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2014 DIGILAW 652 (MAD)

Josehine Antony v. District Collector

2014-03-13

V.M.VELUMANI, V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN

body2014
Order V.Ramasubramanian,J. This writ petition has been filed in public interest by an Animal Welfare Activist, who is also an Honorary Animal Welfare Officer of the Animal Welfare Board of India. The petitioner works for a Non-Governmental Organization by name Gau Gyan Foundation. 2. The fact that a huge stock of cattle is transported from all the three neighbouring States to Kerala, for the purpose of slaughter, has been inviting the attention of the statutory authorities as well as animal lovers. But, the Government of Kerala imposed a ban recently on the entry of cattle into Kerala from Tamil Nadu, following the out-break of a disease known as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). As a result, a large number of cattle which were in transit landed at Cumbum which is virtually the gate-way to Kerala. 3. Upon coming to know of the fact that about 2000 cattle are kept in Cumbum, awaiting the order of the Government of Kerala lifting the ban, the petitioner lodged a criminal complaint in Crime No.3/2014 before the Inspector of Police, Cumbum North Police Station. Claiming that the transporters of cattle attempted to assault her, the petitioner lodged a second complaint in Crime No.4/2014. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner came up with the above writ petition, seeking the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to take appropriate measures to seize the cattle that were allegedly transported illegally to Kerala and which are allegedly now stranded in Cumbum. 5. On 08.01.2014, the above public interest litigation came up for the first time before this Bench and this Court passed an order directing the learned Special Government Pleader to take notice and also further directing the District Collector to secure the cattle, feed them and file a report. 6. On 10.01.2014, the District Collector filed a Report, along with photographs of the animals and also indicating that they have been provided food, shelter and proper medical facilities. This Court also took note of the ban on slaughter of cows imposed by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.1715, Agriculture Department, dated 30.08.1976. After taking note of the provisions of Section 4(3) (A) of the Tamil Nadu Animal Preservation Act, 1958 and the provisions of the Transport of Animals Rules, 1978, this Court issued a direction on the same day, namely 10.01.2014, to the petitioner to produce all documents relating to Animal Welfare. After taking note of the provisions of Section 4(3) (A) of the Tamil Nadu Animal Preservation Act, 1958 and the provisions of the Transport of Animals Rules, 1978, this Court issued a direction on the same day, namely 10.01.2014, to the petitioner to produce all documents relating to Animal Welfare. It was pointed out at that time that two persons, who were named in the First Information Reports lodged by the petitioner, moved applications before the concerned Judicial Magistrate for the return of the cattle which were taken over by the Administration. Therefore, this Court directed the petitioner to implead those persons as parties to the writ petition. 7. Accordingly, the petitioner moved a miscellaneous petition in M.P.(MD)No.3 of 2014. On 23.01.2014, the said miscellaneous petition was allowed and the respondents 5 and 6 were impleaded as parties to the writ petition. 8. Thereafter, the respondents 5 and 6 filed a counter affidavit primarily contending that they have already obtained orders from the Additional Judicial Magistrate, Uthamapalayam, by filing applications under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Crl.M.P.Nos.387 and 388 of 2014. The respondents 5 and 6 claim that they are engaged as coolies by the original owners of the cattle just for the purpose of rearing the animals and getting them grazed. Therefore, the respondents 5 and 6 claim that the present writ petition cannot be entertained in view of the fact that there is a judicial order now obtained for the custody of the animals by the respondents 5 and 6. 9. In the light of the above facts and the report filed by the District Collector, we have heard Mr.G.R.Swaminathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.B.Pugalendhi, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 to 4 and Mr.A.Velan, learned counsel appearing for respondents 5 and 6. 10. Before we proceed to consider the rival contentions, we should bring on record two facts. They are:- (i) The District Administration took into custody a total of 136 cattle, in pursuance of the interim orders passed by this Court on 08.01.2014. Out of the cattle taken into custody, 6 have already died. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted, on instructions, that due to the Election Schedule announced for the Parliament, the District Administration is unable to provide sufficient manpower to take care of the cattle. Out of the cattle taken into custody, 6 have already died. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted, on instructions, that due to the Election Schedule announced for the Parliament, the District Administration is unable to provide sufficient manpower to take care of the cattle. The petitioner is prepared to take into custody the cattle and provide them shelter and food. (ii) In the criminal complaints lodged by the petitioner against the respondents 5 and 6, no charge sheet has so far been filed. But, the Judicial Magistrate has passed an order under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure granting interim custody to respondents 5 and 6. The respondents 5 and 6 are, admittedly, not the owners of the cattle. But, they are engaged by the original owners whose names are furnished in Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 5 and 6 and who have also filed affidavits before the learned Judicial Magistrate. 11. Keeping these two facts in mind, let us now proceed to consider the rival contentions. 12. At the outset, Mr.A.Velan, learned counsel appearing for respondents 5 and 6, raised a primary objection to the very maintainability of the writ petition, in the light of the order passed by the competent Judicial Magistrate under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Judicial Magistrate, has a remedy of revision in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence, it is contended by the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 that the petitioner cannot file a Public Interest Litigation, to get a remedy that is available to her only under Section 397 of the Code. 13. In response to the above contention of the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, it is submitted by Mr.G.R. Swaminathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, that on 10.01.2014, this Court issued an interim direction to the petitioner as well as to the respondents to produce relevant documents. 13. In response to the above contention of the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, it is submitted by Mr.G.R. Swaminathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, that on 10.01.2014, this Court issued an interim direction to the petitioner as well as to the respondents to produce relevant documents. At that time, it was brought to the notice of this Court by the learned Special Government Pleader that the Judicial Magistrate may pronounce orders in the applications under Sections 451 Cr.P.C. But, since this Court was already seized of the matter, the learned Special Government Pleader agreed in open court to inform the Judicial Magistrate, of the fact that this Court is already seized of the matter. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was a communication gap and the Judicial Magistrate proceeded to pass orders handing over interim custody to the respondents 5 and 6. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that independent of the proceedings before the criminal court, the petitioner is entitled to seek remedy before this Court. 14. Even without going into details as to what transpired in open court on 10.01.2014, there is one thing that stares at one's face. This Court passed an order on 10.01.2014 directing the authorities to produce records. It was, on the same day, namely 10.01.2014 that the Judicial Magistrate has also passed an order granting interim custody to the respondents 5 and 6. Therefore, it is clear that the present public interest litigation is not filed by the petitioner for circumventing the alternative remedy available to her under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is needless to point out that when two courts are seized of the same matter, the jurisdiction of the superior court will not stand ousted merely because the lower court chose to pass orders on a matter which is seized of by the superior forum. This is especially so in matters of public interest such as the one on hand. 15. In any event, this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has a supervisory jurisdiction over all Courts subordinate to it. This supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is both administrative and judicial. This is especially so in matters of public interest such as the one on hand. 15. In any event, this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has a supervisory jurisdiction over all Courts subordinate to it. This supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is both administrative and judicial. Therefore, a larger remedy that the petitioner has sought in the present Public Interest Litigation will not be barred by a smaller remedy available before this very same Court under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence, the contention with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, raised on the basis of the order of the Judicial Magistrate, is rejected. 16. Mr.A.Velan, learned counsel appearing for respondents 5 and 6, next contended that under Section 29(2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (in short "the Act"), a Court cannot order forfeiture to Government, of the animal with respect to which an offence under the Act is committed, unless the owner is found guilty of the offence and unless it is shown by evidence as to the previous conviction under the Act. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents invited our attention in this regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Manager, Pinjrapole Deudar vs. Chakram Moraji Nat (1996) 6 SCC 520 and the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Islam (2007) 15 SCC 588. 17. In Manager, Pinjrapole, the Supreme Court referred to Section 35 of the Act and held in paragraph 10 of the Report that whenever an owner claims custody of the animal, the Pinjrapole would not have a preferential right. 