JUDGMENT : M. Seetharama Murti, J. The unsuccessful defendant had preferred this second appeal assailing the decree and judgment dated 02.06.2012 of the learned V Additional District Judge (Judge, Fast Track Court), Khammam at Kothagudem in A.S.No.74 of 2009, whereby the learned Additional District Judge while dismissing the said first appeal had confirmed the decree and judgment dated 09.04.2009 of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem made in O.S.No.96 of 2005 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs for eviction of the of the appellant/defendant and for recovery of vacant possession of the property bearing municipal house No.21-1-39 in an extent of 2200 sq. yards at Bhadrachalam road, Paloncha Town and Mandal, Khammam District, more fully described in the schedule annexed to the plaint. 2. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law: 'Whether the claim of the appellant that the matter falls under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, which was not accepted by the appellate Court, is tenable when the original lease deed does not show the lease of any structures but when the suit schedule discloses a structure in the schedule property?' 3. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for both the sides. 4. To adjudicate the lis and answer the above substantial question of law, it is necessary to refer to the admitted and other allied facts. 5. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, is as follows: "The plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property and are the landlords. The plaintiffs had purchased the site property of an extent of 4,400 square yards along with house bearing No.21-1-39 situate at Bhadrachalam Road, Paloncha Town from its lawful owners under registered sale deeds bearing Nos.66 of 2002 and 352 of 2002, respectively dated 20.02.2002 and 01.07.2002. Originally, the suit is filed for eviction of the defendant by showing the schedule property as a property in an extent of 4,400 sq. yards with house bearing door No.21-1-39 at Bhadrachalam Road, Paloncha Town. However, the schedule of the plaint was amended as per the permission accorded vide orders of the Court of first appeal dated 28.04.2011 in I.A.No.220 of 2011. As per the amended schedule, the present plaint schedule property is 2,200 square yards within the amended boundaries as shown in the amended schedule of the plaint. However, the schedule of the plaint was amended as per the permission accorded vide orders of the Court of first appeal dated 28.04.2011 in I.A.No.220 of 2011. As per the amended schedule, the present plaint schedule property is 2,200 square yards within the amended boundaries as shown in the amended schedule of the plaint. The defendant is the tenant of the suit schedule property. After purchase of the suit property, the plaintiffs had informed about the said purchase to the defendant by their letter dated 08.11.2004 and the tenancy of the defendant was attorned to the plaintiffs. The defendant fell in arrears of rent from 20.02.2002. The defendant was running a petrol bunk in the suit schedule property, through its dealer. The original tenancy was for a period of 20 years. The lease period was extended upto 01.05.2004. After the tenancy was attorned to the plaintiffs, they had demanded the defendant to pay monthly rent of Rs.75,000/- due to escalation in the land value and increase in the rental value. The defendant did not respond. The plaintiffs had got issued a legal notice dated 28.12.2004 demanding a monthly rent of Rs.65,000/- by reducing the earlier demand by Rs.10,000/-. In the said notice the plaintiffs had also demanded the defendant to vacate the suit property and hand over vacant possession in case of default in payment of monthly rent as demanded in the notice. The tenancy of the defendant was determined and stands terminated on failure to vacate within 15 days. The notice was received by the defendant on 02.01.2005. Hence, the plaintiffs had filed the suit for recovery of vacant possession of the suit schedule property and for recovery of arrears of rent and also damages @ Rs.65,000/- per month." 6. The defendant having admitted the tenancy and the receipt of the notice of the plaintiffs had inter alia contended as follows: "The plaintiffs informed the defendant about the purchase of a vacant house site of 2200 square yards bearing House No.21-1-39 of Paloncha Town and the defendant had accepted the co-ownership of the plaintiffs over the property purchased by them through its reply notice dated 02.02.2005. The defendant had also informed about the decree in O.S.No.176 of 1987 on the file of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem over the property of an extent of 4400 square yards of site bearing House No. 21-1-39, wherein the defendant is running a retail outlet since last so many years and also informed about the renewal of lease for a further period of 30 years from 01.05.2004. After the notice of termination, the representatives of the defendant had approached the plaintiffs for further negotiations in the first week of December, 2004 and it was mutually agreed between the parties that the rent for the plaint schedule property will be revised by ten times per quarter. The plaintiffs had orally agreed to extend the lease for a further period of 20 years as requested by the defendant, but the plaintiffs have suppressed the said facts and had filed the suit. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed." 7. Taking into consideration the above pleadings, the trial Court had framed the following issues for trial: "i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of vacant possession of the suit schedule property? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for arrears of rents amounting to Rs.1,800/- from February, 2002 till 28.12.2004 from the defendant? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for damages at the rate of Rs.65,000/- per month from 17.01.2005 to 31.03.2005 from the defendant? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for damages for illegal occupation @ Rs.65,000/- per month from the date of suit, till handing over the vacant possession to the plaintiffs? (v) To what relief?" 8. During the course of trial, PWs 1 and 2 and DW1 were examined and exhibits A1 to A9 were marked. No documents were exhibited on the side of the defendant. On merits, the trial Court had decreed the suit and directed the defendant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs within a period of six months from the date of the decree; and had further directed the defendant to pay the arrears of rent of Rs.1800/- and damages at the rate of Rs.30,000/- per month from 17.01.2005 to 31.03.2005. The trial Court had also directed the plaintiffs to file an application for determination of future damages for use and occupation of the suit property by the defendant. The trial Court had also directed the plaintiffs to file an application for determination of future damages for use and occupation of the suit property by the defendant. The first appeal preferred by the unsuccessful defendant was dismissed confirming the decree and judgment of the trial court and the court of first appeal had granted two months' time to the defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs. Aggrieved of the decree and judgment of the court of first appeal, the defendant had preferred this second appeal. 9. As already noted, during the pendency of the first appeal, the plaint schedule was amended with the permission of the Court. The substantial question formulated deals with the issue of inherent jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit for eviction of the plaintiffs and grant a decree against the defendant. According to the contentions of the appellant/defendant, the subject matter of the present lis is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act since as per the schedule of the plaint the property that was leased out is not a vacant site, but a property with structures. Therefore, the contention of the defendant before this Court is that a Rent Control Court has alone got jurisdiction and that a civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction and grant the reliefs to the plaintiffs; therefore, the decree granted for eviction of the defendant by the civil Court, which lacked inherent jurisdiction is liable to be set aside and the second appeal is to be allowed. 10. (a) Therefore, it is to be examined now as to whether the property leased out, is a vacant site as contended by the plaintiffs/respondents or is it a property with structures as contended by the defendant/appellant. Admittedly, the appellant was inducted as a tenant in the schedule property, by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and that lease between the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs and the defendant is pursuant to a registered lease deed dated 01.08.1964. A copy of the said lease deed is exhibit A5. Admittedly, the appellant was inducted as a tenant in the schedule property, by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and that lease between the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs and the defendant is pursuant to a registered lease deed dated 01.08.1964. A copy of the said lease deed is exhibit A5. The relevant terms in the said document are reproduced hereunder: 'In consideration of the rent and lessee's covenants hereinafter reserved and contained the lessor demises unto the lessee all that piece or parcel of land situate in Palwancha and more particularly described in the schedule hereunder written and delineated in the plan hereto annexed and thereon coloured pink." "To Hold the same to the lessee from the first day of May 1964 for the term of 20 years PAYING THEREFOR during the said term the quarterly rent of Rs.150/- (Rupees One Hundred and Fifty only) such rent to be paid on or before the 10th day of the quarter." Further, the schedule of the said registered lease deed reads as follows: "All that piece or parcel of land situate in New Palwancha in the Registration Sub District of Yellandu in the Registration District of Khammameth bounded on the North by Boorgampahad/Kothagudem Road on the East by vacant land on the South by vacant land on the West by vacant land belonging to Mohammed Omer and containing by admeasurement 230' North to South and 85'X 260'X270' feet East to West in all 41,800 sq. feet or thereabouts." Under the terms of the said lease deed, the