Judgment : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral). This regular first appeal has been preferred by the defendants- appellants against the judgement and decree passed by learned District Judge, Kinnaur, Civil Division at Rampur Bushahr, whereby he decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. The facts, in brief, may be noticed. The plaintiffs filed a suit in a representative capacity for declaration declaring that the land comprised in khata Khatoni No. 70 mini/ 138 min, Khasra Nos. 1, 3, 7, 7/2 and 8 (after recent revenue settlement) measuring 68-11-62 hectares within the area of Chak Pangi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur and that all the right holders of village Pangi have been exercising their customary right of collecting Neoza (Pine-nut), fuel wood, grass and grazing cattle from time immemorial openly, peacefully, continuously as of right without any interruption from any side to the knowledge of the defendants. They have further questioned the order dated 2.9.1983 passed by the Revenue Settlement Collector in case No. 23/83 as being void, illegal, arbitrary, unjust, without jurisdiction and against the law and facts with consequential relief of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the rights of the plaintiffs over the suit land in any manner. The other averments made in the plaint need not be noticed in view of the order, I propose to pass. 3. The defendants- appellants contested the suit by raising preliminary objections that the suit was bad and illegal for non- joinder of State of Himachal Pradesh, who was the owner of the suit land as necessary party and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Apart from that, certain other objections were also raised and on merits, the defendants have denied the claim of the plaintiffs and have stated that it was the defendant alone, who had been exercising various customary rights over the land in dispute. 4. Admittedly, the State of Himachal Pradesh is the owner of the land and has not been arrayed as a party to the present suit despite objection to this effect. The learned trial court framed a issue to this effect vide issue No. 4, which reads as under:- “Whether the suit is bad for non- joinder of State? 4. Admittedly, the State of Himachal Pradesh is the owner of the land and has not been arrayed as a party to the present suit despite objection to this effect. The learned trial court framed a issue to this effect vide issue No. 4, which reads as under:- “Whether the suit is bad for non- joinder of State? OPD” For answering this issue against the defendants, the learned trial court has recorded the following reasons:- “The learned counsel for the defendants had argued that the State of H.P. was a necessary party. The suit land was owned by the State of H.P. The Settlement Collector vide order, dated 2.9.1983, had rejected the customary rights of the plaintiffs over the suit land. I find no merit in the defence of the defendants. The State of H.P. had not denied the customary rights of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The Settlement Collector, in exercise of his statutory duty of preparation of record of rights, had erroneously proceeded to reject the customary rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had not claimed ownership of the suit land. It was nowhere the defence of the defendants that the State of H.P. had been collecting Chilgoza fruit from the suit land to the exclusion of the right holders. The plaintiffs were masters of the litigation and could not be compelled to fight against persons against whom they claimed no relief. The State of H.P. in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, could not be said to be a necessary party. Full and final adjudication of the dispute between the parties could be resolved in the absence of the State. As such, the suit did not suffer from the vice of non-joinder. Issue No. 4 is decided against the defendants.” 5. I am surprised “as to where from the learned trial court came to the conclusion that State of Himachal Pradesh has not denied the customary rights of the plaintiffs over the suit land” particularly when admittedly the State was not a party before the learned trial court. Once the State of Himachal Pradesh is admitted to be the owner of the suit land, it is difficult to comprehend how it would not be a necessary party. In a lis dealing with the property of the State, there can be no dispute that the State is a necessary party. 6. Though Sh. Once the State of Himachal Pradesh is admitted to be the owner of the suit land, it is difficult to comprehend how it would not be a necessary party. In a lis dealing with the property of the State, there can be no dispute that the State is a necessary party. 6. Though Sh. Suneet Goel, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that no relief has been claimed against the State, therefore, the State cannot be termed to be necessary or proper party in the present suit. I cannot persuade myself to agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, merely because the respondents have not claimed any relief against the State is not a determinative factor to decide as to whether the presence of party is necessary for the complete and effective adjudication of the dispute or not. In case the court comes to the conclusion that presence of a party is necessary for complete and final decision on the question involved in the suit, then such a party is required to be joined as party. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra alias Gadasa Guru (1995) 3 SCC 147 , has held as under:- ““6. Order 1, Rule 10(2) postulates that: "10(2) Court may strike out or add parties.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such term as May appeared to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who or to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added". 10. A person may be added as a party defendant to the suit though no relief may be claimed against him/her provided his/her presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the suit. Such a person is only a proper party as distinguished from a necessary party. In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors. Such a person is only a proper party as distinguished from a necessary party. In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors. , 1959 SCR 1111 , in a suit instituted for a declaration of legal status as a married wife, the question arose whether another person claiming to be the third wife and sons through her are necessary and proper party, who sought to come on record under Order 1 Rule 10(2). This Court held that in a suit for declaration, as regards status or legal character under s.42 of the Specific Relief Act, the rule that in order that a person may be added as a party must have a present or direct interest in the subject matter of the suit, is not wholly applicable, and the rule may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position to effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In such suits the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for, on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant, if the court has reasons to insist upon clear proof, apart from the admission. It was therefore, held that a declaratory judgment since binds not only the parties actually before the court but also the persons claiming through them respectively within the meaning of s.43 of the Specific Relief Act, they are proper parties. The petitioner is not claiming this legal status nor through the respondent. In Lala Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors., 1954 SCR 360 , in a suit for specific performance the subsequent purchaser was held to be a necessary party. In this case the petitioner is merely seeking the specific performance of the agreement of sale. Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by "any party thereto"; and under s. 16 the Court has been given discretion and personal bars to relief. Therefore, based on the fact situation, the court would mould the relief The respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate upon the dispute arising in the suit so as to render an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute involved in this suit.” 7. Therefore, based on the fact situation, the court would mould the relief The respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate upon the dispute arising in the suit so as to render an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute involved in this suit.” 7. This position of law was reiterated in Aliji Momonji & Co. vs. Lalji Mavji and others (1996) 5 SCC 379 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “5. The controversy is no longer res integra. It is settled law by catena of decisions of this Court that where the presence of the respondent is necessary for complete and effectual adjudication of the disputes, though no relief is sought, he is a proper party. Necessary party is one without whose presence no effective and complete adjudication of the dispute could be made and no relief granted. The question is: whether the landlord is a necessary or proper party to the suit for perpetual injunction against the Municipal Corporation for demolition of demised building? The landlord has a direct and substantial interest in the demised building before the demolition of which notice under Section 351 was issued. In the event of its demolition, his rights would materially be affected. His right, title and interest in the property demised to the tenant or licences would be in jeopardy. It may be that the construction which is sought to be demolished by the Municipal Corporation was made with or without the consent off the landlord or the lessor. But the demolition would undoubtedly materially affect the right, title and interest in the property of the landlord. Under those circumstances, the landlord necessarily is a proper party, though the relief is sought for against the Municipal Corporation for perpetual injunction restraining the Municipal Corporation from demolition of the building. Under those circumstances, the question of the commercial interest would not arise. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (1992) 2 SCC 524 , this Court had pointed out in para 18 of the judgment that the notice did not relate to the structure but to two chattels. Original lessee from the landlord had no direct interest in that property. Under those circumstances, the question of the commercial interest would not arise. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (1992) 2 SCC 524 , this Court had pointed out in para 18 of the judgment that the notice did not relate to the structure but to two chattels. Original lessee from the landlord had no direct interest in that property. Under these circumstances, it was held that the second respondent has no direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation and the addition thereof would result in causing serious prejudice to the appellant and the substitution or the addition of a new cause of action would only widen the issue which was required to be adjudicated and settled, It is true, as pointed out by Shri Nariman that in para 14, this Court in that case had pointed out that what makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to go into the wider question whether witness can be a proper and necessary party when the witness has a commercial interest. This Court in New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Kumkum Mittal & Ors. [ (1994) 1 SCC 402 ] has pointed out that respondent 11 who filed a suit for specific performance in the High Court was sought to come on record in the suit in which he had no direct interest in the pending matter. Under those circumstances, this Court had held that respondent 11 was neither necessary nor proper party in the lease-hold interest involved in the suit. In Union of India & Anr. vs. District Judge, Udhampur & Ors. Under those circumstances, this Court had held that respondent 11 was neither necessary nor proper party in the lease-hold interest involved in the suit. In Union of India & Anr. vs. District Judge, Udhampur & Ors. [ (1994) 4 SCC 737 ] the Union of India who ultimately had to bear the burden of payment of the compensation was held to be a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC for determination of the compensation in respect of the acquired land. In Bihar State Electricity Board vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [(1994) Supp. 3 SCC 743] the same question was also reiterated and it was held that the Electricity Board was a person interested and also a necessary party. In Anil Kr. Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra [ (1995) 3 SCC 147 ] similar question was answered holding that the respondent was a necessary party. 6. In view of the finding that the in the event of building being demolished, right, title and interest of the landlord would directly be affected, the landlord would be a proper party, though no relief has been sought for against the landlord. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court impleading the landlords.” Therefore, viewed from any angle, the presence of the State is necessary for the complete and final adjudication on the question involved in the suit particularly when both the parties to the lis admit the ownership of the State and they yet want their rights to be determined in absence of the true owner. This is not permissible in law. The presence of the State before the court is otherwise necessary in order to enable the court factually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 8. Accordingly, the judgement and decree passed by the learned court below are set-aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial court for decision afresh. The State of Himachal Pradesh shall stand arrayed as a party defendant. The trial court after affording an opportunity to the State to file its written statement, shall consider the requirement of framing additional issue(s) (if any) and thereafter afford an opportunity to the State to lead its evidence. The State of Himachal Pradesh shall stand arrayed as a party defendant. The trial court after affording an opportunity to the State to file its written statement, shall consider the requirement of framing additional issue(s) (if any) and thereafter afford an opportunity to the State to lead its evidence. Since the suit was instituted in the year 1999, the learned trial court is requested to decide this case expeditiously and in no event beyond 31st December 2014. The parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial court on 9.6.2014. The Registry to ensure that records of the case are sent back so as to reach the court well before the date fixed.