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2014 DIGILAW 670 (CAL)

Competent Authority, Calcutta v. David Mantosh

2014-07-24

MRINAL KANTI CHAUDHURI, TAPAN KUMAR DUTT

body2014
JUDGMENT Mrinal Kanti Chaudhuri, J. :- This review application is filed by the defendant/respondent Nos.3 and 4 against the judgment dated 27th April, 2013 passed by this Division Bench in F.A. No.202 of 2008. In this review application, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have stated that the judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record and misconception of law by holding that Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the order passed by competent authority under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, that according to Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act shall file a statement before the competent authority, that since the appellants did not file such statement, the competent authority has no occasion to serve any notice on the appellants/opposite parties, that this Court, without following the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court, wrongfully held the title of the plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties by giving importance on the criminal court judgment and order and, therefore, the judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. It is also stated in the petition that the aggrieved party may prefer appeal against the decisions of competent authority within the framework provided under the statute and ultimate decision also could be challenged under judicial review. It is also stated in the petition that this Division Bench while passing the judgment and decree, committed error apparent on the face of the record by overlooking the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court that the Special Court can play the role of Civil Court and decide the question of title and possession, that this misconception of law by this Court is an error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the judgment requires to be reviewed. It has also been stated in the petition that this Court, due to the misconception of law, went on deciding the validity of the vesting proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, the judgment requires to be reviewed. It has also been stated in the petition that this Court, due to the misconception of law, went on deciding the validity of the vesting proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It has also been stated in the petition that the judgment of this Division Bench suffers from error apparent on the face of the record in deciding whether or not land is covered under the Land Ceiling Act or whether it was within the ceiling limit or not because those matters are within the purview of the Urban Land Ceiling Authority and the aggrieved party may prefer appeal under the statute and Civil Court cannot decide the said issue, that this Division Bench went on fully wrong while passing the instant judgment on the point of limitation as there is no manner of explanation of delay in filing the suit. That this Division Bench while passing judgment went on fully wrong on the point of limitation as the plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties did not take any legal steps from the date of their dispossession. That the judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as this Court did not consider that the plaintiffs/appellants did not advance any explanation for delay. That the judgment of this Court also suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as the Division Bench did not decide whether learned judge in the trial court had reached to a right conclusion and applied the correct context of law. The judgment of this Court also suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as the plaintiffs/appellants were unable to prove any document relating to the ownership of the land specially when defendant No.1 occupied the suit property after obtaining lease and payment of annual rent to the Government of West Bengal, that judgment of this Court also suffers from error apparent on the face of the record in determining the ownership of plaintiffs/appellants over the suit property since plaintiffs witness examined as P.W.1 failed to prove their case. It is further stated that judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record because this Division Bench failed to consider whether the plaintiffs/appellants have been able to prove their right, title, interest in the suit land by producing relevant documents. It is further stated that judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record because this Division Bench failed to consider whether the plaintiffs/appellants have been able to prove their right, title, interest in the suit land by producing relevant documents. The judgment of this Court also suffers from error apparent on the face of the record because this Division Bench by passing the judgment failed to consider the fact that the defendant No.1 is in physical possession of the suit land. The judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record because this Division Bench failed to consider the fact that when the suit property was leased out by the State of West Bengal to the defendant/respondent No.1, separate right over the suit property was acquired by the defendant No.1, that this Court also failed to consider that the suit was barred by law of limitation and is not maintainable under the law. The judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as this Division Bench, by passing the judgment, failed to look into the pleadings and documents and the case of defendant No.1 in correct perspective. The judgment also suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as this Division Bench while passing the judgment did not consider the fact that the judgment and decree of the learned trial court need not be interfered with. Therefore, these respondents Nos.3 and 4 have prayed for review of the judgment of this Division Bench. The learned counsel for the review petitioners has advanced elaborate argument on the point of review. According to him, this Division Bench failed to consider the legal position of marking documents as exhibits. It is submitted by learned counsel for the review petitioner that the documents marked exhibits are not proved in accordance with law. Learned counsel has referred to a decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen reported in (2010)4 SCC 491 . In the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court held that the admission of a document in Court may amount to admission of its contents but not their truth. Learned counsel has referred to further decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Krishna vs. Sanjeev reported in (2004)1 ICC (Kant) 858. vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen reported in (2010)4 SCC 491 . In the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court held that the admission of a document in Court may amount to admission of its contents but not their truth. Learned counsel has referred to further decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Krishna vs. Sanjeev reported in (2004)1 ICC (Kant) 858. It has been held therein that before a document is let in evidence, there should be a judicial determination of question whether it can be admitted in evidence or not. In other words, the Court admitting a document must have applied its mind consciously to the question whether the document is admissible or not. It has been held further that at the time of admitting the document in evidence, it is open to the opposite party to raise objection regarding the admissibility of the document and if objections are raised, the Court is under obligation to decide the said objection. After the evidence is adduced at the final hearing, it is open to the party to address arguments regarding the admissibility of the document, to the relevancy of the document and proof of the document and the Court will decide all these questions in the course of its judgment. It has been held further in the said decision that if the Court decides to admit the document, then it shall follow the procedure prescribed under Order XIII Rule 4(1) of CPC and mark the document. In the present case, it appears from Order No.149 dated 15th January, 2007 that the documents filed by plaintiffs are marked exhibit as per exhibit list. It also appears from Order No.165 dated 19.03.2007 that defendants also filed documents and those are marked exhibit as A, B, B9(i), C, C(i), D, E, E(i), F, G, G(i), H, H(i), I, J, K, L, M and N for the defendant. In Page 184 of the Paper Book in the affidavit-in-chief of the P.W.1 it is further revealed that the marking of documents was made but there is an endorsement “objected to” from the end of defendants. The P.W.1 has further stated in page 184 of the Paper Book “I have filed certified copy of judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 passed by learned First Subordinate Judge at Alipore marked Exhibit 9”. This document was not endorsed as ‘objected to’ from the end of defendant. The P.W.1 has further stated in page 184 of the