JUDGMENT Mr. Rajiv Narain Raina, J.: - Ms. Geeta Luthra, learned Senior counsel appears for the petitioner-wife and Mr. R.S. Kundu appears for the respondent husband on caveat. 2. With the consent of parties, the matter is taken on board for final disposal at the motion stage since it relates to the preliminary point of jurisdiction of the Court. 3. Heard. 4. The petitioner and the respondent were married according to Hindu rites and ceremonies on July 19, 2010 at Delhi. The marriage was solemnized after a courtship of fourteen months. The respondent is an IAS Officer of the Punjab cadre. Soon after the marriage, the husband told the petitioner that he has to join his duty in Punjab by July 21, 2010 and that his wife should stay back temporarily in his native village with her in-laws, that is his parents. Soon after the wedding, on July 20, 2010 the petitioner was taken to her parental home for the pagphera ceremony. By the time the rituals were done; it was late and raining heavily. It is averred that the petitioner’s parents had requested the groom to stay on in Delhi and avoid night travel as it was not safe with expensive baggage and jewellry in tow. The respondent was adamant and did not accept this advice. In these circumstances the petitioner visited her in-laws for the remaining ceremony at the respondent’s native village Goria in Jhajjar district, in the State of Haryana. 5. Unfortunately, the marriage turned sour before it effectively began. It is seen from record that both the parties are highly educated people. There are allegations of demands of dowry on the wife’s family. It is alleged that the respondent soon after the wedding asked the petitioner’s father to purchase land to help his brother to start a factory as he was retiring from the Indian Army and needed to settle down in an avocation. It is alleged that soon after the marriage, the respondent deserted the petitioner never to return to his wife. The marriage turned a non-starter. The petitioner says that she made sincere efforts to save the marriage but met with failure. 6. In the circumstances, the petitioner was left with no option but to return to England with her visa expiring on August 30, 2010. The marriage turned a non-starter. The petitioner says that she made sincere efforts to save the marriage but met with failure. 6. In the circumstances, the petitioner was left with no option but to return to England with her visa expiring on August 30, 2010. The respondent was not willing to live with her or to take her back with him to Punjab where he is serving whilst belonging to the IAS Punjab cadre. Ever since, parties have been apart from each other and the petitioner herein has been living in UK compelled to do so with few options left. 7. In these circumstances, the respondent-husband filed for divorce on July 28, 2013 before the Family Court at Jhajjar, Haryana seeking dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. The couple had lived apart during the interregnum unable to reconcile their matrimonial differences. 8. For the purposes of this order, it is not necessary to go into the nature of allegations and counter-allegations since challenge in this petition is to the impugned order rejecting the application filed by the wife under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for return of plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, no opinion is expressed on the merits of the case or on the allegations since they remain open to trial exclusively in a matrimonial court of competent jurisdiction. But the question here is, triable in which court? Jhajjar or elsewhere? 9. The further facts are that on receiving summons from the Jhajjar Court on the divorce petition, the petitioner in the first instance approached the Supreme Court through Transfer Petition (Civil) No.1953 of 2013 praying that the case be transferred from Jhajjar, Haryana to a competent court at Delhi. The Transfer Petition was dismissed on December 15, 2013 by observing; “...having regard to the short distance between Jhajjar and Delhi, the Transfer Petition is accordingly dismissed”. 10. The petitioner then filed an application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) in the divorce petition inter alia praying that the petition be returned due to lack of territorial jurisdiction in the Jhajjar Court. 10. The petitioner then filed an application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) in the divorce petition inter alia praying that the petition be returned due to lack of territorial jurisdiction in the Jhajjar Court. It was stated that the respondent herein had invoked jurisdiction of the matrimonial Court at Jhajjar on false allegations that the petitioner and respondent last visited and resided in village Goria, the native village of the husband where his parents live. The pointed attention of the matrimonial Court was drawn to falsehood in paragraph 33 of the divorce petition which is reproduced below and which has a material bearing on the question of territorial jurisdiction of the court and on the fate of this case:- “Para 33. That the matrimonial home of the parties to the Petition is Village Gorea Tehshil Matanhel, District Jajjhar, where she had lastly visited/resided with the Petitioner. Therefore, this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present case.” (emphasis added) 11. The petitioner’s case is that she visited village Goria in Jhajjar district for performing post nuptial rites and ceremonies only following the wedding nearby at Delhi. She stayed there for a brief while with no intention of the parties to reside in the village, home to the in-laws as the married couple did not wish nor did they in fact reside there with intention to start a matrimonial home either temporarily or on an alleged permanent basis. 12. It was explained in the subject matter application that in 2007 the respondent joined the Indian Revenue Service and after training he was posted at Mumbai. Since then he lived outside Haryana pursuing his career in Government service. Later on, in 2009 the respondent successfully competed for the Civil Services and was selected to the Indian Administrative Service. He was allocated to the Punjab cadre of the IAS. In the times that followed he was transferred and posted to different places such as, Ropar, Bhatinda and Ferozepur in the State of Punjab and in UT Chandigarh. At the time of filing of the petition for divorce, the respondent was posted as Additional Commissioner (Development), Muktsar, Punjab. As a Punjab bureaucrat he could be posted anywhere in Punjab or with the Central Government in New Delhi on deputation or elsewhere as per wishes of the Government. At the time of filing of the petition for divorce, the respondent was posted as Additional Commissioner (Development), Muktsar, Punjab. As a Punjab bureaucrat