JUDGMENT I. MAHANTY, J. : The aforesaid batch of writ applications have come to be heard together on the consent of the parties since, the essential prayers and challenges made therein are common in nature. For the sake of convenience, this Court takes up the case of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd. and another (hereinafter referred to as ‘IMFA’). In this writ application, the IMFA have made the following prayers : (a)Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing opposite party No.1 to forthwith grant an opportunity of hearing to petitioner No.1 and/or (b)Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing Rule-24-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 as ultra vires; (c)Issue a declaration that prior approval of the Central Government is required even in cases of renewal of mining lease under Section-8 (3) of the MMDR Act; (d)Costs; and (e)Pass such further and order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case. 2.Mr. P.C. Chidambaram, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner-IMFA confined his submissions to prayer-(a) as noted hereinabove and has sought for a direction in the nature of mandamus to the State of Odisha to grant an opportunity of hearing to IMFA and consequently the other relief sought for in the writ application have not been pressed. 3.The proposition advanced by Mr. Chidambaram is to the effect that, IMFA is entitled to be heard by the State Government while it considers the application of Tata Steel Ltd.-Opposite party No.2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TATAS’) for renewal of its mining lease for chromite ore over 406 hectares under Section 8(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘MMDR Act’). The foundation of the aforesaid prayer is based on the earlier judgment passed by this Court the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 82 (1996) CLT 797 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TISCO (HC)’] and in particular paragraphs-64, 67, 68, 87, 88, 90, 91 and 92 as well as in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709 [hereinafter referred to as ‘TISCO (SC)’] and in particular paragraphs-41 to 48 thereof. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709 [hereinafter referred to as ‘TISCO (SC)’] and in particular paragraphs-41 to 48 thereof. 4.Is is further submitted that following two issues were before the High Court namely; (1) Whether the petitioner’s have “locus standi” in the present writ petition and (2) Whether the petitioner has a “right to be heard” by the Central Government in case the matter is remanded. (Ref : TISCO(HC) para-30). It is submitted that while the Central Government contended that neither TISCO nor any of the other parties were entitled to be heard before the decision to grant renewal (TISCO (HC) Para 10), TISCO had also contended that only TISCO had the right to be heard in the matter of renewal and no other had the right of hearing. It is submitted that this Court by its finding held that, while TISCO has a right to be heard as the applicant for renewal, the other parties (petitioners herein) also had a right to be heard by the competent authority while considering TISCO’s application. 5.Mr. Chidambaram submitted that the “right of the petitioner to be heard” while considering the application for “renewal” of opposite party No.2-TATAS lease is based on the following : (1) The petitioner have a “contingent interest” (High Court Para-88, Supreme Court para-44) (2) The petitioners are “proper parties” (High Court para-88; Supreme Court para-44) (3) The petitioners are “likely to be affected” by an order of renewal in favour of the TISCO (High Court para-90 and Supreme Court para-47) (4) The persons “legitimately have a stake” could be heard (Supreme Court para-47). (5) Principles of “fair play and natural justice” (High Court para-90). 6.In support of the aforesaid contentions, it is submitted that this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court have upheld the petitioners right to be heard while considering the renewal application of TISCO under Section 8(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, at the time of the “second renewal” and, therefore, as fortiori, the petitioners have a “right to be heard” at the time of “third renewal”. It is also submitted that the law as has been declared by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO case in respect of the second renewal application holds good for the third renewal as well and is binding because; (a)it is inter party (b)it concerns chromite ore in the State of Orissa. It is also submitted that the law as has been declared by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO case in respect of the second renewal application holds good for the third renewal as well and is binding because; (a)it is inter party (b)it concerns chromite ore in the State of Orissa. (c)it concern the areas originally comprised of in 1261 hectares and (d)It concern exercise of power under Section 8(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957. 7.Insofar as the binding nature of the aforesaid judgments are concerned, reliance is placed by the petitioner on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 at para-7 and in the case of Union of India v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1370 at para-5. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. BY MR. SALMAN KHURSID, SENIOR ADVOCATE 8.Jindal Stainless Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘JSL’) represented through Mr. Salman Khursid, learned Senior Advocate, who submitted that they have adopted all the arguments and points raised in the written submissions submitted on behalf of IMFA and while adopting the same have made certain additional submissions. Mr. Khursid submitted that the preliminary objection raised by Dr. A.M. Singhvi on behalf of the TATAS to IMFA’s writ petition cannot and do not apply to the case of JSL since JSL not having filed any petition before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Consequently, no suppression can be attributable to JSL. It is submitted that JSL is only seeking a grant of hearing before taking a decision on renewal of TISCO’s lease and further that JSL had been granted a hearing on the earlier occasion i.e., when TATAS 2nd renewal application was being considered and there is no justifiable reason as to why similar opportunity ought not to be granted to the petitioner at the time of the 3rd renewal. Mr. Khursid further made it clear that the petitioner-JSL is not seeking any hearing on its application for grant of mining lease though an application has been filed by it. He clarifies that JSL is only seeking an opportunity of being heard by the State Government before it takes any decision with respect to third renewal application of mining lease of TISCO. He clarifies that JSL is only seeking an opportunity of being heard by the State Government before it takes any decision with respect to third renewal application of mining lease of TISCO. In this respect he submitted that the term “interest of mineral development” is required to be the guiding factor for taking any decision before renewal and such a term can never be given a fixed concept and such term must change with the needs of the time. He further highlights that since Section 8(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 for second or subsequent renewal ought to be allowed only in “very rare circumstances”, and since JSL requires chrome ore for its factory, it ought to be heard to assist the State Government in formulating its policy, as to what would be in the “interest of mineral development”. Although the learned counsel for JSL has stated before this Court various factual aspects regarding the existence or setting up of a factory and the requirement of chrome ore for JSL but, as noted hereinabove, this Court has limited the hearing to only consideration of the issue of right of participate in a hearing and consequently, we refrain from taking note or considering any submission with reference to the inter se merits of the application for renewal by TATAS nor the merits of any application which the petitioners may or may not have made. Consequently, in view of the above, for the purpose of the present case we do not record any submission made by the parties on merits or matter which have no implication on the only issue that has been raised before this Court for its adjudication i.e. the right of participating in hearing at the time of consideration of TATAS 3rd renewal application. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF BALASORE ALLOYS LTD. BY Ms. INDIRA JAISINGH, SENIOR ADVOCATE 9.Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned counsel who has appeared for the M/s. Balasore Alloys Ltd. has also adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Advocate as well as Mr. Salman Khursid, learned Sr. Advocate and further stated that since the lease of TATAS in the meantime has expired, TATAS are in no better position than the petitioner and, therefore, they all stand on the same footing. P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Advocate as well as Mr. Salman Khursid, learned Sr. Advocate and further stated that since the lease of TATAS in the meantime has expired, TATAS are in no better position than the petitioner and, therefore, they all stand on the same footing. She further submitted that allowing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners at the time of consideration of TATAS renewal application will only sub-serve the cause of justice, inasmuch as, the State would have an opportunity to be assisted by the petitioners in formulating its views as to what would be in the best “interest of mineral development”. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF FERRO ALLOYS BY MR. SHYAMANANDA MOHAPATRA, SENIOR ADVOCATE 10.Mr. Shyamananda Mohapatra, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. and FACOR Alloys Ltd. has also adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Chidambaram and other counsel for the various writ petitioners. At the conclusion of arguments he has submitted written notes of submission. In the said note he has highlighted the proposition that the theory of “justice as fairness” and submitted that any order depriving the petitioner of an opportunity of hearing at the stage of consideration of TISCO’s renewal application, may be unfair since, by acceding to the prayer of the petitioner to be heard, it would not in any manner cause any harm to any other person and would support the conclusion that may be reached by the State. Since “justice and fairness” are co-terminus terms. The other factual aspects vis-a-vis comparative merits are not extracted hereunder for the reasons as recorded hereinabove. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE BY ADVOCATE GENERAL 11.Mr. A. Mohanty, the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Orissa in the batch of writ applications has submitted that the lease of which renewal has been sought for was granted to the TATAs over an area of 406 hectares in terms of Rule-24-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘MC Rules’). The petitioners have claimed “locus standi” as well as a “right to be heard” since they have “interest in mineral development” and reliance has been placed on the judgments of TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC). The State Government has opposed the prayer of the petitioners who claimed right of hearing and have made the following submissions : “2. The petitioners have claimed “locus standi” as well as a “right to be heard” since they have “interest in mineral development” and reliance has been placed on the judgments of TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC). The State Government has opposed the prayer of the petitioners who claimed right of hearing and have made the following submissions : “2. That the State Government has filed its counter contesting the right of hearing to the petitioners in this case, the submissions of opposite party-State before the Hon’ble Court are on the following grounds :- (i)That renewal is a lis between the “lessor” and “lessee” and a third party has no right to be heard in the said matter. (ii)Grant of mining lease is neither a statutory right nor fundamental or Constitutional Right, therefore, the writ application in absence of any right in respect of the petitioners cannot lie under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the same is confined to enforcement of a right. (iii)The relevant statutes i.e. the MMDR Act and the MC Rules do not contain any provision for grant of opportunity of hearing to intending objectors in case of a renewal of a mining lease. (iv)It is the well settled principle of law that there is no Fundamental Right nor Constitutional Right or even a Statutory right in the matter of grant or renewal of a mining lease [Ref : Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. UOI : (2012) 11 SCC 1 , at paras 133, 216]. (v)The alternative argument of the petitioners that they are entitled to a right of hearing on the ground of principle of “natural justice” is also belied by the facts that none of their rights are being affected in absence of a right of hearing as violation of the principle of natural justice/right arises only in a case where a right is either divested or abridged or in a case an opportunity to a person to put forth his defence before being faced with civil or penal consequence. The principle of natural justice, in absence of any such contingency, is not envisaged in law and cannot be read into the MC Rules. [Ref: AIR 1973 SC 678 : (1973) A SCC 584 : State of Assam v. Om Prakash Meheta at para 12, 15]. The principle of natural justice, in absence of any such contingency, is not envisaged in law and cannot be read into the MC Rules. [Ref: AIR 1973 SC 678 : (1973) A SCC 584 : State of Assam v. Om Prakash Meheta at para 12, 15]. This decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court still holds the field and has been relied upon in Monnet Ispat (Supra) and Sandur, (infra). (vi)Reliance placed on the decision reported in (1996) 9 SCC 709 is no more tenable in view of the fact that :- (a)it has already been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sandur that the TISCO decision at Paras 42, 44 and 47 does not lay down any law [Ref: Sandur Manganese & Iron Ore Ltd. v. State of Karnataka : (2010) 13 SCC 1 at Para 68, Page 32]. (b)Assuming but not admitting that TISCO : (1996) 9 SCC 709 , lays down any law, it is humbly submitted that the said decision was rendered in the year 1996, at a time, as evident from the judgment, when there was no National Mineral Policy existing whereas, as on date, there is a National Mineral Policy which is being followed by all the States. The National Mineral Policy, 2008 and Guidelines dtd. 11.02.2013 issued by GOI, Ministry of Mines for processing of proposals under the MMDR Act today exist to guide the State Govts. In the case of grant or renewal. (c)The findings of TISCO : (1996) 9 SCC 709 , has lost its relevance, in view of the fact that Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act was substituted by Act 38 of 1999 and proviso to Section 24-A(3) was inserted on 11.01.2002. Moreover, the only opportunity of hearing as has been envisaged under Rule 26 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 is in respect of a lessee when the State Government proposes to refuse renewal and that too, it mandates, that State Government shall further record reasons in writing and communicate it to the applicant for such refusal. This being the legislative policy in absence of any right for getting a mining lease the contents of the provision of the statute cannot be expanded. This being the legislative policy in absence of any right for getting a mining lease the contents of the provision of the statute cannot be expanded. (d)It is further humbly submitted that at present no final decision has been taken in respect of the renewal application of TISCO and, therefore, the bar under Rule 59 of the MC Rules, 1960 will be attracted as the area is not available for grant, without entry in the register referred to in Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 7-D, Sub-rule 2 of Rule 21 or Sub-rule 2 of Rule 40, as the case may be of the said rules and the availability of the area to grant has not been notified in the official Gazette. Therefore, any application made by a third party in respect of the said area will be treated as pre-mature. (vii)Mineral Development now has to be read in consonance with the National Mineral Policy and the proviso to Rule 24(3) and it is to mean that the Controller General of Indian Bureau of Mines will be the competent authority, on whose report, in case of second or subsequent renewal of a mining lease, the matter will be decided as to whether it would be in the interest of Mineral Development or not. It is, therefore, humbly submitted that these writ applications are liable to be dismissed.” SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF TATAS BY DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (SENIOR ADVOCATE) 12.Dr. A.M. Singhvi learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the TATAS has raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, inter alia, on the ground of suppression of material facts and submissions in this regard which noted hereunder : “11. THE PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS 11.1. The petitioner has consciously concealed from this Hon’ble Court the fact that it had moved an Intervention Application I.A. No.3784 in an application filed by opposite party No.2 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court for the extension of the Temporary Working Permission (“TWP”) (I.A.3763 in I.A. No.3561-3562 of 2013 in Writ Petition (c) 202 of 1995). In I.A. No.3784 of 2014, the petitioner opposed the extension of the TWP of opposite party No.2 in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590 (Para 27-28). 