JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. Leave to amend the memorandum of the petition at Page 1, so as to include "Article 227", is granted. The necessary amendment be carried out, forthwith. 2. By preferring this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 13.02.2014, passed by the City Civil Court below the application at Exhibit 11, whereby the application for condonation of the delay of eleven years, that has occurred in filing the application for restoration of Civil Suit No.3121/1983, has been rejected. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner is the original plaintiff, who had instituted Regular Civil Suit No.3121/1983, seeking an order of dissolution of the partnership firm as well as for getting the amount recovered as a partner of the partnership firm in the name and style of "Shri Jay Jay Ambe Corporation". 3.1. According to the petitioner, the defendants therein did not defend the suit or file their written statement. Subsequently, with the consent of the learned advocate for the petitioner, the written statement was permitted to be filed. Thereafter, the suit remained pending. According to the petitioner, during the pendency of the suit, the respondents-original defendants had filed another suit before the Court of Small Causes. The petitioner required certain papers that were part of the suit from which the present proceedings have emanated, therefore, he took away the entire brief of his pending suit from the advocate. During this period, the suit came up for hearing, in the year 2002. The advocate for the petitioner wrote a letter to the petitioner, informing him that the suit had been listed on the Board. According to the petitioner, the letter came to be misplaced by him; therefore, the advocate could not be contacted. The learned advocate for the petitioner informed the City Civil Court that certain papers had been taken away by the petitioner. The said Court granted several opportunities to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that his advocate did not inform him that the Court had granted such opportunities. The suit was listed on the Board and as it was not attended to, the City Civil Court passed an order, dismissing the suit for default, on 29.10.2002. The said Court granted several opportunities to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that his advocate did not inform him that the Court had granted such opportunities. The suit was listed on the Board and as it was not attended to, the City Civil Court passed an order, dismissing the suit for default, on 29.10.2002. It is further the case of the petitioner that he was not keeping good health and the advocate appearing for him also passed away. Due to these "unavoidable" circumstances, the petitioner was unaware of the passing of the order dated 29.10.2002, dismissing the suit for default. When he came to know of the said order, he filed an application for restoration, on 18.01.2013. Objections were filed by the respondent (original defendant) to this application. After hearing the respective parties, the City Civil Court passed the impugned order rejecting the said application. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition. 4. Ms. Mita S. Panchal, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the order passed by the Court below is unjust, improper and illegal, hence, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.1. It is further submitted that though it is true that the papers of the plaint were taken away by the petitioner, however, this was done only with a view to defending another suit filed by the defendant, before the Court of Small Causes. The advocate for the petitioner had not retired from the case, therefore, it was his duty to point out this aspect to the Court when the suit was listed before it. In failing to do so, the advocate failed to discharge his duty and the petitioner ought not to be made to suffer due to the negligence of the advocate. 4.2. It is contended that if the suit is not restored, the petitioner would lose for all times to come, therefore, the City Civil Court ought to have taken a lenient and pragmatic view by condoning the delay, in the interest of justice. 4.3. It is urged that the petitioner had received a letter from his advocate, which was lost, due to oversight. The said letter was not for the purpose of retirement from the case. 4.3. It is urged that the petitioner had received a letter from his advocate, which was lost, due to oversight. The said letter was not for the purpose of retirement from the case. From the Rojkam of the Court, it appears that no representation was made by the concerned advocate, to the effect that the papers of the plaint were taken away by the petitioner. The petitioner came to know only in the year 2013, that the suit had been dismissed for default. Upon inquiry, he also found that the advocate representing him had expired. All the above circumstances were beyond the control of the petitioner, hence, the delay of eleven years deserves to be condoned. 4.4. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Haribhai Lakhubhai Seedhav v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2010 (2) GLH 97 . 5. This Court has heard the learned advocate for the petitioner, perused the averments made in the petition, contents of the impugned order and other documents on record. 6. A perusal of the application for condonation of delay, preferred by the petitioner, makes it clear that the petitioner has admitted that he had taken away the entire papers of the suit from his advocate. It is also clear from the application that the advocate had informed the petitioner regarding the adjournments granted by the Court. The petitioner has stated in the application that the letter of the advocate had been misplaced by him and that he did not return the brief to the advocate. It is further admitted by the petitioner that, as the entire papers of the brief had been taken away by him from his advocate, it was natural that the advocate would not be in a position to appear for him. The petitioner has averred that after he came to know of the order dated 29.10.2002, dismissing the suit for default, he could not take any necessary steps, as he was ill and hospitalized. It was for this reason that he could not establish any communication with his advocate. It is only when he regained his health that he took steps to file the application for condonation of the delay of eleven years. 7. It was for this reason that he could not establish any communication with his advocate. It is only when he regained his health that he took steps to file the application for condonation of the delay of eleven years. 7. In the application for condonation of delay, there is no mention of the so-called 'negligence' of the advocate of the petitioner, as is sought to be established before this Court. There is an admission on the part of the petitioner in the application, that the papers of the brief were voluntarily taken by him for some other reason. The reason that the defendant had filed another suit in the Court of Small Causes, as stated in the petition, does not find mention in the application. 