JUDGMENT K.C. Bhanu, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), is directed against the judgment, dated 05.10.2007, in Sessions Case No. 54 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad, whereunder and whereby, appellant herein/A-1 was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "I.P.C.") and accordingly, he is convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of ` 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four months. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the present appeal may be delineated as follows: About 31/2 years prior to the incident, marriage of one Yashoda @ Latha (hereinafter referred to, as "the deceased") was performed with A-1 and after the marriage, the couple lived happily for six months and thereafter, A-1 to A-3 started harassing the deceased on petty matters. On 30.10.2005, A-1 made a phone call to P.W. 1 and informed him that he was intending to commit suicide and asked him to come to his house. Immediately, P.W. 1 rushed to the house of A-1 at Nizamabad and on enquiry, came to know that his daughter was taken to Venkateshwara Hospital, and then, he went to the said hospital and enquired his daughter who informed him that on that day, A-1 poured kerosene on her and set her fire with a towel by lifting it with a match stick due to which she sustained burn injuries, thereby, he came to know that since the date of marriage, A-1 started harassing the deceased with an intention to kill her and thereby, poured kerosene and set her fire. On the same day, at 8.00 p.m., he lodged a complaint to police on which P.W. 11-the Sub Inspector of Police registered a case in Crime No. 142 of 2005 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 I.P.C. and issued First Information Report (for short, "F.I.R."). Thereafter, he examined and recorded the statement of the complainant and visited Venkateshwara Hospital and there, he examined the deceased and gave a requisition to the Medical Officer for treatment. Thereafter, he examined and recorded the statement of the complainant and visited Venkateshwara Hospital and there, he examined the deceased and gave a requisition to the Medical Officer for treatment. Thereafter, he visited the scene of occurrence, examined P.W. 6, recorded his detailed statement and secured the presence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 and conducted scene of occurrence panchanama and prepared rough sketch of the scene. He seized a kerosene tin and a match box under a cover of panchanama before the same mediators. On requisition, P.W. 14 recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. On 31.102005, at 10.00 a.m. A-1 surrendered in the police station and accordingly, P.W. 11 effected his arrest, produced him before the Court and got remanded to judicial custody. On 26.11.2005, at 9.00 a.m., P.W. 11 received information from the hospital that the deceased, while undergoing treatment at Government Hospital, Nizamabad, succumbed to the injuries and P.W. 12, by filing the memo, got altered the section of law from 498-A and 307 I.P.C. to 498-A and 302 I.P.C. He filed a requisition before P.W. 9-Mandal Revenue Officer, Nizamabad to conduct inquest over the dead body of the deceased and accordingly, he conducted inquest in the presence of P.W. 8 and two others and thereafter, the dead body was subjected to post mortem examination at the hospital. During the course of inquest, P.W. 12 examined the complainant and other witnesses i.e., P.Ws. 1 to 4 and 6 and recorded their statements. On 24.12.2005, on reliable information, P.W. 11 apprehended A-2 and A-3 and produced them before P.W. 13-Circle Inspector of Police, who interrogated them, and they confessed to have committed the offence in this case along with A-1 and accordingly, he effected their arrest and produced them before the Court and got remanded to judicial custody. Thus, the evidence collected well established that A-1 to A-3 harassed the deceased on petty matters and ultimately, on 30.10.2005, in the evening time, A-1 poured kerosene on her, set fire and caused burn injuries, which resulted in her death, and hence, A-1 to A-3 are liable for punishment for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498-A I.P.C. After completion of investigation, he filed the charge sheet. 2. 2. The trial Court framed the following charges against the accused: Firstly:-that Al to A3 of you being husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased Yashoda (Latha) subjected her to cruelty by abusing, scolding and harassing her and that you thereby committed an offence punishable u/sec. 498-A of IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly:-that Al of you on 30.10.2005 in the night hours committed the murder intentionally causing the death of your wife Yashoda (Latha) by pouring kerosene on her body and setting fire and thereby committed an offence punishable u/sec. 302 IPC and within my cognizance. 3. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 14 and got marked Exs. P-1 to P-9 besides case properties-M.Os. 1 and 2. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. They denied the same. On behalf of the accused, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced. 6. The trial Court, basing on the evidence adduced by prosecution, found A-1 to A-3 not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. and accordingly, acquitted them of the said charge. However, A-1 was found guilty of the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as stated supra. Challenging the conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed by A-1. 