JUDGMENT 1. Heard. Admit. Heard finally by consent. 2. This appeal is preferred against an order passed on 07.08.2013 by the learned District Judge-1, Mapusa, in Civil Suit No. 5/2012, thereby rejecting the applications for interim reliefs as per Exhibits 4, 5 and 6. 3. The short point involved in the appeal is :- whether the discretion exercised by learned District Judge-1, Mapusa in refusing injuctory reliefs to the appellant is arbitrary and perverse? 4. The case of the appellant is that he is the tenant of respondent no. 1 in respect of House No. 1150 at Ximer, Candolim, (herein after called as “suit house”) since November, 2010 on monthly rent of Rs. 7,000/-. It is the case of the appellant that the suit house has been let out to him for residential and commercial purpose. He has submitted that in the past, respondents no. 1 and 2 had attempted to evict the appellant, therefore, a police complaint was filed by him. The matter, however, was compromised on 12.01.2011. 5. The appellant further submitted that respondent no. 1 refused to accept the rent and therefore he sent the rent by money orders for the months of November and December, 2011. He submitted that on 10.11.2012, respondent no. 4, on the direction of respondent no. 1 disconnected the electricity connection and so also the water connection was disconnected. He further submitted that on 17.01.2011, respondent no. 1 alongwith one neighbour tried to forcibly evict him from the suit house. As there has been attempt on the part of respondent no. 1 to forcefully evict him and also deprive him of essential services, the appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondent. In this suit, the appellant has filed three applications, one for interim injunction, second for interim mandatory injunction for restoration of water connection and third for interim mandatory injunction for restoration of electricity connection. 6. The respondents no. 1 and 2 resisted suit and applications by filing their written statement and replies. They submitted that appellant approached the Court only after respondent no. 1 filed a suit under Section 6 of the Special Relief Act, being Regular Civil Suit No. 22/2012/A before the Civil Court at Mapusa. They denied that appellant was a tenant and stated that there was no agreement as such in writing or oral. They submitted that appellant approached the Court only after respondent no. 1 filed a suit under Section 6 of the Special Relief Act, being Regular Civil Suit No. 22/2012/A before the Civil Court at Mapusa. They denied that appellant was a tenant and stated that there was no agreement as such in writing or oral. It is their case that the appellant was allowed to occupy the suit house for three months by respondent no. 2, the brother of respondent no. 1 and that was without the knowledge of respondent no. 1. When the respondent no. 1 came to know of this fact, she asked the appellant to vacate the suit house and thereafter the appellant vacated the suit house. According to them, the appellant stayed in the suit house only for few months. The respondents no. 1 and 2 further submitted that thereafter, sometime in the month of November, 2011, the appellant forcefully entered the house and paid the electricity bills for period from November, 2011 to January, 2012. They submitted that the appellant has been staying, not in the suit house but in a house situated nearby called as the Jack's place. According to them, the appellant illegally broke open the lock and paid the electricity bills without permission. They therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit and applications. 7. The three applications for temporary injunction and temporary mandatory injunctions, after hearing both sides, were rejected by the learned District Judge-1, Mapusa. It was found by the learned District Judge that appellant failed to make out prima-facie case that he was in lawful possession of the suit house. The learned District Judge also found that appellant was not staying in the suit house and, therefore, injunction was refused, there being no irreparable loss to the appellant. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that appellant was inducted into the suit house as tenant by respondent no. 1 and even though, there was no lease agreement in writing, the fact of tenancy has been established by rent receipt dated 29.11.2010 issued by respondent no. 2, police complaint dated 11.01.2011 and electricity bills, paid by the appellant. He further submitted that if the tenancy has been proved by the appellant in a prima-facie manner, it was incumbent upon respondents no. 2, police complaint dated 11.01.2011 and electricity bills, paid by the appellant. He further submitted that if the tenancy has been proved by the appellant in a prima-facie manner, it was incumbent upon respondents no. 1 and 2 to show some prima-facie evidence of it's termination by sending a notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, 1882. According to him, there is no dispute about the fact that appellant has been in possession of the suit house and if possession is proved, prima-facie, he is entitled to essential services viz, supply of electricity and water. He has also referred to Section 30 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 in support of his contention. 9. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondents submits that it is the specific case of respondents that appellant had occupied the suit house only for a few months and some time in the month of January, 2011 he had vacated the suit house after being asked to do so by respondent no. 1. He further submits that thereafter the appellant has been occupying the suit house as trespasser and that his possession is not lawful. He further submits that the appellant has been staying in a house situated nearby the suit house called Jack's place and this fact has been established prima-facie, as admittedly, the appellant has received summons in another suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 22/2012/A at this address. Therefore, according to him, neither any inconvenience nor any irreparable loss would be caused to the appellant, if injunction is refused. 10. It is seen from the impugned order that one of the reasons for rejecting the reliefs of interim injunctions to the appellant is that in the opinion of the learned District Judge, the appellant has failed to establish the he is in lawful possession of the suit house. At this stage, important factor is of possession by the appellant and not the basis of possession. The pleadings of respondents no. 1 and 2 show that the fact that appellant is in possession of the suit house has been admitted by them because it is their case that appellant is in possession of the suit house as a trespasser. At this stage, important factor is of possession by the appellant and not the basis of possession. The pleadings of respondents no. 1 and 2 show that the fact that appellant is in possession of the suit house has been admitted by them because it is their case that appellant is in possession of the suit house as a trespasser. Having regard to the nature of the interim reliefs sought by the appellant, it is not necessary to go into the aspect of legality of possession or basis of possession of the appellant. Therefore, I find that learned District Judge has erroneously mixed the factum of possession with the basis of possession in so far as the question of grant of interim reliefs to the appellant is concerned. For these reliefs, which relate to restraining the respondents from interfering with appellant's possession except in accordance with law and restoration of water and electricity supply, the law would not require the parties to prove the basis of its possession and it would be enough to establish, apart from two other usual factors, existence of prima-facie case, which in this case has been established by admission of possession of appellant, may be as a trespasser, without going into the aspect of legality of possession. 