Judgment M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Appellant/Applicant has focussed the instant Original Side Appeal as against the order dated 25.03.2011, in Application No.1784 of 2011, passed by the Learned Single Judge, in dismissing the Application filed by the Appellant/Applicant [under Order XIV Rule 8 O.S. Rules, 1956 r/w. Section 9(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996]. 2.The Learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned order, in Application No.1784 of 2011, dated 25.03.2011, [filed by the Appellant/Applicant seeking for passing of an order by this Court in directing the Respondent to furnish security for a sum of Rs.2,57,702/- or in the event of default to attach the movables available at the address of the Respondent, by transmitting the order through the Principal District Court at Ernakulam, as mentioned in the schedule of property pending initiation and disposal of the arbitral proceedings and till the enforcement/execution of the Award], has, among other things, in paragraph Nos.16 and 17, observed as follows: "16.Mere filing of the claim petition before the Arbitrator does not lead to a conclusion, that interim measures under Sec. 9 of the Act are to be positively passed. The application is misuse of provisions of law, to achieve the object of recovery, which is not the intention of the section. 17. In view of the facts stated, no ground is made out, either to direct the respondent to furnish security or order attachment." and resultantly, dismissed the Application without costs. 3. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant submits that the impugned order of the Learned Single Judge, dated 25.03.2011, is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. 4. According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant, the Learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the Application No.1784 of 2011 filed by the Appellant/Applicant under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking attachment pending arbitration proceedings. 5. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant contends that the Learned Single Judge, while passing the order in Application No.1784 of 2011, dated 25.03.2011, has committed an error in holding that the relief could not be granted without proof of positive evidence of steps to dispose of the properties. 6. 5. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant contends that the Learned Single Judge, while passing the order in Application No.1784 of 2011, dated 25.03.2011, has committed an error in holding that the relief could not be granted without proof of positive evidence of steps to dispose of the properties. 6. It is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/ Applicant that the Appellant/Applicant is entitled to secure the claim in the proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by attachment or other relief which cannot be rejected by the Learned Single Judge, even without issuance of notice to the Respondent. 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Respondent is a defaulter and proceeding for recovery including interim measures were inevitable, resort to which cannot be construed as abuse of due process and contra view taken by the Learned Single Judge, while dismissing the Application No.1784 of 2011, is clearly unsustainable, in the eye of law. 8. The stand of the Appellant/Applicant is that in the course of their regular financial business, the Respondent approached it on 29.09.2007 and availed a personal loan in Loan Account No.XSEGCOC00000160450, by entering into an Agreement on 30.09.2007, to an extent of Rs.1,23,000/-and agreed to pay the same in 36 equated monthly instalments, each EMI comes to Rs.4,634/-, commencing from 05.11.2007 and ending on 05.10.2010. The Respondent is to pay 29 instalments over due of Rs.1,34,288/- and other over dues of Rs.1,23,414/-, aggregating in all a sum of Rs.2,57,702/- as on 28.02.2011. 9. It comes to be known that in terms of Clause (5) of the Loan Agreement, the Respondent has undertaken to pay the monthly instalments on the due dates mentioned in the schedule of the said Agreements without any delay or default. Further, he agreed that in the event of default in payment of the instalment amount or other charges under the said Agreement, the Respondent is liable to pay an interest at 21% per annum from the date of default till payment in full and the same is without prejudice to the Appellant/Applicant's other rights envisaged under the said Agreement. 10. According to the Appellant/Applicant, the Respondent was a chronic defaulter and several cheques issued by him towards payment of monthly instalment dues constantly got dishonoured. 11. 10. According to the Appellant/Applicant, the Respondent was a chronic defaulter and several cheques issued by him towards payment of monthly instalment dues constantly got dishonoured. 11. Further, the Appellant/Applicant Company issued a legal notice to the Respondent on 27.08.2010 calling upon him to pay the outstanding amount. But, there is no positive response from the Respondent in this regard and as such, the Appellant/Company, left with no other alternative, has filed the present Application under Section 9(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 12. Admittedly, the Appellant/Applicant appointed an Arbitrator, through a letter of appointment and filed a claim statement before the Sole Arbitrator to resolve the dispute. In the meanwhile, the Appellant/ Applicant came to understand and apprehend that the Respondent is trying to sell his assets including schedule mentioned movable properties to third parties and to shift his premises to unknown destination to defraud it. 13. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant brings it to the notice of this Court that in the Arbitration Proceedings, all formalities like, taking evidence and marking of documents were completed, but the Arbitrator so appointed had expired and new Arbitrator was appointed and it is for him to pass an Award in the subject matter in issue. 14. At the outset, this Court pertinently points out that an Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot in strict sense be treated as an Interlocutory Application in a suit, as per decision M.M.T.C. Limited V. Rajeev Bakshi Proprietor, M/s. Ganesh Exports, 2001 (2) RAJ 529 . 