Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This Regular Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Procedure, has been preferred by the defendant No.3 -appellant against judgment and decree dated 1.12.2001 passed by learned District Judge, Kullu in Civil Appeal No.26/2000, whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 31.12.1999 passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Kullu in Civil Suit No.198 of 1992. 2. Briefly stated the case of the plaintiff is that defendant No.1 Shri Bhup Singh alias Bhupal Singh was the owner in possession of the suit land/property as per detail given below:- i) Land measuring 0-6-0 bigha, being 3/35 share of land measuring 3-14-0 bighas comprised in khasra No.13 and 18 of khata/khatauni No.91/107. ii) Land measuring 0-1-0 bigha being 5/42 share of land measuring 0-8-0 bigha comprised in khasra No.146 of khasta khatauni No.92/108 iii) Land measuring 3-2-0 bighas being 1/7 share of land measuring 21-12-0 bighas comprised in khasra No.l9, 19, 30, 33, 187, 109, 191, 205 and 223 numbering 9, khata/khatauni No.93/109 iv) Land measuring 0-3-0 bigha being 2/45 share comprised in khasra No.115, 116, 119, 121, 122, 118, 120 numbering 8 measuring 3-18-0 bighas of khata khatauni No.94/110 and 111. v) Land measuring 0-2-0 bigha being 1/15 share of land measuring 1-16-0 bighas comprised in khasra No.198, khata/khatauni No.95/112. Incorporated in jamabandi for the year 1987-88 of Phati Ratwah, Kothi Manglore, Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu. vi) 1/7 share in 2½ storeyed slate roofed residential house measuring 50 ‘x31’ standing on khasra No.190 of khata khatauni No.93/109 known as ailada shown in annexure ‘A’ attached with the plaint by letters A B C D with threshing floor appurtenant thereto shown by letters HIJK. vii) 1/7 share of 1½ storeyed slate roofed/padaghha (Agricultural house standing on khasra No.190 which is shown by letters E F G H in the site plan Annexure ‘A’ viii) 1/7 share of 2½ storeyed slate roofed residential house standing on khasra No.33 of khata/khatauni No.93/109 supra alongwith threshing floor appurtenant to the aforesaid house, which house is shown by letters A B C D in the site plan Annexure ‘B’ and threshing floor is shown by letters E F G H in annexure ‘B’ 3. The plaintiff is also joint owner in possession of the suit property/land. The plaintiff is also joint owner in possession of the suit property/land. It was averred that defendant No.1 Shri Bhup Singh alias Bhupal Singh had appointed defendant No.2 Shri Kamal Singh as his general attorney to look after and manage his all property, including suit land vide registered General Power of Attorney dated 3.4.1981, whereunder said general attorney was competent and authorised to sell the suit/property. In his capacity as general attorney, defendant No.2 was managing and looking after the property of defendant No.1. 4. It was further averred that defendant No.1 Shri Bhup Singh alias Bhupal Singh, through his general attorney, defendant No.2 entered into an agreement to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/- vide agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992. At that time, a sum of Rs.25,000/- was paid to defendant No.1 through his general attorney towards part satisfaction of the sale consideration as earnest money and vide the aforesaid agreement to sell, defendant No.1 had agreed to transfer the suit property in favour of the plaintiff by way of sale deed to be executed on or before 25.6.1992 on receipt of balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/- after deduction of the subsisting amount of mortgage with respect to the suit land comprising in khata No.94. He was through-out ready and willing to perform his part of contract and is still ready to perform his party of contract. On 24.6.1992, he approached Kamal Singh, defendant No.2 and asked him to execute the aforesaid sale deed as per agreement and at that time, he had told that he would come for execution and registration of the required sale deed on 25.6.1992. On his such representation/assurance, plaintiff went to the office of the Sub Registrar, Banjar alongwith the aforesaid balance consideration and money necessary for the purchase of stamp papers, execution and registration fee etc. but the defendant No.2 did not reach the office of the Sub Registrar, Banjar. In these circumstances, an affidavit dated 25.6.1992 was also sworn in by the plaintiff in order to prove the factum of his presence in the office of Sub Registrar, Banjar. Despite repeated requests made by the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 and 2 did not perform their part of contract. 5. In these circumstances, an affidavit dated 25.6.1992 was also sworn in by the plaintiff in order to prove the factum of his presence in the office of Sub Registrar, Banjar. Despite repeated requests made by the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 and 2 did not perform their part of contract. 5. It was further averred that defendant No.4 Shri Gurdial Singh, purporting to act as general attorney of defendant No.1, on the basis of a fictitious general power of attorney, procured by him from the defendant No.1 on 25.5.1992 by exercise of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation, sold the suit land in favour of defendant No.3, Shri Teja Singh for an ostensible and fictitious sale consideration of Rs.8,000/- vide registered sale deed dated 26.5.1992. In fact, no sale consideration amount had been paid and no possession was delivered under the aforesaid sale deed. In fact, the aforesaid sale deed dated 26.5.1992 and general power of attorney dated 25.5.1992 had been procured by defendant No.3, Shri Teja Singh with the motive to cause wrongful loss to the plaintiff and to defeat his right on the basis of aforesaid agreement to sell. The plaintiff is the real brother and cosharer of defendant No.1 and in such capacity, he is in possession of the suit property as co-sharer alongwith other joint owners. He is not bound by the aforesaid sale deed. Defendants No.3 and 4 had also knowledge and notice of the aforesaid agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992. 