11.2. In I.A. No.3784 of 2014, the petitioner opposed the extension of the TWP of opposite party No.2 in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590 (Para 27-28). 11.2. In I.A. No.3784 of 2014, the petitioner raised virtually the same grounds that have been raised in the present writ petition. It asserted its locus standi with respect to the third renewal of the mining lease of opposite party No.2 and consequently asserted its locus standi to be heard before an extension of the TWP was granted. It relied heavily on the TISCO (SC) Case. 11.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not entertain these submissions when the matter was heard on 02.05.2014 and consequently had passed an order extending the TWP of opposite party No.2 until orders were passed in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) 114 of 2014). By order dated 16.05.2014 passed in WP(C) No.114 of 2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held inter-alia that leases operating under second and subsequent deemed renewals under Rule 24A(6) of the MC Rules, 1960 without any express orders of renewal passed by the State Government under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 shall not be allowed to operate. It also directed therein that all pending renewal applications under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 should be disposed off within six months. (Para 6, 10) In view of the said order dated 16.05.2014, opposite party No.2 voluntarily stopped mining operations in the Sukinda Chromite Mine. 11.4. Despite being aware of the time frame laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for the disposal of renewal applications under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the petitioner filed the present writ petition to stall the processing of the renewal application of opposite party No.2. The petitioner, by its active suppression of material facts, successfully persuaded this Hon’ble Court to pass an ex-parte stay on the issuance of final orders under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. 11.5. It is only after this Hon’ble Court had been apprised of this suppression of facts that, on 03.09.2014, at an extremely belated stage and after substantial arguments have been advanced before this Hon’ble Court on two occasions that the petitioner has sought to withdraw I.A. 3784 of 2014. 11.5. It is only after this Hon’ble Court had been apprised of this suppression of facts that, on 03.09.2014, at an extremely belated stage and after substantial arguments have been advanced before this Hon’ble Court on two occasions that the petitioner has sought to withdraw I.A. 3784 of 2014. It must be noted that although the matter was listed on two occasions before the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Forest Bench) i.e. on 25.08.2014 and 01.09.2014 prior to 03.09.2014, no effort was made by the petitioner to withdraw I.A. 3784 of 2014.” 13.Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the TATAS, submitted that the entire approach of the petitioners and the reliance placed by them in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709 [hereinafter referred to as ‘TISCO (SC)’] and the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 82 (1996) CLT 797 [hereinafter referred to as ‘TISCO (HC)’] governs petitioners' case in law and/or binds the opposite party No.2-TATAS and/or binding on the Hon’ble High Court and/or raises the issue of res judicata. Such an approach is wholly erroneous, inter alia, for the following reason : 2.1 The present proceedings are not instituted for the execution of a decree in the TISCO (SC) case. They arise on a fresh cause of action on which a fresh batch of petitions has been filed in 2014, seeking fresh relief in a fresh context of facts and circumstances. At the highest, the petitioners may argue that TISCO (SC), as they understand it, constitutes binding law. Neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the doctrine of constructive res judicata, has any relevance to the present case. 2.2. Alternatively and without prejudice, neither the res (i..e the issue) arising in the TISCO (SC) case is the same as in the present case, and nor has there been any judicata (i.e. law laid down) in the TISCO (SC) so as to bind the present proceedings on the principles of Res Judicata. 2.3. This Hon’ble Court in TISCO (HC) gave a judgment based on a “concession” and hence no law can be said to have been laid down in TISCO (SC) case which affirmed TISCO (HC). 2.4. 2.3. This Hon’ble Court in TISCO (HC) gave a judgment based on a “concession” and hence no law can be said to have been laid down in TISCO (SC) case which affirmed TISCO (HC). 2.4. Alternatively and without prejudice, the proceedings in TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC) proceeded in ignorance of and/or violation of Rules, 5, 12, 27, 37, 59 and 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (the “MC Rules, 1960”) and Section 4A of the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957 (the “MMDR Act, 1957”) are, for that reason, per incuriam, and in any event, do not lay down law. 2.5. In any event, the prayer made in the present writ petition by the petitioners i..e that they have a right to be heard, was not at all the prayer in the earlier writ petitions (the earlier TISCO proceedings) and accordingly the issue of a right of hearing was not decided either in TISCO (HC) or in (TISCO (SC). 2.6. Alternatively, without prejudice, assuming without conceding that this contention was advanced in the earlier TISCO proceedings (even though not forming a part of the pleadings of the earlier writ petitions), the same is now barred by the decision in Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others (2010) 13 SCC 1 (the “Sandur Manganese” case) and petitioners cannot seek this relief in the present proceedings. 2.7. In any event, having regard to the scheme of the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957 (the “MMDR Act, 1957”) and the MC Rules, 1960, the principles of natural justice would stand excluded in the present context. 2.8. Further, the petitioner is not a needy appellant and is completely underserving of the grant of a mining lease in the Sukinda Mines.” 14.It is further averred on behalf of the TATAS that the TISCO (SC) case does not render the issue of hearing res judiciata between the parties and in this respect the following submissions are advanced : “4. THE TISCO (SC) CASE DOES NOT RENDER THE ISSUE OF HEARING RES-JUDICATA BETWEEN THE PARTIES 4.1. The prayer in the present writ petition seeks a right/privilege of hearing to be accorded to the petitioners during/before the renewal of the lease of opposite party No.2. No such prayer was made in the earlier TISCO proceedings. THE TISCO (SC) CASE DOES NOT RENDER THE ISSUE OF HEARING RES-JUDICATA BETWEEN THE PARTIES 4.1. The prayer in the present writ petition seeks a right/privilege of hearing to be accorded to the petitioners during/before the renewal of the lease of opposite party No.2. No such prayer was made in the earlier TISCO proceedings. In TISCO (HC), the prayers in the various writ petitions filed at that time, are reproduced at pages 803-806. It is clear that Indian Charge Chrome Limited (“ICCL”, the sister concern of the petitioner) had sought no such prayer and has simply sought the quashing of even the limited renewal granted to TISCO for an area of 651 ha. (reduced from the area of 1261.476 ha). 4.2. Jindal Strips Ltd., on the other hand, while seeking identical relief of quashing of TISCO’s partial renewal (TISCO (HC) case, Pg. 806), added a prayer : “Issue of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent Nos.1 and 2 to consider the applications of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 and of respondents No.4, 5, 6 together and to equitably distribute the area available for lease taking into account the requirement of chrome ore for captive consumption as also the areas already hold on lease by any of them.” This prayer had nothing to do with a right of hearing. 4.3. At the time of earlier TISCO proceedings, Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957, as it then stood, dichotomized the process of renewal. While the formation of an opinion regarding renewal was vested in the Central Government, Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 provided for hearing by the State Government. 4.4. Assuming without admitting there was scope to argue the reading in of a right of hearing in the law as it then stood (on the basis that the formation of an opinion was vested in the Central Government), the position stands completely altered post 1999 as the amended Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957, like Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 speaks only of the State Government. Consequently, even the minimal scope for reading in is excluded by the law as it now stands. 4.5. Consequently, even the minimal scope for reading in is excluded by the law as it now stands. 4.5. Although a right of hearing was never prayed for in the earlier TISCO round (as shown above), assuming without conceding that any such oral/written prayer was made, it can have no relevance in the scenario post the case of Sandur Manganese, which eliminates the possibility of joint consideration of applications by existing renewal seekers and prospective parties (Paras 62-64, 68 at Pg. 31 & 33). Consequently, the judgments of TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC) would have no relevance in the present scenario. 4.6. For the additional reasons below, i.e. the concession by parties and “guidelines” given by the Hon’ble Court in celebrated TISCO (HC) case, the issue of res judicata is also irrelevant. 4.7. In the TISCO (SC) case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that it was not considering the question of a right of hearing before the Government of TISCO SC where the reference is clearly to the Committee) (Para 19, 30 at Pg. 715 & 719). In view of the concession by parties and “guidelines” given by this Hon’ble Court in the TISCO (HC) case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a fact situation in which the parties were in fact heard by a Committee (the Sharma Committee). Such factual reality cannot be equated to a principle of law laying down a right of hearing before the Government and that too in the teeth of the statutory framework, especially Rules, 26, 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960.” 15.Dr. Singhvi on behalf of the TATAS submitted that the decision of the TISCO (HC) was based on a concession and consequently does not constitute declaration of any law and neither a binding precedent nor be barred by res judicata between the parties in a fresh cause of action. In this respect, the following submissions were advanced: “5. THE DECISION IN THE TISCO (HC) CASE WAS BASED ON A CONCESSION 5.1. Para 55 of the TISCO (HC) case reads as follows : “55. Mr. In this respect, the following submissions were advanced: “5. THE DECISION IN THE TISCO (HC) CASE WAS BASED ON A CONCESSION 5.1. Para 55 of the TISCO (HC) case reads as follows : “55. Mr. Patnaik has also very candidly submitted before this Court that the Central Government has no objection if this Court by appreciating all the facts and circumstances, all the relevant factors, exigencies of the situation, directs the Central Government to reconsider the entire matter afresh after giving opportunity of a hearing to all the parties and to take an appropriate decision within the scheme, framework and scope of the M.M. [R & D] Act and the connected Rules for national interest, public interest and in the interest of mineral development. With proper instructions he submits that the Central Government has no objection to consider the matter again and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law.” (emphasis added) 5.2. Thus, it is clear that not only did the Central Government have no objection to the hearing, but had conveyed this no objection after specific instructions had been sought, obtained and informed to the Hon’ble Court. 5.3. This concession was repeated in Para 90 of TISCO (HC) : “90. As we are of the view that the Central Government should consider afresh and Mr. B.M. Patnaik has submitted that the Central Government has no objection to consider afresh, there is no bar and/or impediment if the Central Government considers the proposal of subsequent renewal of lease of TISCO by giving it opportunity of hearing which may be effected in presence of the other petitioners who have come to this Court. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Central Government has no obligation to invite other intending parties besides the writ petitioners in the case at the time of disposal of the application for a subsequent renewal of the lease at the instance of TISCO, this Court finds that by the ultimate result other writ petitioners are consequently to be affected by renewal, part renewal or refusal of the lease in favour of TISCO. They may be heard by way of fair play and in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and to enable them to place on record such necessary facts for essential consideration by the Central Government. They may be heard by way of fair play and in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and to enable them to place on record such necessary facts for essential consideration by the Central Government. It is made very much clear that only in the event of availability of the area occupied by TISCO, State Government will consider their prospective applications in accordance with law.” 5.4. In the TISCO (SC) case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on this concession and quoted Para 90 of the TISCO (HC) case in its judgment at Para 19. (SC)” 16.It is further submitted on behalf of the TATAS that, in the alternative and without prejudice, the judgment of TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC) were “per incuriam” if read in the manner as the writ petitioners have sought to interpret the same. In this respect, the following submissions were advanced : “6. ALTERNATIVELY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE, THE TISCO (HC) CASE AND THE TISCO (SC) WERE PER-INCURIAM 6.1. In the present proceedings, the status of the petitioner is merely that of an “objector” and nothing more. The provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with the MC rules, 1960 provide a complete code in respect of the renewal of mining leases and also provide for the manner in which the principles of natural justice are to be satisfied while such renewal is considered. Nowhere in the MMDR Act, 1957 or the MC Rules, 1960 has any right of hearing for an ‘objector’ been contemplated. 6.2. Neither the case of TISCO (HC) nor TISCO (SC) have considered the direct exclusionary impact that Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 has on the prayers of the writ petitioners. Rule 26 covers the entire field comprehensively and controls the possibility, if any, on the quantum, degree and nature of hearing. Any hearing contrary to, beyond or in violation of Rule 26 is impermissible and would constitute a direct violation of statute. 6.3. Rule 26 encapsulates the specific legislative intent to limit hearing only to an applicant seeking a renewal of a mining lease. It does not contemplate any right of hearing to any other person, and certainly not to persons like the petitioner who are neither applicants nor could have been applicants in law. It certainly does not contemplate any opportunity of hearing for an ‘objector’. 6.4. It does not contemplate any right of hearing to any other person, and certainly not to persons like the petitioner who are neither applicants nor could have been applicants in law. It certainly does not contemplate any opportunity of hearing for an ‘objector’. 6.4. Indeed, ironically even to the applicant, a hearing under Rule 26 is contemplated only in the event of a refusal/rejection. 6.5. The petitioners have deliberately tried to distort the statute by suggesting reading in a right of hearing into an alleged area of statutory silence. No such reading-in is permissible for the simple reason that there is no silence as has been self-servingly imagined by the petitioners. Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 comprehensively occupies the field. There is no gap and there is no silence. 6.6. Another way of looking at it is the established rule of interpretation, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius i.e. the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. As Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 has expressly stated the extent of hearing, all other alternatives are not only impliedly but expressly excluded. 