Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The plaintiff is the appellant and is aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below. The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative suit for mandatory injunction to the effect that she is shareholder of Hill View Coop Housing Society Limited and having her A/C No. 290. She had taken on lease plot No. 79 from the said Society vide lease agreement dated 1.5.1999 on payment of all the charges including share money, lease money etc. on 18.1.1999 and was put into possession of Plot No. 79 situated in the Hill View Coop. Housing Society Colony, at village Rainsary, Tehsil and District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). It was averred that the defendants being head strong persons, without any right title or interest threatened to interfere with the suit land started raising construction over it a week back before filing the suit. It was also averred that defendants were requested to accede to the claim of the plaintiff, but they refused to do so and as such cause of action accrued to the plaintiff a day before filing of the suit. Hence, the suit. 2. The defendants resisted and contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein they took preliminary objections regarding locus standi, estoppel, mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties and maintainability. On merits, most of the contents of the plaint have been denied as being wrong. It was averred that in fact the defendants being member of the Hill View Cooperative Housing Society, had taken on lease the plot No. 79 i.e. the suit land, vide agreement of lease dated 2.9.1994. It was averred that defendant No. 1 became share holder on 15.3.1992 and a lessee on 2.9.1994 was executed between her and society for a period of 99 years. As per defendant, she had paid all the charges including, share money, lease money etc. amounting to Rs.31,050/- on 15.3.1992 and a sum of Rs.20,000/- was later on paid by her to the Society on 12.10.2001. The possession was handed over to her and ever since she is in peaceful possession over it. It was further submitted that she filed an application for permission to raise construction over the suit land and same was granted to her by the Society on 22.4.2001. The possession was handed over to her and ever since she is in peaceful possession over it. It was further submitted that she filed an application for permission to raise construction over the suit land and same was granted to her by the Society on 22.4.2001. She later on raised boundary wall around the plot i.e. suit land by spending Rs.1,00,000/-. It was submitted that defendant No. 1 had stacked construction material over the suit land and that plaintiff had no right, title or interest whatsoever over the same. It was further averred that the defendant No. 1 spent Rs.2,00,000/- over the suit land and that the plaintiff had been duped by Sh. Rakesh Sharma, Secretary of the Society, against whom several charges of corruptions were made and later on the Deputy Commissioner, Una had asked him to give charge of the account books and record etc. of the Society. The plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands. The suit being misconceived is prayed to be dismissed with special costs. 3. In replication, the contents of the plaint were reiterated and reaffirmed and those of written statement were controverted and denied. 4. The following issues were framed by the learned trial court on 14.6.2005:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to file the present suit? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party, as alleged? OPD. 6. Relief. 5. The learned trial court after recording the evidence and evaluating the same dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, the plaintiff- appellant preferred an appeal before the learned lower appellate court, who too vide its judgment and decree dated 31.12.2013 has dismissed the same. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree the plaintiff-appellant has preferred the present appeal contending therein that the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are based on surmises and conjectures and otherwise erroneous. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree the plaintiff-appellant has preferred the present appeal contending therein that the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are based on surmises and conjectures and otherwise erroneous. The learned courts below have not legally and properly comprehended the facts of the case, inasmuch as the plaintiff had been leased out the plot in reference and even the possession was delivered to her in January 1999 and, therefore, the title of the plaintiff was complete and perfect on this day. The subsequent deposit of money by the defendants in October 2001 does not take away the title of the plaintiff-appellant qua the plot in reference and therefore, the findings of the learned courts below to the effect that plot in reference was allotted to the defendants was not at all sustainable because the title of the plot had already vested with the plaintiff- appellant and there cannot be any subsequent allotment to the defendants by the society and if it is so the said action of the society was not binding upon the plaintiff. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that findings recorded by the learned courts below are not sustainable as they have ignored documentary evidence particularly the lease agreement Ex. PW 1/A, receipt of payment Ex. PW 1/B, resolutions Ex. PW 1/D, Ex. PW 1/G and Ex. PW 1/H confirming the allotment and handing over the possession of the plot to the plaintiff. The learned courts below have further ignored that permission to raise boundary wall has been granted by the society in favour of the appellant vide Ex. PW 1/J. 8. The plaintiff in support of his case has examined PW 1 Secretary of the society apart from other two witnesses. The learned trial court on the basis of evidence led by the parties, dismissed the suit. The plaintiff did not appear in the witness box to support her case and rather examined PW 2 Iqwal Singh. Apart from that, she examined the Secretary PW 1 Rajesh Sharma and PW 3 Rajesh Chaudhary. The Secretary of the plaintiff produced on record the documents Ex. PW 1/A to Ex. PW 1/L, which were stated to be correct as per record. Apart from that, she examined the Secretary PW 1 Rajesh Sharma and PW 3 Rajesh Chaudhary. The Secretary of the plaintiff produced on record the documents Ex. PW 1/A to Ex. PW 1/L, which were stated to be correct as per record. However, in his cross-examination, he has admitted that defendant No.1- respondent was allotted the plot No. 79 i.e. the disputed plot in the year 1991 and further admitted that respondent No. 1 had issued a cheque for a sum of Rs.5,000/- to the society and lease agreement Ex. DA was entered into between him and the society. He further admitted that possession of the suit land had been handed over to defendant-respondent No. 1 at the time of allotment of the suit land to her. In so far as the attorney of the plaintiff is concerned, he was ignorant regarding many of the material facts. While PW 3 Rajesh Chaudhary, Advocate had produced on record the reports Ex. PW 3/A, rough site plan Ex. PW 3/B, memo of appearance Ex. PW 3/C. In his cross-examination, this witness had admitted that he had not issued any notice to the defendants. He also admitted that PW 2 Iqwal Singh was practicing Advocate at District Courts Una. 9. On the other hand, defendant No. 1 appeared as DW 1 and submitted an affidavit in his examination-in-chief, wherein the contents of the written statement were repeated. Though subjected to lengthy cross-examination, nothing much was elicited from this witness, who struck to the stand as raised by her in the written statement as also in examination-in-chief. 10. The learned trial court after considering the evidence led by the parties and taking into consideration the frame of the suit that plaintiff had not come to the court with clean hands and her conduct was such which disentitled her to the discretionary relief claimed by her. These observations were made in the background that plaintiff nowhere disclosed that defendant No. 1 had been allotted the suit land earlier and it was she who was in possession. The learned trial court also drew an adverse inference against the appellant for not appearing in the witness box in support of her case despite her being hale and hearty. These observations were made in the background that plaintiff nowhere disclosed that defendant No. 1 had been allotted the suit land earlier and it was she who was in possession. The learned trial court also drew an adverse inference against the appellant for not appearing in the witness box in support of her case despite her being hale and hearty. Lastly, after scrutinizing the evidence, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that defendant had led sufficient evidence to show that she was in possession over the suit land. 11. The learned lower appellate court has discussed the pleadings and the evidence led in support thereof meticulously and has dismissed the appeal. It further held that despite the specific stand of the defendant whereby she denied the title of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not cared to amend the plaint and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled for the relief of injunction. Further, the learned lower appellate court on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record came to the definite conclusion that there was no infirmity or illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. 12. Though, Mr. Naresh Thakur, learned Senior Counsel would contend that documents Ex. PW 1/A to Ex. PW 1/J have been misconstrued and misinterpreted, I find no substance in the said contention particularly after noticing the cross-examination of PW 1, who in fact had produced on record these documents. This witness had admitted that plot in question had been allotted to defendant No. 1 in the year 1991, who had deposited a cheque of Rs.5,000/- with the society and entered into a lease agreement Ex. DA. Not only this, he also admitted the possession of defendant No. 1 over the suit land from the time of allotment made in her favour. In the teeth of such admissions made by PW 1, I see no reason to interfere with the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the learned court below. 13. After the amendment in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as ‘substantial question of law’ which is indicative of the legislative intention. 13. After the amendment in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as ‘substantial question of law’ which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that the legislature never wanted second appeal to become ‘third trial on facts’ or ‘one more dice in the gamble’ (Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1975 ). 