Judgment Tapabrata Chakraborty, J. This Writ application has been preferred challenging the show-cause notice dated 29th April, 2004, the charge-sheet dated 5th October, 2004, the enquiry report dated 27th March, 2007, the second show-cause notice dated 20th August, 2007, the order of the disciplinary authority dated 3rd July, 2008 and the appellate authority order dated 13th March, 2009. The facts, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was initially appointed as a Guard under Kolkata Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the KMC) and thereafter by dint of his merit he availed promotion the post of Sergeant on 17th November, 1998. As a bolt from the blue the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice dated 29th April, 2004 asking the petitioner to answer to the allegations to the effect that he had availed 27 days Compensatory Casual Leave (hereinafter referred to as CCL) in 2002 and 31 days CCLs up to November, 2003 without prior approval and sanction and that the said CCLs were obtained against off days of previous Calendar year and that the petitioner did not comply with the directives of the Superintendent and did not rectify himself. The said show-cause notice was replied to by the petitioner on 4th May, 2004. Thereafter, in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding, the petitioner was placed under suspension by a memorandum dated 10th June, 2004. The charge-sheet was thereafter issued on 5th October, 2004 and by a memorandum dated 5th October, 2004 itself, the order of suspension was withdrawn and the petitioner was allowed to join. The petitioner replied to the charge-sheet and also made an application on 14th October, 2004 to the Special Officer (market) of KMC requesting him to give information pertaining to his Service Book and the Attendance Register of the year 2002-2003. Subsequent thereto, the enquiry officer was appointed on 20th November, 2005 and the said enquiry was concluded through filing of the enquiry report on 27th March, 2007 which was duly replied to by the petitioner. The petitioner was thereafter served a second show-cause notice dated 20th August, 2007, proposing to impose the following punishments :- 1. Demotion to the rank just below the post he is currently holding. 2. Treatment of suspension period as such. The petitioner replied to the same on 3rd September, 2007 and the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment on 3rd July, 2008 imposing the following punishments :- 1. Demotion to the rank just below the post he is currently holding. 2. Treatment of suspension period as such. The petitioner replied to the same on 3rd September, 2007 and the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment on 3rd July, 2008 imposing the following punishments :- 1. 2 (two) increments of pay of Sri Anjan Kumar Bhattacharjee, Sergeant, Market Department be withheld with cumulative effect. 2. The period spent by him under suspension be treated as such. Aggrieved by the said order of the disciplinary authority the petitioner preferred the statutory appeal on 7th August, 2008, and the same was considered and the punishment imposed was modified as follows :- 1. 1(one) increment of pay of the C.O. be withheld with cumulative effect. 2. The period spent by him under suspension be treated as such. Mr. Goswami, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the information as sought for, pertaining to the Service Book and the Attendance Register of the year 20022003, was not communicated to the petitioner and that as such the petitioner’s right to contest the enquiry was prejudiced and the non-supply of the said documents tantamounts to blatant violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Goswami further argues that the enquiry report is absolutely perverse and no nexus could be established by the enquiry officer between the charges alleged and the petitioner. Mr. Goswami, placing reliance upon a circular No.11/88-89, argues that as per the said circular the leave availed by the petitioner was a sanctioned leave. According to Mr. Goswami the order of punishment dated 3rd July, 2008, is nothing but a reiteration of the observations made by the enquiry officer and that the said order does not disclose any independent application of mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Goswami further submits that the appellate authority had proceeded with a mindset that there has been a confession on the part of the petitioner to the effect that he has committed a mistake to put up some dates in the application for grant of Earned Leave, though such confession on the part of the petitioner, as alleged by the appellate authority, does not stand disclosed in the records pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Mr. Bihani, learned senior advocate appearing for KMC, placing reliance upon the affidavit-in-opposition, submits that the list of leave at page 37 of writ application as stated by the petitioner, to have been sanctioned, is absolutely untrue. The actual dates on which the Earned Leave was sanctioned in favour of the petitioner have been disclosed in paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-opposition. Mr. Bihani further submits that the circular at page 38 of the writ application does not speak of any automatic sanction of Compensatory Leave and in the said circular it has been categorically stated that normally grant of Compensatory Leave shall not be allowed after the expiry of the financial year and that as such the said circular does not assist the petitioner’s claim. Mr. Bihani further submits that the petitioner was granted ample opportunity of hearing and the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in strict consonance with the statutory provisions and the grounds of challenge argued by the petitioner against the said proceedings are not sustainable in law. According to Mr. Bihani, the appellate authority has passed a reasoned order and there is no scope of any interference. In support of his contention, Mr. Bihani places reliance upon the following judgments :- 1. Delhi Transport Corporation –vs- Sardar Singh, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 574 . 2. M/s L&T Komatsu Ltd. –vs- N. Udayakumar, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 224 . I have heard the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and I have considered the materials on record. A perusal of the presenting officer’s report reveals that except the charges I, II and III the other charges could not be categorically established. While dealing with the charge IV the presenting officer has inter alia recorded that the PW1 and PW2 could not say anything about the said charge and it was categorically remarked that “there is a prevalence of doubt”. In support of charges V and VI the presenting officer has observed that PW1 and PW2 have no knowledge about the said charges. A perusal of the enquiry report reveals that after categorically observing that charges IV and VI have not been substantiated through evidence, surprisingly, the said enquiry officer, in the concluding part of the said report, observes that “I find and hold that Shri Anjan Kr. Bhattacharjee, Sergant, Market Deptt. A perusal of the enquiry report reveals that after categorically observing that charges IV and VI have not been substantiated through evidence, surprisingly, the said enquiry officer, in the concluding part of the said report, observes that “I find and hold that Shri Anjan Kr. Bhattacharjee, Sergant, Market Deptt. Kolkata Municipal Corporation was guilty of the Articles of charges I, II, III, IV & V.” Such ultimate conclusion of the enquiry officer does not stand supported with appropriate reasons and in the said report it has also not been considered that the presenting officer in his report has categorically observed that the witnesses did not have any knowledge whatsoever in support of the charge V. Such discrepancy and contradiction amongst the presenting officer’s report and the enquiry report have not been considered while issuing the second show-cause notice proposing the punishment. A perusal of the order of punishment issued by the disciplinary authority on 3rd July, 2008 reveals that the said authority arrived at a finding “only some of the CCL as mentioned in the charge-sheet have been adjusted as Earned Leave. I think on that score the proposed punishment needs some modification”. While issuing the said order the disciplinary authority, however, did not take into consideration the patent infirmities in the enquiry report wherein after categorically observing that the charge Nos. IV and VI do not stand substantiated through evidence, the enquiry officer went on to conclude that all the charges stand proved in the concluding part of the said report. A perusal of the order of the appellate authority reveals that the said authority has proceeded with a mindset that the petitioner has confessed his guilt though the records do not reveal that the petitioner pleaded guilty of the charges. The appellate authority has further observed that it could not find any convincing logic to waive the penalty in its totality and in the backdrop of such uncertainty the appellate authority modified and reduced the punishment to stoppage of one increment of pay but with cumulative effect. In Delhi Transport Corporation (Supra), the charge of negligence in duties and lack of interest in employer’s work was based on a period of absence of 272 days. In M/s. L & T Komatsu Ltd. (Supra) the charge of habitual absenteeism was based on a period of absence of 105 days. In Delhi Transport Corporation (Supra), the charge of negligence in duties and lack of interest in employer’s work was based on a period of absence of 272 days. In M/s. L & T Komatsu Ltd. (Supra) the charge of habitual absenteeism was based on a period of absence of 105 days. In the instant case, the charges are based upon absence of only 58 days and that as such the judgments referred to Mr. Bihani are distinguishable on facts. It is well-settled that even a slight distinction in fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in the decision making process and that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically be deduced therefrom. The conspectus of the facts reveal that both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have modified and reduced the punishment which was initially first proposed to be demotion in rank and from such sequence, the inhibition of the authorities to discharge the petitioner from the alleged charges, in its totality, does not stand supported with appropriate reasons. The conduct of the petitioner was found to be irreproachable and there was no allegation of any pecuniary loss against the petitioner. Furthermore, there is no allegation that absence was wilful. The judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 specifically observed inter alia as follows :- “18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct”. Withholding of increment simpliciter and withholding of increment with cumulative effect have different meaning and implication. The magnitude and effect of the latter is much higher than that of the former. Withholding of one increment with cumulative effect would indisputably mean that one increment earned by the employee is cut off as a measure of penalty forever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words, the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of one year the clock starts working from that stage afresh. In other words, the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of one year the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of such withholding of increment of pay with cumulative effect, by necessary implication, is that the petitioner is reduced in his time scale by one place and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service. Measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct needs to be taken into consideration to determine and to weigh the proportion. The imposition punishment is subject to judicial intervention if the same is exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. If the award of punishment is grossly, in excess of the allegations made, it cannot claim immunity and makes itself amenable for interference under the limited scope of judicial review. In the instant case, there has been no allegation to the effect that the petitioner has intended to gain any pecuniary advantage. The petitioner’s conduct was irreproachable and that his understanding of responsibility and adherence to discipline was not questionable. Regard being had to the facts involved, the nature of post held by the petitioner and the conduct expected of him, I am of the opinion that the doctrine of proportionality is invocable in the instant case. As the petitioner is on the verge of retirement, remand of the proceedings to the authorities for reconsideration, will further delay the matter. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that justice would be subserved by modifying the penalty imposed by the appellate authority. Accordingly, the punishment of withholding one increment of pay with cumulative effect, as imposed by the appellate authority, is modified to withholding of one increment of pay without cumulative effect. The respondents are directed to calculate and disburse all consequential benefits, including the pecuniary benefits, to the petitioner, within a period of 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order. With the above observations and directions, the writ application is disposed of. In the facts of the present case, there will be no order as to costs.