JUDGMENT HEMANT GUPTA, J. This order shall dispose of CWP No.22888 of 2012 filed by Gurmeet Kaur and others, as legal heirs of Sant Singh, against Gram Panchayat challenging the order of removal of encroachment on a public street in proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') and RSA No.3078 of 1997 filed by Gram Panchayat challenging the judgment and decree dated 04.04.1995 passed by the Learned First Appellate Court arising out of a suit for injunction filed by legal heirs of Gurdev Singh. Since the writ petition and the appeal pertain to alleged encroachment upon same common passage within the area of the Gram Panchayat, the same are taken up for hearing together. Firstly, we take up the Regular Second Appeal for decision. The plaintiffs respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants panchayat from interfering in the possession of their house or demolishing the room marked ABCD being part of the house or in any manner dispossessing the plaintiffs from this house and the gate shown as EF in the site plan. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the property is owned and possessed by them as they are in possession for more than 50 years and that the panchayat claimed the property in dispute as a common street and filed a petition under Section 11 of the Act, which was dismissed on 21.09.1987. The said decision has become final, thus, the property in dispute has not been declared as street. The challenge was also made to the proceedings initiated by the Panchayat under Section 21/23 of the Gram Panchyat Act, 1952 in view of the findings recorded in proceedings under Section 11 of the Act. In the written statement, the stand of the defendants was that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of the questions raised. It is pointed out that Gurdev Singh had property on both sides of the galisareaam (public street), but he encroached upon such public street from both sides by including the same in the property as shown by the letters ABCD in the site plan. Such street comes from the house of Joginder Singh and goes up to dharmshala of the village between the house of Darshan Singh and Piara Lal. Such street comes from the house of Joginder Singh and goes up to dharmshala of the village between the house of Darshan Singh and Piara Lal. It is also referred that the Collector in its order dated 21.09.1987 did not give any opinion on the question as to whether the street is public street or not but directed the Gram Panchayat to remove the encroachment under Section 21/23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. The Panchayat gave a notice to Gurdev Singh predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs under Section 21 of the Act. The case was transferred from Panchayat to some other Panchayat by the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar. The order of transfer has since been set aside by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the Panchayat and that the proceedings under Section 21 are pending adjudication. It is, thereafter, Jaswinder Singh brother of deceased Gurdev Singh filed a petition for stay of proceedings before the Collector, which stands dismissed. At this stage, it may be mentioned that the proceedings initiated by Jaswinder Singh under Section 7 of the Act are subject matter of challenge in writ petition. The learned trial Court has framed the following issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the suit property? OPP 2. Whether in view of the order of the DDPO mentioned in the plaint, the defendant cannot proceed against the plaintiffs under Section 21 & 23 of the Gram Panchayat Act? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 4. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred under the Gram Panchayat Act and Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP 6. Relief. The learned trial Court decided issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiffs holding the plaintiffs to be owner of the disputed land in the suit. Under issue No.2, the learned Civil Court returned the finding that in view of the order passed in proceedings under Section 11 of the Act, Gram Panchayat is not at liberty to presume that this dispute property is a public street. Under Issue No.4, it was held that the Collector has made uncalled observations which are beyond his powers and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred. Under Issue No.4, it was held that the Collector has made uncalled observations which are beyond his powers and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred. Consequently, the suit was decreed. In appeal, the learned First Appellate Court affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court but also held that appeal is not properly presented in the absence of resolution of Gram Panchayat authorizing its Sarpanch to file the appeal. We find that the following substantial questions of law arises for consideration in the second appeal: 1. Whether in a suit for injunction, learned Civil Court could examine whether the land vests with panchayat or not? 2. Whether the directions by the Collector to take recourse to the proceedings under Section 21 and 23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 could be challenged before the Civil Court? 3. Whether the first appeal could be dismissed for want of resolution authorizing a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat to file first appeal? In respect of first substantial question of law, learned counsel for the appellant relies upon Single Bench judgment of this Court in Udey Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat Nangal Jat (2010) 1 PLR 206 (P&H), wherein it has been held that in a simple suit for permanent injunction, the question of title qua the suit property is not to be decided. In fact, the judgment referred to by learned counsel for the appellant does not support the case of the appellant. In a suit for injunction, the Civil Court could not examine, whether the land vest with the Panchayat or not. The vesting of land with Panchayat falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector in terms of Section 11 of the Act after the same was amended and Section 13 of the Act was substituted by Punjab Act No.19 of 1976. Section 13 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 