JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.12.2006 passed by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Manipur East in Civil Review Case No. 4 of 2005. 2. The appellant had filed Original Suit No. 28/94/20/2002 in the Court of learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Manipur East for declaration that plaint schedule A land is his inherited and ancestral homestead land and also for eviction of the present respondents who were defendants in the suit from plaint Schedule B land which comes within Schedule A land. The further prayer in the plaint was to declare khas possession of the appellant over the suit land. 3. The case of the appellant before the Trial Court was that one Manik such was the original owner of the suit land and was also the pattadar. He died in 1948 leaving behind four sons namely Cheiteina Singh, Jatra Singh, Samungou Singh and Iboton Singh. Cheiteina Singh died in 1943 leaving behind a daughter namely Tharongoubi Devi. Jatra died in 1941 and Samungou died in 1942 without any legal heir. Iboton died in 1982 leaving behind the plaintiff-appellant as the sole heir. Tharongoubi Devi, daughter of Cheiteina Singh had two sons namely Lala Singh and Ibohal Singh. Ibohal Singh was given in adoption to one Ch. Ibomcha Singh and the case of the plaintiff-appellant is that Lala Singh was missing since 1944 and accordingly, is presumed to be dead. The further case of the plaintiff-appellant is that his father Iboton Singh allowed Tharongoubi Devi to reside in the suit land by constructing a house when she became a divorcee in 1963. She continued to remain in possession of the suit land till her death in 1994. During the lifetime of Iboton Singh, father of the plaintiff-appellant, Tharongoubi Devi prayed for mutation of half of the plaint schedule A land as inherited and ancestral property but failed to get any order in her favour from the Revenue Court. After her death, plaintiff-appellant became the sole owner of the plaint schedule A land extending to .88 acres and is in possession of the same. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration as stated earlier. 4. The defendants-respondents in their written statement denied the allegation made in the plaint. After her death, plaintiff-appellant became the sole owner of the plaint schedule A land extending to .88 acres and is in possession of the same. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration as stated earlier. 4. The defendants-respondents in their written statement denied the allegation made in the plaint. It was the case of the respondents that under a mutual agreement between Cheiteina Singh and Iboton Singh, Schedule A land was divided between the surviving sons of late Manik Singh. According to the custom, Iboton Singh, father of the plaintiff-appellant possessed northern half of the schedule A land, whereas, late Cheiteina Singh possessed southern half. Tharongoubi Devi inherited the said southern portion of land after death of Cheiteina and the defendants-respondents being heirs of Tharongoubi Devi are the owners of the southern half of the Schedule A property. The defendants-respondents also filed a separate counter-claim for declaration that the southern half of the Schedule A land is their inherited property and also for demolition of the structures indicated in the Schedule B of the counter-claim and for declaration that they are in khas possession of southern portion of Schedule A land. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, Trial Court framed five issued such as: (1) Who is/was the original owner of the suit land? (2) Is there cause of action of the present suit? (3) Is plaintiff entitled to the reliefs claimed? (4) Is there cause of action of the defendants’ counter claim? (5) Are defendants are entitled to the reliefs claimed in the counter claim? 6. On analysis of the evidence adduced in the suit, the Trial Court passed a decree declaring possession of the plaintiff-appellant over Schedule A land as his ancestral property. 7. After the suit was decreed in the above manner, the defendants-respondents filed Civil Review Cage No. 4 of 2006 challenging the judgment and decree passed in the said suit on the following grounds. Trial Court did not decide issue No. 4 and issue was, “Have defendants attended over the suit land in the southern half of the plaint schedule A land preferred by adverse possession?” 8. The further grounds taken in the Review are that the suit was barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so far as the prayer for ejectment is concerned and that there was extinguishment of the title of the appellant. 9. The further grounds taken in the Review are that the suit was barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so far as the prayer for ejectment is concerned and that there was extinguishment of the title of the appellant. 9. After filing of the Review Petition, the Trial Court, by order dated 29.09.2005, registered it, issued notice to the present appellant and fixed the case to 7.11.2005. After admitting the Review Petition and issuance of the notice, the Trial Court allowed the parties to adduce further evidence and on analysis of the evidence, passed a fresh judgment and decree by modifying the earlier decree. In the Review, the Trial Court passed a decree to the effect that the defendants-respondents shall be allowed to reside in the land and house occupied by their late mother Tharongoubi Devi. Challenging the above judgment and decree passed in the Review, this appeal has been filed. 10. The defendants-respondents have also filed counter-claim not being satisfied with the judgment and decree delivered by the Trial Court in the Review petition. 11. Shri A. Gourakrishna Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant assailed the judgment passed by the Trial Court in the Review petition on the ground that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the parties to adduce further evidence in Review and passing a fresh decree, modifying the earlier one. According to the learned counsel, if the Trial Court was of the view that judgment and decree sought to be reviewed suffered from any error apparent on the face of the record, only such error could be rectified but the suit could not be reopened by the Trial Court in a review petition. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no counter-claim is maintainable. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the counter claim filed by the respondents in the appeal was barred by time. Therefore, in absence of any application for condonation of delay, the said counter-claim cannot be entertained. 