6. Defendant No.3 Shri Teja Singh further sold the part of suit land measuring 1-11-0 bighas being 1/7 share of the land measuring 10-16-0 bighas comprising khasra Nos. 187, 190, 191, 205 and 223 of khata khatauni No.93/109 of khata khatauni No.95/112 as per jamabandi for the year 1987-88 of Phati Ratwah, Kothi Manglore, Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu for an ostensible sale consideration of Rs.16,000/- in favour of defendants No.5 to 10 vide registered sale deed dated 14.7.1992. The defendants No.5 to 10 had also knowledge and notice of the prior agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992. No possession qua the aforesaid land was delivered as per the aforesaid sale deed dated 14.7.92 which is also not binding on the plaintiff. 7. Shri Teja Singh was not competent to sell the specific khasra numbers to defendants No.5 to 10 and as such the aforesaid sale deed is also null and void, not binding on the plaintiff. No possession qua the aforesaid land was delivered as per the aforesaid sale deed dated 14.7.92 which is also not binding on the plaintiff. 7. Shri Teja Singh was not competent to sell the specific khasra numbers to defendants No.5 to 10 and as such the aforesaid sale deed is also null and void, not binding on the plaintiff. Since defendants No.1 and 2 had failed to execute the sale deed on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992 and other defendants were asked not to claim any interest in the suit property on the basis of subsequent sale deed dated 26.5.1992 and 14.7.1992 but they had declined to do so, hence the suit was filed on the basis of cause of action, which firstly accrued on 19.4.92 and finally when the defendants declined to admit the claim of the plaintiff. 8. The defendant No.2 Shri Kamal Singh by filing a separate written statement had admitted the claim of the plaintiff by making a prayer that his suit be decreed. 9. The suit was contested and resisted by defendants No.3 and 4 by filing a common written statement on the grounds of locusstandi, maintainability and that defendant No,.3 is a bonafide transferee for a valuable consideration and in good faith, without knowledge and notice of the alleged agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992. On merits, the alleged agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992 has been stated to be a forged and fictitious document, falsely prepared by the plaintiff in connivance with the defendants No.1 and 2 in order to defeat the claim of the contesting defendants. In fact, this document had been prepared by them by mentioning the back date. 10. It was further averred that defendant No.1 through a registered general power of attorney dated 25.5.1992, had appointed defendant No.4 Shri Gurdial Singh, as a general power of attorney to sell the suit land and to execute and register the sale deed and in his such capacity, defendant No.4 had sold land measuring 3-16-0 bighas i.e. land measuring 0-6 biswas being 3/35 share of the land measuring 3-14-0 bighas, khata khatauni No.91/107, land measuring 0-1 biswa being 5/42 share of land measuring 0-8 biswas. Khata khatauni No.92/108, khasra No.146, land measuring 9-2-12 bighas, khata khatauni No.93/109, land measuring 0-5 biswas being 1/15 share of the land measuring 3-18-0 bighas, kittas 8, khata khatauni No.94/10, land measuring 0-2 biaswas being 1/15 share of the land measuring 1-16 bighas comprising under khata khatauni No.95/112, khasra No.198, as per jamabandi for the year 1987-88 of Phati Ratwah, Kothi Manglore, Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu through registered sale deed dated 26.5.1992 for a sale consideration of Rs.8,000/- and since then the defendant No.3 has been owner in possession of the said land. The sale is genuine and he was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and in good faith without having any notice and knowledge of the alleged agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff. 11. Thus, the plaintiff was bound by the sale, made in his favour and had got no right to challenge the same in any manner. It has been denied that defendant No.4 had procured the power of attorney from defendant No.1 by exercising fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation. The sale in favour of contesting defendant No.3 was perfectly legal and valid and he was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration. Other allegations denied. 12. The suit was also contested by the defendants No.5 to 10 by filing a separate written statement, by raising preliminary objections inter alia, that the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the suit, the suit is not maintainable in the present form and the same deserves to be dismissed. On merits, it has been denied that defendant No.2 had entered into an agreement to sell the suit land/property in favour of plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/- vide agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992 and that Rs.25,000/- by way of earnest money were paid to defendant No. 1 the alleged agreement to sell is factitious and forged one and replying defendants had no knowledge and notice to the same. It has been admitted that defendant No.4 was duly appointed as general attorney by defendant No.1 and the sale by him in favour of defendant No.3 is legal, valid and binding. 13. It has been admitted that defendant No.4 was duly appointed as general attorney by defendant No.1 and the sale by him in favour of defendant No.3 is legal, valid and binding. 13. Vide registered sale deed dated 14.7.1992, the defendants No. 5 to 10 had purchased the land measuring 1-13-0 bighas as per its description given in preliminary objection No.1 and also in para-7 of the plaint from defendant No.3 Shri Teja Singh for a sale consideration of Rs.16,000/- and possession thereof was also delivered to them and since then, they have been in possession of the said land as owners. Further, they are the transferees in good faith for consideration and without notice of the alleged agreement to sell and as such, the suit against them is not competent and maintainable and the plaintiff is bound by the sale in their favour. Other allegations denied. 14. By filing separate replications, plaintiff reaffirmed his own allegations by denying those of the contesting defendants No.3, 4 and 5 to 10. 15. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 20.7.1994:- 1. Whether defendant No.1 Bhup Singh executed valid general power of attorney dated 3.4.1991 in favour of the defendant No.2, Kamal Singh, as alleged OPP. 2. Whether defendant No.1 Bhup Singh through his attorney defendant No.2 Kamal Singh executed agreement dated 19.4.1992 to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for consideration of Rs.40,000/- , as alleged OPP 3. Whether the defendant No.1 Bhup Singh through his attorney defendant No.2 Kamal Singh received earnest money of Rs.25,000/- at the time of execution of the agreement dated 19.4.1992? OPP 4. Whether defendant No.1 Bhup Singh executed valid general power of attorney dated 25.5.1992 in favour of defendant No.4 Gurdial Singh?OPD-3 and 4. 5. Whether the sale deed dated 26.5.1992 by defendant No.4 Gurdial Singh as attorney of Bhup Singh defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3, Shri Teja Singh is null and void, as alleged? OPP 6. Whether the subsequent sale deed dated 14.7.1992 by defendant No.3, Teja Singh in favour of defendants No.5 to 10 is null and void, as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the defendant No.3 Teja Singh was not competent to sell the specific portion of the suit land in favour of the defendants No.5 to 10 ? OPP 8. OPP 6. Whether the subsequent sale deed dated 14.7.1992 by defendant No.3, Teja Singh in favour of defendants No.5 to 10 is null and void, as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the defendant No.3 Teja Singh was not competent to sell the specific portion of the suit land in favour of the defendants No.5 to 10 ? OPP 8. Whether the defendants No.5 to 10 are bonafide purchasers for consideration without notice? If so, to what effect? OPD. 9. Whether the defendant No.3 Teja Singh is bonafide purchaser for consideration without notice? If so, its effect OPD-3 10. Relief. 16. The learned trial Court after recording and evaluating the evidence was pleased to pass the following decree:- “As a sequel to my findings on above issues, the suit of the plaintiff succeeds and I accordingly pass a decree for joint possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992 of the suit land/property by directing defendants No.1 or 2 to execute a registered sale deed in his favour on receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-, within two months from today, after deducting the sum of Rs.50/- towards the subsisting mortgage amount and to do all other necessary acts to put him in joint possession of the suit property, declare the sale deed dated 26.5.1992 executed through defendant No.4 in favour of defendant No.3 and sale deed dated 14.7.1992 executed by defendant No.3 in favour of defendants No.5 to 10 to be null and void and not binding on the plaintiff, having no legal effect vis-à-vis the right of the plaintiff over the suit property and also sale deed dated 14.7.1992 not binding on the plaintiff so far as it purports to relate to specific khasra Nos.187, 190, 191, 205 and 223 of khata khatauni No.93/109 min, khasra No.198 of khata Khatauni No.95/112, as defendant No.3 had no right to sell the specific khasra Nos. or share in specific khasra Nos. or share in specific khasra No. out of the joint land without making any order as to costs.” Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendants No.3 and 4 preferred an appeal before learned lower appellate Court who vide its judgment and decree dated 1.12.2001 has dismissed the appeal. It is against this judgment and decree that defendant No.3/appellant Teja Singh has come in appeal before this Court. 17. It is against this judgment and decree that defendant No.3/appellant Teja Singh has come in appeal before this Court. 17. This Court on 22.3.2002 admitted the appeal on following substantial question of law:- 1. When the Power of Attorney Exhibit DW-2/A is duly proved in accordance with law, was not the presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act available to such document, when the plaintiff-respondent did not produce any evidence to rebut such presumption? 2. Whether both the courts below have committed grave procedural illegality in permitting the plaintiff-respondent to put forth such contentions like fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation which were absolutely personal to the Defendant No.1, who had chosen not to contest the suit, have not both the courts below traveled beyond their jurisdiction in recording the findings regarding the validity of Exhibit DW-2/A? 3. Whether both the courts below have acted in a highly perfunctory illegal and perverse manner in not examining the pleas put forth by Defendant No.3 as well as Defendant Nos. 5 to 10 that they are bonafide purchasers for consideration? Are not findings in this regard stand vitiated materially effecting the validity of the judgments and decrees of both the courts below when both the courts below failed to record proper findings in this regard? 18. I have heard Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Ashwani Pathak and Mr. V.S. Rathour, Advocates on behalf of respondents No.1 and 3 respectively and have also gone through the records. 19. Since all the questions of law as framed above are interconnected and interlinked, I propose to deal with the same by common reasoning. 20. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that when the power of attorney Ext. DW 2/A is clearly proved in accordance with law, then the presumption, under section 60 of the Registration Act was attracted to such a document, as according to the appellant, it is by now well settled that presumption of truth to due execution of a document arises from the endorsement of Sub Registrar, under section 60 of the Act. Where a person admits the execution before the Registrar after the document has been explained to him, it cannot specifically be accepted that he was ignorant of the nature of transaction. Where a person admits the execution before the Registrar after the document has been explained to him, it cannot specifically be accepted that he was ignorant of the nature of transaction. For this purpose he relied upon a judgement of this court (Coram: K.C. Sood, J. as his Lordship then was) in Kripa Ram and others vs. Smt. Maina 2002 (2) Shim. L.C. 213:- “22. To counter the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, learned senior counsel Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, has rightly relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in Smt. Kala Wati vs. Smt. Vidya Devi and others 2009 (3) Shim. L.C. 306 wherein the decision rendered by this Court in Kirpa Ram’s (supra) was also taken into consideration and it was held as follows: “15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the document being registered, the presumption of truth is attached to tine certificate appended by the Registrar under Section 62 of the Registration Act. He relies upon a decision of this Court in Shri Kirpa Ram and others vs. Smt. Maina, 2002 (2) Shim. L.C.213. He submits that this Court this decision follows the well established principle of law settled in Sennimalai Goundan and another v.Sellappa Goundan and others, AIR 1929 Privy Council 81 and Kanwarani Madna Vati and another v. Raghunath Singh and others, AIR 1976 HP 41 . 