6.7. In this context, the principle law down in the landmark judgment of Nazir Ahmad v. The King-Emperor (1935-36) 63 IA 372 (Pg. 381-382) would also squarely apply i.e. that if a statute requires things to be done in a particular manner, by implication it bars any other manner of doing those things. (See inter-alia Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D.426, Pg.431-432; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others (1999) 8 SCC 266 , Para 17; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 , Para 7; State of Jharkhand and others v. Ambay Cements and another (2005) 1 SCC 368 , Para 26; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755 , Para 35) 6.8. To seek a reading-in of a right of hearing is to seek pure re-legislation or judicial legislation from this Hon’ble Court in violatin of specific statutory intent and mandate. (See Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others (2010) 13 SCC 1 , Para 81-82 at Pg.36-37; Avishek Goenka v. Union of India and another (2012) 5 SCC 321 , Para 18,24 at Pg.327 & pg. (See Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others (2010) 13 SCC 1 , Para 81-82 at Pg.36-37; Avishek Goenka v. Union of India and another (2012) 5 SCC 321 , Para 18,24 at Pg.327 & pg. 328; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and High Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others (1984) 4 SCC 27 , Para 14 at Pg. 39 and Para 22 (last two lines) at Pg. 52) 6.9. If the right to hear an ‘obejector’ is read into the statute, the ensuing implications would result in the complete un-workability of the statutory scheme. There would be no clarity as to who would qualify as an “objector” and have a consequential right to be heard. This so-called “objector” could then demand a hearing at every stage of the proceedings including seeking a hearing for cancellation of an existing mining lease. 6.10. It is vital to note that varying degrees, forms and quantums of hearing have been recognized and specifically provided for in different forms, shapes and sizes in various provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957 and the MC Rules, 1960. For example, Section 4A(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 specifically contemplates a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the holder of a prospecting license or mining lease prior to premature termination of the license or lease. It specifies the contingency in which hearing may be given and the person to whom it may be given. 6.11. Similarly, Rule 5 of the MC Rules, 1960 necessitates an opportunity of hearing to be given to an applicant whose reconnaissance permit is refused. 6.12. Rule 12 of the MC Rules, 1980 encapsulates the identical principle in the event of the refusal of a grant or renewal of a prospecting license. 6.13. Similarly, Rule 37(3) of the MC Rules, 1960 read with its proviso also provides for the salutary rule of natural justice to a lessee whose lease is being determined for a breach of the legal provisions for the transfer of a lease. 6.14. In view of this seamless scheme of the MMDR Act, 1957 and the MC Rules, 1960, the doctrine of reading-in is not only wholly impermissible, but would do irreversible damage and violence to the scheme and structure of the entire statute. 6.15. 6.14. In view of this seamless scheme of the MMDR Act, 1957 and the MC Rules, 1960, the doctrine of reading-in is not only wholly impermissible, but would do irreversible damage and violence to the scheme and structure of the entire statute. 6.15. Rule 59 of the MC Rules, 1960 contemplates a categorical statutory bar in respect of the grant of previously held/reserved/notified areas without re-notifying the availability of the area for re-grant and making appropriate entries in the register for that purpose. Reinforcing this, Rule 60 deems all applications prior to exercise of the power under Rule 59 to be premature, and far from being considered, mandates that they “shall not be entertained”. 6.16. Not one of the aforesaid provisions, being Section 4A of the MMDR Act, 1957, nor Rules 5, 12, 26, 37, 59 or 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 has been considered or adjudicated in either TISCO (HC) or TISCO (SC) case. Although the TISCO (HC) case mentions Rule 26 (Para 9 at Pg. 816, Para 17 at Pg.825) and Rules 59 and 60 (Para 11 at 821), it does not decide their implication or effect. The other rules are not even mentioned. 6.17. The TISCO (SC), firstly does not mention any rule except Rules 59 and 60 and secondly, while mentioning Rules 59 and 60 (Para 41 at Pg. 722) does not decide their impact. It instead notes that the Central Government had exercised its power under Rule 59(2) on 17.08.1995 to relax the rigor of the provisions of Rule 59(1) (Para 46 at Pg. 723). 6.18. Therefore, in the alternative and without prejudice it is submitted that, for the reasons stated above, it is clear that earlier TISCO proceedings would also be hit by the per incuriam principle as being decided without reference to, or in any event without adjudication of relevant provisions of law. The absence of any decision on those provisions renders the decisions in TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC) cases contrary to law and hence per incuriam. (See State of UP and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another 1991 (4) SCC 139 , Paras 14, 36, 39, 40, 41, etc). 6.19. In any event, under current established law, especially in the case of Sandur Manganese (Para 62-68 at Pgs. 31-33), rules 59 and 60 have mandatory affect and disentitle any action contrary to that mandate. 6.20. 6.19. In any event, under current established law, especially in the case of Sandur Manganese (Para 62-68 at Pgs. 31-33), rules 59 and 60 have mandatory affect and disentitle any action contrary to that mandate. 6.20. Further, after the TISCO (SC) case, Section 8(3) of MMDR Act, 1957 and Rule 24A(3) of the MC Rules, 1960 have been amended and a two stage consideration of a second or subsequent renewal of a mining lease in respect of minerals not specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule to the MMDR Act, 1957 has been introduced. (i) The State Government would have to be of the opinion that such renewal is necessary in the interests of mineral development and would have to record reasons for the same; and (ii) the State Government would have to seek a report from the Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines as to whether it would be in the interests of mineral development to grant the renewal of the mining lease. Thus, adequate checks and balances have already been provided for in the decision making process including the providing of inputs from a specialized and independent body in the mining sector after examination of requisite data. 6.21. Thus, it is submitted that if by virtue of Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with Rules 26 and 24A(3) of the MC Rules, 1960, a specific procedure has been statutorily provided for the second and subsequent renewal of mining leases, any other procedure/method of considering such renewal applications is barred.” 17.Dr. Singhvi further submitted that the issue of “right of hearing” was never raised nor decided in TISCO (HC) case or in TISCO (SC) case and in this respect, the following submissions were advanced. : “7. THE ISSUE OF A RIGHT OF HEARING WAS NEVER RAISED OR DECIDED IN THE TISCO (HC) CASE OR THE TISCO (SC) CASE 7.1. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 82 (1996) CLT 797 (the “TISCO (HC) case”) 7.1.1. This Hon’ble Court specifically held that the other writ petitioners in that case could not “insist for a right of hearing while the Central Government takes a decision in order to form its opinion as envisaged under Section 8(3) of the Act”. Ltd. v. Union of India 82 (1996) CLT 797 (the “TISCO (HC) case”) 7.1.1. This Hon’ble Court specifically held that the other writ petitioners in that case could not “insist for a right of hearing while the Central Government takes a decision in order to form its opinion as envisaged under Section 8(3) of the Act”. (Para 88 at Pg.827) It also clarified that “only in the event of availability of the area occupied by TISCO, State Government will consider their prospective applications in accordance with law.” (para 90 at Pg. 873) 7.1.2. The petitioner has conflated and confused the issue of whether it had any right to be heard at the time of the second renewal of the mining lease of opposite party No.2 under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 with the fact that it was heard. As aforesaid, the hearing which this Hon’ble Court had allowed in that case had been pursuant to a concession made by the Ld. Counsel for the Central Government. (para 55 at Pg. 847) 7.1.3. Two critical facts in that case must be noted : firstly on 03.06.1993, the Central Government had conveyed its approval to grant a second renewal of the mining lease of opposite party No.2 over an area of 1261 h. (Para 2 at Pg.807 & para 81 at Pg. 864). Secondly, on 05.10.1993, the Central Government reviewed its earlier decision dated 03.06.1993 and granted approval for a reduced area of 651 ha. (para 2 at Pg. 808 & Para 85 at Pg. 867) 7.1.4. Therefore, by 04.04.1995 when this Hon’ble Court pronounced its judgment, the decision to reduce the area of the mining lease of opposite party No.2 had already been taken by the Central Government. It is only on account of this vital fact of the orders already having been passed, along with the concession made by the Ld. Counsel for the Central Government, that this Hon’ble Court allowed a hearing to be granted to other writ petitioners in that case and not because the law required such hearing. (para 88, 90, 91 at Pg.872-874) It must be noted that the Ld. Counsel for the Central Government, even while making the concession, had made it clear that the Central Government was not obliged to grant a hearing to the other parties. (Para 90 at Pg. 873). 7.1.5. (para 88, 90, 91 at Pg.872-874) It must be noted that the Ld. Counsel for the Central Government, even while making the concession, had made it clear that the Central Government was not obliged to grant a hearing to the other parties. (Para 90 at Pg. 873). 7.1.5. It is also vital to note that the “guidelines” issued in the TISCO (HC) case at the relevant time were with regard to limited parties and if there was any substance in the contention of the petitioners that a binding law was laid in the earlier TISCO proceedings, it would have been made applicable to all concerned and not restricted to certain parties only, especially when a statutory framework was being considered. The existence of this limited nature of arrangement made at the relevant time clearly leaves no room for doubt that the TISCO (HC) case intended to merely give some guidelines in view of the background of the concession of the Central Government that it had no objection to consider the matter afresh and to hear the concerned parties at the relevant time (though the Central Government made it clear that there was no obligation to do so and in any case it did not intend to hear anyone else other than the writ petitioners at the relevant time). This certainly does not qualify as a case of res-judicata or a binding precedent. 7.1.6. Lastly, a preliminary ground had been raised by the Ld. Counsel for opposite party No.2 that by virtue of Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 other parties challenging the renewal, could not be recognized as “applicants” for the area in question. (Para 11 at Pg. 821) This Hon’ble Court did not deal with this ground of challenge in its entire judgment. In any case this issue stands finalized by the Sandur judgment unequivocally holding that no such application can be entertained. Any claim to be heard in spite of this bar would also clearly be a circumvention of Sandur apart from being in breach of the clear legislative intent under Rule 26 of MC Rules, 1960. 7.2. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1996) 9 SCC 709 (the “TISCO (SC) CASE”) 7.2.1. Any claim to be heard in spite of this bar would also clearly be a circumvention of Sandur apart from being in breach of the clear legislative intent under Rule 26 of MC Rules, 1960. 7.2. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1996) 9 SCC 709 (the “TISCO (SC) CASE”) 7.2.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that this Hon’ble Court had stated in its judgment that none of the other parties could, as a matter of right, claim to be heard while the Central Government was considering the issue of renewal. (Para 44 at Pg. 723) 7.2.2. As aforesaid, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had noted the concession that Ld. Counsel for the Central Government had made before this Hon’ble Court and quoted Para 90 (at Pg.873) the TISCO (HC) case which records the concession. (Para 19 at Pg. 723) 7.2.3. Subsequent to the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 04.04.1995, the Sharma Committee was constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of considering the issue of the second renewal of the Mining Lease of opposite party No.2. The Scharma Committee submitted its report dated 16.08.1995 recommending the renewal of the Mining Lease to opposite party No.2 for a reduced area. On the next day, 17.08.1995, the Central Government authorized renewal over a reduced area of 406 ha. And at the same time, in exercise of its powers under Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules, 1960 relaxed the provisions of Rule 59(1). The Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically noted this relaxation under Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules, 1960. (Para 46 at Pg. 723) 7.2.4. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court correctly understood that the hearing allowed to the other writ petitioners by this Hon’ble Court in that case, was pursuant to the concession of the Central Government in the facts and circumstances of that case, and was not granted as a matter of right. In the present case, neither has the State Government made any such concession nor has the Central Government exercised its powers under Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules, 1960. 7.2.5. In the present case, neither has the State Government made any such concession nor has the Central Government exercised its powers under Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules, 1960. 7.2.5. The understanding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is clear from its language in Para 47 at Pg.723 wherein it has stated as under : “To that extent, those likely to be affected and indeed, those who can legitimately have a stake in the proper formulation of such a vital policy, can be heard. No exception can be taken to the High Court treating them as proper parties and directing the Committee to hear them” [Emphasis Supplied] It is also relevant to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was conscious that the so called hearing which took place was a hearing only before a Committee and not a hearing before the Central Government and it is in that factual matrix only that the issue was being looked at. The same cannot be equated to any right to a statutory hearing. The same is also apparent from the issue (iii) outlined in para 30 of the said TISCO (SC) case. 7.2.6. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not confer any right of hearing under the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with the MC rules, 1960 to the other writ petitioners, but merely held that in the facts and circumstances of that case this Hon’ble Court could not be faulted for factually allowing a hearing.” 18.Dr. Singhvi further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others, (2010) 13 SCC 1 has categorically come to conclude that issue of right of hearing does not arise, then to such extent, the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sandur Manganese (supra) constituted a complete change in law and to the aforesaid effect the following submissions have been advanced : “8. ALTERNATIVELY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AFTER THE CASE OF SANDUR MANGANESE THE ISSUE OF A RIGHT OF HEARING DOES NOT ARISE : Assuming but not conceding that the petitioners’ understanding of the law based on the earlier TISCO proceedings is correct, the case of Sandur Manganese constitutes a complete change in the law. 8.1. In the Sandur Manganese case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has put to rest any doubt in respect of an objector’s right of hearing. 8.1. In the Sandur Manganese case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has put to rest any doubt in respect of an objector’s right of hearing. It has elucidated the importance and the import of Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 and clarified that an application made prior to the issuance of a notification under Rule 59(1) would be premature under Rule 60. (Para 62 to 67 at Pgs. 31-32) 8.2. The use of the strong language “shall be deemed to be premature and shall not be entertained” in Rule 60 of the MC Rules, 1960, puts to an end any attempt by the petitioner to argue that it has locus standi with respect to the third renewal of the mining lease of opposite party No.2. Further, it is pertinent to note that in the present case, the petitioner has admitted that its application would be premature under Rule 60 of the MC Rules, 1960. 