12. Shri N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once Review is granted, such application for review has to be decided like a suit and it is open for the Trial Court to accept further evidence and pass a fresh judgment and decree either setting aside the earlier one or confirming the earlier one or modifying the same. 12. Shri N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once Review is granted, such application for review has to be decided like a suit and it is open for the Trial Court to accept further evidence and pass a fresh judgment and decree either setting aside the earlier one or confirming the earlier one or modifying the same. It was further contended by Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the appellant having not filed any appeal against the order granting review, it is no more open for him that the main judgment and decree passed in the suit is not open to be decided in a review petition. Had an appeal been filed by the appellant against the order granting review, defendants-respondents could not have maintained a counterclaim but once the Trial Court passes a decree in the Review, it is open for either parties to challenge the same, it being a fresh decree modifying the earlier one. 13. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the counter-claim is barred by time. No application for condonation of delay having been filed, the said counter-claim cannot be entertained. The impugned judgment and decree in the Review was passed on 30.12.2006. The counter-claim was filed on 26th June, 2007. It is stated in the counter claim that notice in the appeal was received by the respondents on 21st May, 2007. Cross appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the date of service of notice on the respondents. Accordingly, notice in the appeal having been served on the respondents on 21.05.2007, Cross appeal was required to be filed on or before 20th June, 2007. Cross appeal having been filed on the last date i.e. 20th June, 2007, it is not barred by limitation and accordingly, the same can be entertained. 14. It was also contended by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the cross appeal is not maintainable and reliance was placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rekha Mukherjee v. Ashish Kumar Das and others, reported in AIR 2005 SCC 1944. 14. It was also contended by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the cross appeal is not maintainable and reliance was placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rekha Mukherjee v. Ashish Kumar Das and others, reported in AIR 2005 SCC 1944. In the said reported decision, the Trial Court arrived at a conclusion that there had been an error or omission in the judgment dated 20.12.2001 which could be rectified by passing necessary order in that regard after hearing both sides. Therefore, while upholding the Review Petition as maintainable, he allowed the said application under Order XLVII, Rule 7, CPC, passed an order restoring the said suit to its file and original number by order dated 15.07.2002. An objection was raised as to whether, a counter claim could be entertained in an appeal against the order passed under Order XLVII, Rule 7, CPC. In para No. 24 of the judgment, the Apex Court held that in the said case, an appeal preferred against the order dated 15.07.2002 was maintainable in terms of Order XLVII, Rule 7, CPC but no cross appeal was maintainable at the instance of the respondents. This judgment is against the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Order XLVII, Rule 7, CPC prescribes that an order of the Court rejecting an application for review shall not be appealable but Order granting application may be objected by an appeal from the order granting the application or by any appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. Therefore, when an order is passed under Order XLVII, Rule 7, CPC granting application for review, an appeal is maintainable but cross-objection is not maintainable as per the decision of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. The cross appeal has been filed against the decree passed by the Trial Court in the review petition. An appeal as well as cross appeal are maintainable against the fresh decree passed in the review petition. The present cross appeal having been filed against the decree passed by the Trial Court in the review petition modifying the earlier decree, I am of the view that not only the appeal but also the cross appeal are maintainable. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Superintending Engineer & Ors. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Superintending Engineer & Ors. v. B. Subba Reddy, reported in 1999 (4) SCC 423 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1747 ). I am, therefore of the view that both the appeal and cross appeal are maintainable against the decree passed by the Trial Court in the review petition modifying the earlier decree and that cross appeal is not barred by limitation. 15. Having answered the preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the cross appeal, I now proceed to examine as to whether judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in the review petition is within the scope of review or not. Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC provides that any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, or by a decree or Order from which no appeal is allowed, or by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 16. In the present case, the Review Application was filed on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of record and omission on the part of the Trial Court in deciding particular issues. 