JUDGMENT 1. - Having regard to the subject-matter, at the request and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, we have heard on this appeal finally at this stage itself. 2. This appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order dated 14.11.2013 as passed in Civil Misc.Case No.4/2013 whereby, the Family Court, Hanumangarh has dismissed the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as filed by the present appellant (husband), seeking condonation of delay and setting aside of the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2011, made ex parte on the petition filed by the present respondent (wife) for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act). 3. In brief, the relevant background aspects of the matter are that the present respondent (wife) filed the said petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sangria with the submissions that she was being unnecessarily harassed by her husband and in-laws with demand of dowry and, on 09.09.2010, she was turned out of matrimonial house without any reason. The learned Trial Court recorded that despite service, the appellant, who was the non-petitioner in the said petition, failed to appear; and, after taking ex parte evidence and finding the evidence led by the applicant (wife) unrebutted, passed the decree for restitution of conjugal rights on 07.02.2011. It appears further that the respondent-wife levied execution of the decree dated 07.02.2011 whereupon, notices were issued and the same were also served upon the appellant-husband. 4. The appellant-husband later on submitted the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as also under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC before the jurisdictional Family Court at Hanumangarh, seeking condonation of delay and setting aside of the ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The appellant, inter alia, asserted that he had instructed a counsel who did not appear, and for this reason alone, the ex parte decree came to be passed and the delay occurred in applying for setting aside the decree. The appellant, inter alia, asserted that he had instructed a counsel who did not appear, and for this reason alone, the ex parte decree came to be passed and the delay occurred in applying for setting aside the decree. The applications so made were put to contest by the respondent-wife, inter alia, with the submissions that the husband had filed a petition under Section 13 of the Act in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa wherein, a reply was filed on her behalf on 27.09.2011 and therein, the fact of passing of the decree dated 07.02.2011 was specifically mentioned. It was further pointed out that in the execution proceedings, the husband put in appearance through a lawyer on 23.03.2012. With these submissions, the respondent-wife asserted that the appellant-husband was in the knowledge of the ex parte decree; and hence, contended that the application for setting aside ex parte decree, as filed on 31.10.2012, was hopelessly barred by limitation with no ground for condonation of delay. 5. The Family Court has considered and rejected both the applications so filed by the appellant-husband with the observations, inter alia, that he came to know about the ex parte decree on 27.09.2011 when this fact was mentioned in the written statement filed by the wife in the proceedings under Section 13 of the Act; and further had the knowledge about this ex parte decree when he appeared in the execution proceedings on 23.03.2012. The Family Court, therefore, held that the application for setting aside ex parte decree, filed only on 31.10.2012, was a highly belated one. The learned Trial Court further pointed out that the appellant had failed to show as to when did he come to know about the ex parte decree dated 07.02.2011; and had also failed to furnish any satisfactory and just cause for condonation of delay. The learned Trial Court further pointed out that the appellant had failed to show as to when did he come to know about the ex parte decree dated 07.02.2011; and had also failed to furnish any satisfactory and just cause for condonation of delay. The learned Trial Court has rejected the applications with the following observations:- " 6- mYys[kuh; gS fd /kkjk 9 fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e ds izdj.k dk fu.kZ; fnukad 7-2-2011 dks gksuk izdV gksrk gSA vizkfFkZuh ds vuqlkj izkFkhZ us /kkjk 13 fgUnq fookg vf/kfu;e ds rgr ;kfpdk vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k fljlk ds U;k;ky; esa is'k dh] ftlesa vizkfFkZuh us U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj fnukad 27-9-2011 dks viuk tokc is'k dj vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k