8.3. While it is correct that Sandur Manganese, in Paragraphs 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66 etc. considered Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 in the context of Section 11(4) of the MMDR Act, 1957, this does not in any way detract from its interpretation of Rules 59 and 60. The case of Sandur Manganese understands Rules 59 and 60 to be an absolute bar unless complied with. It reinforces the effect of Section 11(4) of the MMDR Act, 1957 largely on the ground that it is consistent and harmonious with Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960. In another words, even statutory provisions are not to be interpreted contrary to the established letter and intent of Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960. 8.4. Applied to the present case, the petitioners have sought an interpretation of the statute which is fundamentally contrary to any possible meaning of Rules 59 and 60 and any interpretation which has ever been imparted to them. In other words, the petitioners have sought relief in the teeth of Rules 59 and 60 which renders them neither applicants nor prospective applicants nor persons having any identity or locus in the process of grant of a mining lease. In other words, the petitioners have sought relief in the teeth of Rules 59 and 60 which renders them neither applicants nor prospective applicants nor persons having any identity or locus in the process of grant of a mining lease. If that be so, the findings in Sandur Manganese, albeit in the context of Section 11(4), are nevertheless directly relevant to the present proceedings and to Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957, on a simple parity of reasoning. 8.5. Paragraph 68 of the Sandur Manganese case (at Pg.33) is significant as after the discussion in paragraphs 59, 60, 62 to 66, the Hon’ble Supreme Court marries the principle of Rules 59 and 60 of MC Rules, 1960 with TISCO (SC). It is in that context, and clearly finding the TISCO (SC) inconsistent with Rules 59 and 60, that in Paragraph 68 the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the TISCO (SC) “cannot be taken as laying down any law”. 8.6. The case of Sandur Manganese had specifically noted that applications by other parties were considered pursuant to a relaxation under Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules, 1960. (Para 68 at Pg.33; Para 77 at Pg.35) 8.7. The petitioner has relied heavily on the fact that the Sandur Manganese case is concerned with the initial grant of a mining lease, whereas the TISCO (SC) case is concerned with the renewal of mining leases under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. In this context, reliance has been placed on Para 44 at Pg.26 of the Sandur Manganese case. This reliance is not germane for the following reasons : 8.7.1. Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 were not discussed in Paragraph 44 but were analyzed comprehensively in the paragraphs aforesaid. In para 44, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has essentially held that the requirement of captive consumption which was read into Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 in the TISCO (SC) case cannot be made a criterion for the initial grant of mining leases for which specific criteria have been laid down in Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. It was in this context, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew a distinction between the two cases. This distinction is not relevant in the present proceedings. 8.7.2. It was in this context, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew a distinction between the two cases. This distinction is not relevant in the present proceedings. 8.7.2. This does not detract from the principles laid down in Rules 59 and 60 of the MC Rules, 1960 which have also been upheld inter-alia in the case of Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v. Union Government of India (1976) 4 SCC 108 (para 7 at Pg.111) (relied on in Sandur Manganese at Para 65) and Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. another v. Union of India and others., AIR 1992 ORI 61 . (Para 6 at Pg.66). These principles are as applicable to Section 8(3) as they are to Section 11(4) of the MMDR Act, 1957. 8.8. It is clear that the petitioners can get relief or be denied relief only on the basis of the law prevailing on the date of filing of the present writ petition. It is undeniable that as on date, the mandate of Sandur Manganese holds the field. No amount of reference to the earlier TISCO proceedings can alter that indisputable fact. 8.9. Paragaphs 81-82 of Sandur Manganese (Pg. 36-37) are no less important. The Hon’ble Court has emphasized that the MMDR Act, 1957 and MC Rules, 1960 constitute a self-contained autonomous complete code and that where “the field of granting mining leases is covered by express statute and rules and the grants must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and no other consideration.” 19.In support of the aforesaid submission, Dr. Singhvi placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Steel Authority India Ltd. v. M/s. Electro Steel Castings Ltd. (LPA 741/2010), (the “SAIL” case) where the Hon’ble Delhi High Court after elaborately discussing the case of the TISCO (SC) came to hold that an application such as that of the petitioner in the present case would be premature under Rule-60 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (para-15) and it is submitted that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court distinguish the TISCO (SC) case correctly and noted that it was a case of relaxation under Rule 59(2) of the M.C. Rules, 1960 (para-14) and further came to hold that when a party whose application was pre-mature could not be considered as perspective applicant and, therefore, had no locus standi when the renewal application of lessee who was being considered under Section 8(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 (para-18). 20.Dr. Singhvi fairly submitted that although the said judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has been appealed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Special Leave Petition(C) No.24130 of 2012, no interim direction had been passed therein till date. In support of the aforesaid submission, it is further submitted that if a subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India explaining an earlier bench is placed before any High Court in India, the later is bound to follow the subsequent decision which interprets the decisions of the earlier bench. The reliance has been placed in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-III v. M/s. Oberio Hotels (P) Ltd. (2011) 334 ITR 293) and in this connection it is submitted that if the case of Sandur Manganese (supra) has interpreted TISCO (SC) case in a particular manner, this Court would be bound by such interpretation and since the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has correctly followed the aforesaid principles in the SAIL case, it is submitted that the similar approach should be adopted by this Court in the present circumstances. 21.Dr. Singhvi further submitted that the reliance placed on the principle of natural justice is wholly erroneous and by law stands excluded due to the following reasons : “9. THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE STAND EXCLUDED : 9.1. The principles of natural justice may be excluded in cases which do not involve a deprivation of rights. 9.1.1. 21.Dr. Singhvi further submitted that the reliance placed on the principle of natural justice is wholly erroneous and by law stands excluded due to the following reasons : “9. THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE STAND EXCLUDED : 9.1. The principles of natural justice may be excluded in cases which do not involve a deprivation of rights. 9.1.1. The rule of audi alterm partem is not attracted unless a deprivation of rights can be shown .For instance, there is an exclusion of rules of natural justice where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity of hearing, such as in the case of a mere license or a privilege. (Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Co., (1984) 3 SCC 258 , Para 38-39) 9.1.2. In the present case, the petitioner cannot argue that it has been deprived of any right, especially in view of the admitted position that it is a premature applicant under Rule 60 of the MC Rules, 1960. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that there has been a violation of natural justice. 9.2. The principles of natural justice may be excluded in a statute by necessary implication. (Rash Lal Yadav (Dr) v. State of Bihar, (1994) 5 SCC 267 , Para 9) 9.2.1. In the present case, a joint reading of Rules 26, 59 to 60 of the MC Rules, 1960, makes it clear that no opportunity of hearing for an ‘objector’ is contemplated when renewal applications are considered under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. Rule 26 permits a limited right of hearing for an applicant only in the event that its renewal application is proposed to be rejected. Further, Rules, 59 and 60 specifically provide that applications which are not made pursuant to a notification under Rule 59(1) or made pursuant to a relaxation granted under Rule 59(2) would be premature and would not be entertained. Thus, the scheme of the MCR, 1960 has excluded the principles of natural justice by necessary implication. 9.2.2. It would be wholly incorrect to interpret the MMDR Act, 1957 or the MC Rules, 1960 to give a right of hearing to an objector but not to the applicant itself when a renewal application is considered under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. 9.2.2. It would be wholly incorrect to interpret the MMDR Act, 1957 or the MC Rules, 1960 to give a right of hearing to an objector but not to the applicant itself when a renewal application is considered under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. Only once the third renewal of the mining lease of opposite party No.2 has been refused, that too after an opportunity of hearing has been given, can applications of other aspiring parties be entertained. 9.3. The cases cited by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner to substantiate the proposition that the principles of natural justice would be attracted in the present case cannot be relied on. 9.3.1. Reliance on the cases of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others (1980) 4 SCC 379 , South Keheri and others v. Ram Sanehi Singh (1971) 3 SCC 864 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248 is misplaced as all the aforementioned cases are cases in which there has been a deprivation of rights. This is not the case of the petitioner who is not even recognized as an applicant under the MMDR Act, 1957. 9.3.2. Reliance on the case of A.K. Karipak and others v. Union of India and others (1969) 2 SCC 262 is not correct as that case is relevant only to the extent that the principles of natural justice would be attracted in Administrative proceedings. However, firstly, this case laid down the now well established principle that no man can be a judge in his own case. This principle is not relevant in the present case. Secondly, the applicability of the principles of natural justice would depend on the context and statute in question, and would certainly not be applicable in the present case especially since the petitioner has no locus standi. 9.3.3. Relied on the Division Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in Dr. Sarojini Pradhan v. Union of India, AIR 1988 Orissa 96 is inapposite and that judgment is completely distinguishable. 9.3.3.1. Firstly, that case involved Section 5(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 with regard to its earlier version prior to its amendment on 18.12.99. Section 5(2) as it then stood is reproduced in Paragraph 6 of the decision. It is clear that Section 5(2), as it then stood, involved a dichotomy since the previous approval then contemplated was that of the Central Government. Section 5(2) as it then stood is reproduced in Paragraph 6 of the decision. It is clear that Section 5(2), as it then stood, involved a dichotomy since the previous approval then contemplated was that of the Central Government. This has been subsequently fused by the amendment of Section 5(2) w.e.f. 18.12.99 substituting the State Government in place of the Central Government. Therefore, the power under Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 and under Section 5 of the MMDR Act, 1957, post 1999 stands aligned and fused by vesting it in the State Government. 9.3.3.2. Secondly, and more importantly, Rule 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 has itself undergone a change w.e.f. 13.4.1988 whereby an opportunity of hearing has been added. Rule 26(1) as it stood prior to 13.4.1988 read as follows : “The State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to grant or renew a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for [No.1 (22)/63-MII, dated 18.07.63].” 9.3.3.3. Thirdly, in this context, assuming without conceding, that the principles of natural justice may be read into the provisions as the field is not occupied and some gaps/silences are premised, that situation does not exist today. In any event w.e.f. 1988 and 1999 in respect of Rules 26 of the MC Rules, 1960 and Section 5(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 respectively have been amended/altered. Consequently, the decision in Dr. Sarojini Pradhan is completely distinguishable and inapplicable since the bedrock of statutory law, on the basis of which the interpretation and decision in that case is arrived at, stands completely altered.” 22.In conclusion, Dr. Singhvi, learned Sr. Advocate for the TATAS submitted that if a right of hearing is actually granted to all objectors, it would virtually make various express provisions of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 and M.C. Rules, 1960 otiose and further a situation of complete chaos would ensue at the time of second or subsequent renewals of all mining leases. It would cosiderably worsen the delay in proceeding and make it completely unworkable which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has sought to curb by its judgment in the case of Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590 and, therefore, prays for dismissal of the writ application. REJOINDER ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF IMFA BY MR. P.C. CHIDAMBARAM (SENIOR ADVOCATE) 23.Mr. P.C. Chidambaram learned Sr. REJOINDER ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF IMFA BY MR. P.C. CHIDAMBARAM (SENIOR ADVOCATE) 23.Mr. P.C. Chidambaram learned Sr. Advocate in rejoinder argument advanced before this Court while reiterating his original submissions submitted as follows : “The right to be heard on the renewal application of TISCO was not upheld by the High Court on the basis of any “concession” made on behalf of the Central Government.” It is submitted that the contention of the Central Government in its counter affidavit has been noted in para-55 of the TISCO (HC) judgment and the same does not record any concession. It merely records the statement of the counsel for the State Government that “if this Court by appreciating all the facts and circumstances, all the relevant factors, exigencies of the situation, directs the Central Government to reconsider the entire matter afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties”, the Central Government would have no objection to that. This cannot be termed as a concession since the Central Government was in essence communicating to the High Court that it would obey the orders of this Court. It is further submitted that Para-90 of the TISCO (HC) judgment would indicate that the aforesaid submission of the Central Government was made in the background of the further submission on behalf of the Central Government that “The Central Government has no obligation to invite other intending parties besides the writ petitioners in the case at the time of disposal of application for a subsequent renewal of the lease at the instance of TISCO”. It is submitted that this finding also clearly rules out any concession. Therefore, TISCO (HC) has indicated its view before the Central Government should consider afresh and the counsel for the Central Government submitted that the Central Government would have no objection to consider afresh and this cannot be treated as a concession keeping in view the fact that the earlier decision of the Central Government dated 3rd June, 1993 and 5th October, 1993 are set aside. Hence what was decided in this Para was whether a hearing by the Central Government on the question of renewal after quashing the earlier order and at the time of taking a decision on the application for renewal. 24.Mr. Hence what was decided in this Para was whether a hearing by the Central Government on the question of renewal after quashing the earlier order and at the time of taking a decision on the application for renewal. 