17. In Manager, Pinjrapole, the Supreme Court referred to Section 35 of the Act and held in paragraph 10 of the Report that whenever an owner claims custody of the animal, the Pinjrapole would not have a preferential right. The factors that are relevant for deciding whether interim custody of the animal is to be given to the owner, who is facing prosecution, were also indicated by the Supreme Court as follows: "(1) the nature and gravity of the offence alleged against the owner; (2) whether it is the first offence alleged or he has been found guilty of offences under the Act earlier; (3) if the owner is facing the first prosecution under the Act, the animal is not liable to be seized, so the owner will have a better claim for the custody of the animal during the prosecution; (4) the condition in which the animal was found at the time of inspection and seizure; (5) the possibility of the animal being again subjected to cruelty. There cannot be any doubt that establishment of the pinjrapole is with the laudable object of preventing unnecessary pain or suffering to animals and providing protection to them and birds. But it should also be seen: (a) whether the pinjrapole is functioning as an independent organization or under the scheme of the Board and is answerable to the Board; and (b) whether the pinjrapole has a good record of taking care of the animals given under its custody." 18. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Islam, the Supreme Court referred to Section 29 of the Act and held in paragraph 10 of the Report that three specific conditions are to be satisfied for invoking Section 29(2). They are: (i) It should be shown by evidence that there was a previous conviction; or (ii) It should be shown that the character of the owner is such that the animal would be exposed to further cruelty if left with the owner; or (iii) That the animal, if left with the owner, is likely to be exposed to further cruelty. 19. Therefore, on the basis of the provisions of Section 29(1) and (2) read with Section 35 of the Act and on the basis of the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. A. Velan, learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, forcefully contended that the petitioner cannot have custody of the cattle. 19. Therefore, on the basis of the provisions of Section 29(1) and (2) read with Section 35 of the Act and on the basis of the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. A. Velan, learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, forcefully contended that the petitioner cannot have custody of the cattle. According to the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, the respondents 5 and 6 have not suffered any previous conviction. Neither their character is shown to be so bad nor their treatment of the animals are shown to be so cruel as to satisfy any of the requirements of Section 29(2) of the Act. Therefore, the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 contended that the custody of the animals should be only with the respondents 5 and 6. 20. Apart from contending that the respondents 5 and 6 are entitled in law to have the custody of the animals, the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, even went one step further and contended that this Court can even impose any additional conditions, for recording the footprints of the animals and monitoring the cattle to ensure that no cruelty is inflicted upon the animals. The learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6 submitted that the contesting respondents are prepared to abide by any stringent condition imposed by this Court to take care of all apprehensions expressed by the petitioner. 21. We have carefully considered the above submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6. 22. In order to appreciate the correctness and validity of the above contentions, it is necessary to have a look at the scheme of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. 23. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 is only a successor to the previous colonial enactment known as "Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1890". There were lot of deficiencies in the 1890 Act and hence the Government constituted a Committee to make recommendations for replacing the same. This is how the 1960 Act was enacted. 24. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the word "animal" to mean any living creature other than a human being. There were lot of deficiencies in the 1890 Act and hence the Government constituted a Committee to make recommendations for replacing the same. This is how the 1960 Act was enacted. 24. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the word "animal" to mean any living creature other than a human being. Section 3 of the Act imposes a duty upon every person, having the care or charge of any animal, to take all reasonable measures to ensure the well being of such animal and to prevent the infliction upon such animal of unnecessary pain or suffering. Sections 4 to 9 of the Act deals with the establishment of Animal Welfare Board, its constitution, terms and office of the members of the Board and the functions of the Board. 25. Section 11(1) of the Act lists out various acts that are treated as cruelty to animals and which are punishable with fine and or imprisonment. Section 28 of the Act saves killing of any animal in a manner required by the religion of any community from being treated as an offence. 