he could be posted anywhere in Punjab or with the Central Government in New Delhi on deputation or elsewhere as per wishes of the Government. In these special circumstances, neither his official abode nor can his physical residence be by personal choice in Haryana unless he quits service to reside in Haryana. Therefore, before the parties were married in Delhi, both were aware their place of residence and matrimonial home inevitably will be in Punjab or any other place in India or abroad but never likely to be anywhere in the State of Haryana during service. Parties were governed by the Hindu law. Matrimonial actions between them had to conform to section 19 of the HMA. Section 19 is reproduced for ready reference: “19. Court to which petition shall be presented. —Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction— (i) the marriage was solemnised, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or [(iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, or] (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive.” 13. Ms. Geeta Luthra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioning wife has centered her arguments on a twofold challenge to the impugned order; One, on the pleadings of the respondent himself contained in paragraph 33 of the divorce petition which according to her is self speaking and clever arrangement of words visited and resided. She submits that the respondent-husband is an educated person and a member of the prestigious Indian Administrative Service and was thus conscious when he carefully used the words “lastly visited/resided” in paragraph 33 on the basis of which he instituted the divorce petition in the Family Court at Jhajjar. She submits that the respondent-husband is an educated person and a member of the prestigious Indian Administrative Service and was thus conscious when he carefully used the words “lastly visited/resided” in paragraph 33 on the basis of which he instituted the divorce petition in the Family Court at Jhajjar. Secondly, she contends by irrefutable logic, and rightly so, that the learned trial judge has returned a positive finding in the impugned order in favour of the petitioner on which point alone the plaint should have been returned for presentation before the proper forum by allowing the application straightaway looking at nothing further. In support she relies on the impugned order in this context which reads, to much surprise, as follows:- “I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the parties last resided together at Village Goria. In fact, neither they resided together at Village Goria nor they had the requisite animus manendi to reside there.” 14. Ms. Luthra next submits that this positive conclusion of fact has only to be matched with the facile assumptions in the rest of the impugned order to discern that there is something seriously wrong in its passing. More on this will come later in the course of this order. For the present, in my opinion the meaning of the words “lastly visited/resided” is plain enough. The word ‘visited’ was truthfully chosen but clubbed with the untruth of ‘resided’ separated by a hyphen. This aspect is crucial to the case and contains the seeds of self destruction. The combination is significantly self defeating and lethal in its deceit inasmuch as the husband petitioning for divorce can hardly be accused of making a false statement in court, if it came to pass. It is obviously a clever device aimed at taking undue advantage of a situation seeking to win by default in case the words are glossed over and escape pointed debate. This strange but crafty combination of two words disparate in shades of meaning has been noticed in the impugned order but has unfortunately been glossed over by the learned trial judge perhaps ill equipped with the nuances of the English language. All said and done, the text of para. 33 was of the divorce seeker’s making. The context was in the hands of the learned trial judge to unravel. All said and done, the text of para. 33 was of the divorce seeker’s making. The context was in the hands of the learned trial judge to unravel. The court had eyes to read, mind to apply, give meaning to words equipped with the tools of grammar to reason with for reaching a just and appropriate conclusion and for this no evidence or proof was required of the wife or her written statement. The application contained substantive evidence on affidavit sufficient to non-suit the respondent husband. Nor was it crucial to hear the petitioner on the meaning of the husband’s own choice of words in paragraph 33 of the petition. It is trite that words have to be read in their text and context. It is also settled that one or two words cannot be taken out at random and read out of context. But this is not the case here. Paragraph 33 is a formal paragraph as to declaration of jurisdiction which every petition must mandatorily contain, duly verified and signed by the party. The Court’s territorial jurisdiction is found pulsating there. The two words are of special significance coming from an IAS officer litigating and who is expected to have a reasonable command over language and would know the tautology of saying the same thing twice over and consciously knowing or appreciating its effects. The word “visited” being the major premise; residing, the minor. The court has to go by substance and not the form. However, at least the respondent husband has had the sanity and the wisdom not to speak the untruth and remain just short of lying when he states that the wife ‘lastly visited/resided’ but by qualifying the word ‘visited’, the major premise, in the sequential order by succeeding it with ‘resided’ to bring his case to Jhajjar, his forum conveniens, and the petition on his home turf to play out the game of divorce according to his rules. 15. The learned Senior Counsel contends that residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of obtaining a divorce but habitual residence or residence which is intended to be permanent for future as well. This aspect is touched upon in Y. Narsimha Rao and others vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi and another, (1991) 3 SCC 451 . 16. 15. The learned Senior Counsel contends that residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of obtaining a divorce but habitual residence or residence which is intended to be permanent for future as well. This aspect is touched upon in Y. Narsimha Rao and others vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi and another, (1991) 3 SCC 451 . 