14. The law on the subject has been succinctly stated in Smt. Nathan and another v. Nokhu Ram AIR 2004 H.P. 20 , wherein it has been held as under:- “23. So far jurisdiction of this Court in appeal under Section 100, CPC is concerned, the matter was set at rest long ago, as far back as in 1963 by three-Judge Bench in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 , wherein while allowing the appeal it was held as under: "Held that the High Court was not Justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reason given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate Court. The findings of the lower appellate Court could not be said to be perverse or not supported by any evidence." 24. Again while dealing with Section 100 of the CPC another three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai, AIR 1963 SC 1203 , was of the view, that concurrent findings of fact that there was partition and separation in the joint family and those being based on evidence and such finding having direct impact on main question to be decided in the case were findings of fact based on evidence is thus binding in the second appeal. 25. In Babu Ram alias Durga Prasad v. Indra Pal Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. (1998) 6 SCC 358 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3021 ) while dealing with Section 100, CPC it was held as under at Page 3026 of AIR: "14. 25. In Babu Ram alias Durga Prasad v. Indra Pal Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. (1998) 6 SCC 358 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3021 ) while dealing with Section 100, CPC it was held as under at Page 3026 of AIR: "14. In our view, the High Court, while holding that the sale deed dated 15-9-1964 was traceable to a new agreement erred seriously in making out of a new case for which there was neither any issue nor evidence. In fact, the defendant specifically admitted in his evidence as DW-1 that there was no fresh agreement between the Official Receiver and the defendant at or before the execution of the sale deed dated 15-9-1964. The defendant, no doubt, came forward with such a statement to negative any fresh agreement of re-conveyance entered into by and between the Official Receiver and the defendant. But that evidence equally negatives the theory that the sale deed dated 15-9-1964 was executed pursuant to a fresh or new agreement entered into between the Official Receiver and the defendant. The recitals in the sale deed do not support such a contention. Further, the sale by the Official Receiver was one made pursuant to the Court order dated 21-11-1963 and was not a sale in exercise of his normal powers to sell the insolvent's property nor was it a sale for distributing the sale proceeds to the creditors. No doubt; the Court's order permitted the "Interim Receiver" to sell but in view of the subsequent adjudication of the debtor as an insolvent on 29-5-1964, the sale deed had to be executed by the Official Receiver. A reading of the sale deed dated 15-7-1964 which is in Hindi and was read out in Court showed that it was executed in pursuance of the agreement between the creditor and the "insolvent, second party". The sale deed did not refer to any agreement with the "Official Receiver" who was one of the executants of the sale deed. It referred only to the agreement with the "insolvent, second party", which, in our opinion could only be the one entered into on 19-11-1963 between the plaintiff and the defendant before adjudication. 15. Novation under Section 62 of the Contract Act requires a clear plea, issue and evidence. Such a question cannot be raised or accepted under Section 100, CPC for the first time in second appeal. 15. Novation under Section 62 of the Contract Act requires a clear plea, issue and evidence. Such a question cannot be raised or accepted under Section 100, CPC for the first time in second appeal. There was no such issue in the Courts below and the defendant's evidence was contrary to such a theory. 16. The High Court, in our view, also erred in thinking that the plaintiff committed breach of the agreement dated 19-11-1963 covered by the joint application when the said aspect covered by Issue 2 was not pressed in the trial Court. Further, the permission for sale dated 22-11-1963 granted by the Court was in favour of the "Interim Receiver" and, therefore, the debtor could not have executed any sale deed. (We are not on the question whether the Insolvency Court could have asked the Interim Receiver to sell the Property.). The defendant admitted in his evidence that after 19-11-1963, he did not issue any notice to the plaintiff to execute a sale deed nor did he move the Insolvency Court to direct the debtor to execute the sale deed. 17. For the above reasons, we hold that the High Court in second appeal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC in giving a finding on an issue which was not pressed in the trial Court. So far as the finding as to a new contract is concerned, there was no issue or evidence. The evidence was to the contrary. We accordingly set aside these findings. Point 1 is, therefore, held in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant." 26. To similar effect are the decisions in cases of Satya Gupta (Smt.) alias Madhu Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 ; Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 6 SCC 683 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3063 ) and Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros., (1998) 6 SCC 748 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2730 ). 27. Again while dealing with the scope of Section 100, CPC after its amendment in the year 1976 in Ellangallur v. Gopalan, (2000) 2 SCC 11 : ( AIR 2000 SC 533 ), it was held as under at page 534 of AIR : "4. 