JUDGMENT 1. - The accused-appellants, in the present Appeal, have challenged the impugned Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1999 in Sessions Case No. 6 of 1987 (State v. Kajor Ram & 3 Ors.) whereby they have been convicted and sentenced for offence under Sections 307, 307/34 and 323/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'I.P.C.1, for short)' as under; Ranchhor Ram: For offence under Section 307 I.P.C. - three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 6 months simple imprisonment in addition. For offence under Section 323/34 I.P.C. - six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500,/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month simple imprisonment in addition. Kajor Ram; Thana Ram and Himta Ram: For offence under Section 307/34 I.P.C. - three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default of payment of fine, to further undergo six months simple imprisonment in addition. For offence under Section 323/34 I.P.C. - six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-; in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one month simple imprisonment in addition. 2. All the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, as surfaced, is that on 19.11.1986, a First Information Report was lodged at Police Station, Samdari. The author of F.I.R. Deva Ram S/o Shri Chela Ram alleged that on 18.11.1986, in the evening while he wanted to stack the cart load of wood in his 'Bada', Himta Ram objected and abused him, but he did not retaliate and reported the matter to his father Chela Ram, whereupon Chela Ram went to the house of Kajor Ram to protest, as a result, Kajor Ram got annoyed. In the meanwhile, the informant also reached there and asked his father to leave the place in order to avoid quarrel. While they were leaving the place, Kajor Ram and Himta Ram obstructed them. Ranchhor Ram and Thana Ram armed with lathis arrived and inflicted blows and one of the blows landed on the head of the Chela Ram, who fell down and became unconscious. Thana Ram inflicted a lathi blow on the back of the informant. Deva Ram raised hue and cry. Ranchhor Ram and Thana Ram armed with lathis arrived and inflicted blows and one of the blows landed on the head of the Chela Ram, who fell down and became unconscious. Thana Ram inflicted a lathi blow on the back of the informant. Deva Ram raised hue and cry. Hearing the hue and cry, Asu Chaudhry and Smt. Teepu arrived at the spot, but the assailants made good their escape. On the receipt of the aforesaid report, an F.I.R. No. 118 of 1986 (Ex. P-6), was registered at Police Station, Samdari, for offence under Sections 307, 341, 323 read with Section 34 I.P.C. The medical reports of Chela Ram and Deva Ram were prepared at Primary Health Centre, Samdari. According to the injury report of Chela Ram (Ex. P-21), he received three injuries i.e., a lacerated wound, an abrasion and a contusion on his head. Deva Ram was also medically examined and according to his medico legal report, he received an abrasion on the back of scapula, a contus on above scapula and complained of pain around the right knee joint. The Government Enforcement Agency after a thorough investigation, submitted a charge-sheet. 4. The prosecution in order to prove their case examined Ganpat Singh (PW-1), Devi (PW-2), Chela Ram (PW-3), Teepu (PW-4), Asu Ram (PW-5), Bhur Singh (PW-6), Khangar Khan (PW-7), Kalu Ram (PW-8), Dr. Ganpat Singh Purohit (PW-9), Deepa Ram (PW-10), Dr. Kamal Kumar Sabrawal (PW-11) and Mangi Lal (PW-12); and also got exhibited certain documents as exhibits, in support of their case. Statements of the accused appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.', for short), wherein the accused-appellant Kajor Ram stated that while he was sitting in his house, Deva Ram and Chela Ram, armed with 'Kassi' (a sharp edge weapon) and lathi, attacked his family members and him. They also gave beating to Ranchhor Ram, Thana Ram and Ms. Gajra. The accused-appellant Ranchhor Ram stated that while he was engaged in his household work, hearing hue and cry of his brother, he rushed to the sport along with Thana Ram where he found blood oozing out of head of his sister-in-law (bhojai). He found Himta Ram with a broken hand and kajor Ram bleeding from his head. Gajra. The accused-appellant Ranchhor Ram stated that while he was engaged in his household work, hearing hue and cry of his brother, he rushed to the sport along with Thana Ram where he found blood oozing out of head of his sister-in-law (bhojai). He found Himta Ram with a broken hand and kajor Ram bleeding from his head. Deva Ram gave beating to Thana Ram and while inflicting a blow on Thana Ram, missed him and the blow landed on the head of Chela Ram. He further stated that Thana Ram along with him suffered injuries. Accused-appellant Thana Ram corroborated and repeated the statement made by the accused-appellant Ranchhor Ram. The accused-appellant Himta Ram stated that Chela Ram and Deva Ram, who came armed with 'Kassi' and lathi, dragged his brother Kajor Ram outside the house and caused an injury by reverse side of 'Kassi'. Chela Ram inflicted a lathi blow on his hand and when his sister-in-law (Bhojai) came to intervene, Deva Ram inflicted a 'Kassi' blow from the reverse side on her head. While Deva Ram was inflicting a blow on Thana Ram, but he missed and the blow landed on the head of Chela Ram. 5. In defence, Shri Jodhraj has been produced as DW-1 and twenty five documents were got exhibited in defence. Four articles were also got exhibited A cross case was lodged leading to institution of Sessions Case No. 53 of 1987 (State v. Deva Ram & Ors.) , which was also tried together with the present Sessions Case No. 6 of 1987. In Sessions Case No. 53 of 1987, the accused persons therein have been acquitted, extending the benefit of doubt, whereas in the present case, i.e., Sessions Case No. 6 of 1987, arising out of the same incident, the accused-appellants have been convicted for the offence as indicated above. 