13 of the Act reads as under: “13. Section 13 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 13 of the Act reads as under: “13. Bar of Jurisdiction in civil courts No civil courts shall have jurisdiction (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question, whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not shamilat deh vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act; or (b) to question the legality of any action taken by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat, under this Act; or (c) in respect of any matter which the Commissioner or the Collector is empowered by or under this Act to determine.” Therefore, the question that the land vest with Panchayat or not could not be examined by the Civil Court more so in a suit for injunction. The Supreme Court in Ram Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364 examined the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and held that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. It observed as under: “5. It is no doubt true that the plaintiffs who claimed to be the owners along with some others of the suit land had avoided to seek a declaration that the suit land was not shamlat deh. They had, however, questioned the correctness of the entries in the revenue records which showed that the Panchayat was entitled to the suit land. The plaintiffs cannot by drawing their plaint cleverly by not claiming a declaration that the land in question was not shamlat deh confer jurisdiction on the civil court when by virtue of Section 13 of the Act the jurisdiction of civil courts to try such suits had been taken away. In the instant case the suit had been filed against the Panchayat and the Panchayat had expressly claimed that the land in question belonged to it as shamlat deh. It will not be possible in the circumstances for the civil court to make a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs without deciding the question whether the property in question was shamlat deh or not and whether it belonged to the Panchayat or not. Reliance was however placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagu v. Ram Sarup 1985 Punj. Reliance was however placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagu v. Ram Sarup 1985 Punj. LJ 366 in which the suit had been held to be maintainable in a civil court even though the defendant had contended that the land involved in that suit was shamlat deh. The High Court found that the plaintiff in that case had only stated in the plaint that the land in question was gali shehreaam or a thoroughfare belonging to the Gram Panchayat which was being used by the plaintiff as an approach to his house for about 30 years and had prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his right. The Gram Panchayat in question had not been impleaded as a defendant. The plaintiff in that case had not claimed that the suit land belonged to him or that it did not belong to the Gram Panchayat. The crucial issue which had been framed in that case was whether the land in question over which the plaintiff had asserted his right was a street or not and whether the defendant had blocked the said street. The High Court held in the circumstances of that suit that the jurisdiction of the civil court had not been taken away by virtue of Section 13 read with Sections 13A and 13B of the Act which had been inserted by the Haryana Legislature into the Act. We are of the view that the above decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case since in this case the Panchayat which had been impleaded as a defendant had raised the plea that the suit land was a part of shamlat deh and that the plaintiff had no right or title in it. This question has to be decided by the Collector only under Section 11 of the Act are not by the civil court. We do not, therefore, find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against which this petition is filed.” Later in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 416 , the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle in the following words: “12. We do not, therefore, find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against which this petition is filed.” Later in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 416 , the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle in the following words: “12. ......A perusal of the section, quoted above, would show that the jurisdiction of a civil court stands ousted: (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any of the following questions: (i) any land or other immovable property is or is not shamlat deh; (ii) any land or other immovable property or any right, title or interest in such land or other immovable property vests or does not vest in a Panchayat under the Act; (b) in respect of any matter which any Revenue Court, officer or authority is empowered by or under this Act to determine; or (c) to question the legality of any action taken or matter decided by any Revenue Court, officer or authority empowered to do so under the Act. Clauses (b) and (c), noted above, are relevant for our purpose. In respect of any matter which any Revenue Court, officer or authority is empowered by or under the Act to determine the issue, the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of that matter is barred. So also, where the Act empowers any Revenue Court, officer or authority to decide the legality of any action taken or matter decided by such court or authority, such a question cannot be entertained or adjudicated upon by a civil court. 