15. It is to be remembered that in an Application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 for granting of interim relief, a Court of Law is to refrain from deciding upon the merits of the disputes between the parties, and will leave such determination for the arbitraral Tribunal itself. Also that, a Court of Law is not to decide issues that are for the Arbitrator to decide, in an Application under Section 9 of the Act. Moreover, a Court of Law is not to make any observations that would influence the adjudication of the dispute between the parties. 16. As a matter of fact, the power to grant interim relief is exercised by a Court of Law in terms of Section 9 of the Act and not in Civil Procedure Code, in the considered opinion of this Court. 16. As a matter of fact, the power to grant interim relief is exercised by a Court of Law in terms of Section 9 of the Act and not in Civil Procedure Code, in the considered opinion of this Court. Indeed, an Application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 cannot be placed at the pedestal of a suit or even a substantive proceedings, as opined by this Court. 17. It is true that a power of a Court of Law is wide enough and the same is to be exercised by way of discretion with utmost care and circumspection. A party requiring a protection order under Section 9(ii) (b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 generally must place some positive material before a Court of Law, besides the merits of the claim that is eminently required to be passed as there is likelihood or an endeavour to defeat the Award, although the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code are not required to be satisfied. 18. It cannot be lost sight of that an Application for interim relief should not be granted by the Courts when a similar Application is pending before the Arbitral Tribunal, as per decision Arun Kumar V. Vikram Kapur, AIR 2002 NOC 103 (Del). Equally, a Court of Law cannot prescribe any general principle in regard to the maintainability of an Application filed by a party. No wonder, the same will have to be determined by a Court of Law based on the facts and circumstances of each case whether for the purpose of interim measure of protection, preservation, sale of any goods, securing the amount in dispute etc. Also that, on the basis of general/bald or vague allegations viz., that the Respondent is about to dispose of the properties or to remove it beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and that too, unsupported by requisite particulars, an extraordinary remedy of requiring the other side to furnish security of the amount in question cannot be granted as a matter of routine. In fact, just because an amount is due from the Respondent, the relief of 'Attachment Before Judgment' cannot be asked for. There must be definite evidence that the Respondent by his definite mala fide conduct is to dispose of or about to dispose of his property with a view to defeat the rights of a Creditor. 19. In fact, just because an amount is due from the Respondent, the relief of 'Attachment Before Judgment' cannot be asked for. There must be definite evidence that the Respondent by his definite mala fide conduct is to dispose of or about to dispose of his property with a view to defeat the rights of a Creditor. 19. In fact, the Appellant/Applicant, in an affidavit to support his/its contentions, ought to state as to which portion they are true and correct to knowledge and necessarily the source of information must be disclosed and the grounds for belief should be stated. Likewise, an interim order under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 in regard to the attachment of properties or furnishing of security and failure to do so, to result in consequent attachment of properties are not to be ordered/passed in a cavalier fashion because of the reason that no inconvenience or prejudice would be caused to the opposite party. To put it succinctly, there must exist circumstances of course to the subjective satisfaction of a Court of Law, whether the Appellant/Applicant has made out a prima facie case for obtaining an interim order against the opposite party in regard to the requirement of furnishing security, as opined by this Court. 20. As far as the present case is concerned, it is to be pointed out that the Appellant/Applicant, in Application No.1784 of 2011, in paragraph No.10, has, inter alia, averred as follows: " ... The Applicant Company has appointed an Arbitrator by a letter of appointment and filed claim statement before the Sole Arbitrator to resolve the dispute. In the meanwhile, the Applicant came to understand and apprehend that the Respondent is trying to sell his assets including schedule mentioned movable properties to third parties and to shift his premises to unknown destination to defraud the Applicant Company'. In reality, these mechanical averments of the Appellant/Applicant are not enough to make out any positive case for furnishing of security, for the business loan availed by the Respondent in question. That apart, in the present case, after the death of the earlier Arbitrator, new Arbitrator was appointed by the Appellant/Applicant and admittedly, passing of an Award is the only thing required to be done in the subject matter in issue between the inter se parties. Looking at from any angle, the OSA fails. 21. That apart, in the present case, after the death of the earlier Arbitrator, new Arbitrator was appointed by the Appellant/Applicant and admittedly, passing of an Award is the only thing required to be done in the subject matter in issue between the inter se parties. Looking at from any angle, the OSA fails. 21. For the foregoing discussions and reasons, this Court dismisses the Original Side Appeal, in furtherance of substantial cause of Justice, without costs. Consequently, the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, in Application No.1784 of 2011, dated 25.03.2011, is confirmed by this Court for the reasons ascribed in this Appeal. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.