26. Section 29 of the Act deals with the powers of the Court to deprive persons convicted, of the ownership of the animal. Under sub-section (1) of Section 29, the Court can order for feiture to the Government of any animal with respect to which its owner is found guilty of an offence under the Act. But, sub-section (2) indicates the circumstances in which such forfeiture can be ordered under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) of Section 29 deals with the power of the Magistrate to prohibit a person convicted of an offence under the Act from having the custody of any animal of any kind whatsoever. Other sub-sections of Section 29 also revolve around the power under sub-section (3). Since sub-sections 3 to 6 are not relevant for our purpose, sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 29 alone are extracted as follows: "29. Other sub-sections of Section 29 also revolve around the power under sub-section (3). Since sub-sections 3 to 6 are not relevant for our purpose, sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 29 alone are extracted as follows: "29. Power of Court to deprive person convicted of ownership of animal.-- (1)If the owner of any animal is found guilty of any offence under this Act, the Court, upon his conviction thereof, may, if it thinks fit, in addition to any other punishment, make an order that the animal with respect to which the offence was committed shall be forfeited to Government and may, further, make such order as to the disposal of the animal as it thinks fit under the circumstances. (2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made unless it is shown by evidence as to previous conviction under this Act or as to the character of the owner or otherwise as to the treatment of the animal that the animal if left with the owner, is likely to be exposed to further cruelty." 27. Section 30 of the Act raises a presumption. Under Section 30, any person charged with the offence of killing a goat or cow, contrary to the provisions of Section 11(1), will be presumed to be guilty of such an offence, if it is proved that he was in possession of the skin of any such animal at the time when the offence was committed. Section 34 of the Act empowers the police officer or any person authorized by the State Government to seize the animal and produce the same before the nearest Magistrate or veterinary officer. Section 35 deals with treatment and care of animals. While sub-section (1) requires the State Government to appoint infirmaries for the treatment and care of animals, sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate, during the pendency of prosecution, to direct the animal to be treated and cared for in an infirmary. 28. Since Section 35(2) of the Act deals with the power of the Magistrate to have the animal treated and cared for in infirmaries during the pendency of the prosecution, in contrast to the power of the Magistrate under Section 29(2) of the Act, it is necessary to extract sub-sections 1 to 4 of Section 35. Hence, they are extracted as follows: "35. Hence, they are extracted as follows: "35. Treatment and care of animals.--(1)The State Government may, by general or special order, appoint infirmaries for the treatment and care of animals in respect of which offences against this Act have been committed and may authorise the detention therein of any animal pending its production before a Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate before whom a prosecution for an offence against this Act has been instituted may direct that the animal concerned shall be treated and cared for in an infirmary, until it is fit to perform its usual work or is otherwise fit for discharge, or that it shall be sent to a pinjrapole, or, if the veterinary officer in charge of the area in which the animal is found or such other veterinary officer as may be authorised in this behalf by rules made under this Act certifies that it is incurable or cannot be removed without cruelty, that it shall be destroyed. (3) An animal sent for care and treatment to an infirmary shall not, unless the Magistrate directs that it shall be sent to a pinjrapole or that it shall be destroyed, be released from such place except upon a certificate of its fitness for discharge issued by the veterinary officer incharge of the area in which the infirmary is situated or such other veterinary officer as may authorised in this behalf by rules made under this Act. (4) The cost of transporting the animal to an infirmary or pinjrapale and of its maintenance and treatment in an infirmary, shall be payable by the owner of the animal in accordance with a scale of rates to be prescribed by the District Magistrate, or, in presidency towns, by the Commissioner of Police: Provided that when the Magistrate so orders on account of the poverty of the owner of the animal, no charge shall be payable for the treatment of the animal." 