24.Mr. P. Chidambaram further submitted that the issue of locus standi of the petitioner to maintain a writ petition for certiorari and the locus standi of the petitioner to be heard while the Government considered the application for renewal are two distinct and different matters. These issues were posed as issue No.V & VI before the High Court and answers to which can be found in the judgment of TISCO (HC) para-30. Both the questions were answered in favour of the petitioner by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The order of the High Court was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this behalf reliance was placed on para-48 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC) which reads as under : “We, therefore hold that both the High Court and the Committee were justified in hearing perspective applicants while considering the issue of renewal of TISCO’s lease”. Hearing by this Court was on the maintainability of the writ petition which raises the issue of right to be heard while considering TISCO’s renewal. Hearing by the committee was on the application for renewal. Thus both the questions were answered in favour of the petitioner. 25.Mr. P. Chidambaram further submitted that the reliance placed by the TATAS on the later judgment in the case of Sandur Manganese (supra) is wholly erroneous. A decision is the authority only for the issue that was raised and decided. Reliance placed in the case of Girinar Traders v. State of Maharashtra and others., (2007) 7 SCC 555 . In this respect the following submissions were advanced : “A. decision is authority only for the issue that was raised and decided. Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra and others., (2007) 7 SCC 555 (Para 45-53) Shin-Eisu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another. - (2005) 7 SCC 234 (Para 69) The judgment of Supreme Court in the Sandur case - 2010 (13) SCC 1 has no bearing on the present case for the following reasons. 1. Sandur concerns a case u/s. 11 of the Act read with Rules 59 and 60. The present case arises U/s.8(3) of the MMDR Act. 2. - (2005) 7 SCC 234 (Para 69) The judgment of Supreme Court in the Sandur case - 2010 (13) SCC 1 has no bearing on the present case for the following reasons. 1. Sandur concerns a case u/s. 11 of the Act read with Rules 59 and 60. The present case arises U/s.8(3) of the MMDR Act. 2. In Sandur, the Court was attempting to interpret and reconcile Sec.11(2) and Sec. 11(4) of the MMDR Act. No such question arises in the present case. 3. The facts and issues that arose in the Sandur case were totally different and do not have any resemblance to the facts and issues in the present case. 4. The central issue in the present case is whether the petitioner and others should be given an opportunity of being heard while the third renewal application of O.P. No.2 is considered by the competent authority. Such an issue did not arise in the Sandur case. 5. O.P. No.2 contended that “If a later bench of the Supreme Court interprets the judgment of an earlier bench of the Supreme Court, the interpretation given by the later bench will bind the High Court and the High Court is bound to follow the interpretation given by the later bench”. This proposition is relevant if and only if : (i)the earlier bench of the Supreme Court and the later bench of Supreme Court were considering the same question of law; and (ii)the later bench interpreted the decision on that question of law given by the earlier bench; and (iii)The conclusion of the later bench was the ratio decidendi of the case and not merely obiter dicta. In the Sandur case, the Court was concerned with interpreting Section 11 of the MMDR Act and Rules 59 and 60 of the MCR Rules, 1960. When one of the parties referred to the TISCO case and sought to apply the ratio of the TISCO case, the Supreme Court interpreted the judgment in the TISCO case and held that it was not attracted to the facts of Sandur. As stated earlier, the TISCO case was concerned with Sec. 8(3) of the MMDR Act whereas the Sandur case was concerned with Section 11 of the Act read with Rules 59 and 60 of the MCR Rules. As stated earlier, the TISCO case was concerned with Sec. 8(3) of the MMDR Act whereas the Sandur case was concerned with Section 11 of the Act read with Rules 59 and 60 of the MCR Rules. Hence, the reference in the Sandur case to the TISCO case and the observations made by the later bench of the judgment in the TISCO case do not constitute the ratio decidendi of Sandur. Hence, observations in Sandur are not binding on the Court in this case. On the contrary, the High Court in the present case is bound by the decision in the TISCO case which directly dealt with Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act and between the same parties. 26.Mr. Chidambaram further submitted that contentions of TATAS and reliance placed by them on Rule-26 of the M.C. Rules to the effect that no other parties entitled to be heard is untenable due to the following reasons : “The contention of O.P. No.2 that in the light of Rule 26 no other party is entitled to be heard is untenable. The submission made by O.P. No.2 that in view of Rule 26 of the MCR Rules, no other provision of the Act or Rules could be interpreted to require grant of a hearing to the affected parties such as the petitioners is erroneous. The fact that Rule 26 of the MCR Rules provide for hearing to the applicant in a renewal application cannot control the intepretation of the provisions of the Act. Moreover, the High Court and the Supreme Court took the view that the petitioners were entitled to be heard while considering the application for renewal, though the statute did not specifically provide for such a hearing. The express mention of the right to be heard in Rule 26 and the absence of a similar provision in Section 8, does not rule out a hearing at the stage of taking a decision to renew the lease to renew the lease u/s. 8(3) of the Act. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others - (1980) 4 SCC 379 @ para 10)” 27.Mr. Chidambaram further submitted that Dr. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others - (1980) 4 SCC 379 @ para 10)” 27.Mr. Chidambaram further submitted that Dr. Singhvi’s argument on behalf of TATAS that natural justice cannot be applicable in the present fact scenario of the case is wholly erroneous since principles of fair play, natural justice will be attracted while interpreting specific provisions of law and the same would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the law. In this respect the following submissions were advanced : “Whether principles of fair play and natural justice will be attracted while interpreting specific provision of a law will depend on facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the law. It is on the basis of the appreciation of the facts and circumstances concerning grant of mining leases in respect of chromite ore in Odisha that the High Court and Supreme Court held in the TISCO case that Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act would require that the proper parties who have a contingent interest, who are likely to be affected by any decision of the Competent Authority (State Government), and who legitimately have a stake in proper formulation of a vital policy must be heard by the Competent Authority. None of the decisions cited by O.P. No.2 would detract from the above proposition. Dr. Sarojini Pradhan v. Union of India and another : AIR 1988 Orissa 96 (Para 7) (DB) Baldev Singh and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others : (1987) 2 SCC 510 paras 4 and 5 A.K. Kraipak and others v. UOI and others : (1969) 2 SCC 262 Para 20. Followed in; The D.F.O., South Kheri and others v. Ram Sanehi Singh : (1971) 3 SCC 864 Msr. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another : (1978) 1 SCC 248 . The submission of O.P. No.2 that there would be a chaotic situation if persons are heard by the Competent Authority while considering a renewal application has no justification either in law or on facts. In 1995, the Sharma Committee heard the petitioner and others and gave its report within 3 months of its constitution. Following the report, the Central Government passed the order on the very next day. In 1995, the Sharma Committee heard the petitioner and others and gave its report within 3 months of its constitution. Following the report, the Central Government passed the order on the very next day. Similarly, in the present case, the Competent Authority i.e. State Government can, after giving an opportunity of hearing to O.P. No.2, the petitioner and others within a stipulated period of time, pass orders under Section 8(3) well before the dead line of 16.11.2014. There is no reason to apprehend that there will be chaos or confusion.” 28.Insofar as the preliminary objection of TATA’s is concerned, Mr. Chidambaram has stated that the said objection is without any basis either in law or on facts and advanced the following submissions : “The preliminary objection raised by O.P. No.2 is without any basis either in law or on facts. The petitioner has placed before this Hon’ble Court the list of dates and events concerning the TWP. It would be seen from that statement that the issue concerning TWP came to an end on 16.05.2014 when the Supreme Court passed its order in the Common Cause case. Consequently, IA No.3763 filed by O.P. No.2 came to an end (as admitted by the counsel of O.P. No.2 at the hearing on 27.08.2014). If IA No.3763 is no longer alive, then IA 3784 for intervening in IA No.3763 is also not alive. Both IAs came to an end on 16.5.2014. The Writ Petition (C) No.10508 of 2014 was filed on 06.06.2014 and a copy of the order of the Supreme Court dated 16.05.2014 was annexed as Annexure-9 to the Writ Petition. The most important fact/document, namely, the order of the Supreme Court dated 16.05.2014 was placed before this Hon’ble Court. Hence, there is no merit in the submission that the petitioner suppressed any material fact which may have a bearing on the adjudication of the issues in the present Writ Petition. SJS Business Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others (2004) 7 SCC 166 @ para 13, 14 and 15. Hence, there is no merit in the submission that the petitioner suppressed any material fact which may have a bearing on the adjudication of the issues in the present Writ Petition. SJS Business Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others (2004) 7 SCC 166 @ para 13, 14 and 15. 29.Insofar as the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Steel Authority India Ltd. v. M/s. Electro Steel Castings Ltd. (LPA 741/2010) relied upon by the TATA is concerned, it is submitted that the said judgment is per incuriam for the following reasons : “The judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in M/s. Steel Authority India Ltd. v. M/s. Electro Steel Castings Ltd. is per incuriam The observation made by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in para 14 of its judgment, is based on a manifest error and mis-appreciation of the facts in the TISCO case. The Delhi High Court’s observations are based on the assumption that the description of the petitioners as “prospective applicants” and their right to be heard was because of the order passed by the Central Government under Rule 59(2). This is a manifest error. The sequence of events was as follows : 1. When the order of this Hon’ble Court dated 04.04.1995 was passed, granting the writ petitioners an opportunity of being heard during consideration of TISCO’s application for renewal of lease, there was no order under Rule 59(2). 2. When the parties i.e. the writ petitioners and TISCO were heard by the Sharma Committee during May-July 2005, there was no order under Rule 59(2). 3. There was no order under Rule 59(2) when the Sharma Committee gave its recommendation dated 16.08.1995, recommending renewal of only 406 ha in favour of TISCO. 4. The Central Government passed its order dated 17.08.1995 accepting the Sharma Committee Report and renewing an area of only 406 ha in favour of TISCO. Thereafter, by the same order, a relaxation under Rule 59(2) was given by the Central Government in order to expedite the process of taking action on mining lease applications of the other parties/writ petitioners over the remaining area. At this point of time, the writ petitioners had already been heard. 5. Thereafter, by the same order, a relaxation under Rule 59(2) was given by the Central Government in order to expedite the process of taking action on mining lease applications of the other parties/writ petitioners over the remaining area. At this point of time, the writ petitioners had already been heard. 5. The exercise of power by the Central Government under Rule 59(2) on 17.08.1995 was long after the hearing given to the parties/writ petitioners by the Sharma Committee (Central Government).” 30.In conclusion Mr. Chidambaram submitted that certain ground raised in the present writ petition by the TATAS are not available to it on the ground of constructive res-judicata since such ground were available to it when it had appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgments of this Court TISCO (HC) dated 04.04.1995 and since these grounds were not raised in the SLP or argued before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, these grounds cannot be raised while opposing the present writ petition. The following grounds are quoted hereunder : “The following grounds raised by O.P. No.2 before this Hon’ble Court are not available to O.P. No.2 on the ground of constructive res-judicata. These grounds were available to O.P. No.2 when it appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 04.04.1995. But these grounds were not raised in the SLP or argued before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, these grounds cannot be raised while opposing the present writ petition. 1. That the provision for hearing under Rule 26 excludes a right to be heard under other provisions of the MMDR Act and the MCR Rules such as Section 8(3) of the Act. 2. That the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 04.04.1995 in the TISCO case was based on a ‘concession’ made by counsel for the Central Government and hence the earlier judgment did not lay down any principle of law. Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and others : AIR 1953 SC 65 @ para 22.” 31.In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel representing the respective parties, the following issues arise for consideration. 1. Whether the petitioner (IMFA) is guilty of suppression of material facts and consequences thereof; 2. Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and others : AIR 1953 SC 65 @ para 22.” 31.In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel representing the respective parties, the following issues arise for consideration. 1. Whether the petitioner (IMFA) is guilty of suppression of material facts and consequences thereof; 2. Whether the principles of res-judicata would be attracted to the pleas raised in the present case in view of the judgment of the High Court in TISCO (HC) and affirmation thereof by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC); 3. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sandur Manganese (explaining earlier TISCO (SC) shall apply to the facts and situations of the present case. FINDINGS ISSUE NO.1- Whether the petitioner (IMFA) is guilty of suppression of material facts and consequences thereof. 32.Insofar as the preliminary objection raised by TATAS is concerned, it is alleged by them that the petitioner has concealed from this Hon’ble Court the fact that it had moved an Intervention Application I.A. No.3784 in an application filed by TATAS before the Hon’ble Supreme Court while seeking extension of the Temporary Working Permission i.e. I.A. 3763 in I.A. No.3561-3562 of 2013 in Writ Petition (C) No.202 of 1995. The submissions made by the learned counsel for opposite party-TATAS as well as the rejoinder arguments on behalf of the petitioner has been noted hereinabove. While having taken note of the preliminary objections as well as response made by the petitioner, it is clear that the application for TATAS for issue of TWP effectively ended with the passing of the order dated 16.05.2014 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause. Therefore, since the application of TATAS for TWP cannot be said to be pending, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court has finally disposed of the case of Common Cause, no question of grant of TWP to the TATAS can arise in the fact and situations of the case, consequently any intervention application at the behest of the writ petitioner also can no longer be said to survive. Although no final order appears to have been passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, either on the application of TATAS for issue of TWP or on the intervention application, yet, in effect by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 16.05.2014, we are of the considered view that the said application become infructuous and since the present writ application was filed by IMFA on 06.06.2014, we find that the petitioners are not guilty of suppression of any material facts, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner appended a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 16.05.2014 as Annexure-9 to the writ application itself. Consequently, we find no merit in the preliminary objection and the same stands rejected. ISSUE NO.