6. The learned Counsel for the accused-appellants has assailed the impugned Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1999 on the ground that the learned Trial Court failed to scrutinise the prosecution evidence in the light of correct perspective ignoring inherent improbabilities and infirmities and therefore, the impugned judgment and order is contrary to the facts, law and materials available on record. 7. 6. The learned Counsel for the accused-appellants has assailed the impugned Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1999 on the ground that the learned Trial Court failed to scrutinise the prosecution evidence in the light of correct perspective ignoring inherent improbabilities and infirmities and therefore, the impugned judgment and order is contrary to the facts, law and materials available on record. 7. The learned Counsel further urged that in the First Information Report, the informant did not attribute injury number 1, suffered by Chela Ram, to anyone and therefore, attributing the blow to Ranchoor Ram, subsequently is an improvement and afterthought. Further, there are material contradictions and infirmities in the statements of highly interested witnesses and their evidence is not corroborated from any independent source. 8. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to furnish any explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused-appellants and the family members. 9. From the contents of the F.I.R., it is evident that it is the complainant party, who picked up the quarrel. It is the complainant party who according to the F.I.R., entered the house of the accused-appellants. Thus, the accused-appellants and family members who were attacked in their house by the complainant party. 10. Since, there was no mention of the fact that Kajor Ram caught hold of Deva Ram in the F.I.R., therefore, the material contradictions and improvement is apparent on the face of record. 11. The learned Counsel further emphasised that Deva Ram (PW-2) has not attributed to any overt act to Thana Ram and Himta Ram so much so, that even their presence has not been recorded at the scene of occurrence. Further, the member of injuries sustained by the complainant party also rules out participation of four persons in the incident. 12. In the First Information Report, author of injury number 1, suffered by Chela Ram, has not been specified. 13. There is no material available on record for attracting the provisions of Section 34 I.P.C. The learned Trial Court has also not discussed the ingredients necessary for attraction of Section 34 I.P.C. At best, the act, if any, of the accused-appellants, did not travel beyond the scope of Sections 334 and 335 I.P.C. 14. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the accused-appellants ought to have been extended the benefit of Probation of Offender Act. 15. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the accused-appellants ought to have been extended the benefit of Probation of Offender Act. 15. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the impugned Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1999 and vehemently argued that it was not a case of acquittal and the learned Trial Court committed no error in passing the same. Further, the complainant party has been acquitted in the cross case. 16. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused-appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record as well as the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 17. It is not in dispute that the complainant and the accused-appellants are members of the same ancestral stock. Out of three injuries suffered by Chela Ram, as per injuries report (Ex. P-21) injury number 1 was found grievous. The injuries suffered by Deva Ram were simple in nature. Further injury number 1 suffered by Chela Ram was a result of single blow. 18. Dr. Ganpat Singh Purohit (PW-9), in his statement, deposed that while conducting the medico legal examination, on the police report, of injured Chela Ram, he found three injuries, which are as under (1) Lacerated wound 1.5 x 0.3 x 0.5 cm on the right posterolatral part of scalp about 12 cms above the root of right ear. (2) Abrasion 2.5 cm x 1.5 cm on the central part of forehead. (3) Contusion emasuring 5 cm x 2.5 cm placed obliquely on the swelling measuring 15 cms x 9 cm on the left frontal region of head. 19. On the same day, he also examined Deva Ram S/o Shri Chela Ram and found the following injuries (1) Abrasion oval in shape measuring 2 cm x 1 cm placed on the back of scapula (2) Contusion measuring 1.5 cm x 0.7 cm about 0.5 cm above the injury No. 1 (3) Complaining of pain in and around the right knee joint. 