16. Learned counsel has also supported the judgment of the Courts below, in particular that of the learned trial Court, by urging that merely because the parties to the lis are related that would not perse attract the principle that the defendant was in fiduciary relationship which would have influenced the plaintiff. Learned counsel has also relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in P. Saraswathi Ammal v. Lakshmi Ammal alias Lakshmi Kantam, AIR 1978 Madras 361 to the effect that mere bond of kinship does not establish undue influence. 17. As a general proposition of law the points urged by learned counsel appearing for the respondent are taken as an established principle of law. However, a principle of law is applied in a particular fact situation and not as a theoretical purpose. In the sequential narration of facts supported by the evidence of the plaintiff, PW-1 Kamal Kishore and PW-2 Karam Chand, the so called attesting witnesses, the narration is clear and natural. However, a principle of law is applied in a particular fact situation and not as a theoretical purpose. In the sequential narration of facts supported by the evidence of the plaintiff, PW-1 Kamal Kishore and PW-2 Karam Chand, the so called attesting witnesses, the narration is clear and natural. The plaintiff admits the putting of a thumb impression on the document but pleads that this was done out of love and affection to help the defendant to obtain loan for the purposes of house construction where she was to give her no objection and consent to such construction so that the defendant could raise the loan. The plaintiff has nowhere stated that she had any idea of relinquishing her share in the property. Registration of the document is of no avail to the plaintiff as the attesting witnesses themselves have stated that they were not aware about the contents of the document. They were not accompanying the defendant. How and under what circumstances the trial Court says that they being the attesting witnesses are now deposing in favour of the plaintiff and as such their testimony is not believable is a clear breach of the rule applicable for appreciation of evidence. Rejection of the evidence of these two witnesses on the ground of perversity is writ large in this case. What is the quality of deposition has not been considered. Both the Courts below have swept the principles applicable for the appreciation of evidence under the carpet without realizing its implications. Without appreciating the evidence it would but be stating the obvious that the perversity of findings on the evidence on record is writ large in this case. True that the plaintiff may not be ‘pardanashi’ lady in the traditional sense when this doctrine was used for protection of such ladies in 19th and 20th century in India, but little seems to have changed with the majority of the women still labouring under the disability of illiteracy and poverty and confined. The concept of ‘pardanasi’ women have withered down. But whether illiterate women are now in a position to understand the true nature of the transaction they are entering into or are overwhelmed by filial affection into following their kin blindly is something which requires a deeper thought. 18. It is true and undisputed that the appellant is an illiterate lady. The concept of ‘pardanasi’ women have withered down. But whether illiterate women are now in a position to understand the true nature of the transaction they are entering into or are overwhelmed by filial affection into following their kin blindly is something which requires a deeper thought. 18. It is true and undisputed that the appellant is an illiterate lady. Even if she is not treated to be ‘pardanashin’ lady, what had to be established on the record was that she was aware about the true nature of the transaction she was entering into. The High Court of Calcutta in Kartick Prasad Gorai and others vs. Neami Prasad Gorai and others, AIR 1998 Calcutta 278 held:- “21 In our opinion, although the protection given to a `Pardanashi’ woman as regards execution of a deed is not available to an illiterate man who has sufficient experience of dealing with property, we are of the view that in case of a deed executed by such a person, the fact that the contents of the deed were read over and explained to the executant must be proved by the person who wants to take advantage of such deeds. In this case in view of contradictory statement made by the alleged witnesses of the deeds as regards execution and explanation of the contents, the finding of the learned trial Court cannot be said to be wrong.” 21. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents would contend that brother of plaintiff-respondent i.e. defendant No.1 Bhup Singh had appointed his real nephew i.e. defendant No. 2 as general power of attorney on 3.4.1981 to deal with the suit property for management and sale of the same. The defendant No. 1 had shifted to reside with his in-laws after the death of his father, namely Sangat Ram. Since the property was being managed on his behalf by defendant No. 2, it was decided by the defendant No. 1 to sell his share of the suit land in favour of his brother i.e. plaintiff- respondent. For this purpose, the defendant No. 2, who was the nephew of defendant No. 1, agreed to sell the share in the suit land in favour of the plaintiff on 19.4.1992 for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-. For this purpose, the defendant No. 2, who was the nephew of defendant No. 1, agreed to sell the share in the suit land in favour of the plaintiff on 19.4.1992 for a sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-. Rs.25,000/- was paid by the plaintiff, which was duly acknowledged and received by defendant No. 2, while the balance amount of