JUDGMENT Dr. Mrinal Kanti Chaudhuri, J. :- This review application is filed by the defendant/respondent No.1 Apollo Gleneagles Hospital Limited against the judgment dated 27th April, 2013 passed by this Division Bench in F.A. No.202 of 2008. The defendant/respondent No.1 has stated that the judgment of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of the record as this Court did not consider that the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 had vacant land in excess of ceiling limit provided in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It is further stated in the petition that this Court did not consider that as the Opposite Parties did not file return under Section 6 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, competent authority had no occasion to serve any notice upon them. The Opposite Parties intentionally refrained from filing appeal against the order of competent authority. That respondent No.1 has further stated in the petition that this Court did not consider that T.S. No. 4 of 2005 is barred by limitation. It is further stated in the petition that this Court did not consider that a modern hospital with all facilities was being run from the suit property by the respondent No.1 and, therefore, the petitioner/respondent No.1 could not be directed to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7. It is also stated in the review petition that this Court did not consider that the respondent No.1, upon payment of consideration obtained lease of the suit property from the Opposite Party Nos.9 and 10 and, therefore, the review petitioner should not be directed to make any payment to the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7. It is further stated in the review petition that neither the Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 7 nor their predecessor-in-interest were owner of the suit property. It is finally stated that the judgment of this Court did not consider the substantial question of law relating to the points involved in the appeal. Therefore, the respondent No.1 has prayed for review of the judgment of this Division Bench. At the time of hearing the review petition, the learned counsel for the review petitioner/respondent No.1 has submitted that the judgment of this Court did not discuss, in detail, the evidence of P.W.1. It is further submitted that P.W.1 knows nothing and he failed to prove its own case. At the time of hearing the review petition, the learned counsel for the review petitioner/respondent No.1 has submitted that the judgment of this Court did not discuss, in detail, the evidence of P.W.1. It is further submitted that P.W.1 knows nothing and he failed to prove its own case. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has further submitted that the sale certificate was not produced and the judgment of this Court did not consider he same. It is also submitted that the judgment of this Court relied upon the judgment of Criminal Court and this is not permissible in law. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 has submitted that the judgment of this Court clearly analysed all the points involved in the dispute and, therefore, the review petition has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. We have carefully heard the submissions of learned counsel of both sides and perused the materials on record. This Court carefully analysed the evidence of P.W.1. On a close and careful scrutiny of evidence of P.W.1, it transpires that he has advanced a detail incident as to how his predecessor-in-interest/P.S. Mantosh acquired title over the suit property. This fact has been elaborately depicted in the judgment. This P.W.1 has stated in paragraph 13 in the evidence that Moni Lal Goyee and Bijay Kumar Goyee filed a Title Suit bearing No.50 of 1942 in the court of learned First Additional Subordinate Judge at Alipore against the late B. S. Mantosh, late James Mantosh and late Daisy Mantosh for recovery of possession of the suit premises. In paragraph 14 he has stated that learned 5th Subordinate Judge at Alipore in T.S. 50 of 1942 passed a judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 on compromise holding late B.S. Mantosh, late James Mantosh and late Daisy Mantosh to be the owners and possessors of 73, Canal Circular Road, Calcutta. Certified copies of the said judgment and decree together with the map have been filed. This evidence in examination chief of P.W.1 has not at all been controverted in the cross-examination. Therefore, the evidences of P.W.1 with regards to paragraph 13 and 14 of the examination-in-chief prevail and are to be accepted. There is no doubt in holding that the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs emanate from the compromise decree of Title Suit No.50 of 1942. Therefore, the evidences of P.W.1 with regards to paragraph 13 and 14 of the examination-in-chief prevail and are to be accepted. There is no doubt in holding that the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs emanate from the compromise decree of Title Suit No.50 of 1942. The P.W.1 has categorically stated in his evidence that since he was born in 1955 it is not possible for him to have the direct knowledge as to the happenings before his birth. He has stated that everything is matter of record. Therefore, his evidences cannot at all be disbelieved. He has rightly stated that he cannot have knowledge about the sale certificate dated 14.08.1920 and he has no knowledge whether his mother collected the sale certificate. This ignorance is quite natural because he was not born at the relevant time. The title of the plaintiffs/appellants is mainly based upon the compromise decree of 1949 and this is not at all challenged. The contents and admissibility of the certified copy of compromise decree was not at all challenged in the cross-examination of P.W.1. No suggestion has been given to the P.W.1 that all those documents in connection with the title are false and fabricated. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff/appellants’ right, title and interest of the suit land are confirmed by the compromise decree dated 17.01.1949 of T.S. 50 of 1942. P.W.1 has categorically stated the acquisition of the title of suit land on the basis of compromise decree. However, he cannot tell in his cross-examination with regards to the happenings which took place prior to his birth. Therefore, there is no reason to discard the evidentiary value of P.w.1 coupled with the judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 in T.S. No.50 of 1942. Merely because his cross-examination reveals that he cannot say whether his mother collected the sale certificate and whether he has any other document regarding the ownership, his evidence cannot be set aside. He has correctly replied the question put from the end of the defendant that those are matters of record. It cannot be stated that P.W.1 has failed to prove the plaint case. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has no merit. He has correctly replied the question put from the end of the defendant that those are matters of record. It cannot be stated that P.W.1 has failed to prove the plaint case. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has no merit. On the point of sale certificate and Criminal court judgment, this Court in page No.30 of the judgment has made a clear observation that “the legal position is not at all disputed and it is the settled principle of law.” This Division Bench in its judgment has made it clear that the existence of sale certificate as well as the survey report under Sections 40 and 41 of Bengal Survey Act for the purpose of demarcation and for showing the separate existence of holding No.42 and 43 are quite relevant and admissible under Section 13 of Evidence Act. This Court relied upon the decision of Privy Council in Dinomoni vs. Brojomohini reported in (1901)29 Cal 187 (P.C.). This Court also relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Santi Kumar Panda vs. Sakuntala Devi reported in (2004)1 SCC 438 , wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held that at the time of final adjudication by competent Court, the proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. has value only as a piece of evidence until the entitlement of possession is determined by a Court having competence to enter into adjudication of civil right, which an Executive Magistrate cannot. This Division Bench did not at all adjudicate the title of the parties on the basis of judgment of Criminal Court or on the basis of sale certificate. This Court relied upon the judgment of Civil Court in T.S. No. 50 of 1942. The compromise decree of Civil Court reveals “the principal defendant namely Mrs. B. S. Mantosh & Ors. will remain in possession as before as absolute owner of 2 bighas 15 katas 4 chatak 19 sq.ft. of the Western portion of the land shown by Mr. Radhika Jiban Mukherjee learned Commissioner of local investigation, in his case plan dated 15.03.1948 as holding No.42 (in blue border) and the holding No.43 (in green border) of sub-division VII or and Division III, Dihee Panchannagram, (corresponding approximately to premises No.73, Canal Circular Road)”. of the Western portion of the land shown by Mr. Radhika Jiban Mukherjee learned Commissioner of local investigation, in his case plan dated 15.03.1948 as holding No.42 (in blue border) and the holding No.43 (in green border) of sub-division VII or and Division III, Dihee Panchannagram, (corresponding approximately to premises No.73, Canal Circular Road)”. In page 26 and 27 of the judgment this Court has made detailed analysis as to how the predecessor-in-interest of appellants acquired title by virtue of the said compromise decree. This Court only referred to the proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. and also the sale certificate filed therein. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 that this Court in its judgment relied upon the judgment of Criminal Court is a misinterpretation of the judgment of this Division Bench. On the point of holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit this Court considered the petition under the Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On scrutiny of the judgment of this Court, it appears that in the Page 41, 42, this Court clearly held that the affidavit-in-opposition and the evidences of P.W.1 and D.W.1 reveal that the suit property consists of vacant land with few sheds and structures comprised of small plinth area. It transpires from the written notes of argument submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that nonsuit holding No.41 and suit holding No.42 were covered by number of structures and quarters and godowns and those premises were used for horticulture purpose and all the vacant lands if taken together would not exceed the ceiling limit prescribed under Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, the question of filing return in respect of the suit property under Section 6(1)) of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 does not arise. The submission has sufficient merit. The judgment of this Court has taken into consideration as to the additional evidence filled under Order 41 Rule 27 and the point of excess land beyond the ceiling limit was also taken into consideration. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has no merit. The submission has sufficient merit. The judgment of this Court has taken into consideration as to the additional evidence filled under Order 41 Rule 27 and the point of excess land beyond the ceiling limit was also taken into consideration. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has no merit. It is further submitted that the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 did not file any return under Section 6(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 and, therefore, the quantum of vacant land did not come within the consideration of competent authority. Learned counsel has also cited a decision reported in 2006(4) ICC (SC) 598 (Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. vs. M. Krishnaveni & Ors.). The judgment of this Court has clearly discussed that the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 did not possess vacant land in excess of ceiling limit prescribed under the Act. Therefore, aforesaid decision cited by learned counsel for respondent No.1 has no application inasmuch as the aforesaid judgment is related to non-submission of declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act where there was excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Section 6(1) of the Act specifically provides that “every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the time of commencement of the Act …………………………………shall file statement before the competent authority.” Since the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 