20. Dr. Ganpat Singh Purohit (PW-9) in the cross-examination, admitted that though the injury suffered by Chela Ram was grievous in nature, but was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 21. Dr. Kamal Kumar Sabarwal (PW-11) in his deposition before the learned Trial Court proved the X-Ray Report (Ex. 20. Dr. Ganpat Singh Purohit (PW-9) in the cross-examination, admitted that though the injury suffered by Chela Ram was grievous in nature, but was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 21. Dr. Kamal Kumar Sabarwal (PW-11) in his deposition before the learned Trial Court proved the X-Ray Report (Ex. P-22) stating that a depressed fracture was detected on the right parietal bone with linear extension in frontal of the scalp of the injured Chela Ram. 22. Jodhraj (DW-1) in his deposition before the learned Trial Court stated that on 20.11.1986 while he was working as Medical Officer, he conducted medico legal examination of Himta Ram at 6.00 P.M. and found injury on the left hand of Himta Ram and on X-Ray, a fracture of lower l/3rd shaft of ulna was detected and thus, the injury was grievous in nature, caused by a blunt weapon. He has further stated that on the same day, he also examined Smt. Gajra and found a lacerated wound 4 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm obliquely placed, crossing the midline, more over left side, over the scalp. The injury was simple and caused by a blunt weapon (Ex. D-8A). A lacerated wound 4.5 x 0.4 x 0.3 cm was also found on the person of Kajor Ram in the anterior post direction left to the middle line anterior and post crossing the inter auricular line, over the scalp (Ex. D-9A). On the person of Ranchhor Ram, three injuries were detected i.e., a lacerated would 1.5 x 0.5 x 0.2 cm at the right ankle over post surface with two abrasions (Ex. D-10A). a lacerated wound measuring 0.5 x 0.2 x 0.2 cm just below the nail with lateral part of nail torn of the left ring finger was detected in addition to bruise on the person of Thana Ram (Ex. D-11A). 23. Deva Ram/Complainant (PW-2) in the F.I.R. as well as in his statement deposited before the learned Trial Court, admitted the fact that the agricultural land of the accused-appellant Kajor Ram is in a joint record alongwith him and there are some issues and strained relations on that count. The genesis of the incident between the parties, is said to be staking up of the card load of wood by the complainant. The genesis of the incident between the parties, is said to be staking up of the card load of wood by the complainant. Deva Ram (PW-2) also admitted the fact that his father had gone to the residence of Kajor Ram to protest and the complainant hearing loud voice/altercation, reached there. Thus, enmity is an admitted fact between the parties on account of division of the agricultural land. 24. It is also evident from the materials available on record that the investigation agency after inspection of the place of incident did not find any mark or material to substantiate the fact that the incident occurred at the place as stated by the complainant. 25. It is also not in dispute that the accused-appellants and family members received injuries and there is no explanation put forward by the prosecution about the injuries suffered by the accused-appellants and family members including an injury, which is grievous on the person of Himta Ram. 26. By a catena of judgments, by now it is well settled that when the prosecution fails to explain the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of same occurrence, the Court can draw the inference that the prosecution has suppressed the true genesis and origin of the incident thereby not presenting the true and correct version of the incident / occurrence. Further, it is also well considered that where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses, then failure to furnish the explanation by the prosecution about the injuries suffered by the accused assumes greater importance. 27. From the contents of the F.I.R. and the statement deposed by Deva Ram (PW-2), inimical relationship is an admitted fact. Therefore, in such circumstances, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses has to be subjected to scrutinise by corroborative evidence from the independent strict sources and the contradictions and omissions cannot be brushed aside unless they were found to be insignificant. In the event of injuries suffered by the accused appellants and the family members including grievous injury by Himta Ram, it was all the more necessary for the prosecution to explain the injuries. 28. Sections 96 and 97 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, recognizes the necessity of right of private defence and stipulates thus "96. Things done in private defence. 28. Sections 96 and 97 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, recognizes the necessity of right of private defence and stipulates thus "96. Things done in private defence. - Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. 