16. A casual or temporary visit to a place cannot be construed as a matrimonial home or a place where the parties intend to reside together as a married couple. A visit can be a visit to any place like a hotel, holiday resort, religious place etc. But a place of residence has to be one particular place or an operational base which the parties create, where the parties intend to make their place of residence where their hearth burns and their home is lit, fulfilling personal and social commitments according to their station in life. The point of the territorial compass has its moorings there, encircled by the boundaries of the matrimonial court within the Sessions Division. When marriage breaks, it breaks there, so to speak. This, in my view is how to determine the locus of the matrimonial home as also pinpointing as to where the parties last resided together as husband and wife for purposes of deciding the question of jurisdiction within meaning of Section 19 of the HMA. 17. Ms. Luthra relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 to urge and submit that the Supreme Court held that the meaning of “reside” in HMA does not include a casual stay or a flying visit to a particular place, the purpose is to live together in a place of residence. The principle was articulated by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Hariram Dhalumal Karamchandani vs. Jasoti, AIR 1963 Bombay 176 to hold that a casual visit for even limited period of stay may not amount to residence at any particular place. The court observed: “It is stated before the Court by the applicant that he is in the permanent service of the Government of India and that he has to reside in Delhi for that service. The court observed: “It is stated before the Court by the applicant that he is in the permanent service of the Government of India and that he has to reside in Delhi for that service. Even if the applicant were so minded, he cannot come to Nagpur and “reside” in Nagpur or at any place within the jurisdiction of the Court at Nagpur because he will not be coming to Nagpur and residing as a measure of permanent residence. A casual visit to Nagpur or even a limited period of stay in Nagput may not possibly amount to residence in Nagpur so as to satisfy the condition of Section 19 that both the husband and wife reside at Nagpur to give jurisdiction to the Court at Nagpur.” 18. The Madras High Court in V. Balakrishna Naidu vs. N. Sakuntala Bai (1942) 2 MLJ 134 held; though in a case of maintenance decided under the provisions of the old section 488 Cr.P.C. that the expressions ‘reside’ and ‘last resided’ imply something more than just a stay and requires some intention to remain at a place and not merely to pay it a casual visit, in the words of Horwill, J., which are useful for the present case, deserve to be quoted in extenso: “2. We cannot go behind the finding of fact of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, which is reasonable on the evidence; and so Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar has confined his arguments to the question of the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Trichinopoly to award maintenance under Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 488, Clause (8), says that “proceedings under that section may be taken against any person in any District where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife ...” The question is whether during those four days in which the petitioner was staying at Trichinopoly, he was residing there with his wife ? I have been taken through the evidence of the husband and of the wife and there can be no doubt that the petitioner intended returning to his house in Bangalore with his wife and resuming his duties as Assistant Engineer in the Mysore State. The expression ‘reside’ implies, something more than ‘stay’. I have been taken through the evidence of the husband and of the wife and there can be no doubt that the petitioner intended returning to his house in Bangalore with his wife and resuming his duties as Assistant Engineer in the Mysore State. The expression ‘reside’ implies, something more than ‘stay’. It is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as “to dwell permanently or for a considerable time; to have one’s settled or usual abode; to live in or at a particular place.” The word therefore implies some intention to remain at a place and not merely to pay it a casual visit, intending shortly to move on to one’s permanent residence. This is the purport of the decision of a Bench of the Lahore High Court in Charan Das v. Surasti Bai I.L.R. (1940) Lah. 755 : A.I.R. 1940 Lab. 449. The lower Court considered that the petitioner had no permanent place of residence; for wherever the petitioner went in the Mysore State he lived in a rented house and it was in a rented house that he lived in, Bangalore. The learned Magistrate concluded that as the petitioner had no permanent place of residence, he must be deemed to have resided wherever he stayed. He stayed last at Trichinopoly; and so last resided in that town. The Magistrate’s reasoning cannot however be accepted. A person who follows a profession must necessarily have some place of residence in which he can keep his wife and family and store his furniture and goods and to which he can return when he is not on tour. He can as well be said to reside in a rented house as in a house of which he is the owner. There can be little doubt that the petitioner had made Bangalore his home before he visited Trichinopoly and intended to continue to reside there. His visit to Trichinopoly was clearly a casual one, in order that the parties might see their relatives on their way from Ceylon to Bangalore. The residence of the petitioner at the time when he ill-treated his wife was therefore Bangalore and not Trichinopoly; and that was where the petitioner last resided with his wife at the time when the application for maintenance was filed. 3. The residence of the petitioner at the time when he ill-treated his wife was therefore Bangalore and not Trichinopoly; and that was where the petitioner last resided with his wife at the time when the application for maintenance was filed. 3. I have been referred to a decision of Burn, J., in Krishnaswamy Iyer v. Subbulakshmi Animal 1935 M.W.N. 475, in a case something like the present one. The husband in that case had his work in a place other than that in which the enquiry took place; but there were important circumstances then existing which are not to be found in this one which led Burn, J., to hold that the husband was residing in the town he visited. The husband’s native place was Trichinopoly; he had two houses and lands there, and he used to visit that town whenever he had sufficient leave. He had left his wife in Trichinopoly at her father’s house and he went there and stayed with her for some days. The present petitioner’s ancestral house is in Mysore and he has no house or other property in Trichinopoly. 