7. The points for determination are: Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellant/A-1 of the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct, legal and proper or not? 8. POINTS:-Learned counsel for the appellant/A-1 contended that there is no direct evidence to show that the accused is the assailant of the deceased; that the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. are not proved by the prosecution; that there is no mention in Ex. P-9 that the accused set fire to the deceased; that P.Ws. POINTS:-Learned counsel for the appellant/A-1 contended that there is no direct evidence to show that the accused is the assailant of the deceased; that the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. are not proved by the prosecution; that there is no mention in Ex. P-9 that the accused set fire to the deceased; that P.Ws. 1 to 3 came to the scene of occurrence after the incident; that the deceased was suffering from mental ill-health; that at the time of recording of the statement of the deceased by P.W. 14, close relatives of the deceased were present and therefore, the possibility of tutoring the deceased in giving a false statement against the accused cannot be ruled out; that the evidence of P.W. 1 is not relevant as he did not state that the deceased gave a statement implicating the accused as the assailant and therefore, the recitals in Ex. P-1 cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of P.W. 1 and hence, she prays to set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court. 9. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that Ex. P-9 is very clear that it is the accused who poured kerosene on the body of the deceased, as a result, she sustained burn injuries; that simply because it was not stated in Ex. P-9 that the accused set fire to the deceased, it does not mean that somebody set fire to the deceased; that the deceased never suffered from any mental ailment or disease; that it is the accused, who was branding the deceased as suffering from mental ailment; that P.W. 1, who is the father of the deceased, had taken the deceased to a Psychiatrist, but after examination, the doctor stated that the deceased was not suffering with any mental ailment; that the evidence of P.W. 14 is clear that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a statement and he also obtained endorsement from the duty Doctor to the effect that the deceased was conscious and coherent at the time of recording the statement; that after elaborate consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court rightly found A-1 guilty and that order of conviction needs no interference by this Court and hence, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 10. The deceased is no other than the wife of A-1. 10. The deceased is no other than the wife of A-1. Marriage of A-1 with the deceased was performed about three and half years prior to the incident. After the marriage, the deceased joined the company of her husband at his house at Gajulpet, Nizamabad. They lived happily for about 7 or 8 months. Thereafter, A-1, his mother and sister started harassing her on the ground that she was not attending to the household work. The incident had taken place in the house of the accused in the evening of 30.10.2005. On coming to know about the incident, P.W. 1 went to the house of the accused and found certain burnt clothes in the house. At the house of the accused, he came to know that the deceased was shifted to Government Hospital, Nizamabad, where he saw his daughter with burn injuries. From hospital, he went to police station and lodged Ex. P-1 complaint. P.W. 11, who received the complaint from P.W. 1, registered a case against A-1 to A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 I.P.C. Section of law was altered after death of the deceased. He proceeded to the scene of occurrence, recorded the statements of the deceased and P.Ws. 1, 3 and 6. He visited the scene of occurrence in the presence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 and prepared Ex. P-2-scene of observation report. He also prepared Ex. P-3-rough sketch of the scene of occurrence. As seen from the recitals in Exs. P-2 and P-3 and the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7, it is clear that the scene of occurrence is in the house of the accused bearing D. No. 9-8-122, Gajulpet, Nizamabad. The police seized M.Os. 1 and 2-kerosene tin and match box from the scene of occurrence. Even the accused is not denying or disputing about the taking place of the incident in his house. 11. P.W. 9 is the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Nizamabad. On 16.11.2005, on requisition from the Station House Officer, Nizamabad II Town Police Station, he held inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.W. 8 and two others. They noticed certain injuries, which have been incorporated in Ex. P-4. The inquest mediators opined that the deceased died as a result of burn injuries. Thereafter, the dead body was subjected to post mortem examination by P.W. 10. 12. They noticed certain injuries, which have been incorporated in Ex. P-4. The inquest mediators opined that the deceased died as a result of burn injuries. Thereafter, the dead body was subjected to post mortem examination by P.W. 10. 12. On 16.11.2005, P.W. 10 conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and found the following ante mortem external injuries: 1. Deep burns front of the neck, front of chest, whole of the back, inguinan to foot and both the lower limbs. 