Judgment : 1. These two second appeals are preferred by defendant Nos.2 and 3 challenging the decrees and common judgment dated 19.4.2004 in A.S.Nos.46 and 47 of 2000 on the file of First Additional District Judge Court, West Godavari District, Eluru, confirming the decrees and common judgment dated 11.10.1999 in O.S.Nos.28 of 1993 and 32 of 1994 on the file of Senior Civil Judge Court, Tadepalligudem, respectively. 2. The parties herein are closely related. Krishna Murthy and Veeranna, who are father and son, are plaintiffs in the two suits. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 are common in both the suits. Krishna Murthy, Smt.Nara Subbayamma, and defendant Nos.2 and 3 are children of the first defendant. Subbayamma is shown as fourth defendant in O.S.No.28 of 1993 and fifth defendant in O.S.No.32 of 1994. For the sake of convenience, they are hereinafter referred to as such. 3. The case of the plaintiffs is that the first defendant and his children have partitioned their properties in the year 1968 in the presence of Village elders. Ever since, they have been in separate possession and enjoyment of their respective properties. First defendant has got Ac.3.18 cents of Zeroyathi wetland in survey No.147/1 situated at Bhuvana Palli Village. The plaintiffs jointly took the said land on lease from first defendant on a condition to pay maktha of 30 bags per year to the entire extent. First defendant used to do money lending business and after death of first defendant’s wife, Veeranna (grandson of first defendant) has been looking after the welfare of first defendant. The first defendant in token of services of Veeranna executed registered gift/settlement deed dated 03.2.1993 bequeathing the land admeasuring Ac.0.80 cents in survey No.147/1 in his favour. On the other hand, the first defendant has, for the purpose of medical expenses, to discharge his debts and to go to pilgrims, sold the land admeasuring Ac.2.38 cents in survey No.147/1 to Krishna Murthy for a consideration of Rs.57,300/- and executed registered sale deed dated 03.2.1993 in his favour. There were disputes between Krishna Murthy and defendant Nos.2 and 3 as to the partition of house and landed properties. Keeping the same in mind, defendant Nos.2 and 3 instigated first defendant, who in turn executed registered cancellation deeds dated 11.3.1993 and 30.3.1993 cancelling the registered settlement deed and registered sale deed executed in favour of Veeranna and Krishna Murthy. There were disputes between Krishna Murthy and defendant Nos.2 and 3 as to the partition of house and landed properties. Keeping the same in mind, defendant Nos.2 and 3 instigated first defendant, who in turn executed registered cancellation deeds dated 11.3.1993 and 30.3.1993 cancelling the registered settlement deed and registered sale deed executed in favour of Veeranna and Krishna Murthy. Cancellation of a document is unknown to law and it is non-est in the eye law. Hence the suits are filed for declaration of title to the respective properties and consequential permanent injunction. 4. The first defendant filed written statement in both the suits inter alia contending that first defendant did not lease his land to plaintiffs at any time; he did not incur any debts; he had never incurred medical expenses and never intended to make any pilgrimage. He never offered to sell his land for Rs.57,300/- and in fact the value of land was Rs.1,95,000/- per acre. Krishna Murthy, Vishnumurthy and Anubolu Subbarao represented to first defendant that for obtaining loan in a Bank, he had to execute a bond in favour of Bank. Believing the same, first defendant went to Sub-Registrar’s Office along with the above three persons, in the absence of third defendant, and signed on two sets of written documents. The contents of the documents were not read over and explained to first defendant. The sale deed is not supported by consideration. The settlement deed was also not accepted. On verification of documents, third defendant informed to first defendant that plaintiffs have obtained sale deed and gift deed in their favour. Because of fraud and misrepresentation, those documents were brought into existence by plaintiffs. On coming to know the fraud played by plaintiffs, first defendant executed cancellation deeds. First defendant was not influenced by defendant Nos.2 and 3 for cancellation of sale deed and settlement deed. The plaintiffs are not entitled for the reliefs claimed in the suits. Hence the suits are liable to be dismissed. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed memo adopting the written statement of first defendant. 5. During the pendency of suit, first defendant died and Nara Subbayamma was impleaded as fourth defendant in O.S.No.28 of 1993, Krishna Murthy and Subbayamma were impleaded as defendant Nos.4 and 5 and in O.S.No.32 of 1994 respectively. Krishna Murthy and Subbayamma remained ex parte. 6. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed memo adopting the written statement of first defendant. 