-2 Whether the principles of res-judicata would be attracted to the pleas raised in the present case in view of the judgment of the High Court in TISCO (HC) and affirmation thereof by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC). 33.The plea of res-judicata and reliance placed upon TISCO (HC) and TISCO (SC) is at the behest of the petitioner. It is submitted on behalf of the IMFA that certain grounds raised in the present writ application by the TATAS in their counter affidavit are not available to it on the ground of “constructive res-judicata” since such a ground was available to it when it had appealed to the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court in TISCO (HC) dated 04.04.1995 and since these grounds were not raised in the S.L.P. nor argued before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, these grounds cannot be raised while opposing the present writ petition. The specific ground against which the objections of constructive res-judicata are taken to (a) the averment that the provisions for hearing under Rule 26 excluded the right to be heard under other provisions of the MMDR Act an MC Rules such as Section 8(3) of the Act; (b) the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in TISCO (HC) dated 04.04.1995 was based on a concession made by the counsel for the Central Government and hence the earlier judgment did not lay down any principle of law. This contention on behalf of the petitioner is responded to by Dr. This contention on behalf of the petitioner is responded to by Dr. Singhvi on behalf of the TATAS by pleading that the said principle would have no application since admittedly the writ petitioners have filed the present writ petition on a purpoted “fresh cause of action” and seeking “fresh relief” in a “fresh context of facts and circumstances”. Consequently, no plea of constructive res-judicata against any objection raised by the opposite parties to their stands and/or contentions ought to be entertained. It is further submitted on behalf of the TATAS that “neither the res” (i.e. the issue) arising in TISCO (SC) case is the same as in the present case and nor has it been any judicata “i.e. law laid down” in TISCO (SC) so as to bar the opposite parties from raising their contentions in opposition to the prayer made by the petitioner. It is further submitted that TISCO (HC), the Hon’ble High Court gave a judgment “based on a concession” and hence no law can be set to have been laid down in TISCO (SC) case which are affirmed the TISCO (HC) judgment. 34.On perusal of the TISCO (HC) judgment, the fundamental facts that emerge therefrom are that while TISCO had sought for second renewal of its lease over 1261 Hectares and the State Government had recommended its case and the Central Government had affirmed the said recommendation by issuing its approval under cover of its letter dated 03.06.1993 for the entire area. But for various other reasons, the Central Government by a subsequent communication dated 05.10.1993 reviewed its earlier decision and approved renewal for reduced area of 651 Hectares. Challenging the alleged reduction directed by the Central Government, TISCO had approached the High Court and IMFA and others had also approached the High Court seeking to challenge both the orders of the Central Government i.e. 03.06.1993 as well as 05.10.1993. The resultant judgment of the Hon’ble High Court was in the aforesaid backdrop of event. What is the most important to note herein is that IMFA, Jindal and other petitioners in the earlier round filed writ petition before the High Court, at a time when the Central Government had reviewed its earlier decision of granting second renewal over 1261 Hectares and had reduced its approval to an area of 651 Hectares. Obviously at such a stage two alternative scenarios emerged. Obviously at such a stage two alternative scenarios emerged. The first, being that an area i.e. 1261-651 =610 Hectares had become available for grant (although no notification as required under Rule 59 had been issued). Consequently, other interested parties, other than TATAS were vitally interested to ensure that the order of reduction, though challenge by the TATAS ought to be sustained. Second scenario, would be that the TATAS may succeed in the writ petition and if the order of reduction of area was set aside by the High Court, then no surplus area would be available for grant. 35.It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop of the matter that the High Court entertained the writ petitions on behalf of TATAS as well as writ petitions on behalf of the IMFA, Jindal and others. It is also relevant to note herein that IMFA had also sought to challenge the order dated 03.06.1993 passed by the Central Government granting its approval for second renewal of the entire 1261 Hectares. 36.In the aforesaid factual backdrop, it is clear that a window of opportunity had been thrown open by the fact that the Central Government had reviewed its original order dated 03.06.1993 vide its order dated 05.10.1993 and in either of the scenarios as narrated hereinabove intending prospective applicants could be said to be vitally interested. We have narrated the aforesaid factual backdrop of the case in order to conclude that in the present factual backdrop of the case no similar situation as was faced by the High Court earlier exists. At the present juncture, only the TATAS 3rd renewal application is pending consideration by the State Government. On further perusal of the TISCO (HC) judgment, para-88 of the said judgment would be most relevant and quoted hereunder : “88. Regarding locus standi of the other writ petitioners, we are also of the view that in fact they are standing on the fence. Mr. Kapil Sibal expressed his anxiety more than once that in TISCO’s applications, other writ petitioners may not get reliefs. This apprehension is obviously without jurisdiction. Their interest is of contingent nature. Regarding locus standi of the other writ petitioners, we are also of the view that in fact they are standing on the fence. Mr. Kapil Sibal expressed his anxiety more than once that in TISCO’s applications, other writ petitioners may not get reliefs. This apprehension is obviously without jurisdiction. Their interest is of contingent nature. In the event the Central Government does not find, it prudent to authorise subsequent renewal of lease, the area eventually will be available and the State will have to take such steps for making necessary advertisement and inviting prospecting applicants for grant of mining lease and other writ petitioners may thus have fair chances. Although it is settled point of law that they cannot insist for a right of hearing while the Central Government takes a decision in order to form an opinion as envisaged under Section 8(3) of the Act, yet due to the decision, already taken by the Central Government, all other writ petitioners and also TISCO are seriously aggrieved. Though TISCO is aggrieved against a part of the order, the other petitioners are aggrieved so far as both the orders of 3rd June, 1993 and 5th October, 1993 are concerned.” 37.A further issue that is to be determined in this case is as to whether the judgment of the TISCO (HC) proceeded on the basis of a “concession” offered by the learned counsel appearing for the Central Government. In this respect, reference made to para-55 and para-90 of the TISCO (HC) judgment, which is as follows : “55. Mr. Patnaik has also very candidly submitted before this Court that the Central Government has no objection if this Court by appreciating all the facts and circumstances, all the relevant factors, exigencies of the situation, directs the Central Government to reconsider the entire matter afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties and to take an appropriate decision within the scheme, framework and scope of the M.M. (R. & D.) Act and the connected Rules for national, interest, public interest and in the interest of mineral development. With proper instructions he submitted that the Central Government has no objection to consider the matter again and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. 90. As we are of the view that the Central Government should consider afresh and Mr. With proper instructions he submitted that the Central Government has no objection to consider the matter again and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. 90. As we are of the view that the Central Government should consider afresh and Mr. B.M. Patnaik has submitted that the Central Government has no objection to consider afresh, there is no bar and/or impediment, if the Central Government considers the proposal of subsequent renewal of lease of TISCO by giving it opportunity of hearing which may be effected in presence of the other petitioners who have come to this Court. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Central Government has no obligation to invite other intending parties besides the writ petitioners in the case at the time of disposal of the application for a subsequent renewal of the lease at the instance of, TISCO, this Court finds that by the ultimate result other writ petitioners are consequently to be affected by renewal, part renewal or refusal of the lease in favour of TISCO. They may be heard by way of fair-play and in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and to enable them to place on record such necessary facts for essential consideration by the Central Government. It is made very much clear that only in the event of availability of the area occupied by TISCO, State Government will consider their prospective applications in accordance with law.” On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid paragraphs as well as the tenure of the judgment, we are of the considered view that the judgment in TISCO (HC) was clearly based upon the submission made on behalf of the Central Government before the High Court to the effect that the “Central Government had no objection to affording an opportunity of hearing to TISCO as well as other petitioners” who have come to this Court and further very importantly it was submitted on behalf of the Central Government that “Central Government has no obligation to invite other intending parties beside the writ petitioners”. In other words, not only was a concession given by the Central Government counsel on behalf of the Central Government to afford an opportunity of hearing to TISCO and other writ petitioners but it categorically sought for limiting the scope of hearing only to the writ petitioners and not to any other party. In other words, not only was a concession given by the Central Government counsel on behalf of the Central Government to afford an opportunity of hearing to TISCO and other writ petitioners but it categorically sought for limiting the scope of hearing only to the writ petitioners and not to any other party. Our view finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC) wherein para-19 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has quoted from para-90 of the High Court judgment. In view of the aforesaid findings, we are of the considered view that the decision of TISCO (HC) was based on a concession granted by the Central Government through its counsel. 38.At this stage, it would be appropriate to take note of the contention raised by TATAS by placing reliance on a later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese and, in particular, the finding at para-68 quoted hereinbelow :- “68. The decision relied on by the learned senior counsel for Jindal in TISCO (supra), (paras 42, 44 and 47), that applications made by certain parties were considered after a relaxation under Rule 59(2) cannot be taken as laying down any law. It is also seen that consideration of the applications made by various parties in the TISCO’s case was pursuant to the directions issued by this Court and not independently by the State Government under Section 11 of the Act. As a matter of fact, the issue whether premature applications revived for consideration after the relaxation under Rule 59(2) was neither expressly raised nor decided in the TISCO’s case. In the light of the above discussion about Section 11(2) alongwith Rules 59 and 60, it should be interpreted that Section 11(2) is to cover virgin areas alone. As a matter of fact, the issue whether premature applications revived for consideration after the relaxation under Rule 59(2) was neither expressly raised nor decided in the TISCO’s case. In the light of the above discussion about Section 11(2) alongwith Rules 59 and 60, it should be interpreted that Section 11(2) is to cover virgin areas alone. In view of the same, the Jindal’s application made prior to the Notification cannot be entertained along with the applications made pursuant to the Notification dated 15.03.2003 because it is Section 11(4) which covers the said Notification along with Rule 59(1) and not the first proviso to Section 11(2) as contended by the respondents.” In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court also dealt with the issue as to whether the “criterion of captive consumption” referred to in TISCO case has no application to the present case because it is not one of the factors referred to in Section 11(3) or even in Rule 35. The conclusion of the Hon’ble Apex Court was in paras-77 & 78, which is quoted hereinbelow : “77. As observed in the earlier paragraphs, the strong reliance placed by the respondent-Jindal on the decision of this Court in TISCO’s case (supra) (Paras 9, 15, 20, 25, 27, 34, 54, 56 & 57) is misplaced. This case concerned solely on the interpretation of Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act in the context of a second renewal of a mining lease in favour of TISCO, and not a fresh grant. It is, in this context the phrase “interest on mineral development” in Section 8(3) was interpreted to include captive requirements. On the other hand, the case of fresh grant is covered by Section 11 of the MMDR Act. Paragraph 54 of the TISCO’s case (supra) makes it clear that the case concerned is chromite whose known reserves were not abundant, whereas iron ore is in abundance. Even otherwise, this judgment is of no assistance even on Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules since it was a case of relaxation by the Central Government under Rule 59(2), as is clear from paragraph 15 of the judgment. 78. Even otherwise, this judgment is of no assistance even on Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules since it was a case of relaxation by the Central Government under Rule 59(2), as is clear from paragraph 15 of the judgment. 78. It is useful to mention that subsequent to the decision in TISCO (supra), this Court in Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others., (2006) 12 SCC 331 (Paras 20 & 26) held that considerations of captive mining cannot be the controlling factor for grant of lease.” 39.A further issue which is to be noted from Sandur Manganese is the issue whether factors such as past commitment made by the State Government to the applicants who have already set up steel plants is not a relevant matters for consideration of grant of lease. The Hon’ble Apex Court’s conclusion at paras-80, 81 & 82 are extracted hereinbelow : “80. It is clear that the State Government is purely a delegate of Parliament and a statutory functionary, for the purposes of Section 11(3) of the Act, hence it cannot act in a manner that is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 11(1) of the MMDR Act in the grant of mining leases. Furthermore, Section 2 of the Act clearly states that the regulation of mines and mineral development comes within the purview of the Union Government and not the State Government. As a matter of fact, the respondents have not been able to point out any other provision in the MMDR Act or MC Rules permitting grant of mining lease based on past commitments. As rightly pointed out, the State Government has no authority under the MMDR Act to make commitments to any person that it will, in future, grant a mining lease in the event that the person makes investment in any project. Assuming that the State Government had made any such commitment, it could not be possible for it to take an inconsistent position and proceed to notify a particular area. Further, having notified the area, the State Government certainly could not thereafter to honour an alleged commitment by ousting other applicants even if they are more deserving on the merit criteria as provided in Section 11(3). 81. Further, having notified the area, the State Government certainly could not thereafter to honour an alleged commitment by ousting other applicants even if they are more deserving on the merit criteria as provided in Section 11(3). 81. In the case of State of Assam and others v. Om Prakash Mehta and others., AIR 1973 SC 678 , this Court observed that the MMDR Act and MC Rules contain the complete code in respect of the grant and renewal of prospecting licences as well as mining leases in lands belonging to Government. In Quarry Owners Association (supra), this Court again reaffirmed the notion that both the Central as well as the State Government act as a mere delegates of Parliament while exercising the powers under the Act and Rules. [Vide M.A. Tulloch (supra), Baijnath Kedio (supra), Kesoram’s case (supra), and Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (supra).] From this, it becomes amply clear that the State Government has divested of legislative and executive powers with respect to mines and minerals development. In addition to the same, Anjum M.H. Gaswala (supra), Captain Sube Singh (supra), Singhara Singh’s case (supra), this Court repeatedly held that the field of granting mining leases is covered by express statute and rules and the grants must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules and no other consideration. 