8. Be that as it may, the ground of negligence of the advocate appears to have been added after a second thought, before this Court. A perusal of the impugned order dated 13.02.2014, passed by the City Civil Court reveals that the said Court has, after scrutinising the application for condonation of delay, arrived at a conclusion that no ground worth the name is made out for condonation of the delay. According to the Court below, the application is laconic and does not explain the delay, as required under the law. In the view of this Court, after having perused the application and examined the record, the impugned order cannot be faulted. 9. It is a settled position of law that a litigant applying for condonation of delay is obliged under the law to show sufficient cause for such delay. If the application made by the petitioner is perused, it is evident that no cause worth the name, leave alone sufficient cause, has been shown for condonation of the gross delay of eleven years. The petitioner had taken away the brief of the suit from his advocate on his own volition, leaving the advocate in a position where he could not defend the suit. It is clear from the record, and is also admitted by the petitioner, that the advocate had informed him in writing by way of a letter, that the Court had granted an adjournment after the papers were taken away. The petitioner never returned the papers of the brief to the advocate, or give him instructions. According to the petitioner, he had misplaced the letter of the advocate. The petitioner never returned the papers of the brief to the advocate, or give him instructions. According to the petitioner, he had misplaced the letter of the advocate. However, it is clear that the petitioner has knowledge of the letter, as it is mentioned in the application for condonation of delay. The petitioner was, therefore, aware that the Court had granted adjournments and the suit was to be proceeded with. 10. The advocate could not proceed with the suit before the Court due to lack of the brief, which is acknowledged by the petitioner. In such circumstances, it can hardly be said that the advocate for the petitioner was negligent in his duty towards the petitioner, in defending the suit. 11. It emerges from the record that the advocate for the petitioner eventually passed away. He cannot be blamed for this circumstance. It is obvious that the petitioner did not try to communicate with his advocate for eleven long years. Had he done so, the state of affairs would have been known to him. This clearly leads to a conclusion that the petitioner was negligent and careless in prosecuting the litigation. The so-called illness of the petitioner, as mentioned in the application, would not have prevented him from at least inquiring about the litigation for eleven long years. What the nature of the illness was, is undisclosed and uncorroborated by any medical certificate. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the petitioner was prevented by an illness of a serious nature from prosecuting the litigation. 12. The learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Haribhai Lakhubhai Seedhav v. State of Gujarat (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court has condoned the delay of ten years in filing an application, seeking leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal. The reason for the condonation of delay was that the appellant was not aware about the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the General Power of Attorney and came to know of this fact only when the appellant was served with a notice under Rule 10 of the Ceiling Rules, by the office of the Mamaltdar. The reason for the condonation of delay was that the appellant was not aware about the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the General Power of Attorney and came to know of this fact only when the appellant was served with a notice under Rule 10 of the Ceiling Rules, by the office of the Mamaltdar. In the said case, the Supreme Court took into consideration the aspect that the appellant was not even a party to the revenue proceedings before the authorities or the High Court, and even the respondents did not know of the dismissal of the writ petition, though they were parties. It is in this factual background that the delay of ten years came to condoned. 13. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court are on a total different footing from the facts obtaining in the present case. In the present case, the petitioner was very well aware of the institution of the suit, as he, himself, was the plaintiff. By his own volition, the entire papers of the plaint were taken away by him from his advocate, for some unspecified reason, which is not mentioned in the application. Before this Court it is stated to be the filing of another suit by the defendant in the Court of Small Causes. The petitioner had knowledge of the fact that in the absence of papers, the advocate would not be in a position to defend the suit. This is not a case where the petitioner did not know about the state of affairs. In fact, the petitioner, himself, is the perpetrator of the state of affairs that has led to the dismissal in default, of the suit. The facts of the case in Haribhai Lakhubhai Seedhav v. State of Gujarat (Supra) would, therefore, not be applicable to the present case. 14. As discussed hereinabove, the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, as required by the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 15. What constitute sufficient cause has been elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 , in the following terms : "19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. 15. What constitute sufficient cause has been elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 , in the following terms : "19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji. 20. In N. Balakrishnan this Court again reiterated the principle that: (SCC p.127, para 11) "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that [the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly." 21. ***** 22. ***** 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in Balwant Singh, as follows: (SCC p.696, paras 2526) "25. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 24. ***** 25. ***** 26. ***** 27. ***** 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay." 16. As held by the Supreme Court in the above quoted judgment, concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach" and "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. This is so, especially in cases where no sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay and where the negligence and carelessness of a litigant is writ large, as in the present case. 17. In case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others, reported in AIR 2010 SC 3043 , the Supreme Court has held as below : "14. ****** The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]" 18. Applying the above principles of law to the facts of the present case, it is evident from the record that no legal or adequate reasons have been advanced by the petitioner to explain the delay. On the contrary, the record reveals that there were no extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that could have prevented him from taking necessary steps and prosecuting the lis. 19. For reasons stated hereinabove, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the impugned order dated 13.02.2014, passed by the City Civil Court, so as to warrant interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 20. As there is no merit in the petition, it deserves to be rejected. It is, accordingly, rejected. Application rejected.