29. A careful look at the scheme of Sections 29 and 35 of the Act would show that there are certain essential distinguishing features between both. They are: (1) The power under Section 29 is for forfeiture to the Government, of the animal. But, the power under Section 35 is only for treating and taking care of the animals. (2) The power under Section 29 is penal in nature and hence it comes after conviction. They are: (1) The power under Section 29 is for forfeiture to the Government, of the animal. But, the power under Section 35 is only for treating and taking care of the animals. (2) The power under Section 29 is penal in nature and hence it comes after conviction. But, the power under Section 35 is preventive in nature and hence it comes even during the pendency of the prosecution. (3) Though the Supreme Court stated in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Islam that sub-section (2) of Section 29 lays down three conditions, the conditions are actually disjunctive of each other. Even if any one of the three conditions is satisfied, the power under Section 29(2) could be exercised. But, insofar as the power under Section 35(2) is concerned, no conditions are prescribed for a Magistrate to exercise the power thereon. 30. In the case on hand, there are only two first information reports. No charge sheet has been filed by the police either against the respondents 5 and 6 or against the owners of the cattle. Therefore, the question of forfeiture under Section 29(1) does not arise. Secondly, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Islam is not applicable to the facts of this case, as there is no conviction. 31. Insofar as the decision in Manager, Pinjrapole is concerned, the facts out of which the said case arose, require our attention. The Gujarat Police seized some sheep and goats while they were being transported. The animals were seized and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, who in turn directed the custody of the animals to be handed over to Pinjrapole. The owners of the animal filed criminal revision before the Additional Sessions Judge. The revision was allowed and the custody was directed to be given to the owners. Pinjrapole filed a revision before the High Court of Gujarat. But, the revision was dismissed. Thereafter, Pinjrapole took the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court. 32. After taking note of the scheme of the Act and provisions of Section 35 of the Act, the Supreme Court indicated in the said decision that unless the owner of the animal in respect of which he is facing prosecution is convicted, no bar can be inferred against him to claim interim custody. 32. After taking note of the scheme of the Act and provisions of Section 35 of the Act, the Supreme Court indicated in the said decision that unless the owner of the animal in respect of which he is facing prosecution is convicted, no bar can be inferred against him to claim interim custody. In paragraph 9 of the Report, the Supreme Court held that the custody of the animal can be deprived to the owners only on conviction for the second time. 33. Again in paragraph 10 of the Report, the Supreme Court held that Section 35(2) of the Act merely confers a discretion upon the Magistrate to hand over interim custody to the Pinjrapole but, he is not bound to hand over custody to Pinjrapole. The Court further held that where the owner claims custody, pinjrapole has no preferential right. After having said this, the Supreme Court laid down five factors, which are essential for the Magistrate to decide the question of interim custody. We have already extracted those five conditions in a previous paragraph. 34. But, unfortunately for the respondents 5 and 6 they cannot fall back upon Section 35(2) or take refuge under the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision in Manager, Pinjrapole. This is due to two important aspects. They are: (1) For some inexplicable reasons, the owners did not file applications under Section 451 Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate seeking custody. The owners appear to have taken advantage of the fact that respondents 5 and 6 alone were named as accused in the first information reports and allowed them to file applications. The owners filed supporting affidavits for the purpose of enabling respondents 5 and 6 to have interim custody. Therefore, it is clear that the owners have indulged in remote control operations. Irrespective of who the accused are, the actual owners are entitled to file an application under Section 451 Cr.P.C. In the absence of the owners before the Criminal Court, any condition imposed upon respondents 5 and 6, who merely claim to be coolies, would turn out to be merely illusory. Hence, the provisions of Section 35(2) would not come to the rescue of the respondents 5 and 6. (2) The decision in Manager, Pinjrapole, arose out of an order passed under Section 35(2) of the Act. Hence, the provisions of Section 35(2) would not come to the rescue of the respondents 5 and 6. (2) The decision in Manager, Pinjrapole, arose out of an order passed under Section 35(2) of the Act. A Judicial Magistrate, who exercises powers in terms of the provisions of an enactment, is bound by the prescriptions contained in the Act. While exercising powers of prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, the Magistrate derives his powers from the Act and hence he is bound by the limitations and restrictions imposed by such Act. This is why the Supreme Court held in Manager, Pinjrapole, that a Magistrate exercising power under Section 35(2) of the Act cannot travel beyond the scope of Section 35(2). But, the case on hand does not arise out of an order of the Magistrate. The case on hand is a public interest litigation filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the fetters imposed upon a Magistrate under Section 35(2) cannot be imported to a public interest litigation that we are dealing with under Article 226 of the Constitution. 