have no vacant land in excess of ceiling limit, they need not require to file return under Section 6(1) of the Act of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. It is stated in the review petition that the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 did not prefer any appeal against the order of the competent authority. In the judgment, it has been clearly observed that since the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 were not served with notice as provided under the Act in spite of being owners of the suit holding, the O.P.s have moved before the Civil Court as per order of Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court as well as that of Hon’ble Apex Court because Civil Court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the rival claim of right, title and interest of the parties. The judgment under review categorically elucidated that in view of the compromise decree in T.S.50 of 1942, Monilal Goyee and Bijay Kumar Goyee cannot sell the suit property to Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Limited and Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Limited cannot sell the said property to the defendant No.2/ Orient Properties Limited (later Orient Beverage Limited). Therefore, defendant No.2 did not acquire any valid right, title and interest over the suit property. Since defendant No.2 was not owner of the suit property, defendant No.2 cannot submit return under Section 6(1) of Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. On the basis of filing return by defendant No.2 who is not the owner of suit land, the suit property cannot stand vested. As a real owner/holder, the appellants are entitled to get notice to be served through Rule 5 of Urban Land Ceiling Rule, 1976. Since the same was not done, the jurisdiction of Civil Court comes into play. It is further stated in the review petition that the Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 7 or their predecessors-in-interests were never owner of the suit property and did not ever have any right over the suit property, but the judgment under review clearly denotes how the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7 and the predecessors-in-interest acquired right, title, interest and possession of the said property by virtue of the judgment and decree dated 17.01.1949 in T.S. 50 of 1942. It is further stated in the review petition that the respondent No.1 obtained lease upon payment of valuable consideration for suit land from Opposite Party Nos.9 and 10 and has been running a hospital with all modern facilities and, therefore, the respondent No.1 cannot be directed to hand over vacant possession of the suit property to the Opposite Party No.1 to 7. But the question that comes up for consideration is whether vesting of the suit land was made in accordance with law. The judgment clearly depicts that the vesting was not made in accordance with the mandatory provision of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. The Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 7 being the real owners were not served with notice in accordance with the mandatory provision of law as embodied in Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 read with Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Rules, 1976. The Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 7 being the real owners were not served with notice in accordance with the mandatory provision of law as embodied in Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 read with Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Rules, 1976. Therefore, the judgment under review considered everything in detail including the principle of law and held that the land of plaintiffs/appellants/Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 7 cannot be vested and taken over by the respondents/defendant Nos.3 and 4 being competent authority, Calcutta and State of West Bengal and the same cannot be leased out to the defendant/respondent No.1 Apollo Gleneagles Hospital Limited and defendant/respondent No.1 acquired no valid right, title, and interest over the suit property for the reason mentioned in the judgment. On a close and careful perusal of the materials on record and the submission of learned counsel for the review petitioner/respondent No.1 and also that of Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7, this Court does not find error apparent on the face of the record and this Court dealt with all the issues and does not find any misconception of law on the part of this Court. In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors. reported in 1997 (8) SCC 715 Hon’ble Apex Court held that error which is not self-evident and is to be detected by a long process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that in exercise of jurisdiction of review petition, it is not possible for erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected. A review petition has limited purpose and cannot be allowed as an appeal in disguise. In Laxman Bhowmick vs. Narayan Chakraborty reported in 1995(11) CHN 490, the Division Bench of this Court also held that an error can be said to be one apparent on the face of the record only when such error is apparent and can be located without any elaborate argument and without any scope of controversy with regard to such error which as if, at a glance stares at the face. Reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in (M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. the Government of Andhra Pradesh) reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 . Reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in (M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. the Government of Andhra Pradesh) reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 . In the light of the aforesaid decision of law, this Court is of considered view that the judgment of this Division Bench does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record or from any misconception of law and the judgment of this Court does not suffer from non-consideration of any issues. By filing review petition, the petitioners, in fact, seek to challenge the judgment of this Division Bench and thereby the rehearing of the appeal which is not permissible under the provision of law. The review petition is, therefore, without any merit and stands dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.