2. Superficial burns on left hand. According to the Doctor, the percentage of burns is 50% to 60% and the blood was present in the heart. He opined that the cause of the death was on account of shock due to extensive burns. The deceased succumbed to injuries on 16.11.2005 at about 5.45 a.m. Ex. P-5 is the post mortem report. The evidence of Doctor with regard to the cause of the death, as spoken to by him, remained unchallenged. Therefore, the homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is established. 13. P.W. 4 is one of the elders, who negotiated the dispute between the accused and the deceased in a panchayat, which was held six months prior to the incident. According to him, the deceased informed the panchayat members that A-1 was harassing her as she was not good looking, whereas A-1 complained them that the deceased was not doing any work in the house. Then, the panchayatdars advised A-1 and the deceased to live happily and sent them to Nizamabad. The dispute mediated is trivial in nature. Therefore, the evidence of P.W. 4 is not much relevant to prove the charge levelled against the accused. Admittedly, he was not present when the incident had taken place. 14. P.Ws. 1 to 3 are the father, mother and brother, of the deceased respectively. The evidence of P.W. 1 would go to show that both the deceased and the accused lived happily for about seven or eight months after their marriage and thereafter, A-1 and his family members started picking up quarrels with the deceased on the ground that she was not doing any work. P.W. 2 did not speak anything about the motive or ill-treatment given by the accused to the deceased. P.W. 3 stated that sometime after the marriage, A-1 started harassing the deceased demanding her to get money from her parents as dowry. P.W. 2 did not speak anything about the motive or ill-treatment given by the accused to the deceased. P.W. 3 stated that sometime after the marriage, A-1 started harassing the deceased demanding her to get money from her parents as dowry. The evidence with regard to the cruelty, as testified by P.Ws. 1 and 3, has been disbelieved by the trial Court and the accused were found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. 15. Insofar as the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. is concerned, admittedly, P.Ws. 2 and 3 did not state anything against the accused as they were not present at the house of the accused at the relevant point of time of the incident. Their evidence is not much relevant to prove the charge levelled against the appellant. Coming to the evidence of P.W. 1, he lodged Ex. P-1 complaint wherein it is stated that on coming to know that his daughter was admitted in Venkateshwara Hospital, Nizamabad, he rushed to the hospital and on his enquiry, his daughter revealed that her husband poured kerosene on himself first and on her secondly and lit a towel with a match box and pushed her on the said burning towel due to which she sustained burn injuries on her left hand, legs, thighs and back. Though the recitals in Ex. P-1 amount to a dying declaration, that aspect of the case has not been testified by P.W. 1 when he was examined in the trial Court. F.I.R. is not a substantive evidence. In the trial Court, he testified that he came to know about A-1 pouring kerosene on his daughter and also pouring kerosene on his person and thereafter, soaked a towel with kerosene and set it fire and with that towel, he burnt his daughter. He has not specifically stated that the deceased informed him about the accused pouring kerosene and setting fire to her. P.W. 1 has not stated as to the person who informed him about the cause of the death of the deceased. Hence, the evidence of P.W. 1 is hear say. If he says that it is the deceased who informed him as to the cause of her death, then only, it is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Act"). 16. P.W. 6 shifted the deceased to the hospital in the first instance. Hence, the evidence of P.W. 1 is hear say. If he says that it is the deceased who informed him as to the cause of her death, then only, it is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Act"). 16. P.W. 6 shifted the deceased to the hospital in the first instance. He is not an eye witness to the incident. P.W. 12 altered the section of law after receipt of death intimation and he also sent a requisition to the M.R.O. P.W. 13 is the Investigating Officer whose evidence is formal in nature. Except arrest of the accused, practically, he did not conduct any investigation. 17. The entire case rests upon the dying declaration said to have been recorded by P.W. 14 as in Ex. P-9. There cannot be any dispute that when the statement made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant and is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Act. Law is equally well settled that once dying declaration is found to be true and trustworthy and not an outcome of tutoring or prompting by any of the relatives, it can be acted upon and it can be a sole basis to convict the accused. Law is equally well settled that once dying declaration is found to be true and trustworthy and not an outcome of tutoring or prompting by any of the relatives, it can be acted upon and it can be a sole basis to convict the accused. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 22 wherein it is held at para No. 16 as under: On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision reported in Copal v. State of M.P. AIR 2009 SC 2111 : 2010 (1) ALD (Crl.) 126 (SC) wherein it is held at para No. 8 as under: Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. (See : Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P., (1993) 2 SCC 684 ). However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinizing the contents of various dying declaration, in such a situation, the Court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. Similarly, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision reported in P.T.M. Marappa and another v. State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor through Inspector of Police, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad 2011 (2) ALT (Crl.) 15 (SB)(A.P.) wherein it is held at para No. 13 as under: Therefore, it is mandatory that while recording a D.D., the Magistrate shall keep in view the purpose of recording of the statement to know cause of the death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death. In this case, evidently no effort was made to know the cause of death and culpability of A-1. The effort of any Magistrate is to put further questions to know about the cause of burns or injuries which results in the death at a later stage. If such material statement is not elicited from the person, no useful purpose will be served for such declarations recorded by the Magistrate. In this case, there is no doubt in our mind that the D.D., recorded by the Magistrate is not satisfactory and is not in the spirit and the purpose for which the statement is to be recorded. If such material statement is not elicited from the person, no useful purpose will be served for such declarations recorded by the Magistrate. In this case, there is no doubt in our mind that the D.D., recorded by the Magistrate is not satisfactory and is not in the spirit and the purpose for which the statement is to be recorded. She placed reliance on a decision reported in Sudhakar and another v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (2) ALT (Crl.) 117 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 2602 wherein it is held at para No. 8 as under: In Ratan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1997) 4 SCC 161 : (1997 AIR SCW 587 : AIR 1997 SC 768 : 1997 Cri.LJ 833) this Court held that the expression "circumstances of transaction which resulted in his death" mean that there need not necessarily be a direct nexus between the circumstances and death. Even distant circumstance can become admissible if it has nexus with the transaction which resulted in death. Relying upon Sharad Birdhichand Sarda's case ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 : 1984 Cri.LJ 1738)(supra) the Court held that (Para 15) It is enough if the words spoken by the deceased have reference to any circumstance which has connection with any of the transactions which ended up in the death of the deceased. Such statement would also fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. In other words, it is not necessary that such circumstance should be proximate, for, even distant circumstances can also become admissible under the sub-section, provided it has nexus with the transaction which resulted in the death. In Najjam Faraghi alias Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal, (1998) 2 SCC 45 : (1998 AIR SCW 344 : AIR 1998 SC 682 : 1998 Cri. LJ 866) this Court held that the death of declarant long after making the dying declaration did not mean that such a statement lost its value merely because the person making the statement lived for a longer time than expected. But to make the statement admissible, it has to be shown that the statement made was the cause of the death or with respect to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The facts mentioned in the statement are, however, required to be shown connected with the cause of the death whether directly or indirectly. But to make the statement admissible, it has to be shown that the statement made was the cause of the death or with respect to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The facts mentioned in the statement are, however, required to be shown connected with the cause of the death whether directly or indirectly. Rejecting the contention that as the injuries caused as mentioned in the dying declaration were indirectly responsible for the cause of death, the statement of the deceased could not be admitted in evidence, this Court in G.S. Walia v. State of Punjab: (1998) 5 SCC 150 : (1998 AIR SCW 1674 : AIR 1998 SC 2857 : 1998 Cri. LJ 2524) held (Para 7): Therefore, there is no substance in the contention raised by Mr. U.R. Lalit that the injuries were only directly responsible for causing death of Balwant Singh and as his death cannot be said to have been caused due to the injuries caused, the statement made by him would not fall within Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In view of our finding on this point the decision in Imperatrix v. Rudra, (1900) ILR 25 Bom 45 : 2 Bom LR 331 : Abdul Gani Bandukchi v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Cal 465 : 47 Cal WN 332 : 45 Cri. LJ 71; Mallappa Shivlingappa Chanagi, Re : AIR 1962 Mysore 82 : 1962 (1) Cri. LJ 619 and Moti Singh v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1964 SC 900 : 1964 (1) Cri. LJ 727 relied upon by Mr. Lalit are of no help to him. In all these cases, the court had held that there was no evidence or that the evidence led was insufficient to prove that the deceased had died as a result of injuries caused to him. As the statement of Balwant Singh related to the cause of his death it was admissible in evidence under Section 32 and the High Court was in error in holding otherwise. 19. Bearing the above principles in mind, it has to be seen as to whether the dying declaration recorded by P.W. 14 is true and voluntary or not. As the statement of Balwant Singh related to the cause of his death it was admissible in evidence under Section 32 and the High Court was in error in holding otherwise. 