35. Keeping the above fundamental distinction in our mind, if we now look at the counter filed by the District Collector, it is seen that the Government of Kerala imposed a ban on entry of cattle into Kerala from Tamil Nadu, following the out-break of Foot and Mouth Disease. But, the ban was lifted on 01.01.2014. The counter further states that 132 cattle were taken into custody, but, despite the efforts of the Administration, six died. In a report filed on 10.01.2014, the District Collector has stated in paragraph 4 that traders purchase the cattle for reselling/slaughtering, on the basis of fitness certificate obtained from Veterinary Doctors. Though in paragraph 5 of the same report, the District Collector has stated that no previous complaint was received regarding violations of the Animal Welfare Rules, a careful look at paragraphs 5 and 6 shows that the focus of the Report is on the treatment given by the District Administration to the cattle. 36. Keeping the above in mind, if we have a look at the writ petition, it will be seen that the petitioner only wants respondents 1 and 2 to take care of the cattle so that they are not transported from Cumbum to Kerala for the purpose of slaughter. 36. Keeping the above in mind, if we have a look at the writ petition, it will be seen that the petitioner only wants respondents 1 and 2 to take care of the cattle so that they are not transported from Cumbum to Kerala for the purpose of slaughter. The petitioner is not setting up a rival claim to the ownership of the cattle. She is only an animal welfare activist who wants to ensure that these animals do not land-up at the slaughter houses to meet their maker before their destined hour. This Court, in such circumstances, cannot shut its eyes and allow the respondents 5 and 6, who claim only to be the coolies engaged by the owners, to gain custody of the cattle on the strength of the orders of the Judicial Magistrate. Out of the 136 cattle, whose custody was handed over to the Police, six already died. Therefore, we are of the view that till the prosecution against respondents 5 and 6 comes to a close, the cattle cannot be handed over to the respondents 5 and 6. As a matter of fact, the police ought to have implicated the owners as accused. But, even now it is not too late since investigation is not completed and final reports are not filed. Therefore, we are of the view that directing the police to complete the investigation within a time frame and allowing the owners to seek custody of the cattle if they are acquitted in the criminal case would be the better course of action. 37. In normal course, the cattle should be in the custody of Pinjrapole till the criminal case comes to its logical conclusion. But, the petitioner is prepared to provide shelter and food to the animals, at her cost. The District Administration is unable to take care of the cattle for want of manpower and also for want of necessary sanction for such expenditure. As a matter of fact, the District Administration appears to have taken good care of the animals. But, unfortunately, the Print Media appears to have projected the same in bad taste, by showing as though policemen were rearing cattle, ignoring their duties. Therefore, we are unable to continue to burden the District Administration. 38. As a matter of fact, the District Administration appears to have taken good care of the animals. But, unfortunately, the Print Media appears to have projected the same in bad taste, by showing as though policemen were rearing cattle, ignoring their duties. Therefore, we are unable to continue to burden the District Administration. 38. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of to the following effect: (i) Since the State is unable to provide food and shelter to the cattle, due to the circumstances prevailing now, the petitioner is permitted to keep the cattle as a temporary measure. (ii) The 4th respondent Police is directed to complete the investigation into the complaints in Crime Nos.3 and 4 of 2014 and file final reports within a period of 30 days. (iii) Since the owners have filed affidavits before the Criminal Court, supporting the applications of the respondents 5 and 6 for interim custody under Section 451 Cr.P.C., the investigation may also focus on the owners. (iv) If final reports are filed by the police to the effect that no offence is made out, at least in respect of the offences under the Prevention of Cruelty Animals Act, 1960, the petitioner shall hand over custody to the owners. (v) If the final reports result in framing of charges for the offences under the Prevention of Cruelty Animals Act, 1960, the question of custody shall be determined on the basis of the final outcome of the criminal cases. (vi) Until such time the criminal complaint in respect of the offences under the Prevention of Cruelty Animals Act, 1960, comes to its logical end, either with a final report in favour of the accused or with an order of acquittal, after trial, the petitioner shall provide shelter and food to the animals. (vii) It will be open to the owners to make periodical visits to the place where the animals are kept, in order to satisfy themselves that they are under proper care. (viii) In case, there are any difficulties with respect to the care afforded to the animals, it will be open to the owners to come-up before this Court for a modification of this order. 39. The writ petition is disposed of on the above terms. No costs. Connected M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2014 is closed.