Paper Book “I have filed certified copy of judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 passed by learned First Subordinate Judge at Alipore marked Exhibit 9”. This document was not endorsed as ‘objected to’ from the end of defendant. In fact, title of the plaintiffs/appellants originates from the judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949. Therefore, it is crystal clear that neither of the parties raised any objection as to the admissibility of such documents and its marking. The legal position as observed by Hon’ble Court is not disputed, but the fact remains that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants raised any objection as to the admissibility and marking of the documents in question. Since no objection was raised by the parties in the trial court, learned court below admitted and marked the document as exhibit. No revision has been preferred by the respondents/defendants Nos.3 and 4 against the admissibility and the marking of documents by the trial court which passed judgment on the basis of documents marked exhibit on behalf of both the plaintiffs/appellants and defendants/respondents. The question is whether the respondent Nos.3 and 4 can raise the question of marking of the documents as new contention for the first time in the appeal? In decision of Karpagathachi & Ors. vs. Nagara Thinathachi reported in AIR 1965 SC 1752 Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that “new contention should not be raised for the first time in appeal”. It is necessary to quote the observation of Hon’ble Apex Court. “In the trial court, the suit was tried on the footing that the partition was oral and that the two partition lists were merely pieces of evidence of oral partition and no objection was raised with regards to their admissibility in the evidence. In the High Court, the appellants raised the contention for the first time that the two partition lists were required to be registered. The point could not be decided without further investigation into the question of fact and in the circumstances. The High Court rightly ruled that the new contention could not be raised for the first time in appeal. We think that the appellants ought not to be allowed to raise new contention”. Similarly, in Samir Chandra Das vs. Bibhas Chandra Das & Ors. The High Court rightly ruled that the new contention could not be raised for the first time in appeal. We think that the appellants ought not to be allowed to raise new contention”. Similarly, in Samir Chandra Das vs. Bibhas Chandra Das & Ors. reported in 2010(3) ICC (SC) 519 Hon’ble Apex Court held that when in the first appeal, new plea was raised and the question was not argued before the trial court nor was it raised by way of written statement nor was it raised even in the memo of appeal before the High Court, the Appellate Court should not have allowed this question to be argued as there was no plea raised in the written statement in support of the theory of renunciation by the widow, Parulbala and the present executor Samir Chandra Das. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the defendant/respondent Nos.3 and 4 cannot raise such a new plea in the appeal as they did not raise objection to the admissibility of the documents before the trial court and the learned trial court also relied upon those documents and marked them exhibit and passed judgment. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 did not even raise objection as to the admissibility, truthfulness or genuineness of the contents of those documents which have been marked exhibit in the Trial Court. Therefore, the argument advanced by learned advocate for the review petitioner is devoid of merit. The review petitioners have further submitted that this Division Bench in its judgment relied upon the judgment of Criminal Court which is totally a misconception of law. On a close and careful perusal of the judgment of this Court, it appears that this Court in Page 30 of the judgment has made a clear observation that “the legal position is not at all disputed and it is the settled principle of law.” This Division Bench in its judgment has made it clear that the existence of sale certificate as well as the survey report under Sections 40 and 41 of Bengal Survey Act for the purpose of demarcation and for showing the separate existence of holding No.42 and 43 are quite relevant and admissible under Section 13 of Evidence Act. This Court relied upon the decision of Privy Council in Dinomoni vs. Brojomohini reported in (1901)29 Cal 187 (P.C.). This Court relied upon the decision of Privy Council in Dinomoni vs. Brojomohini reported in (1901)29 Cal 187 (P.C.). This Court also relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Santi Kumar Panda vs. Sakuntala Devi reported in (2004)1 SCC 438 , wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held that at the time of final adjudication by competent Court, the proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. has value only as a piece of evidence until the entitlement of possession is determined by a Court having competence to enter into adjudication of civil right, which an Executive Magistrate cannot. This Division Bench did not at all adjudicate the title of the parties on the basis of judgment of Criminal Court or on the basis of sale certificate. This Court relied upon the judgment of Civil Court in T.S. No. 50 of 1942. The compromise decree of Civil Court reveals “ the principal defendant namely Mrs. B. S. Mantosh & Ors. will remain in possession as before as absolute owner of 2 bighas 15 katas 4 chatak 19 sq.ft. on the Western portion of total land shown by Mr. Radhika Jiban Mukherjee, learned Commissioner of local investigation, in his case plan dated 15.03.1948 as holding No.42 (in blue border) and the holding No.43 (in green border) of sub-division VII or and Division III, Dihee Panchannagram, (corresponding approximately to premises No.73, Canal Circular Road)”. In page 26 and 27 of the judgment this Court has made detailed analysis as to how the predecessor-in-interest of appellants acquired title by virtue of the said compromise decree. This Court only referred to the proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. and also the sale certificate filed therein. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 that this Court in its judgment relied upon the judgment of Criminal Court is a misinterpretation of the judgment of this Division Bench. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has further submitted that this Division Bench did not properly consider the Civil Court’s jurisdiction in this regard and the decisions cited by him were not considered. In pages 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the judgment, this Court has categorically elucidated that Civil Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the rival claim of the parties in respect of the title and ownership. In pages 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the judgment, this Court has categorically elucidated that Civil Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the rival claim of the parties in respect of the title and ownership. The Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the mandatory provisions and statutory rules have been complied with by the statutory authority or whether the Tribunal has complied with fundamental principles of judicial procedure. This Court relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the State of West Bengal vs. The Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited reported in AIR 1970 SC 1298 and the decision of Privy Council reported in AIR 1940 PC 105 in Secretary of State vs. Mask and Company as well as the decision of Apex Court reported in Ramesh Gobindram (deceased by LRs) vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf reported in AIR 2010 SC 2897 . It is submitted by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 that Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 provides for appeal and revision under Section 33 and 34 of the Act. Without taking recourse to those provisions, the appellant moved the Civil Court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. But this Court in the judgment has categorically observed that Civil Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the rival claim of the right, title, interest of the parties and also to examine whether statutory Tribunal has complied with mandatory provisions of law. If the mandatory provisions of the law are violated by the statutory Tribunal, Civil Court has certainly jurisdiction to interfere. The applicability of the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court and Privy Counsel cited in the judgment are not questioned by the learned advocate for the respondent Nos.3 and 4. The judgment under review categorically elucidated that in view of the compromise decree in T.S.50 of 1942, Monilal Goyee and Bijay Kumar Goyee cannot sell the suit property to Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Limited and Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Limited cannot sell the said property to the defendant No.2/ Orient Properties Limited (later Orient Beverage Limited). Therefore, defendant No.2 did not acquire any valid right, title and interest over the suit property. Since defendant No.2 was not owner of the suit property, defendant No.2 cannot submit return under Section 6(1) of Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. Therefore, defendant No.2 did not acquire any valid right, title and interest over the suit property. Since defendant No.2 was not owner of the suit property, defendant No.2 cannot submit return under Section 6(1) of Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. On the basis of filing return by defendant No.2 who is not the owner of suit land, the suit property cannot stand vested. As a real owner/holder, the appellants are entitled to get notice to be served through Rule 5 of Urban Land Ceiling Rule, 1976. Since the same was not one, the jurisdiction of Civil Court comes into play. On the other hand, some decisions have been cited from the ends of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and this Court in Page 53 of the judgment has categorically stated “we have also carefully perused the decisions of law cited from the end of defendant/respondent Nos.1, 3 & 4 and considered the same. The facts and circumstances and proposition of law of those decisions are distinguishable with reference to the present case and the ratio of those decisions of law have no application in the present case.” Learned advocate for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cited a decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 1738 (State of Kerala vs. M/s. N. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors.). It was the case of sales tax computation. In Paragraph 8 of the said judgment it is made clear that even if the jurisdiction of Civil Court is excluded by statute where the provisions of statute have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the Civil courts have jurisdiction to examine those cases. Decision of Privy Council reported in AIR 1940 PC 105 was also relied upon. It has been held therein that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court may be excluded expressly or by clear implication arising from the scheme of the Act. In the present case, the decision is not applicable as statutory Tribunal did not serve the draft statement under Section 8(3) by following the Rule 5 of the Urban Land Ceiling Rule upon the holder of vacant land and upon all other persons likely to have any claim or interest in the ownership and possession of the vacant land, by sending the same to the person concerned. Therefore, this Court has clearly held that Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine as to who are actual holder of the land vested by the respondent Nos.3 and 4. The submission that the provision of Section 33 and 34 of the Act impliedly barred the Civil Courts’ jurisdiction has no merit in view of the non-compliance of the mandatory provision of the law and judicial procedure. Therefore, these decisions cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 do not help the review petitioners in any way. Learned counsel has further mentioned a decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1801 (Government of A.P. and Ors. vs. J. Sridevi & Ors.) in the notes of argument but the compilation furnished by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 does not disclose any such decision. Citing the said decision learned counsel submitted that when a statutory authority is vested with power to determine the question as to the applicability of the provisions of the Act, it is ordinarily desirable to leave the question to be decided by such authority. The aggrieved party can file appeal against the decision within the framework provided under the statute and the ultimate decision could be challenged under judicial review. But this decision, although not found in the compilation, does not help the respondents in any way on the facts and circumstances of the case elucidated in the body of judgment. The statutory Tribunal did not comply the mandatory provisions of the judicial procedure. The Tribunal did not serve the statement under Section 8(3) by following rule 5 of the Urban Land Ceiling Rule, 1976. Learned counsel cited a decision reported in AIR 1994 CALCUTTA 82 (West Bengal properties Limited & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.). In the said decision it has been held that “the municipal authorities are only concerned with the planning of the cities and to see that no construction was made except in accordance with sanctioned plan and after complying with the conditions and restrictions imposed under the municipal laws. It had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of ownership of the land in question. The municipal authorities are concerned with the prima facie title of the applicant in such land. It had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of ownership of the land in question. The municipal authorities are concerned with the prima facie title of the applicant in such land. The sanctioning of plan did not and could not create any right, title and interest in the land in question if it is not otherwise there and as such it is beyond the scope of the powers of the municipal authorities under the Act and lay down any procedure travelling the scope and ambit of the Act which had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by sanctioning of such plan under the law.” In the present case, this decision has no relevance in connection with Civil Courts jurisdiction. The facts and circumstances of this decision is quite distinguishable from the present one and has no application in the present case. Learned counsel has further cited a decision reported in (2007)1 ICC (SC) 227 (State of A.P. vs. Smt. Prameela Modi & Ors.). It was a case of Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. While deciding the jurisdiction of the Special Court, it was held that the condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the case must have arisen out of any alleged Act of land grabbing and the District Judge while acting as a Special Court merely acts as a Presiding Officer of the court. But the present case is not a case of land grabbing. Therefore, decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited another decision reported in 2007 (1) ICC (SC) 159 (Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority vs. K. S. Narayan). The ratio of the judgment is on a different context in the said case. Sub-section 5 of Section 17 of Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 provides that after the publication of the notification in the official gazette the authority shall, during the period of next 30 days, serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment of any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the authority proposed to recover betterment tax. The person on whom the notice is served is entitled to raise objection regarding the proposed acquisition within 30 days. In the present case, no notice under Section 8(3) of the Land Ceiling Act, 1976 was served following Rule 5 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, plaintiff has no opportunity to raise objection on the question of vesting. In the said case, trial court dismissed the suit relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmi Chand vs. Gram Panchayat. The High Court distinguished the aforesaid decision by observing that the ratio of the said decision will be applicable only when the person aggrieved is covered by the notification directly or as nominee. However, when a person is not covered by the notification and without reference to him any notification issued would not be binding and in such a situation it would not prevent the aggrieved person from approaching the Civil Court. Hon’ble Apex Court differed with the observation of the Honble High Court. Hon’ble Apex Court held that the plaintiffs were assailing the validity of the acquisition proceeding because the ground of assailing the notification, namely, that notice under Sub-section 5 of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs. Hon’ble Apex court held that its effect could only be examined in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and not by the Civil Court. Therefore, the facts and circumstances and the ratio of the decision of the aforesaid judgment has no application in the present case. The present case is concerned to the claim of the appellants for right, title, interest and possession and they are entitled to get a notice of Sub-section 3 of Section 8 served through Rule 5 of Urban Land Rule, 1976. Learned counsel has referred to a decision referred in 2004(1) ICC (Cal) (DB) 477 (Biswanath Maji vs. Karuna Sindhu Dey & Ors.). In the said case it has been held that entry in the record of right cannot be questioned by Civil Court. It has a presumptive value but such presumption is rebuttable. In the said case, it was held that the question is whether a person is or is not a bargadar cannot be decided in a civil suit as provision of Section 21(3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act comes into play. It has a presumptive value but such