97. Right of private defence of the body and of property. - Every person has a right subject to the restrictions contained in Section 99, to defend- First. - His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body; Secondly. - The property, whether moveable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass." 29. At this juncture, it will also be relevant to consider the text of Section 100 I.P.C., which reads thus "100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death. - The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the, right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely First. - Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Secondly. - Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Thirdly. - An assault with the intention of committing rape; Fourthly. - An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; Fifthly. - An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting; Sixthly. - An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release." 30. It needs no reiteration that the right to protect oneself and property against unlawful aggression of others is the supernatural instinct of human and is a right inherent in man. 31. It needs no reiteration that the right to protect oneself and property against unlawful aggression of others is the supernatural instinct of human and is a right inherent in man. 31. In a recent pronouncement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the foundation, principles and scope of right to private defence in the case of Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 333 ; held thus "When enacting Sections 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code, excepting from its penal provisions, certain classes of acts, done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggressions, the Legislature clearly intended to arouse and encourage the manly spirit of self-defence amongst the citizens, when faced with grave danger. The law does not require a law-abiding citizen to behave like a coward when confronted with an imminent unlawful aggression. As repeatedly observed by this Court there is nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in face of danger. The right of private defence is thus designed to serve a social purpose and deserves to be fostered within the prescribed limits. 25. Hari Singh Gour in his celebrated book on Penal Law of India (11th Edition 1998-99) aptly observed that self-help is the first rule of criminal law. It still remains a rule, though in process of time much attenuated by considerations of necessity, humanity, and social order. According to Bentham, in his book 'Principles of Penal Laws' has observed "the right of defence is absolutely necessary". It is based on the cardinal principle that it is the duty of man to help himself. 26. Killing in defence of a person, according to the English Law, will amount to either justifiable or excusable homicide or chance medly, as the latter is termed, accordingly to the circumstances of the case. 27. But there is another form of homicide which is excusable in self-defence. There are cases where the necessity for self-defence arises in a sudden quarrel in with both parties engage, or on account of the initial provocation given by the person who has to defend himself in the end against an assault endangering life. 28. 27. But there is another form of homicide which is excusable in self-defence. There are cases where the necessity for self-defence arises in a sudden quarrel in with both parties engage, or on account of the initial provocation given by the person who has to defend himself in the end against an assault endangering life. 28. The Indian Penal Code defines homicide in self-defence as a form of substantive right, and therefore, save and except the restrictions imposed on the right of the Code itself, it seems that the special rule of English Law as to the duty of retreating will have no application to this country where there is a real need for defending oneself against deadly assaults. 29. The right to protect one's own person and property against the unlawful aggressions of others is a right inherent in man. The duty of protecting the person and property of others is a duty which man ownes to society of which he is a member and the preservation of which is both his interest and duty. It is, indeed, a duty which flows from human sympathy. As Bentham said : "It is a noble movement of the heart, that indignation which kindles at the sight of the feeble injured by the strong. It is noble movement which makes us forget our danger at the first cry of distress It concerns the public safety that every honest hman should consider himself as the nature protector of every other." But such protection must not be extended beyond the necessities of the case, otherwise it will encourage a spirit or lawlessness and disorder. The right has, therefore, been restricted to offences against the human body and those relating to aggression on property. 30. When there is real apprehension that the aggressor might cause death or grievous hurt, in that event the right of private defence of the defender could even extend to causing of each. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self-defence into operation, but it is also settled position of law that a right of self-defence is only right to defend oneself and not to retaliate. It is not a right to take revenge. 