5. During the pendency of suit, first defendant died and Nara Subbayamma was impleaded as fourth defendant in O.S.No.28 of 1993, Krishna Murthy and Subbayamma were impleaded as defendant Nos.4 and 5 and in O.S.No.32 of 1994 respectively. Krishna Murthy and Subbayamma remained ex parte. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues. O.S. No.28 of 1993 1. Whether the first defendant is entitled to cancel the sale deed dated 03.2.1993? 2. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and consequential relief of injunction as prayed for? O.S. No.32 of 1994 1. Whether the first defendant is empowered to cancel the settlement deed dated 03.2.1993? 2. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the consequential permanent injunction as prayed for? 4. To what relief? 7. Basing on the memo filed by both parties, the trial court clubbed the two suits and recorded the evidence in O.S.No.28 of 1993 and delivered common judgment. 8. Basing on the oral, documentary evidence and other material available on record, the trial court arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs in both the suits are entitled for the reliefs of declaration and consequential perpetual injunction. Feeling aggrieved by the above decrees and common judgment, defendant Nos.2 and 3 have preferred appeals and the same were dismissed. Aggrieved by the decrees and common judgment in the appeals, defendant Nos.2 and 3 have preferred these second appeals. 9. The substantial question of law raised in these second appeals is. Whether the suits filed by plaintiffs for declaration of title and consequential permanent injunction without seeking the relief of cancellation of registered cancellation deeds dated 11.3.1993 and 30.3.1993 are maintainable? 10. Heard Sri K.Chidambaram, learned counsel for appellants/defendant Nos.2 and 3 and Sri Meharchand Nori, learned counsel representing Sri Narasimha Rao Davuluri, learned counsel for plaintiffs/respondents. 11. To substantiate the case, Krishna Murthy and Veeranna, who are plaintiffs in both suits, examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A13. P.Ws.3 and 4 were examined to prove the execution of Exs.A1 and A2. To dislodge the case of plaintiffs, third defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked Exs.B1 to B7. 11. To substantiate the case, Krishna Murthy and Veeranna, who are plaintiffs in both suits, examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A13. P.Ws.3 and 4 were examined to prove the execution of Exs.A1 and A2. To dislodge the case of plaintiffs, third defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked Exs.B1 to B7. D.Ws.2 and 3 were examined in support of the case of the defendants. 12. The admitted case of both the parties is that first defendant executed Ex.A2 registered gift deed dated 03.2.1993 bequeathing Ac.80 cents of land in favour of P.W.2 and Ex.A1 registered sale deed dated 03.2.1993 in respect of Ac.2.38 cents of land in favour of P.W.1. First defendant also executed registered deeds viz., Ex.B2 dated 30.3.1993 cancelling Ex.A1 sale deed and Ex.B3 dated 11.3.1993 cancelling Ex.A2 gift deed. First defendant also executed Ex.B5 registered Will dated 31.5.1994 bequeathing Ac.3.18 cents of land (covered under Exs.A1 and A2) in favour of D.W.1. 13. The contention of learned counsel for defendant Nos.2 and 3 is two fold: (1) plaintiffs obtained Exs.A1 and A2 by playing fraud on first defendant, and (2) there is no legal sanctity to Exs.A1 and A2, in view of Exs.B2 and B3 registered cancellation deeds. Per contra, learned counsel for plaintiffs submitted that Exs.B2 and B3 are non-est in the eye of law; therefore the plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs sought by them. 14. As per the averments in the written statement, plaintiffs have obtained Exs.A1 and A2 by playing fraud on first defendant. As per the averments in the written statement, P.W.1 along with P.Ws.3 and 4 created an impression that in order to obtain a bank loan first defendant has to execute a bond in favour of the bank. Believing the same, first defendant signed on two written documents in the Sub-Registrar’s Office. It is needless to say that burden of proving fraud lies on the person who alleged it. To resolve the issue, this court is placing reliance on the decisions in A.L.N. Narayanan Chettiyar v Official Assignee, High Court, Rangoon AIR 1941 PC 94, wherein the Privy Council held that “fraud like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond reasonable doubt. A finding as to fraud cannot be based on suspicion and conjecture”. A finding as to fraud cannot be based on suspicion and conjecture”. In Ranganayakamma v K.S.Prakash (2008) 15 SCC 673 , while dealing with the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, the Supreme Court observed as follows : They admitted that they had put their signatures before the Sub-Registrar and nowhere else. Their statements appear to be far-fetched and beyond the ordinary human conduct. If a plea was to be raised and evidence was required to be addressed that there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the character of partition deed (Exhibit D-6) and in absence of any particulars having been furnished as regards alleged fraud and misrepresentation, the said deeds would not be void but only voidable. 