19. Bearing the above principles in mind, it has to be seen as to whether the dying declaration recorded by P.W. 14 is true and voluntary or not. P.W. 14, who is the jurisdictional Magistrate, went to Venkateshwara Private Hospital at Nizamabad on receipt of requisition from II Town Police Station, Nizamabad on 30.10.2005 and reached the hospital at 8.50 p.m. The Doctor, who was present there, identified the patient. The learned Magistrate put some preliminary questions to the deceased, who gave answers rationally. On being satisfied by the answers, the statement of the deceased was recorded by the Magistrate. After recording the statement, the statement was read over and explained to the deceased and the same was admitted to be true and correct. The Doctor made an endorsement to the effect that the deceased was coherent and conscious throughout the recording of the statement. The relevant portion in Ex. P-9 reads as follows: 1. What is your name? Ans: My name is Latha. 2. What is your husband's name? Ans: Murali. 3. How old are you? Ans: 23 years. 4. What is your educational qualification? Ans: 8th class. 5. Who brought you to this hospital? Ans: My brother in law, my uncle's son, caste elder by name Satyanarayana brought me to this hospital. 6. Do you know, I am a Magistrate? Ans: I came to know on your statement. 7. How did you sustain those injuries, what is the reason, can You tell? Ans: We both were sitting and speaking each other, in the meantime my husband brought kerosene and poured on me and also poured on himself. There is house dispute as such you must die or myself at about 4.30 p.m., he poured kerosene on me and he himself poured on him. He said that I am having mental and asked me to bring my mother stating so he pushed me out of the house, I said that I will not go and he poured kerosene on me. My parents provided treatment for 2 or 3 times to him as his mind is not good. While I was at my parents in law my husband did not provide any treatment to me. My parents provided treatment for 2 or 3 times to him as his mind is not good. While I was at my parents in law my husband did not provide any treatment to me. Today evening he asked me to go to my parents house and take treatment. Prior to my marriage I never approached psychiatric doctor. My husband, parents in laws used to tell me that I am a mental, as such my parents took me to psychiatric doctor. If I won't clean utensils properly, they used to say that 1 am a mental. If there is no salt in the food, they used to tell me I am a mental. On petty matters, they used to tell me I am a mental. My mother in law went to see my brother in law, at that time my brother in law went out side the house. At that time we both were atone present. First he poured kerosene on him and then on me. My parents in law used to tell my husband that I am created the disputes in the house and I am tutoring my husband. Today while we were in a Auto, he said that if you cooperate with me we will lead good life. He got angry as my mother side peoples also not coming and seeing me. Due to house disputes only he poured kerosene on himself and on me. My neighbourers came and extinguished flames. I stated every thing, nothing is remained. 20. A perusal of the above statement goes to show that there is no mention that the accused lit fire to the deceased. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the litting of fire by the accused to the deceased has not been specifically stated by the deceased, but if the entire statement is read as a whole, she has narrated everything with regard to the sequence of events that had happened on the fateful day of the incident: As seen from the entire statement, it is clear that the accused brought the kerosene, poured on her and also on himself, then, instigated the deceased to die or he himself had to die. It further revealed that the accused was suffering from mental illness and asked her to bring her mother and pushed her out from the house. It further revealed that the accused was suffering from mental illness and asked her to bring her mother and pushed her out from the house. When the deceased refused to leave the house, it is at that time, the appellant/A-1 poured kerosene on her. So, the intention of the accused is to get rid of this woman, who was said to have been suffering from some mental ailment. With what intention, the accused poured kerosene is only to make her die herself by setting fire. As the deceased refused to leave the house and refused to die, in all probability, the accused must have set fire to her. Therefore, in the absence of any specific mention in Ex. P-9 statement that the appellant/A-1 set fire to the deceased, the sequence of events that took place would clearly indicate that it is the accused, who set fire to the deceased, If really after pouring the kerosene on the deceased, the appellant/A-1 did not set fire to her and the deceased herself set fire to herself, certainly, he would have extinguished the flames or made some efforts to bring water or wrap a blanket over her body in order to extinguish the flames. He did not make such attempts. On hearing the cries of the deceased, the neighbourers rushed to the scene of occurrence and extinguished the flames. P.W. 6 is the person, who telephoned to P.W. 3 and informed about the incident. Having waited for one hour for the arrival of the family members of the deceased, as nobody had come, P.W. 6 and others shifted the deceased to Venkateshwara Hospital. If it is a case of deceased litting fire to herself, appellant/A-1 would have made attempts to extinguish the flames and take the deceased to the hospital. 