4. The Magistrate therefore had no jurisdiction to try this case; but the learned Magistrate seems to have thought that even if that were so, the lack of jurisdiction would not nullify his order. He quoted Section 531, Criminal Procedure Code, which says that “No order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the... proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at...took place in a wrong sessions division, district, division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.” I agree that in this case there was no failure of justice; but Section 531 is naturally intended to apply only to inquiries in British India; for the Criminal Procedure Code applies only to British India. It certainly does not condone the wrongful exercise of jurisdiction by a British Indian Court when no British Indian Court would have’ jurisdiction in the matter. If it were otherwise, a person, by instituting a proceeding in a British Indian Court might obtain a remedy that was not open to him in the Court having jurisdiction. If authority for this position be necessary, it is found in In the matter of Bichitranand Das v. Bhugbut Perai (1889) 16 Cal. 667. If it were otherwise, a person, by instituting a proceeding in a British Indian Court might obtain a remedy that was not open to him in the Court having jurisdiction. If authority for this position be necessary, it is found in In the matter of Bichitranand Das v. Bhugbut Perai (1889) 16 Cal. 667. Bangalore is within the Mysore State and so the Bangalore Courts—even those in the Civil and Military Station—are foreign Courts. Section 531, Criminal Procedure Code will therefore not cure any defect in jurisdiction in the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who passed this order. 5. The order of the Magistrate is therefore set aside as one without jurisdiction.” 19. In these ways the words ‘last resided’ have to be understood within the framework of S.19 (iii) of the HMA. There must be animus manendi, in absence of which, the test of residence would fail. 20. The Supreme Court in Smt. Jeewanti Pandey vs. Kishan Chandra Pandey, 1981 4 SCC 517 had occasion to deal with the word “residence” and “residing” used in S.19 of the Act and held that the word “resides” means more than a temporary stay and which has to be of a permanent character. The Supreme Court observed as follows:- “In order to give jurisdiction on the ground of “residence”, some thing more that a temporary stay is required. It must be more of less of a permanent character, and of such a nature that the court in which the respondent is sued, is his natural form. The word “resides” is by no means free from all ambiguity and is capable of a variety of meanings according to the circumstances to which it is made applicable and the context in which it is found. It is capable of being understood in its ordinary sense of having one’s own dwelling permanently, as well as in its extended sense. In its ordinary sense “residence” is more or less of a permanent character. The expression “resides” means to make an abode of an considerable time; to dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time. It is the place where a person has fixed home or abode. In Webster’s Dictionary, “to reside” has been defined as meaning “to dwell permanently or for any length of time”, and words like “dwelling place” or “abode” are held to be synonymous. It is the place where a person has fixed home or abode. In Webster’s Dictionary, “to reside” has been defined as meaning “to dwell permanently or for any length of time”, and words like “dwelling place” or “abode” are held to be synonymous. Where there is a such fixed home or such abode at one place the person cannot be said to reside at any other place where he had gone on a casual or temporary visit, e.g. for health or business or for a change. If a person lives with his wife and children, in an established home, his legal and actual place of residence is the same. If a person has no established home and is compelled to live in hotels, boarding houses are houses of others, his actual and physical habitation is the place where he actually or personally resides.” 21. In Smt. Satya vs. Teja Singh, (1974) 1 SCC 120 the Supreme Court observed:- “Prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings, he might have stayed but he never lived, in Nevada. Having secured a divorce decree he left Nevada immediately thereafter rendering false his statement in the petition for divorce that he had ‘the intent to make the State of Nevada his home for an indefinite period,’ The concept of domicil is not uniform in all jurisdictions and just as long residence does not by itself establish domicil, brief residence may not negative it. But residence for a particular purpose fails to satisfy the qualitative test, for, the purpose being accomplished the residence would cease. The two elements of factum et animus must concur. Thus, the decree of the Nevada Court lacks jurisdiction and cannot receive recognition in Indian Courts. The judgment to operate as conclusive proof under s. 41, Evidence Act, has to be of a ‘Competent Court’, that is, a Court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Even a judgment in rem is open to attack on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction, and s. 44 of the Evidence Act gives the right to a party to show that a judgment under s. 41 was delivered by a Court. not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Even a judgment in rem is open to attack on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction, and s. 44 of the Evidence Act gives the right to a party to show that a judgment under s. 41 was delivered by a Court. not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Fraud, in any case bearing on jurisdictional facts, vitiates all judicial acts whether in rem or in personam; and no rule of private international law could compel a wife to submit to a decree procured by the husband by trickery.” 22. Thus, the Supreme Court in Smt. Satya so succinctly explained how trickery must be understood and that fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the matter but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts. Those which I may say are the very foundation of territorial jurisdiction limited by boundaries. 23. Keeping in view the above legal position in the foreground and upon the construction of S.19 HMA as to jurisdictional facts, then to my mind the Jhajjar Court does not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition merely upon a plea of a visit of the parties to village Goria, as is the case set up by the petitioning husband in his own words: ‘visited/resided’. By visiting Goria for a ceremony, parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court at Jhajjar as it would militate against the concept of last resided together enshrined in Section 19 HMA. Therefore, if the Court is found to be lacking in territorial jurisdiction to entertain the plaint then the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10, CPC have to be given their plain, clear and legislative meaning and the Court ought to return such plaint to be presented to the proper forum. 