31. Right to private defence of person and property is recognised in all free, civilised, democratic societies within certain reasonable limits. It is not a right to take revenge. 31. Right to private defence of person and property is recognised in all free, civilised, democratic societies within certain reasonable limits. Those limits are dictated by two considerations : (1) that the same right is claimed by all other members of the society and (2) that it is the State which generally undertakes the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The citizens, as a general rule, are neither expected to run away for safety when faced with grave and imminent danger to their person or property as a result of unlawful aggression, nor are they expected, by use of force, to right the wrong done to them or to punish the wrong doer of commission of offences. 32. A legal Philosopher Michael Gorr in his article "Private Defence" (published in the Journal "Law and Philosophy" Volume 9, Number 3/ August 1990 at Page 241) observed as under: "Extreme pacifists aside, virtually everyone agrees that it is sometimes morally permissible to engage in what Glanville Williams has termed "private defence", i.e., to inflict serious (even lethal) harm upon another person in order to protect oneself or some innocent third party from suffering the same." 33. The basic principle underlying the doctrine to the right of private defence is that when an individual or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, that individual is entitled to protect himself and his property. The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger not of self creation. That being so, the necessary corollary is that the violence which the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is sought to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. 34. This Court in number of cases have laid down that when a person is exercising his right of private defence, it is not possible to weigh the force with which the right is exercised. The principle is common to all civilised jurisprudence. 34. This Court in number of cases have laid down that when a person is exercising his right of private defence, it is not possible to weigh the force with which the right is exercised. The principle is common to all civilised jurisprudence. In Robert B. Brown v. United States of America, (1921) 256 US 335 , it is observed that a person in fear of his life in not expected to modulate his defence step by step or tier by tier. Justice Holmes in the aforementioned case aptly observed "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." 35. According to Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code the injury which is inflicted by the person exercising the right should commensurate with the injury with which he is threatened. At the same time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising this right in good faith, to weigh "with golden scales" what maximum amount of force is necessary to keep within the right every reasonable allowance should be made for the bona fide defender. The Courts in one voice have said that it would be wholly unrealistic to expect of a person under assault to modulate his defence step by step according to attack. 36. The Courts have always consistently held that the right of private defence extends to the killing of the actual or potential assailant when there is a reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the six clauses of Section 100 of the I.P.C. According to the combined effect of two clauses of Section 100 I.P.C. taking the life of the assailant would be justified on the plea of private defence; if the assault causes reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the person exercising the right. A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened. When we see the principles of law in the light of facts of this case where Darshan Singh in his statement under Section 313 has categorically stated that "Gurcharan Singh gave a gandasa blow hitting my father Bakhtawar Singh of the head as a result of which he fell down. I felt that my father had been killed. When we see the principles of law in the light of facts of this case where Darshan Singh in his statement under Section 313 has categorically stated that "Gurcharan Singh gave a gandasa blow hitting my father Bakhtawar Singh of the head as a result of which he fell down. I felt that my father had been killed. Gurcharan Singh then advanced towards me holding the gandasa. I apprehended that I too would be killed and I then pulled the trigger of my gun in self defence." Gurcharan Singh died of gun shot injury. 37. In the facts and circumstances of this case the appellant, Darshan Singh had the serious apprehension of death or at least the grievous hurt when the exercised his right of private defence to save himself. Brief Enumeration of Important Cases: 38. The legal position which has been crystallized from a large number of cases is that law does not require a citizen, however law-abiding he may be, to behave like a rank coward on any occasion. This principle has been enunciated in Mahandi v. Emperor, (1930) Cr.L.J. 654 (Lahore) ; Alingal Kunhinayan & Anr. v. Emperor, ILR 28 Mad 454 ; Ranganadham Perayya, In re, (1957) 1 AWR 181 . 