11. But, the matter does not end here. Even though the appellant has established the factor of prima-facie case of possession of suit house, the appellant would also have to establish existence of two other usual factors namely, balance of convenience and causing of irreparable loss. The factor of balance of convenience can be examined from the view-point, as to who would be inconvenienced most, if injunction as sought, is granted. The third factor of irreparable loss would also have to be examined from the view-point, whether the appellant would suffer any irreparable loss, if injuctory reliefs are denied to him. Both these questions can be determined by referring to the contentions raised by respondents no. 1 and 2 and material produced by them before the court in support of them. 12. It has been contended specifically by respondents no. 1 and 2 that appellant has not been staying in the suit house and has been staying in a nearby place called the Jack's place and the appellant has failed to deny this fact. It is also contended by respondents no. 12. It has been contended specifically by respondents no. 1 and 2 that appellant has not been staying in the suit house and has been staying in a nearby place called the Jack's place and the appellant has failed to deny this fact. It is also contended by respondents no. 1 and 2 that appellant has received a suit-summons issued in another suit at the said address called Jack's place, indicating reasonably that appellant was residing not in suit house but at Jack's place and this fact too, has not been specifically denied by the appellant. The leaned Counsel for the appellant submits that since the brother of the appellant was residing at Jack's place, the appellant used to go there and therefore accepting suit-summons at the said address would not mean that appellant has abandoned the use of the suit house and he has been staying at the said Jack's place. This clarification has been given by the learned Counsel for the appellant before this Court and not by way of any rejoinder to the contentions specifically raised in the written statement before the trial Court. There is nothing on record to show that said contention of respondents has been specifically denied by the appellant. The obvious interference would be, prima-facie, neither the balance of convenience nor the factor of irreparable loss lean towards the appellant. Therefore, the learned District Judge has correctly found that since the appellant has not been prima-facie using the suit premises and prima-facie staying at the house called Jack's place, refusal of injuctory reliefs would cause no irreparable loss to the appellant. I may add, it would also not disturb the balance of convenience. The impugned order therefore, has to be upheld as correct and legal. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to me some cases, one such case is of Ramjilal Sharma and another versus Purushottam Lal Sharma, reported in AIR 1993 Gauhati 63. In this case, it has been held that temporary injunction directing restoration of water supply and electricity supply can be granted. The second case cited before me is of N. Umapathy versus B.V. Muniyappa, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2467. In this case, it has been held that temporary injunction directing restoration of water supply and electricity supply can be granted. The second case cited before me is of N. Umapathy versus B.V. Muniyappa, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2467. In the said case, Hon'ble Apex Court has held, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, that even though the appellant was entitled for possession, the possession cannot be given to the appellant unless respondent is ejected in accordance with due process of law. Further, Hon'ble Apex Court has also held that respondent is entitled to Ad-interim relief for protection of his lawful possession pending civil suit. In the third case, relied upon by him, of Vikas Kamalakar Walawalkar versus Deputy Salt Commissioner, reported in AIR 2006 Bombay 265, the learned Single Judge of this Court considered the facts and circumstances of the case and found that the balance of convenience as well as element of strong prima-facie case were in favour of plaintiff therein and therefore, protected plaintiff's possession, by granting temporary injunction. 14. The principles set out in these cases are not in dispute. They are well-settled. By following them only, that I have found that in this case, neither the balance of convenience nor the factor of irreparable loss go in favour of the appellant. Therefore, no error or fault can be found with the refusal of temporary injunctions by the learned District Judge. Hence, these decisions would not assist the appellant in any manner. 15. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also referred to me the case of Kazhugumalai Raja (deceased by LR) and another versus Rajapalayam Palayapalayam Boopalarajaptti Illathar Samuga Pothu Nala Fund, reported in AIR 2004 Madras 267, wherein Madras High Court has held that whenever a civil suit is filed for eviction of a tenant under the Rent Control Act, notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, terminating tenancy, must be sent. In the instant case, so far there is no material brought to my notice indicating that any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been issued to the appellant. If it has not been issued, it would only go to show existence of strong prima-facie case in favour of appellant and would not go any further. In the instant case, so far there is no material brought to my notice indicating that any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been issued to the appellant. If it has not been issued, it would only go to show existence of strong prima-facie case in favour of appellant and would not go any further. The other two factors necessary for seeking injuctory reliefs must also be shown to be going in favour of the party seeking such reliefs. I have already noted earlier, the appellant has failed to clear the test on these two counts. The ratio of said case of Kazhugumalai (supra) therefore would not help the appellant in any manner. 16. In the circumstances of the case, I find that there is no warrant for interfering with the impugned order. The learned District Judge-1, Mapusa has correctly and reasonably exercised discretion in refusing injuctory reliefs to the appellant. The point is, therefore, answered as in the negative. The appeal fails. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed with costs. However, since the appellant has been prima-facie found to be in possession of the suit house, it is made clear that appellant shall not be evicted therefrom, except in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.