24. To reach this conclusion I have carefully gone through the reply of the husband to the application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code as well and find from there that it contains no simple and direct answer to the wife’s objections pleaded in the application for return of plaint. The replies are evasive and non-committal. He admits that as an IAS Officer he will remain posted either in Punjab or with the Central Government but yet says that he is allowed annual leave/casual leave/earned leave as if a matrimonial residential home can work or rest on leave. The replies are evasive and non-committal. He admits that as an IAS Officer he will remain posted either in Punjab or with the Central Government but yet says that he is allowed annual leave/casual leave/earned leave as if a matrimonial residential home can work or rest on leave. This is begging the question by a fallacy. He asserts in his reply that he can “definitely live in his parental house in village Goria, District Jhajjar in Haryana”. Yes he can without doubt. No one can stop him. But the question here is one of ‘last resided’ together within the meaning and intendment of section 19 HMA and not permanent residence of the husband in a village where his roots may lie. For HMA, the locus of the matrimonial home is to be determined accordingly. 25. He then bandies words in his reply to suggest that it was never agreed by the petitioner (wife) that parties will not live in Haryana (see para.6). So artfully put in the negative. The mind set shows through the pleadings. In para.12 he avers: “the Court has very much jurisdiction to entertain the present suit because Petitioner is permanent resident of village Goria and was permanent resident of Village Goria when the present petition was filed and at the time of filing the present petition the Respondent was residing in England i.e. outside the territories to which Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 extends”. These are irrelevant facts and not enough to satisfy the test of jurisdictional facts as to territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 HMA as the husband relies on Section 19 (iii) which talks of “where the parties to the marriage last resided together” and not where the husband alone has his permanent home. Only when the petitioner is the wife, does Section 19(iii-a) allow the petition to be filed where the wife is residing on the date of the presentation of the petition. Since, in the present case, the husband is the petitioner in the trial court, this benefit is not available to him. These defensive statements do not add to the credit of the petitioner-respondent hailing from a rural background and belonging to India’s premier civil service, serving in the highest echelons of the Government. Since, in the present case, the husband is the petitioner in the trial court, this benefit is not available to him. These defensive statements do not add to the credit of the petitioner-respondent hailing from a rural background and belonging to India’s premier civil service, serving in the highest echelons of the Government. If he belongs to the IAS cadre of Punjab, is educated and married to an educated woman after courtship, it follows sequitur that the matrimonial home will normally be in such a case more likely than not in a Government house allotted at the station of posting in Punjab which by the very nature of things cannot be imputed to VPO Goria, Jhajjar and certainly not conferring jurisdiction resting on a slim visit to meet with her in-laws and not for good measure. This requires no special proof or admitting evidence by long drawn litigation unless there is express intention to the contrary which is not discernible from the papers placed before me. 26. It is also the husband’s case in defence of the application for return of plaint that the parties never resided anywhere else except in his native village at Goria but as he says this he does not explain for how long, for what reason, for what purpose, with what objective, and with what intention. Nor does he plead any material facts and particulars of their visit/residence sufficient for a court to continue with the proceedings at Jhajjar. It appears to me that the husband instituted the petition gambling on the point of jurisdiction on concealed falsehood and misrepresentation in trying his luck in litigation that it may pass muster only to harass the spouse in a wrong forum. Courts are not chess boards to play moves on, to checkmate the opponent. Litigation must be fought fair and square and by just and lawful means and on candid and truthful statements made before court with no tricks played by twisting and splitting words. 27. In Liverpool & London S.P.7 I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success 1 & another, (2004) 9 SCC 512 the Supreme Court observed: “The idea underlying Order 7 Rule 11 (a) is that when no cause of action is disclosed, the courts will not unnecessarily protract the hearing of a suit. 27. In Liverpool & London S.P.7 I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success 1 & another, (2004) 9 SCC 512 the Supreme Court observed: “The idea underlying Order 7 Rule 11 (a) is that when no cause of action is disclosed, the courts will not unnecessarily protract the hearing of a suit. Having regard to the changes in the legislative policy as adumbrated by the amendments carried out in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Courts would interpret the provisions in such a manner so as to save expenses, achieve expedition, avoid the court’s resources being used up on cases which will serve no useful purpose. A litigation which in the opinion of the court is doomed to fail would not further be allowed to be used as a device to harass a litigant.” 