate order, forfeiting the gratuity amount. Since the learned single Judge did not keep in view the scope of Section 4(6)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act and also the judgment, rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Y.P. Sarabhai Vs Union Bank of India and another [ (2006) 5 S.C.C. 377 ] and also the judgment of the Division bench of this Court in the case of Manohar Singh Neech (Tak) Vs. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Dhanbad-cum- Appellate Authority & Ors. 2004 (4) JCR 320 (Jhr). The order of learned single Judge and also the orders of Appellate Authority and the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act are liable to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the order of the learned single Judge dated 22.6.2011 passed in W.P.(L) No. 4673 of 2008 as well as the order dated 22.8.2007 passed by the Controlling Authority in Application No. 36(26)/2005-E-4 and the order dated 21.7.2008, passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act in P.G. Appeal No. 31/2007 are hereby set aside and this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as per the statutory requirement, the appellant-Management has deposited the gratuity amount of Rs.2,63,963/- before the Appellant Authority and the Appellate Authority has disbursed the amount to the respondent. If that be so, the Management is at liberty to recover the same from the respondent in accordance with law.