lessee was given full and free liberty to erect and maintain upon the demised premises a pump outfit or outfits with underground tank or tanks with necessary fittings and pipelines and with or without a retail shop or store. The lessee was also given full and free liberty to erect and maintain in the demised premises all manner of equipment, plant, buildings, machinery and other facilities for servicing or otherwise attending to motor vehicles or otherwise howsoever. The lessee was further given full and free liberty to excavate, construct a road or roads, erect a compound wall, fencing or railing, lay out garden and provide such other conveniences as the lessee may at its discretion wish to provide. The lessee was further given full and free liberty to excavate, construct a road or roads, erect a compound wall, fencing or railing, lay out garden and provide such other conveniences as the lessee may at its discretion wish to provide. One more vitally important term in the lease deed reads as follows: "That in the event of the demised premises or any part thereof being acquired by Government or any local authority or public body under any law in force, it will be at the discretion of the lessee whether or not to continue to occupy the remaining unacquired portion of the demised premises at a rent which will be reduced pro rata to the area so acquired or treat this demise as at an end from the date of the said acquisition. In the acquisition proceedings, the compensation for the structures and the lessee's business conducted therein shall go to the lessee, while the compensation for land shall belong to the lessor." It is to be noted that if the above terms and other terms in the lease deed are read harmoniously, it is manifest that the property that was leased out under the registered lease deed was a vacant site and there were no structures in the leased land at the time of inception of the lease. Since the defendant is given full and free liberty, the defendant as a lessee made some constructions in the vacant property. However, the property that was leased out to the defendant is only a vacant site. Therefore, on facts, the contention that the structure was leased out cannot be countenanced. What was shown in the schedule of property is not the criterion and what property was leased out is the criterion or a decisive factor. Both the courts below directed the tenant/defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the property to the plaintiffs as at the inception, vacant site was leased out. 10. (b) In the decision in C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran and others, (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 228, relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, the facts are as follows: "The landlord leased out for ten years the suit property to the tenant/appellant, who is a dealer of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and the said dealership is being carried on in the leased site belonging to the landlord 1st respondent. A notice was sent by the landlord to the tenant stating that the tenant is a tenant of the property described in the schedule of the notice and that the period of lease expired on 30.09.1996 by agreement and that the landlord had issued a notice dated 24.8.1996 determining the lease and directing the tenant to vacate and handover possession of the schedule mentioned property and that after determination of the lease, the tenant's possession amounts to that of a trespasser and that the tenant is liable to pay compensation which is to be determined after tenant vacating the premises. The notice issued on 24.08.1996 called upon the tenant to vacate and handover vacant possession of the schedule mentioned property and also to take necessary steps for removing the equipments which have been installed on behalf of the tenant in the said property." Having regard to the facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 'The lease deed is very clear as to what was leased. The lease was of vacant land. That is evident from the recitals in the plaint, legal notice, lease deed et cetera. It is therefore, not in dispute that the lease of the land is not covered by the Statute, the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 in force extending protection to the tenants.' The ratio in the decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, it is clear from the lease deed that what was leased out is a vacant site. Therefore, the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 are not applicable and do not extend any protection to the defendant/tenant. Having regard to the facts of the instant case and the ratio in the cited decision, it must be held that there is no substance in the substantial question of law raised and that the second appeal is devoid of merit. 11. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. The defendant/tenant is granted six months' time from today to vacate and handover vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs. On failure of the defendant to do so, the plaintiffs are at liberty to recover possession of the plaint schedule property in accordance with the procedure established by law. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand dismissed.