Rs.15,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed on or before 25.6.1992. For this purpose, the plaintiff had approached defendant No. 2 on 24.6.1992 for execution of the sale deed for which he agreed, but defendant No.2 did not reach the office of Sub Registrar, Banjar. In fact the plaintiff even got an affidavit prepared to show his bonafide. In this background, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the sale consideration in his case was Rs.40,000/-, which was pursuant to an agreement and one month earlier to the sale deed relied upon by the appellant wherein the sale consideration is barely Rs.8,000/-. This clearly proves that defendant No.4 Gurdial Singh purporting himself to act as general power of attorney appointed by defendant No.1 Bhup Singh connived with appellant and got a fictitious general power of attorney prepared on 25.5.1992 and on the very next day i.e. 26.5.1992, a sale deed was allegedly executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of the appellant for a token amount of Rs.8,000/- only. The circumstances according to the respondents are loud and clearly to suggest that both general power of attorney and the sale deed were result of fraud, misrepresentation and executed with a view to cheat the plaintiff- respondent and deprive him of his right to get the sale deed executed in his favour pursuant to the agreement to sell dated 19.4.1992. It has further argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that defendant No.1 and defendant No. 4 Gurdial Singh who had claimed himself to be the general power of attorney of defendant No.1 and executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant had in fact never appeared in the witness box, whereas the general power of attorney of defendant No. 1 i.e. the defendant No. 2 Kamal Singh had not only filed his written statement supporting the claim of the case of the plaintiff-respondent, but had even appeared in the witness box and subjected himself to cross-examination. The absence/ non appearance of defendant No. 1 and his general power of attorney Gurdial Singh sufficiently proves that general power of attorney dated 25.5.1992 and sale deed dated 26.5.1992 were not the genuine documents and therefore rightly disbelieved and rejected by both the learned courts below. 22. I have carefully and meticulously considered the rival submissions of the parties. No doubt, there is a presumption attached to a registered document in terms of Section 60 of the Registration Act, however, the same is rebutable and is required to be evaluated in light of the overall facts and circumstances and evidence led by the parties. A principle of law has to be applied in a fact situation and not on theoretical basis. From what has been observed earlier, there is no explanation forthcoming from the appellant side that once the general power of attorney could have been executed on 25.5.1992 allegedly by defendant No. 1 in favour of Gurdial Singh then what prevented the original owner from executing the sale deed on 25.5.1992 itself and why the sale deed was in fact got executed then by the general power of attorney for a token of Rs.8,000/- when the sale consideration a month earlier in the agreement to sell entered into between defendant No. 1 through his general power of attorney defendant No. 2 in favour of plaintiff was Rs.40,000/-. In fact what surprises me is the further fact that appellant immediately within 45 days sold a part of the property to defendants No. 5 to 10 for a sale consideration of Rs.16,000/- vide a registered sale deed dated 14.7.1992. 23. The learned courts below have concurrently found that there was suspicion surrounding the valid execution of general power of attorney and have given cogent and convincing reasons for the same, which cannot be termed to be perverse or based on mis-reading, misinterpretation of oral and documentary evidence available on record. Substantial question No.2: 24. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that plaintiff had no locus or cause of action to challenge the power of attorney executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 4 on the basis of which the defendant No. 4 sold the property to the appellant because this act was personal between the defendant No. 1 and defendant No.4. The learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that learned courts below have missed out on the fact that defendant No. 1 had not cancelled either one of the power of attorneys which had been executed by him in favour of defendant No. 2 or defendant No. 4. According to the appellant, the plaintiff- respondent could at best be considered to be a prospective buyer and could not have challenged the sale deed executed in his favour. 25. I am afraid that this contention of the appellant cannot be accepted as a person having entered into an agreement of sale and parted with a part of the sale consideration would definitely have locus to challenge a transaction which on the face of it appears to be sham. Thus, this contention cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Admittedly, the defendant No. 4 has not stepped into the witness box so as to prove the general power of attorney allegedly executed by defendant No. 1 in his favour and also subject himself to cross-examination by the opposite party and therefore, an adverse inference under section 114(g) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is clearly attracted in the present case. While on the other hand, the appellant has examined defendant No.2, who was the power of attorney of defendant No. 1 and proved on record the agreement of sale executed in his favour. Not only this, in case the sale transaction in favour of appellant was genuine, then it remains a mystery why the defendants No. 5 to 10 have not even cared to file an appeal against the findings recorded by the learned trial court. The appellant cannot be permitted to succeed on technical ground alone when the facts and circumstances and the evidence available on record do not support the claim of the appellant. Substantial question No. 3. 26. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that both the courts below have acted in highly perfunctory, illegal and perverse manner in not examining the pleas put forth by defendant No. 3 i.e. the appellant as well as the defendants No. 5 to 10 that they were bonafide purchasers for consideration. I am afraid even this contention of the appellant cannot also be accepted. I am afraid even this contention of the appellant cannot also be accepted. In case, there was a valid transaction of sale effected in favour of the appellant, then what prevented him from examining the general power of attorney Gurdial Singh in support of his claim. In fact, it appears that appellant is totally oblivious to the fact that defendants No. 5 to 10 despite having suffered a decree have not even questioned this judgment and decree, which has attained finality against them. This silence on behalf of defendants No. 5 to 10 speaks volume. The appellant has not placed anything on record so as to prove that he was bonafide purchaser and purchased the property of ostensible owner. 27. The learned counsel for the appellant has though vehemently contended that he had taken reasonable care to ascertain that transferor had power to make the transfer and had acted in good faith. In this background, he relied upon the judgment in Layak Ram vs. Dharamwati & ors. Etc. AIR 2010 Punjab and Haryana 95, wherein it has been held as follows:- “5. When mere mutation in the revenue records does not confer any title, then whether the sale/transfer of the said property, on the basis of such mutation can transfer/confer any title on the purchaser? 11. Section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act reads as under:- “41. Transfer by ostensible owner:- Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfer the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it: Provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith.” 12. The mutation of inheritance of Ramla was sanctioned in favour of his daughter Daulti, widow and plaintiff to the extent of 1/3rd share. After the death of Phoolwati, the share of Daulti thus increased to 1/24 share in the suit property. The respondents vendees had apparently made inquiry from the revenue record and on satisfying themselves that as per the revenue record Daulti was owner of half share in the suit property had purchased the same. After the death of Phoolwati, the share of Daulti thus increased to 1/24 share in the suit property. The respondents vendees had apparently made inquiry from the revenue record and on satisfying themselves that as per the revenue record Daulti was owner of half share in the suit property had purchased the same. The mutation of inheritance was sanctioned in favour of Daulti after the death of Ramla in the year 1977 and thereafter the revenue record reflected her as owner to the extent of ½ share in the suit property. The plaintiff did not challenge the entries in the revenue record prior to the execution of the sale deeds by the husband of Daulti in favour of the vendees. 16. Thus, a co-sharer in exclusive possession cannot become owner qua the share of the other co-sharers on the ground of adverse possession unless ouster is proved. However, in the present case, the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out that the plaintiff had ousted the other co-sharer/vendor from the suit land or that the vendor had abandoned his share in the suit property. In these circumstances, the Additional District Judge had rightly held that the subsequent vendors we bona fide purchasers for consideration.” 28. For the aforesaid purpose, he in continuation of his arguments, has further relied upon a judgment in Seshumull M. Shah vs. Sayed Abdul Rashid and others AIR 1991 Karanataka 273, wherein, it has been held as under:- “7. The learned counsel for the appellant urged before me two submissions:- The first submission was that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The suit was governed by Art. 58 and not by Art. 65 of the Limitation Act. Second submission urged before me was that in the facts and circumstances of the case, defendant No.1 was entitled to the protection of S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, he being bona fide purchaser for value without notice. So far as the first submission is concerned, it proceeds on the assumption that the suit was merely a suit for declaration of title and nothing else. It is not possible to accept this submission. In the plaint, the plaintiff has stated the manner in which she acquired title to the suit lands. So far as the first submission is concerned, it proceeds on the assumption that the suit was merely a suit for declaration of title and nothing else. It is not possible to accept this submission. In the plaint, the plaintiff has stated the manner in which she acquired title to the suit lands. She then stated the facts about the necessity to appoint her son-in-law defendant No.2 as her manager to look after her properties. She has then stated about the manner in which defendant No.2 dealt with her properties and ultimately her knowledge about the fact that defendant No.2 had got a patta made in his own name in respect of the suit lands and his selling the suit lands to defendant No.1. On such pleadings, the plaintiff claimed not merely a declaration that she was the owner of the property and that the sale deed executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the first defendant was void, but also a relief for possession of the suit lands and damages amounting to Rs.1,500/- from defendant No.1, who, it was alleged, had cut a standing Tamarind tree on the land in question. To me it is obvious that such a suit where possession is claimed as a consequence of the declaration would be governed by Art. 65 and not Art. 58 of the Limitation Act. The first submission must therefore be rejected. The second submission must also be rejected. S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act is in the nature of an exception to the rule that a person cannot confer better title than he has. The section provides that a transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it where, with the consent express or implied of the real owner, the transferor is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration. The section obliges the transferee in all such cases to make reasonable enquiries to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, and in addition the transferee must have acted in good faith. The section obliges the transferee in all such cases to make reasonable enquiries to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, and in addition the transferee must have acted in good faith. This is based on the principle of equity that one, who allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate and a third party purchased for value from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner, the man, who so allows the other to hold himself out, shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title, unless he can overthrow that purchaser by showing either that he had direct notice or something which amounts to constructive notice of the real title, or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an enquiry, which if prosecuted would have lead to a discovery of it.