JUDGMENT : R.P.DHOLARIA, J. 1. Rule. Mr.Anip A.Gandhi, learned advocate appearing for the respondents -State Bank of India and HDFC Bank Ltd., Ms.Nalini Lodha, learned advocate appearing for the respondents -Punjab National Bank, State Bank of Hyderabad and Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. and Mr. C.Z. Sankhla, learned advocate with Mr.V.M.Gohil, learned advocate appearing for the respondents -Union Bank of India, waive service of notice of Rule. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for both the sides, the matter is finally heard today. 2. Since all these Writ Petitions arise out of the same judgment and order, they are, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. In the present Writ Petitions, the petitioners have challenged an order dated 02.04.2014 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Ahmedabad in Original Application No.11 of 2008. The petitioners have also challenged the common order dated 05.05.2014 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai in Miscellaneous Appeal No.23 of 2014. 4. Some facts necessary to appreciate the contentions may be noted at this stage. 4.1 In or around the year 1997, the petitioners obtained financial facilities from a consortium of banks led by the State Bank of India which expanded over time to include State Bank of India, Allahabad Bank, Andhra Bank, Canara Bank, Central Bank of India, Dena Bank, Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd., Indian Bank, IndusInd Bank Ltd., Indian Oveseas Bank, State Bank of Travancore, South Indian Bank Ltd., State Bank of Indore, Vijaya Bank, United Bank of India, UCO Bank, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Union Bank of India, Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, HDFC Bank Ltd., State Bank of Hyderabad. 4.2 During the financial year 2006-2007, since the petitioners were unable to discharge their liabilities with regard to the financial facilities granted by the consortium, various banks of the consortium initiated recovery proceedings by way of filing Original Application Nos.11/2008, 47/2007, 117/2007, 133/2007, 97/2008 and 24/2009 before the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad for recovery of approximately Rs.800 crores. However, the petitioners did not lodged any counter-claim jointly and severally against the consortium bank and instead filed a Civil Suit No.145/2010 in the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad against all the consortium banks seeking a decree for a sum of Rs.7,86,61,71,301/-with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. However, the petitioners did not lodged any counter-claim jointly and severally against the consortium bank and instead filed a Civil Suit No.145/2010 in the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad against all the consortium banks seeking a decree for a sum of Rs.7,86,61,71,301/-with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The banks filed an application in the said suit under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 18 and 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The said application is pending for adjudication whereas the above said Original Applications filed by the banks before the learned Tribunal reached the stage of final hearing. 4.3 The petitioners had filed applications before the learned Tribunal for consolidation of aforesaid Original Applications filed by various banks of the consortium, which came to be rejected vide order dated 02.04.2014. 4.4 The petitioners had also filed Special Civil Application Nos.5393/2014, 5394/2014, 5398/2014, 5401/2014, 5403/2014 and 5499/2014 before this Court inter-alia seeking a direction for consolidation of the Original Applications, which were disposed of vide orders dated 15.4.2014 and 23.4.2014 permitting the petitioners to withdraw the said petitions with a liberty to pursue the remedy before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. 4.5 The petitioners had also filed an interim applications in above mentioned Original Application before the learned Tribunal seeking stay/postponement of the final hearing of the said Original Application till disposal of the application filed by the banks under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in aforesaid Civil Suit No.145/2010, which was rejected by the learned Tribunal vide its order dated 23.12.2013. 4.6 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed appeals before the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, which came to be rejected by the learned Tribunal vide its order dated 05.05.2014. 5. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court challenging the above two orders mentioned hereinabove. To recapitulate, the petitioner challenges an order dated 02.04.2014 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad in Original Application No.11/2008 for consolidation of above mentioned six Original Applications filed by various banks of the consortium and the common order dated 05.05.2014 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai in Miscellaneous Appeal No.23/2014. To recapitulate, the petitioner challenges an order dated 02.04.2014 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad in Original Application No.11/2008 for consolidation of above mentioned six Original Applications filed by various banks of the consortium and the common order dated 05.05.2014 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai in Miscellaneous Appeal No.23/2014. The petitioner further seeks directions to stay and suspend the proceedings of the Original Application No.11/2008 pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad and to direct the said Tribunal to consolidate above six Original Applications and to hear and decide the same together. 6. Heard Mr.Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms.Amrita Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners and Mr.Anip A.Gandhi, Ms.Nalini Lodha and Mr. C.Z. Sankhla, learned advocate with Mr.V.M.Gohil, learned advocates appearing for the respective respondents. 7. Before deciding the issues arise in these Writ Petitions, it may be noted that there is no dispute as regards to the “debt” as defined in the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and that the petitioners have obtained financial assistance from the respondents. 8. Learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties have made detailed submissions about the validity of the orders under challenge. Mr.Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that since various petitions came to be filed against the present petitioners and that are being proceeded separately, it was not possible to file a counter claim in the aforesaid proceedings and consequently therefore, they have filed a separate suit before the learned City Civil Court for recovery of damages. In the aforesaid suit, the respondents have made the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the aforesaid application under Order 7 Rule 11 is not being proceeded by the respondents consequently therefore, if the present proceeding before the Debts Recovery Tribunal is heard and decided, then the suit itself would become infructuous or even if the learned Court comes to the conclusion that the suit is not maintainable then the respondents would have no opportunity for filing the counter claim if the aforesaid applications are being disposed of. In this peculiar facts and circumstances, learned Senior Counsel Mr.Mihir Thakore has argued that till the aforesaid application under Order 7 Rule 11 is being decided by the learned City Civil Court, the proceeding before the DRT is required to be stayed and he has further urged that all the six applications are required to be clubbed together. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Mr.Mihir Thakore has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation reported in 2009 (8) SCC 646 , more particularly at para 96,97, 105 and 106, which read as under: “96. The Tribunal was constituted with a specific purpose as is evident from its statement of objects. The preamble of the Act also is a pointer to that too. We have also noticed the scheme of the Act. It has a limited jurisdiction. Under the Act, as it originally stood, did not even have any power to entertain a claim of set off or counter-claim. No independent proceedings can be initiated before it by a debtor. 97. A debtor under the common law of contract as also in terms of the loan agreement may have an independent right. No forum has been created for endorsement of that right. Jurisdiction of a civil court as noticed hereinbefore is barred only in respect of the matters which strictly come within the purview of Section 17 thereof and not beyond the same. The Civil Court, therefore, will continue to have jurisdiction. *** 105. The Civil Court indisputably has the jurisdiction to try a suit. If the suit is vexatious or otherwise not maintainable action can be taken in respect thereof in terms of the Code. But if all suits filed in the Civil Courts, whether inextricably connected with the application filed before the DRT by the banks and financial institutions are transferred, the same would amount to ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts indirectly. Suits filed by the debtor may or may not be counter claims to the claims filed by banks or financial institutions but for that purpose consent of the plaintiff is necessary. 106. Suits filed by the debtor may or may not be counter claims to the claims filed by banks or financial institutions but for that purpose consent of the plaintiff is necessary. 106. It is furthermore difficult to accept the contentions of the respondents that the statutory provisions contained in section 17 and 18 of the DRT Act have ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court as the said provisions clearly state that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in relation only to applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.” The above observation of the Apex Court has no bearing in these matters as the same delve upon maintainability of suit in a civil court irrespective whether inextricably connected with the applications filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal by the banks or financial institutions. In the present case, maintainability of suit in a civil court is not under question before us. The Civil Suit No.145/2010 filed by the petitioners before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad is yet to be adjudicated. On the other hand, the learned Counsels for the respondents have supported the orders passed by the learned Tribunal as well as learned Appellate Tribunal. 10. In view of the aforesaid argument, we are called upon to decide whether the aforesaid six applications which came to be filed by the respondents for the recovery of existing debts against the present petitioners can be proceeded and are required to be clubbed together and as to whether without clubbing together, if the matters are being proceeded before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, then any likelihood of prejudice to the interest of the petitioners and whether the aforesaid proceedings of the six applications are required to be stayed, pending hearing of the applications under Order 7 Rule 11 preferred before the learned City Civil Court in the Civil Suit No. 145 of 2010. 11. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mihir Thakore, on going through the petition, it becomes very clear that against the present petitioners, the consortium of banks have filed six different applications for the recovery of existing debts of Rs.800 crores approximately. 11. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mihir Thakore, on going through the petition, it becomes very clear that against the present petitioners, the consortium of banks have filed six different applications for the recovery of existing debts of Rs.800 crores approximately. Therefore, the right of recovery exercised by the respondents is in-existence, whereas the suit preferred by the present petitioners for seeking various damages is yet to be measured and the damages claimed is yet not quantified. The petition preferred by the consortium of banks is preferred under the special statue, which came to be enacted for expeditious recovery of debts of the banks as well as financial institutions and that proceeding is before the Tribunal having its own procedure as laid down in the law, whereas the suit preferred by the present petitioners before the City Civil Court is full fledged judicial trial which naturally takes long period for trial and hearing of the suit. The records and proceedings indicate that out of six applications preferred by the consortium of banks, five applications have reached at the stage of pronouncement of judgment and only one application is pending for hearing and argument as the record of the aforesaid application is being taken away by the CBI in a criminal inquiry and consequently therefore, it would be difficult to procure the record back and the conclusion of trial of hearing cannot be fixed for a particular period. The provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 are stringent, time bound and the Act is enacted for expeditious disposal of recovery of public money and therefore, the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal has rightly recorded the findings that there appears no necessity of clubbing these Original Applications, which remain pending due to papers being taken away by the CBI in the criminal investigation as hearing of rest of the five applications are concluded and await judgment. 12. 12. So for as the contention raised as regard to the stay of proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal are concerned, it appears that if the stay is granted then the whole object and purpose of constituting the Tribunal itself would be frustrated because it will definitely entail protracting the trial of five applications which are pending for pronouncement of judgment and stake of huge amount of Rs.800 crores of public money will jeopardize. After all nowhere in the law provides specifically for clubbing or consolidating any proceedings even if it is arising out of the same transaction. The clubbing or consolidating of judicial proceedings is a rule of prudence in order to observe the principles of natural justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Here, in the present case, all the six applications were preferred before the Tribunal and out of the six applications as narrated above, hearing of five applications has already concluded and the hearing of one application is pending for want of papers taken away by the CBI for investigation purpose. If this proceeding is stayed till the decision of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which came to be filed in Civil Suit No. 145 of 2010 preferred before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, then the Tribunal would have to be directed not to pronounce the judgment and all purpose and object of the special statute would be frustrated. 