39. The law clearly spells out that right of private defence is available only when there is reasonable apprehension of receiving the injury. The law makes it clear that it is necessary that the extent of right of private defence is that the force used must bear a reasonable proportion of the injury to be averted, that is the injury inflicted on the assailant must not be greater than is necessary for the protection of the person assaulted. A person in fear of his life is not expected to modulate his defence step by step, but at the same time it should not be totally disproportionate. 40. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Rabindranath Dalai & Anr., (1973) Cr.L.J. 1686 (Orissa)(FB) summarised the legal position with respect to defence of person and property thus : "In a civilised society the defence of person and property of every member thereof is the responsibility of the State. 40. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Rabindranath Dalai & Anr., (1973) Cr.L.J. 1686 (Orissa)(FB) summarised the legal position with respect to defence of person and property thus : "In a civilised society the defence of person and property of every member thereof is the responsibility of the State. Consequently, there is a duty cast on every person faced with apprehension of imminent danger of his person or property to seek the aid of the machinery provided by the State but if immediately such aid is not available, he has the right of private defence." 32. From the principle reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Singh (supra), it is evident that in a civilised society, the defence of person and property of every member thereof is the responsibility of the State. No doubt, a person is under duty, if he faced with apprehension of imminent danger of his person or property, to seek the aid of the Governmental Enforcement Agency, but if no such aid is available immediately, he has 'right of private defence', a supernatural instinct of self-preservation inherent in man. Therefore, a person, who is unlawfully and illegally attacked, has every right to counter-act and ensure self-preservation of person and property. 33. On a survey of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it will be evident that right of private defence, is not available when there is sufficient time to have recourse of the Governmental Enforcement Agency. If there exists a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the person or danger to property, the force exercise should not be more than the necessary. Thus, in the event of the threat to a person to his person or property while having ......... to the counter-act, one cannot be expected to measure the force in a 'golden scale' in order to ward off the apprehended danger. 34. Having considered the evidence, statements and the nature of the injuries suffered by the accused appellants and the family members, I am of the opinion that the learned Trial Court committed an error while holding that the accused-appellants had no right to private defence. 35. The prosecution has failed to furnish any explanation of the injuries suffered by the accused-appellants and family members and one of the injury suffered being a grievous-one. 35. The prosecution has failed to furnish any explanation of the injuries suffered by the accused-appellants and family members and one of the injury suffered being a grievous-one. Needless to say that right of self-defence is a valuable right and serves a social purpose and cannot be construed with a restriction meaning. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case at hand, the nature of the injuries suffered by the accused-appellants and the family members as well as by the complainant party; the accused-appellants had a right of private defence and therefore, their counteraction in exercise thereof is totally justified and hence, it is difficult to sustain the conviction and sentence of the accused appellants as recorded by the learned Trial Court. 36. In the totality of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand and for the reasons and discussions herein above, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants are of some substance. For the reason that the informant (PW-2), who lodged the F.I.R., did not attribute the grievous injury suffered by the Chela Ram to anyone, for the reason that the entire incident at the spur of moment, for the reason that Chela Ram had gone to the house of the accused-appellants to protest; for the reason that the accused-appellants and family members suffered injuries, including grievous injury, for which the prosecutions furnished no explanation; for the reason that no overt act has been attributed to Thana Ram and Himta Ram by the informant-Deva Ram (PW-2), so much so their presence at the scene of occurrence, for the reason that there is no cogent and convincing evidence available to sustain the attraction of provisions of Section 34 of I.P.C., I am unable to agree with the findings and conclusions arrived at by the learned Trial Court. 37. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. I, accordingly, hereby quash and set aside the impugned conviction and sentence of the accused-appellant and acquit them of the charge levelled against them. 38. The accused-appellant are on bail and need not to surrender. Their bail bonds are hereby discharged.Bail application dismissed. *******