17. The grounds taken in the review petition are quoted hereunder: “GROUNDS For that, the judgment is error on the face of the records; For that, the Hon’ble Court failed to decide that issue No. 4-A and to frame proper issues. For that, the judgment failed to consider the maxim possession follows title. According to law possession is a good title against all. For that misreading or misconception of evidence of long adverse possession of the Defendants/Petitioners against the Plaintiff/Respondent is an error on the face of the judgment. For that, the judgment failed to consider the maxim possession follows title. According to law possession is a good title against all. For that misreading or misconception of evidence of long adverse possession of the Defendants/Petitioners against the Plaintiff/Respondent is an error on the face of the judgment. For that, misreading or misconception of the Article of the Limitation Act, 1963 is an error on the face of the judgment. For that, the Hon’ble Court erred to decide the ownership of the Schedule - “B” land and “C” without considering the evidence on records. Right of the Plaintiff/Respondent for filing the suit for recovery of khas-possession got expired before instituting the suit. If the original owner does not come forward and assert her title by process of law within the period of limitation his right is extinguished and the person in possession acquires an absolute title by virtue of section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. For that, the defendants/petitioners have perfected their title to the Schedule “A” of their counter claimed or to the schedule “B”, land and “C” of the plaint by staying for more than forty years prior to the suit without any interruption as owner thereof and being in adverse possession against the plaintiff/respondent. For that, the Hon’ble Court has omitted the issue No. 4-A that is the claim of the defendants/petitioners in the suit. For that, the Hon’ble Court was pleased to hold that the case of the defendants/petitioners have not cause of action and this was very likely due to mistake or error as it appears that your Honour was pleased to believe the exclusion of women’s right from inheritance. As a fresh period of limitation started under section 14(1) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 from the year 1956 and thus the cause of action arose in the year 1988 when the plaintiff/respondent started construction of the house for the first time and in 1992-93 when the plaintiff started to construct another house for the second time in 1994 when the plaintiff/respondent filed the present suit and that the same is still continuing with the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court as the plaintiff/respondent started to dispossess the possession of the defendants/petitioners after the expiry of period of limitation. For that, the Hon’ble Court was pleased to hold that the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to recover khas possession from the defendants/petitioners and this was very likely due to mistake or error, as it appears that your Honour was to believe the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. As expire the period of limitation starting from the year 1956 then enforcement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Right of plaintiff/respondent for filing the suit for recovery of possession as expire before filing the above suit.” 17-A. On examination of the above grounds, it appears that issues which could be considered in the review petition are grounds Nos. 2, 5, 8. These grounds relate to failure on the part of the Trial Court in deciding issue No. 4-A as well as question as to whether the suit was barred by time or not. On verification of the record of the Original Suit, it appears that by order dated 3.4.2003, Trial Court formulated five issues which have been quoted earlier. By order dated 3.07.2003/11/7/2007, an additional issue was framed which is quoted below: “Issue No. 4-A is defendant’s title over the suit land of the southern half of the plaint schedule A land perfected by adverse possession.” 18. From the order passed in the suit, it appears that after framing of issues and additional issues, parties laid evidence and ultimately judgment was delivered in the suit by the Trial Court. In the judgment delivered by the Trial Court in the suit, there is no reference to issue No. 4-A. Though issue No. 5 could cover the additional issue No. 4-A, the Trial Court having formulated an additional issue, should have also answered the said issue with reference to the evidence adduced before the Court. Admittedly and as is evident from the judgment delivered in the suit, there is no mention of additional issue No. 4-A and accordingly, the Trial Court has not rendered any findings on the said issue. Even in relation to issue No. 5, no finding has been rendered. Therefore, it was an error apparent on the face of the record for which review could be entertained. 19. Even in relation to issue No. 5, no finding has been rendered. Therefore, it was an error apparent on the face of the record for which review could be entertained. 19. On perusal of the impugned judgment passed in the review, it is clear that while reviewing the earlier judgment, the Trial Court has not taken note of the said additional issue No. 4-A or has rendered any finding in respect of the said issue. Though the review application had been filed mainly on the ground that while delivering the judgment in the suit, the Trial Court had committed an error apparent on the face of the record by not rendering a finding on issue No. 4-A while reviewing also this issue was not answered. This casual approach of the Trial Court in deciding the review by not answering the ground on which the Review application was filed is a serious matter to be taken note of. When the review was accepted on particular ground, it was duty of the Trial Court to answer the said issue and render a finding thereon. A total casual approach has been adopted by the Trial Court while deciding the Review petition. 20. I am therefore, of the view that judgment and decree impugned in this appeal is liable to be set aside and the matter should be sent back to the Trial Court for deciding the review afresh in accordance with law by answering the issue No. 4-A with reference to the evidence adduced before the Court. 21. For the reasons stated above, I set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back to the Court of Addl. District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Manipur East to decide the Civil Review Case No. 4 of 2005 afresh and render a finding on issue No. 4-A with reference to the evidence adduced by the parties. 22. Though arguments were advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties on merit of the case, I have not discussed on the merit considering the fact that the matter is being remitted back to the Trial Court to decide the Review Application on merit. 23. Appeal is accordingly allowed. 22. Though arguments were advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties on merit of the case, I have not discussed on the merit considering the fact that the matter is being remitted back to the Trial Court to decide the Review Application on merit. 23. Appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 30.12.2006 passed in Civil Review Case No. 4 of 2005 is set aside and the case is remitted back to the Trial Court for disposal of the Review Application afresh in terms of the direction contained in the judgment. Appeal allowed. ____________