laxfj;k }kjk /kkjk 9 fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ds ckjs esa dFku vafdr dj fn;s FksA vizkfFkZuh us ,sls vfHkopu vius tokc ds iSjk la[;k 1 o 2 esa vafdr fd;s gSa] ftldh iqf"V esa vizkfFkZuh vkHkk us viuk 'kiFk&i= is'k fd;k gSA ftlds [k.Mu esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls dksbZ rF; izdV ugha fd, x, gSaA bl izdkj vizkfFkZuh ds mDr dFkuksa ls ;g izdV gksrk gS fd /kkjk 9 fgUnq fookg vf/kfu;e esa ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMdzh fnukad 7-2-2011 dh tkudkjh izkFkhZ dks fnukad 27-9-2011 dks gks xbZ FkhA blds vfrfjDr cdksy vizkfFkZuh btjk; izkFkZuk&i= esa fnukad 23-3-2012 dks izkFkhZ ds mifLFkr vkus ij mldks fMdzh dk Kku gks pqdk Fkk tcfd ekStwnk izkFkZuk&i= izkFkhZ dh vksj ls fnukad 31-10-2012 dks is'k fd;k x;k gSA vizkfFkZuh ds tokc ds iSjk la[;k 1 esa vafdr vfHkopuksa ls ;g izdV gksrk gS fd izkFkhZ dks fu.kZ; fMdzh fnukad 7-2-2011 dh tkudkjh fnukad 27-9-2011 dks gks xbZ vkSj mlls djhc 13 ekg ls vf/kd le; ckn ekStwnk izkFkZuk&i= is'k fd;k x;k gSA btjk; vkosnu esa Hkh izkFkhZ dh mifLFkfr fnukad 23-3-2012 dks gksuk crkbZ xbZ gS tcfd ekStwnk izkFkZuk&i= fnukad 31-10-2012 dks is'k fd;k gSA bl izdkj btjk; vkosnu esa mifLFkfr ds djhc 7 ekg ckn ekStwnk vkosnu is'k fd;k x;k gSA dfFkr foyEc dks Li"V ugha fd;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ us foyEc dh ekQh dk vk/kj ;g vafdr fd;k gS fd og de i<+k&fy[kk gS vkSj mls dkuwuh Hkk"kk dh tkudkjh ugha gS ysfdu mldk ;g vk/kkj fof/kd :i ls iks"k.kh; izrhr ugha gksrk gSA ;g lqfLFkj oS/kkfud fLFkfr gS fd dksbZ Hkh O;fDr dkuwu dk Kku ugha gksus dk cpko ugha ys ldrk gSA 7- blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ us vius vkns'k 9 fu;e 13 flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk ds izkFkZuk&i= o /kkjk 5 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds izkFkZuk&i= esa dgha ij ;g vafdr ugha fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k laxfj;k }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMdzh fnukad 7-2-2011 dh loZizFke tkudkjh dc gqbZA dqy feykdj izkFkhZ us fu.kZ; o fMdzh fnukad 7-2-2011 dh izFke ckj tkudkjh dc gqbZ] ;g vafdr ugha fd;kA blds vfrfjDr dfFkr foyEc dks ekQ djus dk dksbZ U;k;ksfpr ,oa larks"ktud dkj.k izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izdV ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% ,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr mDr nksuksa izkFkZuk&i= Lohdkj fd;s tkus ds ;ksX; izrhr ugha gksrs gSaA " 6. Seeking to question the order aforesaid, the learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that the rules of procedure are essentially intended to serve the cause of justice; and mere delay ought not to operate against the right of the appellant to seek merit consideration. The learned counsel has further submitted that the appellant should not be penalised for the faults and omissions of the counsel. It has also been suggested that there had been alterations in the dates as mentioned in the notices said to have been issued from the Court; and it cannot be said with all certainty that notices were indeed served before the date fixed. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has duly supported the order impugned and submitted that the cursory, vague and baseless grounds are being sought to be suggested in this appeal only in order to seek setting aside of ex parte decree; and else, it is apparent on the face of the record that the appellant was all through in the knowledge of the proceedings and has failed to assign any reason for his non-appearance in the Court when the petition was called out as also the reasons for gross and inordinate delay in applying for setting aside ex parte decree. 7. After having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, in the singular facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to grant the prayer of the appellant and to afford him an opportunity of contesting the matter. 8. It appears from the order-sheets of Case No.62/2010 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sangria that notices were ordered to be issued by ordinary process as also by registered post on 16.12.2010 for date of hearing 06.01.2011. However, on 06.01.2011, the Court recorded that the Bar was abstaining from work; that the process had not returned; and waiting return of notices, the matter was posted for 02.02.2011. On 02.02.2011, it was found that the notices had been served and nobody was present for the appellant and for this reason, the proceedings were set ex parte and, after taking evidence on 04.02.2011, the petition was decreed on 07.02.2011. It is not borne out from the record as to what happened to the registered post notices, if at all sent. It is not borne out from the record as to what happened