13. In regard to a claim falling under Section 13(a)(i), this Court in Babu Ram v. Gram Sabha, Buhavi 1988 Supp. SCC 485 held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts was barred.” Thus, the question as to whether, the land in question vest with Panchayat or not could not examined by the Civil Court. With regard to second substantial question of law, the proceedings, which are subject matter of the second appeal, have been initiated by the legal representatives of Gurdev Singh and that in the writ petition by Jaswinder Singh, brother of Gurdev Singh. It further transpires that in terms of the directions of the Collector, there were proceedings initiated by the Panchayat on account of encroachment of a public street in terms of Section 21/23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. It further transpires that in terms of the directions of the Collector, there were proceedings initiated by the Panchayat on account of encroachment of a public street in terms of Section 21/23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. A perusal of the order passed by the Collector on 21.09.1987 Ex.P2 shows that after a finding was returned that the existence or the nonexistence of Gali at the site in dispute is not proved, it was observed as under: “Neither the witnesses of the applicant nor the witnesses of the Respondent have been able to prove clearly about the existence or the nonexistence of Gali at the site in dispute. The site plan appended with the application is also vague. Therefore, the petition can not be accepted and is hereby dismissed with the observations that the Gram Panchayat has failed in its duties in exercising the powers given to it under Section 21/23 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 if it was clear to the panchayat that the dispute site is a Gali. With this observation, I leave it to the Gram Panchayat to initiate action under Section 21 of the Gram Panchayat Act, if it so desires and think in its wisdom that some obstruction has been caused in any street.” An application was filed by the petitioners before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to transfer the proceedings pending before the Gram Panchayat. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred such proceedings from Gram Panchayat of Village Hafizabad to Gram Panchayat of Village Khanpur on 29.01.1988. The order of transfer was set aside by this Court on 10.07.1990 in CWP No.1250 of 1988 titled 'Gram Panchayat & another Vs. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar & others'. The operative part of the order reads as under: “Proviso to Section 41 (Gram Panchyat Act) lays down that a Chief Judicial Magistrate may for reasons to be recorded in writing transfer any criminal case from one Panchayat to another Panchayat of competent jurisdiction or to another Court subordinate to him. He can only transfer a criminal case from one Panchayat to another Panchayat having jurisdiction to try the same. Under Section 41 of the Act, he has no jurisdiction to transfer a case pending before a Gram Panchayat under Section 21 of the Act. He can only transfer a criminal case from one Panchayat to another Panchayat having jurisdiction to try the same. Under Section 41 of the Act, he has no jurisdiction to transfer a case pending before a Gram Panchayat under Section 21 of the Act. Section 21, inter alia, provides for removal of encroachment and nuisance from a public street, place or drain by the Gram Panchayat. The order under Section 21 of the Act is not passed by the Gram Panchayat in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction. Schedules IA and IB appended to the Act illustrate the offences cognizable by a Gram Panchayat. Removal of an encroachment or nuisance from a public street does not fall either in Schedule IA or Schedule IB to the Act. Consequently, the order of respondent No.1 is not envisaged by Section 41 of the Act and is thus without jurisdiction.” It may be noticed that no argument was raised before this Court that the proceedings could not be continued against the encroachers in view of the findings recorded by the Collector. As a consequence of the aforesaid order of this Court, the proceedings under Section 21/23 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 corresponding to Section 34 and 36 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 revived. The order passed by the Collector is an appealable order. Any direction of the Collector in an order under Section 11 of the Act could not be challenged by the plaintiffs before the Civil Court, but could be challenged only in appeal. Since no appeal was filed against the order passed by the Collector and the fact that this Court has set aside the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of transfer the proceedings from Gram Panchayat Hafizabad to Gram Panchayat Khanpur in a way amounts to merger of said order with the order passed by the High Court in CWP No.1250 of 1988. The civil suit was filed on 17.03.1992 without disclosing the decision in the writ petition filed by the Panchayat. Thus, we find that the action of the plaintiffs to approach the Civil Court against the findings recorded by the Collector even after the order of this Court passed on 10.07.1990 is not tenable. The claim of the plaintiff before the Civil Court was that the land does not vest in Panchayat. Thus, we find that the action of the plaintiffs to approach the Civil Court against the findings recorded by the Collector even after the order of this Court passed on 10.07.1990 is not tenable. The claim of the plaintiff before the Civil Court was that the land does not vest in Panchayat. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the vesting of land with Panchayat being a shamlat deh is specifically barred in terms of Section 13 of the Act, as reproduced above. Subsection (2) of Section 104 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 also bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the action taken by the Panchayat. Not only the writ petition filed by the Panchayat against the order of transfer in respect of proceedings under Sections 21 and 23 were set aside, but the civil court in respect of a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Panchayat in terms of Sections 21 & 23 of the Act (now Sections 34 & 36 of the Panchayati Raj Act) could not return a finding that the directions issued by the Collector are not tenable. A Full Bench of this Court in Narain Singh & another Vs. The State 1959 PLR 93 has held that a Gram Panchayat while proceeding under Sections 21 and 23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act is acting judicially, therefore, a petition challenging its orders under either of those sections would lie to the High Court. It observed as under: “Now, a Gram Panchayat acting under Section 21 in the first instance makes a conditional order on the basis of information or report received by it or on taking such evidence, if any, as it thinks fit, and the person against whom the conditional order is made