21. Nothing has been elicited in the cross examination of P.W. 14 to discredit his testimony. Except giving some suggestions, nothing has been elicited in the cross examination to show that some of the relatives of the deceased, who were present at the hospital, made the deceased to give a false statement or tutored the deceased to give a statement against the accused. A specific suggestion was given that the statement is not in the own words of the patient and not made voluntarily, but the same was denied. So, from the recitals in Ex. A specific suggestion was given that the statement is not in the own words of the patient and not made voluntarily, but the same was denied. So, from the recitals in Ex. P-9 and the evidence of P.W. 14, it is clear that the deceased gave the statement voluntarily without any tutoring or influence from her relatives. From the evidence on record, when the element of tutoring is ruled out or prompting by the relatives is not appearing, it can be safely said that Ex. P-9 is a true and voluntary statement. Once it is found to be true and voluntary, it can be acted upon and it does not require any corroboration on material particulars. Therefore, from the evidence on record, it is clear that the appellant/A-1 is the assailant of the deceased. 22. Now, it has to be seen as to whether the act of the appellant/A-1 falls under culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder or not. 23. Under Section 300 I.P.C. except in the cases excepted therein, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or secondly if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or thirdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or fourthly, if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Where culpable homicide falls under anyone of the four clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. and none of the exceptions applies, the culpable homicide is murder and is punishable under Section 302I.P.C. Exception 4 of Section 300 I.P.C. would be applicable if all the four conditions laid down are satisfied viz., (i) absence of pre-meditation (ii) there must be a sudden fight (iii) the killing must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 24. A quarrel was going on between the accused and the deceased on the fateful day of the incident. There was no motive or pre-meditation for the appellant/A-1 to commit the murder of the deceased. Except trivial disputes between the accused and the deceased, there were no serious disputes existing between them. If really the accused intended to kill his wife, certainly, without any hesitation, he would have lit the match stick immediately after pouring kerosene on the body of the deceased. In the first instance, he poured kerosene on the body of deceased and thereafter, he himself soaked with the kerosene and asked the decided to set fire to herself. As she was not attending to the household work, he asked her to leave the house to bring her mother. When the deceased refused to go out in a fit of anger, he must have lit a match stick and set fire to her. The deceased did not sustain 100% burn injuries. The crime was committed without pre-meditation. The quarrel arose all of a sudden. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the offence committed was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. If really the intention of the accused is to kill her, he would have poured sufficient quantity of kerosene over her entire body and set fire so that the entire body would have burnt. As per the medical evidence, it is clear that the deceased sustained only 50% to 60% burn injuries. Therefore, the circumstances would clearly indicate that it is not a case where the accused intended to kill his wife. As per the medical evidence, it is clear that the deceased sustained only 50% to 60% burn injuries. Therefore, the circumstances would clearly indicate that it is not a case where the accused intended to kill his wife. Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. can be invoked if the following ingredients are satisfied: (i) the death of the person must have been caused (ii) such death must have been caused by the act of the accused by causing bodily injury (iii) there must be an intention on the part of the accused viz., (a) to cause death or (b) to cause such bodily injury which is likely to cause death. Therefore, we find him guilty under Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. because pouring kerosene on the body and setting fire to her would likely cause the death of the deceased. Hence, the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. are set aside and we find him guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-T I.P.C. The accused stated that he was a private employee and his parents were depending upon his income. Therefore, instead of imposing fine, the accused can be directed to pay compensation. 25. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence recorded by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad vide judgment, dated 05.10.2007, in Sessions Case No. 54 of 2007 against the appellant/A-1 of the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. are set aside. However, appellant/A-1 is found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. and accordingly, he is convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven (7) years. The period of detention underwent by the appellant/A-1 during the course of investigation, trial of the case and after conviction shall be given set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. The appellant/A-1 is directed to pay compensation of ` 10,000/-(Rupees ten thousand only) to P.W. 1-Gooda Venkatesham and in default of payment of compensation, he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 26. With the above modification of sentence and conviction, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed.