Judgment Ashok Bhushan, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants. 2. This writ appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 1st January, 2014 in W.P(C) No. 25782/2013, by which order, the writ petition filed by the appellants/petitioners was dismissed. The brief facts necessary for deciding this writ appeal are as follows: Under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, (for short 'the Act'), notification under Section 3A was published on 4.1.2005. Declaration under Section 3D of the Act was issued on 29.12.2006 and thereafter determination of compensation payable to the petitioners was made on 29.12.2009 in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The petitioners/appellants feeling dissatisfied with the determination, approached the 2nd respondent Arbitrator. The Arbitrator delivered the award on 10th July, 2013 determining the compensation payable to the petitioners and other persons whose lands were acquired. The Arbitrator has enhanced compensation to the tune of 30% of the land value. After the award was delivered, the petitioners/appellants filed the writ petition praying for quashing the notification under Sections 3A and 3D and determination of the compensation as well as the award given by the Arbitrator. On 19.11.2013, the petitioners filed I.A. No. 1466/2013 praying for amendment of the writ petition to enable the petitioners to challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 3A to 3J of the Act. The learned Single Judge considered the I.A. as well as the writ petition. The learned Single Judge took the view that the petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the constitutional validity of the provisions at this stage, since the petitioners did not choose to challenge the notification under Sections 3A and 3D within a reasonable time. The learned Single Judge dismissed the I.A and proceeded to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and observed that in event the petitioners feel aggrieved by the award given by the Arbitrator enhancing compensation, they are free to take recourse to the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. With these observations, the writ petition was dismissed, which judgment is under challenge in this writ appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge. He submits that one of the prayers in the writ petition, i.e. prayer no. With these observations, the writ petition was dismissed, which judgment is under challenge in this writ appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge. He submits that one of the prayers in the writ petition, i.e. prayer no. (ii) should have been considered by the learned Single Judge, which is to the following effect: "(ii) Declare that the petitioners are entitled for enhanced compensation considering the entire statutory and other benefits, facts and circumstances of the case and by shifting the date of effect of Section 3A Notification under the National Highways Act, 1956." Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that since there was infirmity in the notification under Sections 3A and 3D, equities can be adjusted by shifting the date of the notification under Section 3A, which would have made the petitioners entitled to have compensation on a later date. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and others, (2005) 13 SCC 477 . Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in rejecting the I.A where permission was sought to challenge the validity of the Act and merely because the I.A. was rejected, the writ petition was also dismissed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the second prayer which was made in the writ petition for shifting the date of effect of Section 3A of the Notification has not been considered. He submits that compensation awarded was being inadequate, the shifting of date would have substantially redressed the grievance of the appellants regarding compensation. He submits that in a similar matter, the Apex Court had taken a decision to hold that the date of notification under Section 3A be treated as the date when possession of the land was taken from the petitioners and the compensation to be determined as on the said date. 4. The judgment of the Apex Court in Competent Authority's case (supra) shows that the writ petition was filed in the High Court challenging the proceedings initiated under the National Highways Act, 1956. The notification under Section 3A dated 11th June, 1998 was challenged before the High Court. The High Court set aside the notification. The High Court held that notification was bad in law. The notification under Section 3A dated 11th June, 1998 was challenged before the High Court. The High Court set aside the notification. The High Court held that notification was bad in law. However, the High Court, taking into consideration the fact that the possession of land had already been taken over, no useful purpose would be served in quashing the notification. The High Court also observed that there is power with the authority for issuing fresh notification for acquisition of land. But that will lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation payable to the owners. Considering the aforesaid aspects, the High Court took the view that the land owners be granted additional amount calculated at 30% over and above the compensation already determined. The competent authority, feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, appealed to the Supreme Court. 5. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court took the view that the date of notification under Section 3A be treated as date of possession of land taken from the land owners and compensation is directed to be determined accordingly. It is useful to quote paragraphs 3, 14 and 15 of the judgment, which are relevant in the present case. "3. The subject-matter of these appeals is the compulsory acquisition of certain lands belonging to the writ petitioners by the Central Government vide notification dated 11-6-1998 under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The writ petitioners challenged the acquisition of their lands on various grounds. The Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 7-4-2004 disposed of the writ petition holding the impugned notification regarding compulsory acquisition of land to be bad in law. However, keeping in view the fact that possession of the acquired land had already been taken by the authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the notification. The High Court also took note of the power of the acquiring authority to issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land which could only lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in view, it ordered that an additional amount of compensation be awarded to the landowners. Accordingly, an additional amount calculated at 30% over and above the compensation already determined was ordered to be paid to the writ petitioners. Keeping these aspects in view, it ordered that an additional amount of compensation be awarded to the landowners. Accordingly, an additional amount calculated at 30% over and above the compensation already determined was ordered to be paid to the writ petitioners. The competent authority is aggrieved by the order of the High Court holding the notification regarding the acquisition of the land to be illegal, while NHAI is aggrieved by the award of additional 30 per cent amount as compensation to the writ petitioners. The owners/writ petitioners are aggrieved by the notification not being quashed in spite of having been declared as illegal. 14. Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of a national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the landowners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the landowners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the landowners, that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. 15. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the landowners, that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. 15. Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the landowners are adequately compensated. Reference may be made to: – (a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Raj Kumar Johri (b) Gauri Shankar Gaur vs. State of U.P. (c) Haji Saeed Khan vs. State of U.P. In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when possession of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This date admittedly is 19-2-2003. We, therefore, direct that compensation payable to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19-2-2003, the date on which they were deprived of possession of their lands. We do not quash the impugned notification in order not to disturb what has already taken place by way of use of the acquired land for construction of the national highway. We direct that the compensation for the acquired land be determined as on 19-2-2003 expeditiously and within ten weeks from today and the amount of compensation so determined, be paid to the writ petitioners after adjusting the amount already paid by way of compensation within eight weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the amount of compensation so determined is to be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority. We express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available. The claim of interest on the amount of compensation so determined is to be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority. We express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available. The compensation as determined by us under this order along with other benefits, which the respondents give to parties whose lands are acquired under the Act, should be given to the writ petitioners along with what has been directed by us in this judgment. The above direction was given by the Apex Court in the background when the notification under Section 3A was challenged and was held to be bad by the High Court itself. The present is the case where the petitioners/appellants had come up with the writ petition after the award was given against the decision of the competent authority determining the compensation. At this stage, they sought to challenge the notification under Section 3A, which was issued on 4.1.2005 and declaration under Section 3D dated 29.12.2006. It is well settled that in acquisition proceedings under Land Acquisition Act or National Highway Act, 1956, different stages of proceedings would effect different consequences. Challenge to the acquisition proceedings at a belated stage has always been repelled by the Apex Court. In this context, reference is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sawaran Lata and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, (2010) 4 SCC 532 , where following was observed in paragraphs 7 to 10, which are quoted below: 7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi while dealing with the issue, observed as under: (SCC p. 291, para 11) "11. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners." 8. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners." 8. Same view has been reiterated by this Court observing that acquisition proceedings should be challenged before the same attain finality, in State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan; Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India; State of Orissa v. Dhobei Sethi; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar; State of T.N. v. L. Krishnan; and C. Padma v. Govt. of T.N. 9. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 517 & 520, paras 19 & 29) "19. If the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in furtherance thereof and vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the slumbering interested person would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be entertained. 29. When there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications." 10. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi wherein this Court has held that even the void proceedings need not be set at naught if the party has not approached the court within reasonable time, as judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. This Court held as under: (SCC pp. 452-53, paras 9-10) "9. Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of laches. It is thus, well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. 10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. 10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances." (Emphasis added) Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corpn. Ltd. v. Jain School Society." 6. In the present case, the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants does not help him since the learned Single Judge has not permitted the appellants to challenge the notification under Sections 3A and 3D. The appellants came after the award was passed by the Arbitrator enhancing the compensation, which was granted by the competent authority. It was rightly observed that the remedy against the said award is under the 1996 Act. 7. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Single Judge after rejecting the I.A. seeking permission to challenge the constitutional validity of the Act, dismissed the writ petition. With regard to the question of permission for amending writ petition, it is well settled that amendments in the writ petition will be permitted at any stage by the Court. But, looking into the facts of the present case, the petitioners were not entitled to challenge the constitutional validity under Sections 3A and 3D. The petitioners having participated in the proceedings after the stage of the Arbitrator determining compensation, they have no right to challenge the notifications under Sections 3A to 3J. The submission of the appellants that merely because the I.A was rejected, the writ petition was dismissed also does not appeal to us. The petitioners having participated in the proceedings after the stage of the Arbitrator determining compensation, they have no right to challenge the notifications under Sections 3A to 3J. The submission of the appellants that merely because the I.A was rejected, the writ petition was dismissed also does not appeal to us. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that challenge to the Arbitrator's award can very well be raised by the petitioners under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is well settled principle as laid down by the aforesaid judgment of High Court that against an award given by the Arbitrator, the remedy is to challenge the same under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 8. Counsel for the appellants expressed an apprehension that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, there are very limited grounds to challenge the award given by the Arbitrator. These questions have already been considered and it has been held that in appropriate cases under the Act, the District Court can exercise jurisdiction if award is contrary to public policy. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants also expressed an apprehension that the time for limitation under the 1996 Act is over. It is open for the appellants to make such application under the Act as permissible under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the view that no good ground has been made out for interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.