28. Though the Court made the observations in the context of Order 7 Rule 11 (a) which deals with rejection of plaint for want of disclosure of cause of action but the principles would eminently apply to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 (return of plaint) and Order 7 Rule 11 (d) where plaint is liable to be rejected if the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The present case is hit also by Order 7 Rule 11 (d). Barred by any law would encompass barred by territorial law conferring or denying jurisdiction or the lack of authority to decide a case presented before a court of law. 29. Ms. Luthra further submits that a selection of judgments were cited and relied on in the body of the application under Order 7 Rule 10 & 11of the Code praying for return of plaint objecting to lack of territorial jurisdiction in the Jhajjar court with reference to the issue of ‘resides’ and ‘last resided’ in the context of the provisions of S.19 (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “HMA”) but there was no due deliberation on them by the learned trial judge. It follows sequitur that the parties can hardly be said to be residing or being in residence or having last resided together as husband and wife in village Goria as per the provisions of S.19 (iii) of the HMA and for these reasons the application deserved to be allowed and the plaint returned to the petitioner for presentation in a proper forum exercising territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter. The petitioner was within her rights to approach the Family Court to raise the objection of jurisdiction and maintainability without filing a written statement as the issue of the petition being non maintainable had to be determined from the pleadings in the plaint. Accordingly, if the parties to the marriage had not last resided together within the jurisdiction of the Family Court, Jhajjar, it had no jurisdiction per se to even entertain the petition. Therefore, if from the divorce petition itself the petitioner and respondent had not resided together as husband and wife at Jhajjar, the Family Court at Jhajjar could not entertain the divorce petition. 30. She then draws attention to the impugned order to point out the several grave errors committed and irrelevant reasoning relied on taking into consideration irrelevant facts through perverse reasoning to dilute and water down the finding of the trial judge himself heavily relied upon by the petitioner quoted supra which have led to the dismissal of the application, thereby wrongfully compelling the wife to face a trial at Jhajjar which clearly lacks territorial jurisdiction on the showing of the husband. These are culled out and reproduced without paraphrasing. Take these for instance: “Respondent had given her address as a resident of United Kingdom and the address of the Petitioner as a resident of VPO Goria, Distt. Jhajjar (Haryana). I am of the considered view that in view of the above circumstances, it would not be appropriate to look into the matter. Take these for instance: “Respondent had given her address as a resident of United Kingdom and the address of the Petitioner as a resident of VPO Goria, Distt. Jhajjar (Haryana). I am of the considered view that in view of the above circumstances, it would not be appropriate to look into the matter. Though, I am of the considered view that it is not proper on the part of the Respondent to agitate the matter again before this Court but considering the technical grounds, the matter is being considered.” “In fact, he (petitioner) was born and brought up there and the respondent, at the time of filing of the present petition, was residing in U.K. Para No.33 of the petition states that the matrimonial home of the parties to the petition is Village Goria, Tehsil Matanhail, Distt. Jhajjar where she had lastly visited/resided with the petitioner and the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present petition. It has already been mentioned that Ms. Minerva Singh has not filed the reply to the divorce petition so far. At the time of filing the present petition, the Respondent was residing in U.K. What is meant by residing together or residing at a Particular place in the context of section 19 of Hindu Marriage act, is some time not easier to answer. The question may not require much deliberation in case the parties had resided at a particular place for a sufficiently long time. However, in case they do not reside for a sufficiently long time at particular place, the answer to the question may pose a problem. In the case in hand, it is admitted that the respondent had visited Village Goria after the marriage with the petitioner and thereafter both of them left for the home of the Respondent at Delhi, from where she did not accompany the petitioner. The problem in the present case is compounded by the fact that the petitioner is an IAS officer of the Punjab Cadre.” “In the case in hand, it is admitted that the petitioner is an original resident of Village Goria. Petitioner has also produced a photocopy of wedding card which states that the marriage party had left from his residence at Village Goria Distt., Jhajjar for Parkland Exotica, New Delhi. It is submitted that the parties to the marriage after the marriage ceremony also returned to Village Goria. Petitioner has also produced a photocopy of wedding card which states that the marriage party had left from his residence at Village Goria Distt., Jhajjar for Parkland Exotica, New Delhi. It is submitted that the parties to the marriage after the marriage ceremony also returned to Village Goria. The question which arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, it can be said that the parties last resided together at Village Goria? I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, it is not necessary that the parties should actually reside together at a particular place to confer jurisdiction on the Court which exercises the jurisdiction on that area and the fact that parties had the necessary animus manendi, i.e. an intention to stay there in future, may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.” “Supposing in the case in hand, the petitioner had not been serving anywhere and residing at village Goria. The circumstances that the wife had left the company of the petitioner, it could well be said that the parties had the necessary animus manendi to reside together at Village Goria. However, it was argued on behalf of the respondent that since the petitioner is serving in the State of Punjab and had no intention to set up the matrimonial home at Village Goria, it cannot be said that the parties last resided together at Village Goria. I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the parties last resided together at Village Goria. In fact, neither they resided together at Village Goria nor they had the requisite animus manendi to reside there.” “However, it cannot be denied that the petitioner is a resident of Village Goria. He was born and brought up there. His parents are still residing at Village Goria. The marriage party had left for Delhi from Village Goria. I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be denied that he is a resident of Village Goria. It is admitted on record that at the time of filing of the present petition, the respondent was residing in U.K. I have also perused the other judgments cited at bar on behalf of the Respondent. It is admitted on record that at the time of filing of the present petition, the respondent was residing in U.K. I have also perused the other judgments cited at bar on behalf of the Respondent. They are wholly beside the point and have no bearing on the merits of the present application.” (Underlined