15. As seen from the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 4, first defendant executed Exs.A1 and A2 at his volition. It is not elicited in the cross-examination of P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 that they have taken first defendant to the Sub-Registrar’s Office to execute a bond in favour of a bank. It is a known fact that no one need to go to the Sub-Registrar’s Office to execute a bond in favour of a bank. Interestingly, no suggestion was put to P.Ws.1 to 4 that they have obtained Exs.A1 and A2 by playing fraud on first defendant. The very object of cross-examination is to destroy the case of opponent and to establish the party’s own case and thereby to elicit the truth. By putting different suggestions, required information can be extracted from the witnesses. In the cross-examination of P.Ws.1 to 4, the stand taken by the defendants is not elicited. In view of the principles enunciated in the cases cited supra, the material placed before the court falls short to establish that Exs.A1 and A2 are the outcome of fraud played by the plaintiffs. 16. It is a known fact that the revenue officials issue pattadar pass books to ryots. The concerned revenue officials issued Ex.A3 pattadar pass book in favour of P.W.1 in respect of land covered under Ex.A1 sale deed. Likewise, Ex.A10 pattadar pass book was issued in favour of P.W.2 in respect of the land covered under Ex.A2. These two documents support the version of plaintiffs that they have been in possession and enjoyment of schedule properties. 17. Likewise, Ex.A10 pattadar pass book was issued in favour of P.W.2 in respect of the land covered under Ex.A2. These two documents support the version of plaintiffs that they have been in possession and enjoyment of schedule properties. 17. In the written statement, first defendant in unequivocal terms admitted that he executed Exs.A1 and A2 in favour of P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively. He took a plea that he executed Exs.B2 and B3 to cancel Exs.A1 and A2. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether Exs.B2 and B3 are legally enforceable. It is a settled principle of law that the donor will lose his right over the property gifted to another person at the moment the done accepted and acted upon it. As per the testimony of P.W.2, he accepted and acted upon Ex.A2 gift deed. Therefore, first defendant lost his right and title over the property covered under Ex.A2 with effect from 03.2.1993; but it is otherwise if mala fides in obtaining Ex.A2 are proved. On 11.3.1993, first defendant executed Ex.B3 cancellation deed to cancel Ex.A2. Legally speaking, the first defendant did not have any right whatsoever in respect of the land covered under Ex.A2, by that date. In such circumstances, execution of Ex.B3 cancellation deed has no legal sanctity. First defendant transferred the land covered under Ex.A1 in favour of P.W.1 by way of sale. On 30.3.1993, first defendant executed Ex.B2 to cancel Ex.A1 sale deed. By then the first defendant was not having right or title over the property covered under Ex.A1. A registered document executed by a person without having right and title to property conveyed therein, is as good as a white paper. First defendant was not having right or title over the properties covered under Exs.A1 and A2; therefore Ex.B5 is not legally enforceable. 18. At this juncture, let me consider the legal remedy, if any, available to first defendant. The only recourse available to first defendant is to approach jurisdictional civil court and file a suit for cancellation of Exs.A1 and A2. In order to resolve this issue, this court is placing reliance on the decision in Yanala Malleshwari v Ananthula Sayamma 2006 (6) ALD 623 (FB) = 2006 (6) ALT 523 (FB). Relevant para –26 is extracted hereunder. 26. In order to resolve this issue, this court is placing reliance on the decision in Yanala Malleshwari v Ananthula Sayamma 2006 (6) ALD 623 (FB) = 2006 (6) ALT 523 (FB). Relevant para –26 is extracted hereunder. 26. It is a misconception that in every situation, a person who suffers injury by reason of a document can file a suit for cancellation of such written statement. Two conditions must exist before one invokes Section 31 of Specific Relief Act. These are: the written instrument is void or voidable against such person; and such person must have reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left outstanding may cause him serious injury. Insofar as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, it is no doubt true that a person entitled to any right as to any property can seek declaration that he is so entitled to such right. Here again, the person who claims the right to property can institute a declaration suit only when the defendant denies or interested to deny the title of the plaintiff. The difference between the two situations is glaring. In one case, cancellation of deed can be sought in a Court only by a person who executed document and who perceives that such document is void or voidable. In the other case, even if a person is not a party to the document, he can maintain a suit for declaration. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the decisions in Thota Ganga Laxmi v Government of Andhra Pradesh 2010(1) ALD 90 (SC) = (2010) 15 SCC 207 . In para 4 it was held as follows : 4. In our opinion, there was no need for the appellants to approach the civil court as the said cancellation deed dated 4-8-2005 as well as registration of the same was wholly void and non est and can be ignored altogether. For illustration, if A transfers a piece of land to B by a registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed that A had the title to the land, that title passes to B on the registration of the sale deed (retrospectively from the date of the execution of the same) and B then becomes the owner of the land. If A wants to subsequently get that sale deed cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for cancellation or else he can request B to sell the land back to A but by no stretch of imagination, can a cancellation deed be executed or registered. This is unheard of in law. As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the only remedy available to first defendant is to file a suit for cancellation of Exs.A1 and A2, in view of Section 31 of Specific Relief Act. First defendant did not file such suit during his life time. Instead of that, first defendant executed Exs.B2 and B3 under the impression that these documents automatically nullify Exs.A1 and A2. Therefore, Exs.B2 and B3 are non-est in the eye of law and they do not affect the legal rights of plaintiffs in respect of schedule properties. 19. The contention of learned counsel for appellants is that present suits are not maintainable without seeking relief of cancellation of Exs.B2 and B3. It is a settled principle of law that the edifice of civil suit is based on the pleadings. The trial court frames issues basing on the pleadings of the parties and the lis involved for adjudication. The parties lead evidence in accordance with their pleadings and the issues framed in the suit. The court has to give its specific findings on the issues. It is needless to say that no party to the suit is entitled to introduce a new version at a later stage. The first defendant has not taken a specific plea that the present suits are not maintainable without seeking relief of cancellation of Exs.B2 and B3. The trial court has not framed any issue to that effect. When there is no specific pleading and issue, there was no necessity for the plaintiffs to adduce evidence on this aspect. Moreover, the question urged before this court is a mixed question of fact and law. Whether the defendants are entitled to take such a plea, for the first time, at the stage of second appeal, without proper foundation? To substantiate the same, learned counsel for the plaintiff has drawn my attention to the decision in Bachhaj Nahar v Nilima Mandal (2008) 17 SCC 491 . Para 12 is extracted hereunder. "12. Whether the defendants are entitled to take such a plea, for the first time, at the stage of second appeal, without proper foundation? To substantiate the same, learned counsel for the plaintiff has drawn my attention to the decision in Bachhaj Nahar v Nilima Mandal (2008) 17 SCC 491 . Para 12 is extracted hereunder. "12. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court for its consideration. This Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any deviation from the course which litigation on particular causes must take. (emphasis supplied) In State of Gujarat v Vora Salebhai Gulamali (1977) 3 SCC 225 , the principle enunciated is that appellant is not entitled to raise new plea as to mixed question of fact and law for the first time at the stage of second appeal. The principle enunciated in the cases cited supra is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to urge mixed question of fact and law at this stage." 20. The courts below concurrently held that plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs sought by them. The courts below have assigned cogent and valid reasons to its findings. Learned counsel for plaintiffs also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal v Seeni Ammal (2002) 1 SCC 134 . As per the principle enunciated in that case, the concurrent findings of fact at the stage of second appeal cannot be interfered, in view of Section 100 of CPC. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that there is no question of law much less substantial question of law in these second appeals. 21. As per the principle enunciated in that case, the concurrent findings of fact at the stage of second appeal cannot be interfered, in view of Section 100 of CPC. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that there is no question of law much less substantial question of law in these second appeals. 21. In the result, the second appeals are dismissed confirming the decrees and common judgment dated 19.4.2004 in A.S.Nos.46 and 47 of 2000 on the file of I Additional District Judge Court, West Godavari District, Eluru. There shall be no order as to costs. 22. The miscellaneous petitions if any pending in these second appeals shall stand closed.