82 From a perusal of the above settled legal position, it becomes clear that the State Government cannot grant mining leases keeping in mind any considerations apart from the ones mentioned in the MMDR Act and MC Rules. In those circumstances, no extraneous considerations such as past commitments made by the State Government to Jindal and Kalyani who have already set up steel plants can be entertained by the State Government while granting mining leases and must abide by the Act and Rules.” In Sandur Manganese, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also considered the issues whether the recommendation made in favour of a party can be save by the operation of “law of equity” and the conclusion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-87 is quoted hereunder : “87. With reference to the allegation that MSPL has a mining lease over an area of 722.94 hectares, it was pointed out that inactual it has a lease over an area of 347.22 hectares only. With reference to the allegation that MSPL has a mining lease over an area of 722.94 hectares, it was pointed out that inactual it has a lease over an area of 347.22 hectares only. On 05.06.2009, MSPL filed an affidavit before the Division Bench stating that it holds only a single mining lease granted over five decades ago and the major proportion of which has been afforestated. It is also their grievance that the iron ore reserves in this lease have almost been exhausted over a period of 58 years, since 1952. The remaining iron ore cannot support a steel plant of the size that is being set up by MSPL. Since the entire field of granting mining lease is covered by MMDR Act and MC Rules, the State Government cannot use any consideration apart from the ones mentioned in the Act and Rules.” 40.In the fact situation of the present case, all the petitioners are companies which have set up plants and/or in process of setting up plants on the basis of which they claim that they have huge requirement for chromite ore which they are otherwise having to purchase from the open market at exorbitant cost and though some of the petitioners have leases of chromite ore mines claim that the same is inadequate to meet the need of their factories. In view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sandur Manganese and all the issues enumerated hereinabove, since the criteria of captive consumption and the issue of commitment by the State Government as well as equity have all being rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as grounds for consideration of applications for mining lease and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated in para-87 “since the entire field of granting mining lease is covered by the MMDR Act and the MC Rules, the State Government cannot use any consideration apart from the ones mentioned in the Act and the Rules”. This Court is bound by the aforesaid judgment and consequently the very right of the petitioners to seek any relief in the present writ application since it is based on the aforesaid claims i.e. either for captive consumption or based on past commitment (MOUs) and even on equitable ground, such being debarred from consideration by the State Government, this Court is of the considered view that, the aforesaid judgment is clearly binding and being a later judgment which are explained the earlier TISCO (SC) judgment, we are of the considered view that Sandur Manganese applies to the fact situations of the present case and consequently binds this Court. 41. Although it is argued on behalf of the petitioners (IMFA and others) that the case of Sandur Manganese is distinguishable since in paragraph-68, the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself has made a distinction between TISCO (SC) and Sandur Manganese by stating that in TISCO (SC) applications made by certain parties were considered after a relaxation under Rule 59(2). While the matter was pending before the Hon’ble High Court in TISCO (HC) no relaxation under Rule 59(2) had been made and on the contrary as noted hereinabove TISCO (HC) in para-88 of the judgment came to hold that, the interest of the petitioners was of a “contingent nature” and in the event the Central Government does not find a prudent to authorize subsequent renewal of lease (of the TATAS), the area eventually will be available and the State will have to take such steps for making necessary advertisement and inviting prospective applications for grant of mining lease and (thereafter) other interested parties may thus have a fair chance. The aforesaid observation of the High Court was clearly based on Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules and had, therefore, directed that in the event any area becomes available, an advertisement of such availability was directed. The aforesaid observation of the High Court was clearly based on Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules and had, therefore, directed that in the event any area becomes available, an advertisement of such availability was directed. 42.At this point it would be relevant to also take note of the Sharma Committee Report and, in particular, from page-261 thereof, where the Committee stated as follows : “We have examined their need (petitioner) and their problems of either not having adequate raw material source or economical prices not for the purpose of distributing leases, but as we find that the need of the manufacturing industries is an essential consideration while determining the question of instant renewal in the light of the factors outlined by the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in their judgment dated 04.04.1995”. In other words, the S.D. Sharma Committee which was constituted on the direction of the Hon’ble High Court was clearly of the views that though opportunity of hearing was afforded to other parties (present petitioners) other than TISCO to put forward their problems, the said exercise was carried out by the Committee “not for the purpose of distributing leases”. The Central Government while accepting the Sharma Committee Report under cover of its letter dated 07.08.1995 under Annexure-8 affirming the further reduction of the area for renewal of TISCO to 406 Hectares, came to direct as follows : (Relevant extract) “17. (ii) xxx xxx xxx Since the other 4 (four) parties are in dire necessity of the raw material (chrome ore) as observed by the Hon’ble High Court and have set up mineral based industries and are suffering for want of chrome ore, the Central Government, in conformity with the observation of Hon’ble High Court and have set up mineral based industries and are suffering for want of chrome ore, the Central Government, in conformity with the observation of Hon’ble Orissa High Court (in para 96 of its judgment dated 4.4.1995), and in exercise of powers conferred by sub-rule (2) of Rule 59 hereby relaxes the provisions of sub-rule (1) of the said Rule 59 with the objective of expediting the process for making available the raw material which is chrome ore, to the needy industries in the interest of mineral development. xxx xxx xxx.” No doubt, the aforesaid committee report has come to be accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC), but the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of these facts in TISCO (SC) at para-13 as follows : “13. By its impugned order dated 4.4.1995 the High Court of Orissa struck down the renewal of TISCO’s lease granted by the Central Government through its decisions dated 3.6.1993 and 5.10.1993. Thereafter, it directed the Central Government to reconsider TISCO’s application for renewal of the lease in accordance with law; the Central Government was also directed to give a personal hearing to, and consider the applications of the other parties before the Court.” It would be material to mention herein that in TISCO (HC) no direction had been issued by the High Court to the Central Government to consider any application of any of the petitioners apart from the renewal application of the TISCO. Obviously taking the mandate of Rule 59(1) of the MC Rules into account the Hon’ble High Court in para-88 had noted that in the event the Central Government does not find it prudent to authorize subsequent renewal of lease the area eventually will be available and the State will have to take such steps for making necessary advertisement and inviting prospective applicants for grant of mining lease. Apart from that the Hon’ble High Court had also accepted the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the Central Government, that the Central Government while having no objection to consider the renewal application of TISCO along with the writ petitioners, the Central Government would have no obligation to invite other parties other than the writ petitioners at the time of disposal of TISCO’s renewal application. This aforesaid request was also acceded to by the High Court, obviously keeping in view the fact that in the event any land became available the same would have to be dealt with by way of issuing the necessary notification under Rule 59(1). This aforesaid request was also acceded to by the High Court, obviously keeping in view the fact that in the event any land became available the same would have to be dealt with by way of issuing the necessary notification under Rule 59(1). Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid factual backdrop while the Central Government choose to exercise its power under Rule 59(2) in favour of the writ petitioners and claimed to have done so “in conformity with the observation of the Hon’ble High Court”, the same was clearly not in consonance with the direction of the High Court nor in consonance with the requirement of Rule 59(1) and most importantly without there ever being any request or recommendation by the State Government to the Central Government for relaxation under Rule 59(2) in favour of any party. 43.In the light of the aforesaid situation that has arisen in the present case, while the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterating, time and again that both the Central Government as well as State Government act as mere delegates of Parliament while exercising power under the Acts and the Rules what become very relevant for consideration in the present case is the circumstances under which the power under Rule 59(2) of relaxation can be exercised. In this respect, it would be beneficial to quote para-82 in Sandur Manganese. The aforesaid observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are clearly reiteration of principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court right from M.A. Tulloch, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1284 onwards and equally importantly for the purpose of the scope of relaxation under Rule 59(2) in Sandur Manganese, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para-90 as stated as follows : “90. The Division Bench has also accepted Jindal’s contention that if Rule 60 is interpreted to render applications made prior to Rule 59 (1) Notification non est, in that event, it would make Rule 59(2) unworkable because persons will normally apply mining lease areas along with an application for relaxation under Rule 59(2). In view of our earlier reasons, this conclusion is clearly misplaced. It is only the request under Rule 59(2) for relaxation in respect of an area that is considered and not the application for grant. In view of our earlier reasons, this conclusion is clearly misplaced. It is only the request under Rule 59(2) for relaxation in respect of an area that is considered and not the application for grant. It is only after the relaxation under Rule 59(2) by the Central Government of the requirement of the Notification under Rule 59(1) that the applications could be considered for grant of mining lease.” On a reading of the aforesaid paragraph-90, it would be clear that for power under Rule 59(2) to be utilized for relaxation, it would require a request for relaxation in respect of an area and not an application for grant. It is only after such request is made by the State Government that the Central Government may pass an order of relaxation from the requirements of Rule 59(1) and thereafter an application for grant can only be entertained. For better appreciation, Rule 59(2) of the MC Rules is quoted as hereunder : “59. Availability of area for regrant to be notified-(2) The Central Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, relax the provisions of sub-rule (1) in any special case.” 44.The present writ applications are in essence arise out of the petitioners seeking mining leases for extraction of chrome and the litigation in this respect have been going on for decades. Some of the present petitioners, namely, IMFA and FACOR amongst others appears before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in W.P. No.14116 of 1984 under Article 34 of the Constitution of India which came to be disposed of by order dated 30.4.1987, by which order the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that since there was large number of applications for mining leases over varying extent of land in the area in question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided that the respective merits of the applications could not be gone into and held that the same should be considered by responsible officer of the Central Government and accordingly, based on the directions issued by the Supreme Court, the matter was referred to settle the controversy to the Secretary, Government of India in the Ministry of Mines, Sri B.K. Rao for detail consideration of the claims of various parties. Shorn of unnecessary details, it is suffice to note herein that Sri B.K. Rato Committee considered the inter se merits of the applicants and endorse the State Government decision to grant mining lease to IMFA, FACOR & AIKATH and rejected the claims put forward by others. 45.Thereafter, it appears that IMFA being aggrieved by the inaction of the State Government in not complying with the Rao Committee Report approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in WP No.14116 of 1984 along with the challenges of some others which had not been recommended by Rao Committee and these applications came to be disposed of on 21st September, 1990 reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 1991. 46.The Hon’ble apex Court in the aforesaid judgment confirmed the Rao Committee’s Report in favour of IMFA and FACOR but set aside the portion of the Rao Committee’s Report whereas the other applications of the applicants have been rejected and most importantly, in conclusion, in Para-66 came to direct as follows : “66. In the circumstances, we accept and confirm Rao’s recommendation for grant of MLs to IMFA, FACOR and Aikath, to the extent indicated by him. We set aside his rejection of the claims of OCL and ORIND. We leave it open to all the parties to place their claims, or further claims, as the case may be, in regard to the areas applied for by them on or before April, 30, 1987, backed by supporting reasons, before the S.G. in the form of representations within four weeks from the date of this order. The S.G., we hope, will dispose of these applications within the statutory period failing which the parties will have their remedy under the statute by way of revision to the C.G. In arriving at its decisions, it will be open to the S.G. to take into account the discussions and findings of the Rao report in the light of this judgment. The S.G. should also keep in mind that no leases to any of the parties (other than OMC and IDCOL) can be granted unless either the areas so proposed to be leased out are dereserved and thrown open to applications from the public or unless the C.G., after considering the recommendations of the S.G., for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers a relaxation in favour of any of the parties necessary and justified.” 47.In the circumstances as noted hereinabove, it clearly appears therefrom that while the Rao Committee recommendation in favour of IMFA, FACOR and AIkath were affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the applications of other applicants were directed to be considered by the State Government and the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in arriving at its decision, it will be open to the State Government to take into account the discussions and findings of the Rao Report in the light of the said judgment and further, most importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the State Government should also keep in mind that no leases to any of the parties (other than OMC and IDCOL) can be granted unless either the areas so proposed to be leased out are dereserved and thrown open to applications from the public or unless the Central Government after considering the recommendations of the State Government, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers a relaxation in favour of any of the parties necessary and justified. 