( See Ramcoomar v. Macqueen ( 1872) 52 Ind App Sup 40). It is equally well settled, and the section is quite clear, that the real owner must have by his consent express or implied held out the ostensible owner as the owner of the property. If either by words or by conduct, he induced others to treat such a person as the real owner and to do that from which they might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the Act to the prejudice of those who acted in good faith. Mere possession of a Manager cannot be treated as ostensible ownership with the consent of the real owner. In every case, where a transferee for valuable consideration seeks protection u/S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, he must show that it was the real owner, who permitted or created the apparent ownership of the transferor either by express words or consent or by acts or conduct, which imply consent. Conversely, it must be held that if the real owner was not responsible for permitting or creating the apparent ownership, the protection u/S 41 will not be available to a transferee from such person because such a person cannot be said to be an ostensible owner as his claim to ownership does not arise from the consent of the real owner. In substance, before one can be considered to be an ostensible owner, it must be shown that it was with the consent express or implied of the true owner that he was enabled to represent himself as the owner of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If it is found that the so-called ostensible owner by any fraudulent means created documents without the knowledge of the real owner and represented himself as the owner of the property. S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act will not protect the interest of a transferee from such a person and it must be held that the ostensible ownership of the property is not created by an act of the real owner or with his consent express or implied. Indeed such a person cannot claim himself to be an ostensible owner. S.41, in my view, incorporates a rule akin to the rule of estoppel whereby the real owner, who by reason of his conduct or express or implied consent was responsible for the creation of an ostensible ownership cannot be permitted to set up his real ownership to defeat the rights of a bona fide purchaser acting in good faith and who despite reasonable enquiries could not discover such real ownership. It is, therefore, the conduct of the real owner which gives rise to an enquiry in favour of a bona fide purchaser acting in good faith. S. 41 is a statutory recognition of this equitable rule.” 29. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in these judgments, but as already observed, the principle of law has to be applied in a fact situation and not on theoretical basis. Admittedly, the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendant No.2 belong to one family and the sale consideration in the agreement to sell Ext. PW 2/A dated 19.4.1992 is Rs.40,000/-, while in the sale deed allegedly executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of the appellant, the sale consideration is a meager amount of Rs.8,000/- only. This sale consideration is for a part of the suit land set out in para-2 supra. PW 2/A dated 19.4.1992 is Rs.40,000/-, while in the sale deed allegedly executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of the appellant, the sale consideration is a meager amount of Rs.8,000/- only. This sale consideration is for a part of the suit land set out in para-2 supra. While, it is the case of the appellant alongwith defendants No. 5 to 10 that immediately after a period of six weeks, a portion of the suit land measuring 1-11-0 bighas being 1/7th share was sold to defendants No. 5 to 10 that too for a sale consideration of Rs.16,000/- vide registered sale deed dated 14.7.1992. How the value of entire suit property according to the appellant was only Rs.8,000/- and six weeks later only a part of the property suddenly becomes valuable and is sold for Rs.16,000/- i.e. double than what the appellant had paid not for this property but for the entire suit land. Definitely the innocence claimed by the appellant is much more than what meets the eye. 30. The learned counsel for the appellant then made a disparate attempt to contend that once the defendant No. 4 had a valid general power of attorney in his favour, who in turn sold the land to the appellant, the learned courts below ought not to have decreed the suit of the plaintiff. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment in Syed Abdul Khader vs. Rami Reddy and others (1979) 2 SCC 601 , wherein it has been held as under:- “11. The next limb of the submission was that if three co-principals jointly constituted an agent then unless the contrary is indicated by the deed of the Power of Attorney, the necessary inference would be that the agent can act in respect of those affairs in which all the co-principals are jointly interested. In other words, it was said that such a Power of Attorney would clothe the agent with an authority to act in respect of joint affairs of the co-principals. We are unable to find any force in this argument, for what the Power of Attorney authorities depends on its terms and the purpose for which it is executed. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer to the Power of Attorney, Exh P-1 and the supplementary deed, Exh P-2. Exh P-1 is dated April 10, 1949 and is styled as general Power of Attorney. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer to the Power of Attorney, Exh P-1 and the supplementary deed, Exh P-2. Exh P-1 is dated April 10, 1949 and is styled as general Power of Attorney. The co-principals are: (1) plaintiff Syed Abdul Khader, (2) Kazim Yar Jung, and (3) Syed Mustafa Hussain. The purpose for which the power was executed is set out in Exh P-1 in the following words: …….that in view of our private needs and as we are unable to conduct cases and answer them in time, we therefore appoint Copper Sattayya son of Copper Durgayya resident of Ghanpur, Medak Taluq as our general Power of Attorney to act on our behalf and we empower the said person through this Power of Attorney that the said Muktar can conduct the cases ( Parvi) of all sorts, question and answer, admit or deny, either orally or writing on our behalf in all departments, civil and criminal courts, in the High Court, in the judicial committee, in the Revenue Departments of the districts, namely, in the offices of the IInd, IIIrd, and Ist Taluqdars, the Tehsil offices etc…… and purchase or sell (sic) of lands and that he is authorised to appoint any pleader or special Muktar when occasioned (sic) and to stop or to take or file any copies in any suit or to file any suit or file any written statements with his own signature to fetch any loan for our business or lands or to pay the debts from out of the income of the estate or to purchase or sell the lands and to execute the sale deeds and get registered under his signature etc………… The last sentence is that “all the acts of the said Muktar shall be deemed to be acts done and effected by us which we hereby accept and approve”. Subsequently on April 20, 1949 a supplementary Power of Attorney in addition to Exh P-1 was executed by the aforementioned three donors of power in favour of defendant 34 in which it is specifically stated that they affirm earlier Power of Attorney dated April 10, 1949 and thereafter the relevant recital is as under: ……….But by the said document, the powers of sale and registration were not confirmed (sic) on him and that therefore through this deed the same is hereby confirmed (sic) on him. 12. 12. It was urged that the Court should bear in mind the first principle, that a Power of Attorney has to be strictly construed. Undoubtedly, where someone other than the person who has a right to act in respect of certain things has, under a contract of agency, the right to act on behalf of principal, the authority conferred by the written instrument has to be strictly construed. Ordinarily a Power of Attorney is construed strictly by courts (vide Bryant, Powis and Bryant Ltd v. Lal Banque du Peuple (1893) AC 170, 177: 68 LT 546). 13. Adopting the principle of strict construction of a Power of Attorney, the first question that is required to be answered is whether the Power of Attorney, Exh P-1 was meant to confer the authority on the agent to act only in respect of the joint affairs or joint property of the co-principals or it was in respect of the individual affairs and effects of each principal. In Exh P-1 at three places the expression used is: “our Power of Attorney” to act on our behalf and we empower the said person,” then again “on our behalf in all departments”. And then lastly “acts done and effected by the agent shall be deemed to be the acts done and effected by the principals”. Mr. Gopalakrishnayya said that it would be extraordinary to hold that the expression “on our behalf” as disclosing a conjoint action on behalf of more than one person could ever be interpreted by any canon of construction as one on behalf of each individual. He said that apart from the strict construction the court must put on a Power of Attorney, where the terms of the written contract are clear and unambiguous it is impermissible for the Court to take into consideration the other circumstances to determine the intention of the parties. When a contract is reduced to writing, undoubtedly the court must look at the terms of the contract and proceed on the assumption that the parties intended what they have said and if the terms are unambiguous the court must give effect to the terms of the contract. However, it is well established that in considering a contract it is legitimate to take into account the surrounding circumstances for ascertaining the intention of the parties ( vide Modi & Co. However, it is well established that in considering a contract it is legitimate to take into account the surrounding circumstances for ascertaining the intention of the parties ( vide Modi & Co. v. Union of India (1968) 2 SCR 565 : AIR 1969 SC 9 ).” 31. Again it may be reiterated that there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law as laid down in the aforesaid judgment, but the question still remains as to whether the ratio of the judgment is applicable to the fact situation obtaining in this case. Admittedly, in this case the defendant No. 4 the alleged power of attorney holder of defendant No. 1 has not appeared in the witness box to depose regarding the execution of valid general power of attorney in his favour for which an adverse inference has already been drawn against the appellant. Moreover, there is no explanation forthcoming from the appellant side as to how and why the necessity of appointing defendant No. 4 as general power of attorney arose when admittedly the same is alleged to have been prepared on 25.5.1992 and on the very next day i.e. 26.5.1992 the sale deed had been executed by the alleged power of attorney in favour of the appellant. 32. The learned trial court as also the learned lower appellate court have correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record. The learned lower appellate court has not only agreed with the findings recorded by the learned trial court, but has discussed in detail the pleadings of the parties and appreciated afresh the entire evidence led by the parties even though, there was no requirement of law to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court and even an expression of general agreement with reasons given by the trial court, which was under appeal would have ordinarily sufficed as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs (2001) 3 SCC 179 , as under:- “15. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v.Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai (1983) 1 SCC 35 ). The rule is – and it is nothing more than a rule of practice – that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 33. All the aforesaid substantial questions of law are accordingly answered. 34. Resultantly, the present appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed with costs throughout and the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are affirmed.