27. Again while dealing with the scope of Section 100, CPC after its amendment in the year 1976 in Ellangallur v. Gopalan, (2000) 2 SCC 11 : ( AIR 2000 SC 533 ), it was held as under at page 534 of AIR : "4. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the decision of the Kerala High Court in C.P. Madhavan Nair case does not lay down the correct law and also does not take notice of a Full Bench decision by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ganpat v. Ram Devi, (AIR 1978 Punj & Har 137), taking the view that in spite of amendment in Section 100, CPC, the local law containing a provision inconsistent with Section 100, CPC shall continue to remain in operation. 5. In our opinion, the plea which is sought to be raised on behalf of the respondents before us was not raised before the High Court and, therefore, it will be appropriate if the matter is remitted back to the High Court leaving it open to the parties to raise their respective contentions before the High Court and the High Court forming and expressing its opinion on the effect of amendment in Section 100, CPC introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976) on the preexisting Section 100 (1) (d) as applicable in the State of Kerala in view of local amendment." 28. In Thimmaiah v. Ningamma, (2000) 7 SCC 409 : (AIR 2000 SC 3529 (2)) while dealing with scope of Section 100, CPC it was held as under at Pages 3532-3533 of AIR: "15. We have already noted the findings of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court on the question of consent. These observations clearly show that there was some evidence in support of the findings of the lower Courts. In the circumstances, the High Court was not entitled to re-assess the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. Besides, the onus was on the respondents to prove the fact of Appellant 1's consent. These observations clearly show that there was some evidence in support of the findings of the lower Courts. In the circumstances, the High Court was not entitled to re-assess the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. Besides, the onus was on the respondents to prove the fact of Appellant 1's consent. When Items 3 to 6 were being claimed by the respondents to be the self-acquired property of Hiri, it could hardly be contended in the same breath that Appellant 1 had consented to the gift of Items 3 to 6 on the basis that it was coparcenary property and Appellant 1 the only other coparcener. 16. The High Court also erred in its view on the effect of consent on a gift which may otherwise be void. This Court in Ammathayee v. Kumaresan summarised the Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral properties in the following words : "Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral property is well settled. So far as moveable ancestral property is concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift is within reasonable limits. A gift for example of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral moveable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection : (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edn., P. 252, Para 225). But so far as immovable ancestral property is concerned, the power of gift is much more circumscribed than in the case of movable ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for 'pious purposes' : (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edn. Para 226, P. 252). Now what is generally understood by 'pious purposes' is gift for charitable and/or religious purposes. But this Court has extended the meaning of 'pious purposes' to cases where a Hindu father makes a gift within reasonable limits of immovable ancestral property to his daughter in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of her marriage, and the same can also be done by the mother in case the father is dead : (See Kamla Devi v. Bachulal Gupta, AIR 1957 SC 434 . 17. 17. The karta is competent or has the power to dispose of coparcenary property only if (a) the disposition is of a reasonable portion of the coparcenary property, and (b) the disposition is for a recognised "pious purpose". The High Court has not come to any conclusion as to whether the gift of Items 3 to 6 by Hiri to Respondent No. 2 was within reasonable limits or in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of Respondent 2's marriage. It must be taken, therefore, that the findings of the lower Courts on both counts were accepted. That being so, Hiri could not have donated Items 3 to 6 to Respondent 2 and the deed of gift dated 9-6-1971 was impermissible under. Hindu Law. The question is could such an alienation be made with the consent of Appellant 1?" 29. Keeping in view the evidence on the file of this case it cannot be said that the findings regarding the documents having been proved in accordance with law can be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence so as to call for interference in this appeal. Unless such a situation is there, this Court would not interfere. While setting aside the judgment in case Hamida v. Md. Kahlil, AIR 2001 SC 2282 it was held as under at page 2283 : "6. The High Court has upset the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court, taking a different view merely on reappreciation of evidence in the absence of valid and acceptable reasons to say that the findings recorded by the first appellate Court could not be sustained either they being perverse or unreasonable or could not be supported by any evidence. The High Court