48.In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear therefrom that the State Government has no option for considering any application for issue of ML unless the area is thrown upon and applications are sought for from the public in accordance with the MMRD Act as well as the MC Rules The only proviso under Rule 59(2) that where the Central Government may relax the requirement of Rule 59(1). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment categorically indicated the manner in which the Central Government authority under Rule 59(2) can be exercised and the first requirement for exercise of such Rule as mandated by the Hon’ble apex Court is that the Central Government can only act under Rule 59(2) “after considering the recommendation of the State Government”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment categorically indicated the manner in which the Central Government authority under Rule 59(2) can be exercised and the first requirement for exercise of such Rule as mandated by the Hon’ble apex Court is that the Central Government can only act under Rule 59(2) “after considering the recommendation of the State Government”. In other words, bereft of the recommendation of the State government in favour of any party there can arise no occasion for the Central Government to exercise power under Rule 59(2). 49.Even apart from the aforesaid directives of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, what is most important to take note is the impact of the order under Rule-59(2). It is obvious that no notice of throwing open need to be issued in terms of Rule 59(1) and the land may not be entered into the resister as required nor is the requirement of advertising and calling for applications required. Therefore, the impact of Rule 59(2) is essentially to oust from consideration any prospective applicant from being considered. Therefore, in our considered view that the power of the Central Government under Rule 59(2) in essence, limits consideration to a particular individual or company and the obvious consequence being ousting all others from being considered or being denied the right to apply. In such an event, in our considered view, rules of natural justice have to be instilled in Rule 59(2) for the purpose of fair play and justice. In the celebrated judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Meneka Gandhi v. Union of India and others, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , Hon’ble the Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as His Lordship the then was) in Para-1 of the judgment of course in the contest of Section 10(3) of the Indian Passports Act, 1967 that, in the said provision was “read in such a manner so as to exclude the right of hearing, the Section would be infected with the vice of arbitrariness and it would be void as offending Article 14. Of course in the facts of the said case Hon’ble Supreme Court came to conclude that a post-decisional hearing also was adequate in the circumstances of the said case for the purpose of complying with the principles of natural justice but, in the present case at hand, unless we read into Rule 59(2), the principles of audi alterm partem as well as public notice. The resultant would be that in a case where Rule 59(2) is exercised in favour of an entity, all other persons who may be vitally interested in the area would be ousted for consideration since there would consequently be no advertisement calling for application. In other words, by the exercise of the petitioner under Rule 59(2), a benefit would be limited only to the entity whose application has been recommended by the State Government of course subject to the Central Government exceeding to such request debarring all others from being considered. Therefore, in our considered view that the principles of audi alterm partem has to be read into the power vested into the Central Government under Rule-59(2) and there has to be a public notice informing the public at large that the case of the particular entity has been recommended by the State Government to the Central Government and further indicating that if there is any other person who may be effected by such a decision or interested in such a decision in any manner, they must be invited to file their objections and be heard. This power vested in the Central Government under Rule 59(2). In essence, is not limited to the recommended entity alone but essentially oust all other parties who may have vital interest in the matter from the knowledge itself and consequently, ousted from consideration as well. 50.At this juncture, it would be profitable to also take note of the decision rendered by this Court in the Case of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan v. Union of India and another., AIR 1988 Orissa 96 and, in particular, para-7, which is quoted as hereunder : “7. xxx xxx xxx It cannot be disputed that refusal by the Central Government exercising its jurisdiction under Section 5(2) involves civil consequences of considerable magnitude for the applicant for grant of mining lease. Sarojini Pradhan v. Union of India and another., AIR 1988 Orissa 96 and, in particular, para-7, which is quoted as hereunder : “7. xxx xxx xxx It cannot be disputed that refusal by the Central Government exercising its jurisdiction under Section 5(2) involves civil consequences of considerable magnitude for the applicant for grant of mining lease. If an opportunity is afforded, the applicant may possibly convince the Central Government why approval should be accorded, to use the words of Lord Parker, to disabuse the Central Government of its impression inclining it not to accord approval. The applicant may show that the grounds on which the Central Government is not inclined to accord approval are unsustainable, erroneous, even absurd. The wisest even is liable to err. The situation or nature of the exercise is not such as to attract the exclusionary principles. Whereas an opportunity of hearing does not prejudice the Central Government, the denial of it might prejudicially affect the applicant. Even assuming that the exercise under Section 5(2) is of administrative character, what heavens would fall if an opportunity of hearing is given. By grant of lease, there is augmentation of the revenue of the State by way of royalty. Exploitation of minerals leads to economic development of the State and the nation. Refusal to accord approval also affects the State Government where the State Government is inclined in favour of the grant. Therefore, when by the refusal not only the applicant but also the State Government, where it is inclined in favour of the grant, would be so prejudically affected, in our opinion, the principles of natural justice would supplement the law contained in Section 5(2). Our view gets support from the decision of the Patna High Court in Ramnik Lal Kothari v. Govt. of India, AIR 1970 Panta 189. Therein, Untwalia, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed : “xxx xxx The order of the Central Government in exercise of the said power may be executive in character, as contained on its behalf by the learned Government pleader. of India, AIR 1970 Panta 189. Therein, Untwalia, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed : “xxx xxx The order of the Central Government in exercise of the said power may be executive in character, as contained on its behalf by the learned Government pleader. Yet I am of the opinion that if the exercise of power under Section 5(2) of the Act and the order made thereunder adversely affects or prejudices a person, the trend of the decisions of the Courts in India as also in England is that such a person must be given an opportunity to have his representation or say in regard to the matter which is going to affect him adversely. To put it briefly, the power may be executive, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice which are generally applicable for the exercise of power in a judicial manner. Reference in this connection may be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 . I do not mean to suggest that invariably in all cases, the power under Section 5(2) of the Act has got to be exercised by the Central Government keeping in view the principles for the exercise of a judicial power. But by and large it may affect or prejudice the rights or interest of a person; in all fairness, the person concerned must be given a reasonable opportunity to make his representation.” We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Inasmuch as the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity, and, therefore, the principles of natural justice were violated, the decision of the Central Government as per Annexure-5 is invalid and void.” 51.In the light of the judgment of the Orissa High Court as noted hereinabove, we are of the considered view that prior to the exercise of power under Rule 59(2), if an advertisement/public notice is issued and objectors if any heard, no prejudice will be caused to Central Government even if the nature of power exercise by the Union may be executed in character. It is well settled that even if the nature of power being exercised is executive in nature, the same has to be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice which are generally applicable for the exercise of power in a judicial manner. 52.Our conclusion arrived at hereinabove are further strengthened by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Assam and others v. Om Prakash Mehta and others, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 678 and, in particular, para-9 thereof, which is quoted hereinbelow : “9. The Act and the Rules thus contain the complete code in respect of the grant and renewal of prospecting licences as well as mining leases in lands belonging to Government as well as lands belonging to private persons. The main point to be kept in mind is the fact that the mining lease in question is in a land belonging to Government and it is for a mineral included in the First Schedule to the Act in respect of which no mining lease can be granted without the previous approval of the Central Government. Normally the Government like any other owner of property is entitled to choose with whom it shall deal and what sort of a contract it will enter into, but being a public authority its acts are necessarily regulated by certain rules. The Act and the rules in this case are intended to regulate the development of mines and minerals under the control of the Union and contain the provisions necessary for that purpose. No person can claim any right in any land belonging to Government or in any mines in any land belonging to Government except under and in accordance with the Act and the Rules or any right except those created or conferred by the Act. There is no question of any fundamental right in any person to claim that he should be granted any lease or any prospecting licence or mining lease in any land belonging to the Government. It is necessary to bear this in mind because some sort of vague right was claimed on behalf of the respondents as though there is a right of renewal of the mining lease in question even apart from the rules.” It would be relevant to quote Rule 26(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, which is noted hereunder : “26. Refusal of application for grant and renewal of mining lease - (1) The State Government may after giving an opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to grant or renew a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for.” 53.On a plain reading of the aforesaid rule, it would be clear therefrom that the State Government is obliged to afford an opportunity of hearing to the applicant for renewal prior to taking a decision on such application whether to grant or to refuse to grant renewal of mining lease. Even though, the Hon’ble High Court in TISCO (HC) has used various adjectives to describe the interest of the other petitioners other than TISCO such as “contingent” of “prospective” applicants, since the MMDR Act or the MC Rules do not provide for opportunity of hearing to any such persons as has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sandur Manganese and since it has been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. O.P. Mehta (supra) “no person can claim any right to in any land belonging to the Government or any mines in any land belonging to the Government except under and in a accordance with the acts and rules or any right except those created or conferred by the Act there is no question of any fundamental right in any person to claim that he should be granted any lease or any prospective license or mining lease in any land belonging to the Government”. 54.Consequently, in the case at hand, we are of the considered view that whereas there can be no doubt about the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in TISCO (HC) as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TISCO (SC), at the same time, there can be no doubt that, the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese which has explained TISCO (HC) as well as TISCO (SC) the said judgment would bind this Court. We are of the further view that TISCO (HC) having proceeded on the basis of a “concession” of the Central Government through its counsel, cannot form the basis of any law for it to be binding on the Court and more importantly since in Sandur Manganese, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has come to hold, that no consideration apart from the consideration stipulated in the MMDR Act as well as MC Rules can be taken into consideration by the State and since in the case of State of Assam v. O.P. Mehta (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has concluded that no person has a fundamental right for being granted with the lease, apart from that which is provided under the statute, we are of the considered view that the right to be heard in the present case under Rule 26 of the Minerals Concession Rules, 1960 permits a right of hearing (i.e. to be afforded at the time of consideration of renewal application under Section 8(3) read with Rule 26) has to be confined to the renewal application itself and no other. 55.We also find support to our aforesaid conclusion by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court presided by Hon’ble Justice A.K. Sikri, Acting Chief Justice (as His Lordships the then was) in the case of M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. M/s. Electro Steel Castings Ltd. and others in L.P.A. 741 of 2010 decided on 28.02.2012. In the said case Electro Steel Castings Ltd., who had termed itself as an “aspirant” for lease over the same area for which renewal has been sought for by Steel Authority of India (SAIL) made an application the State Government for granting lease. The Hon’ble Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had allowed the writ petition placing reliance on TISCO (HC) and TISCO (HC). The LPA was filed challenging the decision of the Hon’ble Single Judge. The Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sandur Manganese and held that the application of the writ petitioner/ (M/s. Electro Steel Castings Ltd) was the premature application in view of the provision of Rule 60 of the MC Rules, since it was made prior to the issuance of notification under Rule 59(1). Their Lordships of Delhi High Court considering the contention of the TISCO judgment came to conclude in para-18 as follows : “18. xxxxxx No doubt, it would be the endeavour of the respondent No.1 that the application of the appellant for renewal is rejected because only then the area in question becomes available for mining by others. However, whether the application of the appellant for renewal is proper or not or whether the appellant is entitled to renewal or not are the aspects which can always be considered by the State Government as well. We have to decide the present case in the light of the provisions contained in MCR and when we find that respondent No.1 cannot be treated as the prospective applicant at this stage, we cannot hold that it has any locus standi when the matter is at the stage when the application of the appellant for renewal is considered. (Of course, it may be noted that it has been brought to our notice that the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Steel Authority India Ltd. is under challenge before the Hon’ble Apex Court, but no interim orders have been passed thereon.) 56.In view of the findings arrived at as noted hereinabove, the issues are answered against the petitioners and in favour of the opposite parties. 57.In view of the fact situation as noted hereinabove and the findings arrived at hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the writ applications merit no further consideration and ought to be dismissed and all interim orders vacated. We direct accordingly. As a consequence of these directions, the State Government is free to proceed with considering TATAS’ application for 3rd renewal strictly in accordance with the MMDR Act and MC Rules and in view of the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Common Case (supra). The exercise be completed by the deadlines set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e. on 16.11.2014. There would be no order as to costs. B.N. MAHAPATRA, J.I agree. Application dismissed.