to the registered post notices, if at all sent. Secondly, no further notices had been issued after 16.12.2010 and it is not clear as to how the date of hearing as mentioned in the earlier notices i.e., 06.01.2011 was changed to 02.02.2011 and as to how the date of issuance of same notices was also changed to 15.01.2011. In the copy of record of proceedings, the fact of issuance of notice on 15.01.2011 is not mentioned as such. Be that as it may, in the given set of facts and circumstances, it does not appear necessary to dilate much on this aspect of the matter. Of course, it appears that the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa by the appellant-husband, which was instituted on 24.12.2010. From the material placed on record, it appears that the said petition was contested by the parties and came to be dismissed after trial when the learned Trial Court found that the appellant had failed to prove the ground of cruelty as alleged. In the said petition, of course, the respondent-wife filed a reply on 27.09.2011 and therein, the reference was indeed made to the decree dated 07.02.2011 as passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangria. It appears further that there had been criminal cases between the parties as FIR No.67 of 2012 was registered at Police Station, Sangria on 03.02.2012 for offences under Sections 498A, 406, 323, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B; and another FIR bearing No.155 of 2012 was registered on 04.04.2012 at the same Police Station for offences under Sections 420, 464, 468, 471 and 120B IPC against the appellant. 9. Looking to the overall circumstances, it is but apparent that there had been several litigation's between the parties and the appellant had, otherwise, been prosecuting the matters including the one under Section 13 of the Act which was, of course, ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court at Sirsa on 10.05.2013. 9. Looking to the overall circumstances, it is but apparent that there had been several litigation's between the parties and the appellant had, otherwise, been prosecuting the matters including the one under Section 13 of the Act which was, of course, ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court at Sirsa on 10.05.2013. In the given set of singular facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that even if there had been extra delay on the part of the appellant in applying for setting aside ex parte decree, such a delay could have been condoned, while putting him to the condition of heavy costs so that the decision by the Court is ultimately rendered after hearing both the parties. In the singular facts and circumstances, this course appears rather necessary to secure the ends of justice. 10. Accordingly and in view of the above, this appeal is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated. The impugned order dated 14.11.2013 is set aside and the applications filed by the appellant shall stand allowed with setting aside of the ex parte decree dated 07.02.2011 on the condition of his making payment of costs in the sum of Rs. 15,000/- (fifteen thousand) by way of a demand draft to the respondent-wife on or before the date of appearance in the Trial Court. It shall also be required of the appellant to file his reply to the petition on or before the date of appearance being fixed by this order. The parties through their counsel shall stand notice to appear before the Family Court, Hanumangarh on 28.04.2014, where the said petition under Section 9 of the Act shall stand transferred after being restored.It is made clear that upon the appellant failing to carry out compliance of any of the requirements of this order i.e., of appearance before the Family Court, Hanumangarh on 28.04.2014, of making payment to the respondent-wife of the costs of Rs. 15,000/- on or before the date of appearance, and of filing reply on or before the date of appearance, this order shall not operate and in that event, the appeal shall be treated as closed. 15,000/- on or before the date of appearance, and of filing reply on or before the date of appearance, this order shall not operate and in that event, the appeal shall be treated as closed. However, upon the appellant carrying out the requirements as aforesaid, the Family Court shall proceed with the matter expeditiously and shall try to take the same to finality at the earliest, preferably within six months from the date of appearance.No further order as to costs.A copy of this judgment alongwith record of Civil Misc. Case No.4/2013 be sent to the Family Court, Hanumangarh; and a copy of this judgment be also endorsed to the Court of Additional District Judge, Sangria for necessary compliance.Appeal allowed. *******