neither framed a substantial question of law nor any such question is indicated in the impugned judgment as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The approach of the High Court, in our view, is clearly and manifestly erroneous and unsustainable in law. Para 10 of the impugned judgment reads:- "The appellate Court although has decided the issue of personal necessity but from the judgment it appears that the appellate Court has not decided this issue in its correct perspective. The approach of the High Court, in our view, is clearly and manifestly erroneous and unsustainable in law. Para 10 of the impugned judgment reads:- "The appellate Court although has decided the issue of personal necessity but from the judgment it appears that the appellate Court has not decided this issue in its correct perspective. Since the trial Court has not recorded any finding on the issue of personal necessity, the finding recorded by the appellate Court cannot be said to a concurrent finding of fact. I am, therefore, of the definite view that in such circumstance, this Court can re-appreciate the evidence and scrutinize the findings recorded by the appellate Court under Section 100 CPC when admittedly this issue was not decided by the trial Court. ……………………………………………………………. The sons of the plaintiff for whose requirement the plaintiff sought eviction, have not been examined. The nephew of the plaintiff was examined as a witness who supported the case of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also not led any evidence to the effect that the house property where the plaintiff resides, is not sufficient for their own use and occupation. There is also no evidence to the effect that suitable alternative accommodation is not available to the plaintiff for meeting the requirement. I am, therefore of the view that the finding recorded by the appellate Court on the issue of personal necessity cannot be sustained in law for want of sufficient evidence." As can be seen from the para extracted above, the High Court thought that it could re-appreciate the evidence and scrutinize the findings recorded by the first appellate Court under Section 100 CPC. This approach is plainly erroneous and against law. The High Court was also wrong in saying that the plaintiff did not lead sufficient evidence to establish his bona fide requirement. As observed by the first appellate Court and noted above already, there is evidence of the plaintiff, his nephew and the neighbour. The finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court based on evidence could not be interfered with by the High Court, that too in the absence of any substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties." 15. The finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court based on evidence could not be interfered with by the High Court, that too in the absence of any substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties." 15. Applying the tests laid down by this Court in the above case which have been noted to illustrate the constant view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that there is no merit in this appeal as the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are not based on any misconception of fact or law or misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on construction of inadmissible evidence or ignorance of material facts so as to call for interference by this Court. 16. Moreover, admittedly the appellant has not appeared in the witness box in support of her case, therefore, an adverse inference in the given facts and circumstances of the case is required to be drawn against her as she was the best witness who could have deposed regarding the facts pleaded by her in the case. Having failed to do so, the provisions of section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act are clearly attracted. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iswar Bhai C. Patel @ Bachu Bhai Patel vs. Harihar Behera & Anr. 1999 (1) SLJ 724, has held as under: - “15. Admittedly defendant No.1 had an account in the Central Bank of India Limited, Sambalpur Branch which his father, namely, respondent No.2, was authorised to operate. It is also an admitted fact that it was from this account that the amount was advanced to the appellant by respondent No.2. It has been given out in the statement of respondent No.2 that when the appellant had approached him for a loan of Rs.7,000/-, he had explicitly told him that he had no money to lend whereupon the appellant had himself suggested to advance the loan from the account of respondent No.1 and it was on his suggestion that the respondent No.2 issued the cheque to the appellant which the appellant, admittedly, encashed. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant who did not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath denying the statement of defendant (respondent) No.2 that it was at his instance that respondent No.2 had advanced the amount of Rs.7,000/- to the appellant by issuing a cheque on the account of defendant (respondent) No.1. Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act.” 17. Thereafter the ratio laid down in Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573 was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010)10 SCC 512 , wherein it has been held as follows:- ‘17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct……’ 18. Consequently the appeal is dismissed in limine without any cost. The judgments and decrees of courts below are affirmed. The pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.