for emphasis) 31. On the other hand Mr. Kundu submits that the plaint is open to trial and cannot be ordered to be returned for the reason that the words ‘visit/resided’ can be appreciated only by contest after receiving written statement and after completion of the pleadings to enable issues to be struck and evidence to be led by the parties. The argument does not impress me as acceptable reason to continue the trial at Jhajjar for the reasons recorded above and in the face of the findings of the trial court itself relied upon by the wife. His next argument deserves to be noticed and rejected which is that the petitioner’s transfer application was rejected by the Supreme Court and thus she is precluded from agitating the matter again and has to face litigation in the Jhajjar Court on merits. He supports the reasoning of the trial court when it says “Though, I am of the considered view that it is not proper on the part of the Respondent to agitate the matter again before this Court but considering the technical grounds, the matter is being considered.” The learned trial judge seems to be doing a great favour to the wife in not non-suiting her application on “technical grounds” after forming an opinion in his considered view that it was not proper for her to agitate the matter again in the application under Order 7 Rule 10, CPC. The reasoning is utterly disturbing. She was not agitating the matter again. She only exercised her right under Order 7 Rule 10, CPC for the first time at the earliest opportunity in terms of section 21 of the Code. The Supreme Court had no occasion to opine on territorial jurisdiction in the Transfer Petition. The order has been passed under Constitutional authority on a limited issue of transfer raised before the Supreme Court from one jurisdiction to another. It is not a declaration of law on territorial jurisdiction in the present matter. Only the request for transfer has been declined. No determination had taken place. The order has been passed under Constitutional authority on a limited issue of transfer raised before the Supreme Court from one jurisdiction to another. It is not a declaration of law on territorial jurisdiction in the present matter. Only the request for transfer has been declined. No determination had taken place. That issue is raised in the present proceedings and has to be answered within the statutory framework of the Code, HMA and The Family Courts Act, 1984. Those provisions need to be addressed as well. 32. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 enjoins that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) shall apply to suits and proceedings before a Family Court. For this purpose a Family Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court under the CPC. Section 21 of the CPC stipulates that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. The petitioner did as much. In view of the aforestated position of law, for purposes of invoking Order 7, Rule 10, CPC, the determination can take place to see at the outset if there is any triable cause of action in the petition which can be ascertained from the pleadings in the plaint itself. Therefore, at the earliest possible opportunity the objection regarding jurisdiction can be taken as enjoined in Section 21 CPC. This is what was done in the present case. 33. The learned trial judge manning a matrimonial court in Superior Judicial Services does not display anywhere in the impugned order even a rudimentary knowledge of law, forget about matrimonial law and may pose a detriment in deciding cases. The Family Court has seriously erred in dismissing the application under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC without due application of mind. A determination can certainly take place to see at the outset if there is territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate as may be ascertained from the pleadings in the plaint itself. If the Court has no jurisdiction, parties may not be put to the ordeal of trial. 34. A determination can certainly take place to see at the outset if there is territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate as may be ascertained from the pleadings in the plaint itself. If the Court has no jurisdiction, parties may not be put to the ordeal of trial. 34. What is res ipsa loquitur requires no proof. The determination can take place to see at the outset if there is any triable issue on territorial jurisdiction in the petition which can be ascertained from the pleadings in the plaint itself. I ask a simple question to myself. Where would an IAS officer belonging to the Punjab cadre but native of village Goria lying in the rural part of district Jhajjar in the State of Haryana, expect a modern educated wife to live with him, among rural folk or in the social milieu of his station in life, notwithstanding the matrimonial discord and in the absence of any indication to the contrary. This case does not deserve being put through the grinding mill of gathering evidence and proof through protracted adjudication to arrive at what can be concluded now on the pleadings itself. I am sorry to say but the learned trial judge has made a complete hash of the application under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC by perverting logic, returning findings in one part of the order in favour of the wife, at other places diametrically opposite in favour of the husband leaving no scope for this court to reconcile the contradictions in the two sets of reasoning, unless he himself had chosen to review his order by re-visiting the case. 35. The matrimonial court seems to have walked an extra mile to dismiss the application anyhow. The trial judge has not even cared to read the provisions of law and the catena of case law cited before him interpreting section 19 (iii) and 19 (iv) of HMA or to have taken time out to cull out the ratio of those cases to see if they apply. He has put them in one paragraph one after the other separated by commas as though they were books lying unread on a shelf. Not a word is said about any of them leaving it for this court to do his duty. He has put them in one paragraph one after the other separated by commas as though they were books lying unread on a shelf. Not a word is said about any of them leaving it for this court to do his duty. In one line he has dismissed off hand all of them including the judgments of the Supreme Court by recording in one splendid sweep: “They are wholly beside the point and have no bearing on the merits of the present application.” Absence of reasons in a judicial order is a cardinal sin. Bad or perverted reasoning is a lower species of judicial sin. No reasons are forthcoming from the impugned order on the points of distinction or the distinguishing features of those cases from the facts of this case for this Court to understand the process of reasoning followed to arrive at the conclusions made or to know what has really weighed in the mind of the judge. The impugned order lacks application of mind and fails the test of sound judicial reasoning. Hence it must be set aside. 