JUDGMENT DEBABRATA DASH, J. 1. The appellant from inside the jail has challenged the judgment of conviction recorded against him for commission of offence under Section 376 (e), IPC and the order of sentence directing him to under rigorous imprisonment for 5 years with payment of fine of Rs. 1000/- with default stipulation to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months. 2. Prosecution case as it reveals from the First Information Report (Ext. 1) lodged on 8-6-2004 by P.W. 1 is that on that day around 11 a.m. when the wife of his younger brother was suffering from ailment, one Baidhar Patra (P.W.4), a sorcerer (locally called as Gunia) was called and the appellant accompanied Baidhar to their house to help being one of his companions. The appellant having performed the art of sorcery in his own style (locally known as jhada phunka) upon the wife of the younger brother of the informant, next did so upon wife of P.W. 2 in a separate room. It is stated that appellant then asked all to leave the room and for the purpose closed the door. Thereafter, he asked P.W. 2 to lift her saree to the knee level and sit with her eyes closed, whereafter pressing her mouth, he committed rape upon her. Thereafter, the doors being opened immediately P.W. 1 was given with some mustard seeds to be sprinkled in the other rooms and at that time, the appellant whispered something in the ear of P.W.2. It is stated that when P.W.1 asked his wife, P.W. 2 about the matter, she disclosed the appellant to have raped her. The appellant was then detained; Ward Member was called so also the village Choukidar and at last F.I.R., Ext. 1 was lodged at the police station. On receipt of the said F.I.R., the OIC, Thakurmunda P.S., registered necessary case and took up the investigation. Informant and other witnesses were examined in course of investigation. The wearing apparels of the victim were seized under seizure list, Ext. 2 and so also the wearing apparels of the appellant vide seizure list, Ext. 3. Both were medically examined. During medical examination, the sample vaginal swab, sample blood of victim were collected which were seized under seizure list Ext. 6. The seized articles were also sent for chemical examination through Court. 2 and so also the wearing apparels of the appellant vide seizure list, Ext. 3. Both were medically examined. During medical examination, the sample vaginal swab, sample blood of victim were collected which were seized under seizure list Ext. 6. The seized articles were also sent for chemical examination through Court. Finally on completion of investigation, charge-sheet for commission offence under section 376(e), IPC being submitted, the appellant faced the trial. 3. The appellant during trial took the plea of complete denial and false implication while specifically stating that as P.W. 1 was to pay him a sum of Rs. 520/- on account of the clothes purchased by him on credit and as that was being asked, the false case has been foisted. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the charge against appellant, examined six witnesses. As already stated, informant is P.W.1 and his wife, the victim is P.W. 2. Sister-in-law of the victim has been examined as P.W. 3; the sorcerer with whom the appellant had come to the house of P.W. 1 has been cited as a witness from the side of the prosecution and he is P.W. 4. The doctor has been examined as P.W.6, when the investigating officer has come to the dock as P.W. 5. Besides oral evidence, the prosecution has proved the F.I.R., marked as Ext. 1, seizure lists, medical examination report and also report of the chemical examiner. 5. The trial Court on analysis of evidence has arrived at a conclusion that the prosecution has established its case against the appellant for commission of offence under section 376 (e), IPC and accordingly the judgment of conviction has been passed followed by the order of sentence as stated above which are now impugned in this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the evidence of P.W. 2 ought not to have been accepted by the trial Court to fasten the guilt upon the appellant. According to him, the prosecution evidence on this score of commission of rape upon P.W. 2 by the appellant is highly unbelievable. In this connection, he has placed the deposition of P.W. 2 as also the other witnesses in further submitting that how the story appears to be highly improbable and rather it appears to be a consensual act. According to him, the prosecution evidence on this score of commission of rape upon P.W. 2 by the appellant is highly unbelievable. In this connection, he has placed the deposition of P.W. 2 as also the other witnesses in further submitting that how the story appears to be highly improbable and rather it appears to be a consensual act. Therefore, he contends that it is a fit case to set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. Learned counsel for the State urges in support of the finding rendered by the trial Court. According to him, here the solitary testimony of P.W. 2 has to be accepted as there surfaces, no such feature to raise any suspicion whatsoever as regards the incident. Therefore, he contends that the appeal bears no merit. 7. Keeping in mind the rival submission, lets now approach the evidence let in by the prosecution to judge the defensibility of the finding of the trial Court in fastening the guilt upon the appellant for commission of offence under Section 376(e), IPC. 8. But before that, it is felt opposite to have a look at the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to appreciation of the evidence of a victim of rape. In case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 73, their Lordships, have held that in the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian society and its profile. At paragraph-11 of the said decision, it has been held as follows :- 11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to book. At paragraph-11 of the said decision, it has been held as follows :- 11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to book. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye-witness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hang-over). We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the probabilities factor- does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation or when the probabilities factor is found to be out of tune. 9. The star witness of the prosecution is P.W. 2, the victim. It has been stated by her that her father-in-law had gone to call a sorcerer to perform some jhada phunka upon her sister-in-law P.W. 3 who was having abdominal pain and so the appellant with that P.W. 4 came to their house and performed the art of sorcery upon P.W. 3. It has been stated by her that her father-in-law had gone to call a sorcerer to perform some jhada phunka upon her sister-in-law P.W. 3 who was having abdominal pain and so the appellant with that P.W. 4 came to their house and performed the art of sorcery upon P.W. 3. She has further deposed that the appellant then did some jhada phunka upon her as she was also suffering from illness at times and was by then carrying seven months child in womb. It is further stated by P.W. 2 that the appellant did some jhada phunka upon her in a room and after sometime, he asked her husband and mother-in-law to leave the room as he would be chanting some muni mantra. She has further deposed that after the mother-in-law and her husband left the room, appellant closed the door and asked P.W. 2 to close her eyes and sit by lifting saree upto knee level. It is her further evidence that thereafter the appellant closing her mouth, forcibly did sexual intercourse upon her. She further deposed to have not been able to raise any shout out of fear and no sooner did her husband of (P.W.1) entered, the appellant gave some water and mustard seeds to sprinkle outside leading to an inference that it was just to avoid the immediate presence of P.W.1 at the scene. Then he whispered at her ear not to disclose this incident and when her husband asked entertaining some suspicion observing the whispering by the appellant, she narrated the incident before him, when the appellant was restrained. It is there in the evidence of P.W. 2 that she did not raise any objection, when was asked by the appellant to close her eyes, raise her saree upto knee level and also when appellant closed her mouth. But that itself in the fact and circumstances of this case and taking into account the acceptance of such evil practice of performing the art of sorcery in the rural areas especially in the scheduled district and viewing the background and areas wherefrom the parties hail does not render the evidence of P.W. 2 unworthy of credence. The manner in which this P.W. 2 has narrated the incident, the non-offering of some physical resistance cannot be adversely viewed to discard the evidence of P.W. 2 more particularly when she was pregnant. The manner in which this P.W. 2 has narrated the incident, the non-offering of some physical resistance cannot be adversely viewed to discard the evidence of P.W. 2 more particularly when she was pregnant. It is there in the evidence of P.W. 2 and others that her pregnancy was known to the appellant. The explanation given appears to be quite acceptable. The victim has narrated the facts in a very natural manner, when also there remains no such justification on her part to falsely implicate the appellant by putting her dignity, reputation and family life at stake. When evidence of P.W. 2 is found to be trustworthy free from basic infirmity to hold the factum of commission of rape upon P.W. 2 by the appellant who knew about her pregnancy, the presumption as provided in section 114-A of the Evidence Act also stands drawn that P.W. 2 had no consent. From the evidence, no such materials surfaces nor their stands any such factors tending to rebut the said presumption of absence of consent. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant does not stands for acceptance. Therefore, even without any corroboration, I am led to hold that the evidence of P.W. 2 in the present case is sufficient to establish the charge. However, here also the evidence of P.W.2 find corroboration on material particulars from the evidence of P.W. 1 and 4 that it was the appellant who remained sometime inside the room by closing the door keeping the victim alone on the pretext of chanting some special mantras. Moreover, it is also the evidence of P.W. 4, who is none other than the sorcerer who had taken the appellant with him that it is the appellant who told him to say that he would be doing jhada phunka and had requested him to refrain from doing so on the ground of old age and fragile health. His evidence is also there that P.W. 2 after having come out of the house, revealed the appellant to have raped her closing her mouth which have remained unshaken. 10. In the above discussion of evidence and the settled position of law, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been failure on the part of the prosecution to bring home the charge for commission of offence under section 376(e), IPC against the appellant cannot be countenanced. 10. In the above discussion of evidence and the settled position of law, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been failure on the part of the prosecution to bring home the charge for commission of offence under section 376(e), IPC against the appellant cannot be countenanced. Therefore, the judgment of conviction is found to in conformity with the evidence on record and on their proper appreciation in the touch stone of the settled position of law. In view of conviction for the above offence, the substantive sentence directed to be undergone, as also the fine imposed with default stipulation is not found to be disproportionate and this Court find the same to be commensurate one and thus needs no interference. 11. Resultantly, the JCRLA stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.