13. In our opinion, various six applications came to be filed by the respondents in a concrete nature for the purpose of recovery of existing debts against the present petitioners whereas the suit for damages preferred by the present petitioners is yet to be adjudicated or yet to be measured and in the civil proceeding, a lengthy procedure is required to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and it may take several years together whereas the proceeding before the Debts Recovery Tribunal is summary and the Tribunal is constituted for the purpose of expeditious recovery of public dues. 14. It may be expedient at this juncture to reproduce few provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 19 of the above Act pertains to the application to be made before the Tribunals. 14. It may be expedient at this juncture to reproduce few provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 19 of the above Act pertains to the application to be made before the Tribunals. Sub-section (6) to (11) of Section 19 reads as under:- (6) Where the defendant claims to set-off against the applicant’s demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by him from such applicant, the defendant may, at the first hearing of the application, but not afterwards unless permitted by the Tribunal, present a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set-off. (7) The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order in respect both of the original claim and of the set-off. (8) A defendant in an application may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under sub-section (6), set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the applicant, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the applicant either before or after the filing of the application but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. (9) A counter-claim under sub-section(8) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order on the same application, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (10) The applicant shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Tribunal. (10) The applicant shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Tribunal. (11) Where a defendant sets up a counter-claim and the applicant contends that the claim thereby raised ought not to be disposed of by way of counter-claim but in an independent action, the applicant may, at any time before issues are settled in relation to the counter-claim, apply to the Tribunal for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded, and the Tribunal may, on the hearing of such application, make such order as it thinks fit.” The provisions of sub-section 6 to 11 of Section 19 of the above Act provides for filing counter claim in the petitions filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The aforesaid provision of law also provides for filing a counter claim for seeking damages also. A bare perusal of aforesaid provisions of law clearly provides remedy for getting set-off the claim on the part of the debtor for any demand of ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by them from the banks or financial institutions. Similarly, in the rest of sub-sections of Section 19 of the above Act, a detailed procedure is provided for claiming counter-claims as well as damages recoverable from the banks or financial institutions before the Tribunal itself. Not only that, a detailed provisions are also made for withdrawal of counter-claims for taking independent action under the general provisions of law. Specific provisions in sub-section 11 of Section 19 of the above Act appears to have been enacted for specific purpose of bringing within the knowledge of Tribunals regarding such counter-claims or damages. These provisions of law prima-facie appears to have been enacted for observance of principles of natural justice so that rival parties can apprise the Tribunals about their respective claims so far as recovery of respective dues are concerned. 15. In spite of express provision of law, the present petitioners have exercised and opted for filing a suit before the City Civil Court instead of filing counter claim and thereafter, insisting that very suit be heard and decided first and thereafter the present applications preferred by the consortium of banks may be decided. If that request may be accepted, then the whole purpose of special enactment for the recovery of public debts would be frustrated. 16. If that request may be accepted, then the whole purpose of special enactment for the recovery of public debts would be frustrated. 16. The aforesaid two distinctive proceedings preferred before the Tribunal as well as the Civil Court have been selected by the parties to the proceedings at their own volition whereas the petitioners have selected the forum of Civil Court. Thereafter, they cannot insist that unless the proceedings before the City Civil Court is concluded, the aforesaid proceedings before the Tribunal should be stayed. Even otherwise also, records and proceedings clearly indicate that the aforesaid six applications were preferred first in the point of time. Thereafter, there was an option for the present petitioners to prefer the counter claim in the aforesaid Original Applications instead of preferring a regular suit for recovery of damages. Still however, they have opted for preferring the suit and thereafter by way of urging to stay the proceedings before the Tribunal clearly indicate the intention of stalling the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 17. We have also thoughtfully considered the impugned orders challenged before us. The learned Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal has given elaborate reasons for not staying the proceeding as well as for not clubbing said six Original Applications together. We are convinced with the reasons assigned by the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Appellate Tribunal for rejecting the applications preferred by the present petitioners. 18. For the aforesaid reasons recorded above, we are convinced that the orders passed by the learned Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal are in consonance with law. There appears no likelihood of prejudice to be caused to the present petitioners and there is no likelihood of violating the principles of natural justice prejudicial to the interest of the present petitioners if no directions to stay the proceedings before the Tribunal as well as clubbing together all the Original Applications are granted and consequently therefore these petitions require to be dismissed. 19. Hence, all these petitions stand dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. 20. At this stage, an oral request has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the interim relief may be continued for a period of one month. We do not see any reason to continue the interim relief and therefore, the oral prayer for granting relief is rejected.