36. As I read the impugned order I am not even sure whether the learned trial judge has actually understood the import of “animus manendi” which means ‘intention of remaining’. This simple test could have been applied to the facts with salutary effect. At places in the impugned order the trial judge candidly confesses confusion. He seems to be in a predicament. What for? There is nothing special about the case. Some other court of competent jurisdiction would try the case. I find the court dithering for no reason when it records: “What is meant by residing together or residing at a Particular place in the context of section 19 of Hindu Marriage Act, is some time not easier to answer. The question may not require much deliberation in case the parties had resided at a particular place for a sufficiently long time. However, in case they do not reside for a sufficiently long time at particular place, the answer to the question may pose a problem”. 37. People come to court looking for solutions to their problems. The court cannot create them. Litigants cannot be told off that the court has run into a problem in deciding their lis lest they panic. However, in case they do not reside for a sufficiently long time at particular place, the answer to the question may pose a problem”. 37. People come to court looking for solutions to their problems. The court cannot create them. Litigants cannot be told off that the court has run into a problem in deciding their lis lest they panic. If this were to happen people might lose faith in the judicial system they have come knocking. Where else would they then go for justice ‘for fixing the problem’. If a judge has a problem at hand, as he may have, he has to go it alone or take help from a colleague in finding legal solutions to issues but he cannot express helplessness and that too in writing in a judgment or an order. There was no dharam sankat on the learned judge to decide the application one way or the other and as he thought fit in his judicial discretion. There is no room for worry or pressure on the mind of the judge in deciding a case involving persons howsoever high they may be. The learned trial judge ought not to have said: “The problem in the present case is compounded by the fact that the petitioner is an IAS officer of the Punjab Cadre.” Where was the need to introduce this strange line of thinking? It makes the reasoning suspect. The fact that the petitioner was an IAS officer was itself a solution to the ‘problem’ of residence in locating places where the parties could reasonably be said to have last resided with sufficient intention or animus manendi to confer territorial jurisdiction on a court in accordance with territorial matrimonial law. The court cannot apply the Orwellian paraphrasing of the Declaration of Independence in The Animal Farm where the famous words lie: “all men are created equal but some are more equal than others”. The present case was as clear as the clear blue sky. Indeed, at the boiling point in the discussion the trial court analyzed and reached a finding that the parties never last resided at village Goria nor had the requisite animus manendi to reside there within meaning of Section 19 HMA. Nothing further remained to be examined or done and yet the application was declined. 38. Indeed, at the boiling point in the discussion the trial court analyzed and reached a finding that the parties never last resided at village Goria nor had the requisite animus manendi to reside there within meaning of Section 19 HMA. Nothing further remained to be examined or done and yet the application was declined. 38. Forget all that; what takes the cake is when the learned trial judge says “I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, it is not necessary that the parties should actually reside together at a particular place to confer jurisdiction on the Court which exercises the jurisdiction on that area and the fact that parties had the necessary animus manendi, i.e. an intention to stay there in future, may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.” That is an interesting twist in the tale. A new law has been created and the frontiers of territorial jurisdiction stand extended by taking it back to the future. I am sorry to say but the impugned order is riddled with facile assumptions drawn from god-knows-where. Worse still, it is full to the brim with statements that border on the absurd. I know these are very hard words to speak for a fellow judge in the lower judiciary but I am unable to withhold myself for the cause of justice. I find the order far too long, far too repetitive and far too laboured to ignore its suspect reasoning. This court is a tad suspicious. If a short order was passed in the rush and hurry of transacting a long list of judicial business of the day and the application was rejected for good, bad or indifferent reason, I am certain the observations in the present judgment would not have followed and there might have been room for latitude without any comments. There is great room for forgiveness of some judicial work of fledgling judges during their incubation period sitting in Junior Division passing bad orders. But when they graduate to superior judicial service and hold appellate jurisdiction, the rope of inspection becomes tighter corresponding to the higher levels of decision making and subject matter. Having read the queer order many times over during the course of preparation of this judgment, I feel sufficiently moved to express my displeasure not so much for what was done but for what was written. Having read the queer order many times over during the course of preparation of this judgment, I feel sufficiently moved to express my displeasure not so much for what was done but for what was written. The greatest asset and the strongest weapon in the armoury of the judiciary, said Justice H.R. Khanna in his Tagore Law Lectures in 1985 is “the confidence it commands and the faith it inspires in the minds of the people in its capacity to do even-handed justice and keep the scales in balance in any dispute” 39. The petition is accepted. The impugned order is set aside. I hesitate to impose costs though the petitioner wife deserved them. This is for the reason that the matter has been finally decided at the first motion hearing on caveat. The learned trial court is ordered to return the plaint for presentation before the proper forum after following due procedure under the Code. 40. A copy of this order be sent to the learned trial judge through email for his introspection. ---------0.B.S.0------------