has, if he objects to the order, the right to appear before it and to show cause with a view to have the order set aside or modified. When he does so appear, the Gram Panchayat is required to take evidence and it can make the conditional order absolute only if it is satisfied that that order was reasonable or proper. When he does so appear, the Gram Panchayat is required to take evidence and it can make the conditional order absolute only if it is satisfied that that order was reasonable or proper. Thus, there is a dispute affecting legal rights before the Gram Panchayat, the parties interested in which are on one side the person against whom the conditional order has been made and on the other the person who may have given the report or information to the Panchayat. The Panchayat is required to decide the questions involved in the dispute after taking evidence and on the basis of the evidence led before it. Its decision cannot be arbitrary or unfettered; and the conditional order made by it is to be made absolute only if it is reasonable and proper, otherwise it must be set aside. That decision so far as the Panchayat is concerned disposes of the whole matter finally. The Gram Panchayat acting under Section 21 of the Act would, therefore, appear to have all the attributes of a judicial tribunal.” The action of Panchayat in terms of Section 21/23 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (now section 34/36 of the Punjab Panchyati Raj Act, 1994) is thus a judicial function. The machinery is provided to exercise such powers. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand impliedly barred in terms of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of third substantial question of law, a perusal of the record shows that the memorandum of first appeal was filed before the first Appellate Court on 15.05.1995. The very first para has reference to the resolution of the Panchayat to file an appeal. Panchayat has now produced a copy of the resolution along with the present second appeal dated 12.05.1995 resolving to file appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and authorizing Gurnam Singh Sarpanch to file such appeal. The record further shows that the panchayat has produced numerous resolutions to seek removal of encroachment on the public street including resolutions to file writ petition against the earlier order of Chief Judicial Magistrate. Such resolutions are Exs.DW3/A to DW3/K. It appears that objection regarding maintainability of appeal was raised during the course of arguments without examining the record or giving an opportunity to the Panchayat to meet such objection. Such resolutions are Exs.DW3/A to DW3/K. It appears that objection regarding maintainability of appeal was raised during the course of arguments without examining the record or giving an opportunity to the Panchayat to meet such objection. Since the resolution authorizing the Sarpanch has been produced on record, which fact has not been controverted, therefore, the dismissal of the first appeal on the ground that Sarpanch was not authorized to file an appeal is clearly not sustainable. In view of the decision on the above three substantial question of law, we find that the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below suffer from patent illegality or irregularity. Consequently, the regular second appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the Courts below have been set aside and the suit is dismissed. CWP No.22888 of 2012 Coming to the writ petition, the challenge is to an order dated 06.12.2010 in proceedings under Section 7 of the Act. The plaintiffs in civil suit were found to have raised a wall encroaching upon the common street. Therefore, respondents No.1 to 3 were directed to remove the encroachment. The appeal against the said order was dismissed vide order dated 16.05.2012. It was found to the following effect: “After careful examination of written arguments and record on file and specially the compromise entered in the Panchayat and the report dated 08.03.2010 submitted by Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Chamkaur Sahib. After examination I have come to the conclusion that the appellants have put obstructions in the Panchayat Gali by raising unauthorized wall and in this context Sh. Jaswinder Singh, Panch has filed complaint in the Police Station Chamkaur Sahib and on 05.03.2010 a compromise was effected. As per the compromise Kulwinder Singh s/o Sant Singh in the presence of Panchayat admitted in writing that he will demolish the disputed wall but the appellants have not demolish the same. The appellants could not prove in this court or in the Lower Court that the disputed place in the Gali belongs to them. This is a public street and the obstruction is required to be removed. There is no substance in the appeal. The appellants could not prove in this court or in the Lower Court that the disputed place in the Gali belongs to them. This is a public street and the obstruction is required to be removed. There is no substance in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed and the order of the courts below is maintained.” A perusal of the site plan produced along with the written statement shows that Harbans Kaurplaintiff in civil suit and respondent No.4 in the present writ petition has obstructed the free flow of the passage. The street falls between the two houses of the Petitioner and the passage has been obstructed to deny the user thereof by any other person. From the perusal of site plan, there can not be any doubt that the public passage has been included in the properties of the Petitioner located on both sides of passage. There is street before the houses of the Petitioner and the street after the house of the Petitioners. Therefore, the plea that their signatures were obtained by police under force is need not to be examined it being a bald statement and not believable. Still further, as no inhabitant of the village can be permitted to encroach upon public street. Since the petitioners have been found to be encroachers on a public street, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is dismissed. However, in respect of encroachment by Harbans Kaur wife of Gurdev Singh, the Panchayat is directed to conclude the proceedings, if not already concluded, immediately.