presumption is rebuttable. In the said case, it was held that the question is whether a person is or is not a bargadar cannot be decided in a civil suit as provision of Section 21(3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act comes into play. The principle of law is settled one and it cannot be disputed; but this principle cannot be applied in the present case as the facts and circumstances are quite distinguishable. In the present case, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 does not provide any bar on a Civil Court’s jurisdiction expressly or by necessary implication. Learned counsel has further cited a decision reported in 2006(2) ICC (SC) 205 (Deva Sahayam (D) by L.Rs. vs. P. Savithramma & Ors.). It was the case of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and in that case Civil Court’s jurisdiction was excluded under Rent Control Act. In the said case, there is a clear provision of bar of the Civil Court jurisdiction. It was held in the said decision that the suit for eviction under the said Act would lie before the Rent Controller not before the Civil Court. The facts and circumstances of the said case have no application in the present case. Therefore, this judgment does not help the respondents in any way. Learned counsel has cited another decision reported in (2006)9 SBR 52 (Ganpatibai & Anr. vs. State of M.P. & Ors.). In the said case, Hon’ble apex Court held that civil suit was not maintainable and the remedy to question of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 lies in filing a writ petition. The facts and circumstances of the said case are distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the appellant filed writ petition and Writ Court observed that the petitioner has right, title, interest and allowed opportunity to the appellants for filing return under Section 6(1). The judgment is set aside by the Division Bench of this Court holding that the civil suit is the appropriate forum is to adjudicate the rival claim of right, title and interest. Hon’ble Apex Court did not disturb the finding of the Division Bench and dismissed the special leave petition. So, the facts and circumstances are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. Hon’ble Apex Court did not disturb the finding of the Division Bench and dismissed the special leave petition. So, the facts and circumstances are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. Another decision reported in 2010(3) ICC (SC) 519 (Samir Chandra Das vs. Bibhas Chandra Das & Ors.) has been cited by learned counsel. It was a case of Will probate under Section 230 of the Succession Act, 1925. It was held that the provision of Section 230 lays down specifically as to how the executor renounces his character as an executor and the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it cannot be done in any other manner. Apex Court further held that the concept of deemed renunciation as found by the High Court, does not appeal to the Appellate Court. Hon’ble Apex Court held that there was no such renunciation or deemed renunciation. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision of this case is totally distinguishable and cannot have any application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 also cited a decision reported in 2000(2) ICC (SC) 152 (V. Narayanaswamy vs. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu). The facts and circumstances of this case are quite distinguishable. It was a case of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Hon’ble Apex Court held that the dismissal of the election petition is not improper because election petition is based on the rights which are purely creative of statute and if the statute renders any particular requirement mandatory, the Court cannot exercise dispensing powers to waive off the non-compliance. In the said case, Apex Court held that when the petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to be rejected. The Court cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. The petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot be any partial rejection of the petition. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision of this case are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. In the notes of argument two decisions reported in AIR 1975 SC 2092 and AIR 1970 SC 1298 have been referred. There cannot be any partial rejection of the petition. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision of this case are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. In the notes of argument two decisions reported in AIR 1975 SC 2092 and AIR 1970 SC 1298 have been referred. But these decisions do not find place in the compilation submitted by the respondent Nos.3 and 4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the vesting order passed under the Act including other orders and notifications are not set aside and declared to be null and void, the plaintiff/appellant’s right, title and interest cannot be decided and, therefore, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the aforesaid issues of the vesting order including other orders passed by the competent authority under the said Act. It is further submitted that the learned trial court is right in holding that Civil Court’s jurisdiction is excluded in deciding the issues of vesting and other orders passed by the competent authority. But it is to be borne in mind that the plaintiffs have alleged that no notice of draft statement under Section 8(3) was served upon them in accordance with Rule 5. Since they are owners/holders of the land, they are entitled to get a notice. The non-compliance of the mandatory provision of service of notice gives birth to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine whether statutory authority has complied with the mandatory provision of the law. Since same was not complied with, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the rival title of the parties and to examine the propriety of vesting under the Act in question. Therefore, submission of the learned counsel of the respondents has no merit. Learned trial court completely ignored the aforesaid legal position and mechanically passed the judgment holding the lack of Civil Court’s jurisdiction in deciding the issues indispute. The Civil Court has sufficient jurisdiction to adjudicate the rival claim of right, title and interest and to examine the compliance of mandatory provisions by the statutory Tribunal. Division Bench of this Court while hearing the appeal from order of writ court held that the Civil Court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the rival claim of right, title and interest and possession of the contending parties and Apex Court did not disturb the said finding. Division Bench of this Court while hearing the appeal from order of writ court held that the Civil Court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the rival claim of right, title and interest and possession of the contending parties and Apex Court did not disturb the said finding. Therefore, the submission of learned advocate for review petitioners has no merit. The aforesaid decisions cited by learned counsel by respondent Nos.3 and 4 are not applicable in the present facts and circumstances. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 that the P.W.1 failed to prove the case. P.W.1 stated that as he was born in 1955 he has no direct knowledge about the earlier happenings. On the close and careful scrutiny of the evidence-in-chief of P.W.1 it transpires that he has advanced a detailed incident as to how the predecessor-in-interest of P.S. Mantosh acquired the title over the suit property. This fact has been elaborately depicted in the judgment. This P.W.1 has stated in Paragraph 13 of his evidence that Moni Lal Goyee and Bijay Kumar Goyee filed a Title Suit bearing No.50 of 1942 in the court of learned First Additional Subordinate Judge at Alipore against the late B. S. Mantosh, late James Mantosh and late Daisy Mantosh for recovery of possession of the suit premises. In paragraph 14 he has stated that learned 5th Subordinate Judge at Alipore in T.S. 50 of 1942 passed a judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 on compromise holding late B.S. Mantosh, late James Mantosh and late Daisy Mantosh to be the owners and possessors of 73, Canal Circular Road, Calcutta. Certified copy of the said judgment, decree together with map have been filed. This evidence in examination chief of P.W.1 has not at all been controverted in the cross-examination. Therefore, the evidences of P.W.1 with regards to paragraph 13 and 14 of the examination-in-chief prevail and are to be accepted. There is no doubt in holding that the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs emanate from the compromise decree of Title Suit No.50 of 1942. The P.W.1 has categorically stated in his evidence that since he was born in 1955 it is not possible for him to have the direct knowledge as to the happenings before his birth. He has stated that everything is matter of record. Therefore, his evidences cannot at all be disbelieved. The P.W.1 has categorically stated in his evidence that since he was born in 1955 it is not possible for him to have the direct knowledge as to the happenings before his birth. He has stated that everything is matter of record. Therefore, his evidences cannot at all be disbelieved. He has rightly stated that he cannot have knowledge about the sale certificate dated 14.08.1920 and he has no knowledge whether his mother collected the sale certificate. This ignorance is quite natural because he was not born at the relevant time. The title of the plaintiffs/appellants is mainly based upon the compromise decree of 1949 and this is not at all challenged. The contents and admissibility of the certified copy of compromise decree was not at all challenged in the cross-examination of P.W.1. No suggestion has been given to the P.W.1 that all those documents in connection with the title are false and fabricated. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff/appellant’s right, title and interest of the suit land originate from the compromise decree dated 17.01.1949 of T.S. 50 of 1942. P.W.1 has categorically stated the acquisition of the title of suit land on the basis of compromise decree. However, he cannot tell in his cross-examination with regards to the happenings which took place prior to his birth. Therefore, there is no reason to discard the evidentiary value of P.W.1 coupled with the judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 in T.S. No.50 of 1942. Merely because his cross-examination reveals that he cannot say whether his mother collected the sale certificate and whether he has any other document regarding the ownership, his evidence cannot be thrown aside. He has correctly replied the question put from the end of the defendant that those are matters of record. Therefore, it cannot be stated that P.W.1 has failed to prove plaint case. In the written notes of argument it has been repeatedly submitted that the P.W.1 has failed to prove the documents filed and marked exhibit on behalf of plaintiffs. It is needless to repeat here that the legality, genuineness and admissibility of those documents were not challenged before the trial court. No appeal or revision was filed against the marking of those documents. It is also needless to repeat even the documents namely judgment and decree of T.S. 50 of 1942 was not challenged and no endorsement of objection was made. No appeal or revision was filed against the marking of those documents. It is also needless to repeat even the documents namely judgment and decree of T.S. 50 of 1942 was not challenged and no endorsement of objection was made. No crossexamination was made on the aforesaid point of acquisition of title. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is devoid of merit. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 that this Court allowed the petition under the Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but the quantum of land was not taken into account. On the scrutiny of the judgment of this Court, it appears that in the Page 41, 42, this Court clearly held that the affidavit-in-opposition and the evidences of P.W.1 and D.W.1 reveal that the suit property consists of vacant land with few sheds and structures comprised of small plinth area. It transpires from the written notes of argument submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that non-suit holding No.41 and suit holding No.42 were covered by number of structures and quarters and godowns and those premises were used for horticulture purpose and all the vacant lands if taken together would not exceed the ceiling limit prescribed under Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, the question of filing return in respect of the suit property under Section 6(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 does not arise. The submission has sufficient merit. The judgment of this Court has taken into consideration as to the additional evidence filled under Order 41 Rule 27 and the point of excess land beyond the ceiling limit was also taken into consideration. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent nos.3 and 4 has no merit. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 that this Court did not properly adjudicate the point of limitation because the appellant should have filed the suit within the period of 3 years from the date of knowledge of dispossession under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, there is no explanation of delay in filing the suit in the Civil Court. He has cited some decisions of law. Moreover, there is no explanation of delay in filing the suit in the Civil Court. He has cited some decisions of law. In the written argument learned counsel for the respondent nos.3 and 4 has also submitted that appellants’ knowledge of dispossession took place during 1990-91 and 92 but they filed civil suit in 1998. Therefore, the suit is barred by provision of Limitation Act. This Court dealt with the point of limitation in Pages 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 in detail. This Court also relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (1) AIR 2009 SC 1200 , (2) 1996(6) SCC 100 , (3) (2004)3 SCC 458 and held that the appellants are entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in view of the fact that the plaintiffs/appellants have been prosecuting with due diligence and good faith the writ petition, appeal before the Hon’ble Division Bench and special writ petition before the Hon’ble Apex Court and, therefore, the period consumed in prosecuting in the aforesaid forum should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This Court also noted in detail that when the possession of suit land was taken over by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and handed over to the respondent No.1 during 1992, Daisy Mantosh moved a writ petition bearing No.1382 of 1992. The observation of Hon’ble Writ Court has also been noted in Page 50 of the judgment and appeal was preferred by the defendant/respondent No.1 being 324 of 1993. Hon’ble Division Bench disposed of the said appeal by observing that there was serious dispute on the question of title of the property and, therefore, the matter is to be disposed of by way of title suit, inasmuch as the right, title and interest has to be adjudicated on the basis of some records and documents and the same could be adjudicated by the Civil Court not by the Writ Court. This observation of Hon’ble Division Bench was not disturbed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the special leave petition. On the other hand, Hon’ble Apex court held that if the petitioner has any appropriate remedy under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 or any other law, it would be open to her to avail of the same. This observation of Hon’ble Division Bench was not disturbed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the special leave petition. On the other hand, Hon’ble Apex court held that if the petitioner has any appropriate remedy under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 or any other law, it would be open to her to avail of the same. Relying on the observation of Hon’ble Division Bench and also Hon’ble Apex Court the appellants instituted this civil suit. This Court observed that since the appellants were pursuing their remedy diligently on good faith or bona fide, they are entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that suit is barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act has no merit. The appellants/plaintiffs also stated in paragraph 21 of the plaint that the cause of action for the suit arose on 3rd April, 1997 when the Hon’ble Court directed the original plaintiffs to take recourse to civil suit. Having regards to the facts and circumstances it is crystal clear that the predecessor of the appellants did not remain silent after their forcible dispossession from the suit land by the respondent Nos.3 and 4. The explanation of delay in filing civil suit is automatically forthcoming from their pursuing proceeding before Writ Court, Appeal Court and Apex Court. In fact, the appellants were given liberty to institute civil suit by the Division Bench and Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, the benefit of Section 14 of limitation was given by the higher forum. Learned advocate for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cited a decision reported in 1997(6) SCC 26 (Ashis Kumar Hazra vs. Rubi Park Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors.). It is a case of West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983. Under Section 95(3) of the Act, any claim which arises between the society and its members etc. requires to be laid down within two months from the date of notice for arbitration. But as the petitioner was bona fide prosecuting their claim before Civil Court, the said period may be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Registrar dismissed the petition on the ground that explanation was not properly given and, therefore, the Registrar refused to condone the delay. But as the petitioner was bona fide prosecuting their claim before Civil Court, the said period may be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Registrar dismissed the petition on the ground that explanation was not properly given and, therefore, the Registrar refused to condone the delay. Hon’ble Apex Court held that the explanation for period of delay from 26.10.1974 till the date when the civil suit came to be filed is required to be explained. The limitation prescribed is only two months after notice. Hon’ble Apex Court held unless proper explanation is given, the delay cannot be condoned. But the facts and circumstances of the said case are not applicable in the present case. In the present case, the appellants’ predecessors having been forcibly dispossessed filed the writ petition in the very same year on 1992. Against the order of Writ Court, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench and Division Bench held that since disputed question of title is involved, Civil Court is proper forum. Hon’ble Apex Court did not disturb the findings of Division Bench and allowed the opportunity to take recourse to law under Land Ceiling Act or any other law. Therefore, the delay had been condoned by Division Bench and Hon’ble Apex Court in this case. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant in this respect as noted in the Page 48 of the judgment has sufficient merit. Therefore, the facts and circumstances and ratio of the decision of the aforesaid case has no application in the present case. Learned advocate for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cited a decision reported in 2009(4) ICC (SC) 430 (Laxmidas Morarji (Dead) by LRs vs. Miss Behrose Darab Madan). In the said case, the appellants were bona fide prosecuting the suit before the Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Hon’ble Apex Court directed that if along with the plaint, an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is filed the time from the date of institution of the suit till this day shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation in filing the suit. Hon’ble Apex Court also fixed a time frame for disposal of the same. In the present case, the aforesaid circumstances do not appear. There is no direction of Hon’ble Apex Court to file a separate petition for explanation of delay. Hon’ble Apex Court also fixed a time frame for disposal of the same. In the present case, the aforesaid circumstances do not appear. There is no direction of Hon’ble Apex Court to file a separate petition for explanation of delay. The appellants in the plaint have mentioned the date of cause of action for filing the suit, that is, from the date of direction of Hon’ble Court upon the original plaintiff to take recourse to civil suit before a Civil Court. The appellants got the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by virtue of the order of Division Bench and Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, this decision also does not help the respondent nos.3 and 4 in any way. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 further cited a decision reported in AIR 2012 KARNATAKA 155 (Sri Ameeruddin vs. Hussainsab Imamsab Hakki). In the said case, there was encroachment on land of the plaintiff by defendant’s neighbour by putting up construction. Plaintiff claimed ownership of said land and accused another person of violating his property rights. Hon’ble Court held that the starting point of cause of action is when the right was violated. In the said case, the suit was filed after 16-17 years of the construction and, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation. The facts and circumstances of the said case is quite distinguishable from the present one and has no application in the present case. In the notes of argument another decision reported in AIR 1966 Mad 425 regarding Article 59 of the Limitation Act has been mentioned, but this decision does not find place in the compilation. Moreover, the applicability of Article 59 of the limitation Act has already been discussed and the said Article has no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cited a decision reported in 2004(1) ICC (Cal) (DB) 273 (Soraban Bewa & Ors. vs. Jinnath Bibi & Ors). In the said case, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was discussed and it was held that the period of limitation is three years for institution of a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside first become known to him. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision are quite distinguishable and have no application in the present case. Therefore, prayer for review on the point of limitation fails. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has submitted that the appellants were not entitled to the service of notice as they did not file return under Section 6(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. With regards to the service of notice, Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited some decisions. The decision reported in 2011(1) SCC 330 (Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition C.M.D.A. vs. J. Sivaprakasam & Ors.) has been cited. It was a case of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it relates to the notification/publication on the newspapers. The decision deals with requirement of proper publication and circulation of publication of notification in newspaper having reasonably wide circulation by the acquiring authorities. In the said case, difference between actual, implied and constructive notice were distinguished. The facts and circumstances of the said case are quite distinguishable. The mode and manner of the service of the notice under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are not similar to that of the service of notice under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 specifically provides how to serve draft statement prepared under Section 8(3) of the Act. The Act stipulates that the said notice shall be served in compliance with Rule 5 of Urban Land Ceiling Rules, 1976. Therefore, this decision has no application in the present case. Learned counsel has further cited a decision reported in 2005(2) ICC (Kant) 554. It was a case of service of notice under Section 3 of Transfer of property Act, 1882 wherein it was observed by Hon’ble Apex Court that the notice could be constructive or deemed or implied. In the said case, statutory presumption of notice was discussed. It was also held that where there is a tenant in possession under a lease or an agreement, a person purchasing part of the estate must be bound to enquire on what terms that person is in possession. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision are not at all applicable in the present case. Another decision reported in 2004(1) ICC (SC) 18 (Calcutta Gujrati Education Society & Anr. vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors.) has also been cited. The facts and circumstances and ratio of decision are not at all applicable in the present case. Another decision reported in 2004(1) ICC (SC) 18 (Calcutta Gujrati Education Society & Anr. vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors.) has also been cited. It was a case of public and written notices at the time of determination of valuation, assessment, revision of assessment and amendment of assessment. The facts and circumstances and the ratio of the decision are quite distinguishable from the present case where mandatory provision of service of notice under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is incorporated. The aforesaid decision of law cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 has no application in the present case. The judgment under review has categorically discussed as to how and on whom notice is to be served in Pages 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 of the judgment and the decision reported in (2009)3 GLR 2270 of Hon’ble High Court at Gujarat and the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad reported in 2000(4) ALD 596 and 2000(4) ALT 694 are also relied upon. The facts and circumstances and the ratio of decision are quite applicable in the present case. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of law, this Court held that by virtue of the notifications under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, the land of the declarant was vested; but the declarant was not the holder of the land. This Court also held that the aforesaid notifications stand vitiated as those notifications do not indicate the name of the actual holder. Consequently, taking over the possession pursuant to such notifications also stands vitiated. Following the similar decision of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in WP No.8411 of 1992 (Kothuru Babu Surendra Kumar & Ors. vs. Special Officer and Competent Authority, ULC, Vijayawada and Ors.) reported in 2000(4) ALD 596 and 2000(4) ALT 694 this Court held that “issuance and service of notice as contemplated under Sub-section 2 of Rule 5 of the Rules is mandatory. Therefore, the statement prepared under Section 10 of the Act without following the mandatory requirement under Rule 5(2) is clearly invalid and illegal”. The decision of M/s. L.S. & Co. Therefore, the statement prepared under Section 10 of the Act without following the mandatory requirement under Rule 5(2) is clearly invalid and illegal”. The decision of M/s. L.S. & Co. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1995(2) APLJ 325 in connection with the issue of draft statement and final statement under Section 8(4) and Section 9 of the Act and the effect of Rule 5 of the Rules was also referred to. Hon’ble Court observed that the rights of immovable properties cannot be allowed to be adjudicated by the quasi judicial authorities like the special officer and competent authority in a casual and perfunctory manner. The scheme of the Act and particularly Sections 8 and 9 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder would show that the procedure to be adopted by the special officer and competent authority is to be reasonable and fair. The said Court in W.P. No.6855 of 1984 dated 26.08.1988 held that without notice taking action is void. While holding so, the said Hon’ble Court quashed the notification issued under Section 8(4) of the Act, as the same was issued without issuing notice to the actual owner/holder. Therefore, this Court held that non-compliance of mandatory provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Acts and Urban Land Ceiling Rules invites the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the cases whether statutory Tribunal has acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon’ble Privy Council reported in 1940 P.C. 105 (Secretary of State vs. Mask and Company). Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is devoid of merit and the decisions cited are not applicable in the present case. Learned counsel has cited another decision reported in 2006(4) ICC (SC) 598 (Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. vs. M. Krishnaveni & Ors.) and submitted that since the appellant did not file any statement under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the authority was under no obligation to conduct an enquiry. But the facts and circumstances and the ratio of decisions are not applicable in the present case in view of the fact that in the said decision there was excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Hence, the said case was decided for non-submissions of declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. But the facts and circumstances and the ratio of decisions are not applicable in the present case in view of the fact that in the said decision there was excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Hence, the said case was decided for non-submissions of declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. Section 6(1) of the Act specifically provides that “every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the time of commencement of this Act ………………………………………….shall file statement before the competent authority”. In the present case, the appellants have no vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited another decision reported in 2004(1) ICC (SC) 81 (Rajgopal (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Kishan Gopal & Anr.). In that case, Hon’ble Court held that “in absence of any pleadings whatsoever on the question as to whether adoption was made, there was no lis between the parties on this question and the Courts cannot go into the same even if some evidence is adduced.” In the present case, this Court does not find any instance of absence of pleading although evidence is adduced. Therefore, this decision does not help the respondents in any way. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited another decision reported in 2004(1) ICC (Cal) (DB) 227 (Khan Bahadur Sk. Mohammed jan vs. Sheikh Saifur Rahaman & Ors.). The facts and circumstances of this decision are quite distinguishable. It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that a party who has raised allegations of fraud must set forth specific particular thereof in the pleading. This decision also does not help the respondents in any way. We do not find any absence of pleading in so far as the relief sought for by the appellants is concerned. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited another decision reported in 2003(8) SCC 740 (Kashi Nath (dead) through LRs. vs. Jaganath). In the said decision it has been held that the evidence cannot be relied upon where there is variance of pleadings and evidence and adverse inference is to be drawn when pleadings and evidence are self-contradictory. We do not find any variation of pleadings and evidence in the present case. vs. Jaganath). In the said decision it has been held that the evidence cannot be relied upon where there is variance of pleadings and evidence and adverse inference is to be drawn when pleadings and evidence are self-contradictory. We do not find any variation of pleadings and evidence in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 has cited another decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1061 (J. J. Lal Private Limited & Ors. vs. M. R. Murali & Anr.). In the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court held that the documents referable to some other litigation between the parties cannot be taken into consideration unless tendered in evidence and brought on record consistently with procedural law governing trial of civil cases. This decision of law although settled one, has no relevance with the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court has properly dealt with all the issues involved in the present dispute. No important issue has escaped the notice of this Court and there is no case of non-consideration of any important issue so as to necessitate the party to approach this Court by way of filing review petition. Therefore, decision reported in (2003)9 SCC 519 (Shankar K. Mandal and Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) cited at the time of hearing of review petition has no application. Similarly, grievances/submissions of both sides were properly recorded and, therefore, question of review does not arise. The decision of law reported in (2009)2 WBLR (Cal) 686 (Sri Anil Kumar Saha vs. The Board of Councillors of Nabadwip Municipality & Ors.) has no application in the instant case. The judgment of the Division Bench under review has clearly dealt with all the issues involved in the suit by placing reliance on the decision of Apex Court, Privy Council and other Courts. Therefore, the judgment does not exhibit any misconception of law or ignorance of law. No error apparent on the face of the record is forthcoming in this case. There is no sufficient reason for review. Decision reported in 2012(3) WBLR (Cal) 224 (Rabindranath De vs. Manick Chandra Sasmal & Ors.) cited at the time of hearing the review application has no application. The judgment under review does not disclose any erroneous assumption of facts which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. There is no sufficient reason for review. Decision reported in 2012(3) WBLR (Cal) 224 (Rabindranath De vs. Manick Chandra Sasmal & Ors.) cited at the time of hearing the review application has no application. The judgment under review does not disclose any erroneous assumption of facts which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the decision cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 at the time of hearing review petition reported in (2013)12 SCC 1 (Abu Salem Abdul Qayyum Ansari vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.) has no application. We do not find any error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment. Further we do not find any materials on record which escaped the notice of this Court while considering the legality of vesting and Civil Court’s jurisdiction and adjudication of the title of the party concerned. Therefore, decisions cited at the time of hearing of review petition reported in 2004 AIR SCW 1347 (M/s. Green View Tea and Industries vs. Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr.) has no application. The decision of law reported in 2004(3) ICC (SC) 590 cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 at the time of hearing review petition is quite distinguishable. It is a case of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962 and there is a case of non-impleading the legal representatives of one of the parties. The said decision has no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 at the time of hearing of the review petition referred to a decision reported in (2009)15 SCC 429 (Ramesh Dutt & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors.). In the said decision Hon’ble Court referred to a judgment in (Seth Ramdayal Jat vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009)11 SCC 545 ) and quoted the same as under: “20. It is now almost well settled that, save and except for Section 43 of the Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41 and 42 thereof, a judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit.” The legal position is undisputed. This judgment under review of this Court does not rely upon the judgment of Criminal Court in deciding the title of the parties. It has only referred to a criminal proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. and some of its document filed therein having relevancy under Section 13 of Evidence Act. This judgment under review of this Court does not rely upon the judgment of Criminal Court in deciding the title of the parties. It has only referred to a criminal proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. and some of its document filed therein having relevancy under Section 13 of Evidence Act. This Court relied upon the decision of Civil Court to decide the title of the parties. Therefore, this decision does not help the respondents in any way. Similar decision has also been cited by the learned counsel at the time of hearing of review petition reported in (2009)13 SCC 729 (Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Saprpa (Smt.). The said decision also held that judgment of a Criminal Court will not be binding in civil proceeding and the judgment of Criminal Court in civil proceeding will only have limited application namely who was the accused and what was the result of the criminal proceedings. The legal petition is undisputed and the matter was discussed in the judgment. Therefore, this decision does not inspire us to review this judgment of Division Bench. Learned counsel at the time of argument of review petition cited another decision reported in 2011(4) ICC (SC) 846 (State Bank of India & Anr. vs. M/s. Emsons International Ltd. & Anr.). In the said case High Court did not consider all the issues of law and fact. But in the present case, the judgment under review clearly dealt with all the issues of law and facts under dispute. Therefore, this judgment has no application in the present case. Similar decision has also been cited at the time of hearing of the review application reported in (2013)12 SCC 64 (S. Kesari Hanuman Goud vs. Anjum Jehan & Ors.). In the said case, Hon’ble Court held that decision on all the issues is necessary and the decision must be supported by evidence, dealing with only one issue is not sufficient and the decision must be supported by evidence. This is the settled law. In the present case, this Court dealt with all the relevant issues supported by evidence. Therefore, the decision does not help the respondents in any way. Another decision at the time of hearing of review petition is cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 and it is reported in (2010)4 SCC 81 (Laxmi Kant Bajpai vs. Haji Yaqoob & Ors.). Therefore, the decision does not help the respondents in any way. Another decision at the time of hearing of review petition is cited by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 and it is reported in (2010)4 SCC 81 (Laxmi Kant Bajpai vs. Haji Yaqoob & Ors.). Hon’ble Apex Court held in the said decision that the election petition must disclose all the facts and circumstances relied upon by the petitioner along with the definite cause of action in absence of which petition is liable to be dismissed. In other words, Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon proper pleading. In the present case, plaint averments clearly disclose the material facts and circumstances which are necessary for adjudication of dispute. Therefore, the aforesaid decision has no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 at the time of hearing of review petition has cited a decision reported in (2010)9 SCC 712 (M. Chandra vs. M. Thangamuthu & Anr.). Hon’ble Court held that “it is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if the secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form it may be available whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by fundamental evidence that the alleged copy is, in fact, a true copy of the original. The exceptions to the rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party.” In the present case, almost all the documents are more than 30 years old. The parties did not challenge the authenticity of the contents of the documents in the trial court. Moreover, judgment and decree of the trial court in civil suit No.50 of 1942 which clearly indicates the title of plaintiff/appellants was not at all challenged. No endorsement of objection was also made on the said document. The documents were marked exhibit and the contents of those documents are also accepted as genuine by the trial court. Therefore, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cannot agitate the matter afresh before the Appellate Court. No endorsement of objection was also made on the said document. The documents were marked exhibit and the contents of those documents are also accepted as genuine by the trial court. Therefore, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 cannot agitate the matter afresh before the Appellate Court. Moreover, the evidence in the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 about the acquisition of title of their predecessor-in-interest by virtue of decree and judgment in T.S. 50 of 1042 dated 17.01.1949 was never challenged in the cross-examination. The contents of this compromise decree dated 17.01.1949 clearly establish the title of the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs and plaintiff/appellants. The appellants, therefore, successfully proved the right, title, interest and possession of the suit property. Finally another decision has been cited during the course of hearing of the review petition and it is reported in (2012)2 SCC 11 (Horil vs. Keshav & Anr.). It has been held therein that Civil Court has inherent jurisdiction to try all types of civil disputes unless its jurisdiction is barred expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other Tribunal or authority. In the present case, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not barred expressly or by any statutory provision or by any necessary implication. Hon’ble Court also referred to Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred by the said Act, 1976. The judgment under review has elaborately discussed the issue. Learned advocate on behalf of opposite party Nos.1 to 7 has submitted that review petition has no merit as the grounds raised in the review petition are the grounds of appeal. Learned advocate further submitted that this Court has made elaborate discussion on these points involved in this suit. This Court made observation on the Civil Court’s jurisdiction and on the question of vesting and the right, title of the party concerned in details and this Court has also observed that the true owner had not been served with the notice. Learned advocate has further submitted that on the question of adjudication of rival claim of title there was no question of ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. When the real owner had not been served with notice, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not ousted. Learned advocate has further submitted that on the question of adjudication of rival claim of title there was no question of ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. When the real owner had not been served with notice, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not ousted. On close and careful perusal of the records and the submission of the learned counsel for the review petitioner and also that of opposite parties, this Court does not find any error apparent on the face of the record. This Court also does not find that any of the important issues was not discussed and considered. This Court has dealt with all the issues and does not find any misconception of law on the part of this Court. In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors. reported in 1997 (8) SCC 715 Hon’ble Apex Court held that error which is not selfevident and is to be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that in exercise of jurisdiction of review petition, it is not possible for erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected. A review petition has limited purpose and cannot be allowed as an appeal in disguise. In Laxman Bhowmick vs. Narayan Chakraborty reported in 1995(11) CHN 490, the Division Bench of this Court also held that an error can be said to be one apparent on the face of the record only when such error is apparent and can be located without any elaborate argument and without any scope of controversy with regard to such error which as if, at a glance stares at the face. Reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in (M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. the Government of Andhra Pradesh) reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 . In the light of the aforesaid decision of law and consideration of facts and circumstances, this Court is of considered view that the judgment of this Division Bench does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record or from any misconception of law and the judgment of this Court does not suffer from non-consideration of any issue. By filing review petition, the petitioners, in fact, seek to challenge the judgment of this Division Bench and thereby the rehearing of the appeal which is not permissible under the provision of law. The review petition is, therefore, without any merit and stands dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. In view of disposal of review petition, CAN No.1450 of 2014 is disposed of.