Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 680 (KER)

P. S. George v. Balkrishanan

2014-08-21

K.HARILAL

body2014
JUDGMENT : K. Harilal, J. The appellant is the 3rd defendant in O.S.No.419/1999 on the files of the Munsiff's court, Wadakkanchery, as well as the appellant in A.S.No.102/2003 on the files of the Additional District and Sessions Court, (Fast Track Court No. I), Thrissur. The above Original Suit was one for recovery of possession on the strength of title with future mesne profit. The 3rd defendant, inter alia, contended that his title and possession over the property sought to be recovered from him is perfected by adverse possession. After considering the evidence on record, the learned Munsiff decreed the suit as prayed for, granting recovery of possession. Feeling aggrieved, though the appellant had preferred the above Appeal Suit, the learned District Judge also concurred with the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the 3rd defendant challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below, on various grounds. PLEADINGS 2. The plaint averments necessary for disposal of this RSA can be encapsulated as follows: The parties are referred to as in the Original Suit. The 2nd the 3rd plaintiffs are the title holders in possession of plaint 'A' schedule property and their mother Gouriyamma got the property by virtue of Ext.A2 partition deed dated 15-02-1997. The defendants 1 to 3 are in possession and enjoyment of item numbers 1 to 3 respectively of 'B' schedule property. 'B' Schedule item No.3 having an extent of 42.35 cents of land in Sy.No.1145 of Kondazhi Village is a part of 'A' schedule property. The 'B' schedule property is lying adjacent on the northern and eastern side of 'A' schedule property which belongs to the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the 3rd defendant encroached into the plaint 'A' schedule property and gradually took possession of some portion of 'A' schedule property on the eastern side which is shown in the plaint as 'B' schedule (item No.3). On 25/11/98, the plaintiffs sent a lawyer's notice requiring the 3rd defendant to surrender 'B' schedule item No.3 with mesne profit. But, there was no response from the 3rd defendant. 3. The 3rd defendant filed a written statement contending that he is in exclusive possession and enjoyment over item No.3 of 'B' schedule property since 1980 and the said property is lying together as a single plot with his remaining properties. The plaintiffs have to prove their title. But, there was no response from the 3rd defendant. 3. The 3rd defendant filed a written statement contending that he is in exclusive possession and enjoyment over item No.3 of 'B' schedule property since 1980 and the said property is lying together as a single plot with his remaining properties. The plaintiffs have to prove their title. The existence of 'B' schedule as narrated in the plaint is also denied. 'B' schedule item No.3 does not form part of plaintiffs' 'A' schedule property; whereas it forms part of his remaining property which is in his possession since 1980. Alternatively, it is also contended that even if 'B' schedule item No.3 belongs to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' right in that property has been lost by adverse possession and limitation, by the long continuous, open and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the 3rd defendant. THE EVIDENCE 4. The 1st plaintiff was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A7 were marked. Defendants were examined as DWs.1 to 3 and Exts.B1 to B7 were marked.. The commission report and rough plan were marked as Exts. C1 and C1(a). THE FINDINGS UNDER CHALLENGE 5. The prime issue was, whether the defendants have perfected their title over plaint 'B' schedule property by way of adverse possession? After considering the entire evidence on record, the learned Munsiff, on the above issue, found that the plaintiffs have right and title over the plaint 'A' schedule property as per Ext.A2 partition deed and they are having valid title over the entire 'A' schedule property. Even though, the defendants pleaded possessory title over 'B' schedule properties relying on the law of adverse possession and limitation, the learned Munsiff found that since there is no specific pleadings or proof satisfying the requirements to claim the right of adverse possession and limitation, they are not entitled to get the right of adverse possession. The defendants are in possession of 'B' schedule properties without having any right or title. The 3rd defendant preferred the above first appeal challenging the findings of the learned Munsiff. Though, the first appeal was filed on various grounds, the main challenge was against the findings whereby the claim of adverse possession was rejected. So, the learned District Judge raised the point whether the appellant has perfected his title over item No.3 of 'B' schedule property by way of adverse possession and limitation, as alleged. Though, the first appeal was filed on various grounds, the main challenge was against the findings whereby the claim of adverse possession was rejected. So, the learned District Judge raised the point whether the appellant has perfected his title over item No.3 of 'B' schedule property by way of adverse possession and limitation, as alleged. After re-appreciating the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge also concurred with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 6. Going by the impugned judgment under challenge, it is seen that the learned District Judge observed that, where the 3rd defendant does not know the true owner, the question of denying title of true owner does not arise. According to the 3rd defendant, he purchased the property in the year 1980 and his predecessor in interest also was in possession of item No.3 of 'B' schedule property. He has been in possession of the said property since 1980 also. In short, 'B' schedule item No.3 also forms part of his remaining property, which he got in the year 1980. Therefore, it is evident that he came into possession as true owner of the property in question and he exercised his right over the disputed property as true owner and the exercise of such right, by no stretch of imagination, can be ripened to adverse possession and it cannot be said that he possessed the property adversely to the right and interest of the true owner. ARGUMENTS AT THE BAR 7. Sri. Dinesh Mathew J.Murikan, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced arguments mainly challenging the finding that there was no sufficient pleading constituting the claim of adverse possession. The learned counsel further pointed out that possession under wrong or mistaken impression that the defendant himself is the owner is also adverse possession, if such possession is open, continuous and satisfies the required period of 12 years. According to the learned counsel, it is trite law that defendant can plead adverse possession alternatively, anticipating the contingency, in case, where he fails to prove his possession under title. To bring home the above argument, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Raman v. Devadasa Maller and others (1991 KHC 16). He further pointed out that this decision was followed in Devaki Pillai v. Gouri Amma (2003 KHC 71) also. 8. To bring home the above argument, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Raman v. Devadasa Maller and others (1991 KHC 16). He further pointed out that this decision was followed in Devaki Pillai v. Gouri Amma (2003 KHC 71) also. 8. On the other hand, Sri.R.Rejith, the learned counsel for the respondents mainly pointed out that the alternative plea of adverse possession along with plea of possession under title is mutually opposing and destructive. According to the learned counsel, where the defendant claims that he himself is the owner of the property and nobody else has ownership over the property under title, he cannot be allowed to turn round and further say alternatively that his possession was hostile and in denial of the title of the true owner. It is also contended that there is no specific pleading or proof to satisfy the requirements constituting right of adverse possession and on that reason the courts below can be justified in rejecting the claim of adverse possession concurrently. To drive home his argument, the learned counsel cited the decisions in T.Anjanappa v. Somalingappa & Others ( 2006 (7) SCC 570 ) and P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy & Others v. Revamma & Others ( 2007 (6) SCC 59 ). QUESTIONS OF LAW 9. In view of the rival contention, the questions of law emerge for decision in this Regular Second Appeal is: (i) Whether the claim of adverse possession can be pleaded alternatively in the pleadings with the plea of possession under title as true owner of the disputed land? (ii) Whether the person who pleads the claim of adverse possession must identify and acknowledge the true owner of the property under dispute and disclose it in his pleadings? (iii) Whether the person who claims adverse possession must know that he has been possessing and enjoying the land of the true owner against his right and interest? and (iv) Whether the claim of adverse possession is sustainable against an unknown true owner of the land? CONFLICTING VIEWS 10. It is true that both parties advanced their arguments relying on judicial precedents. At this juncture, the endevour is to make a survey on these authorities and place reliance on the correct law, which is binding at present. and (iv) Whether the claim of adverse possession is sustainable against an unknown true owner of the land? CONFLICTING VIEWS 10. It is true that both parties advanced their arguments relying on judicial precedents. At this juncture, the endevour is to make a survey on these authorities and place reliance on the correct law, which is binding at present. Let us examine the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in Raman's case (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court held that: Though some decisions said that there cannot be adverse possession if the defendant himself did not know that he was occupying somebody else's land, that does not appear to be the correct law. What is required to have hostile animus is not the knowledge that any particular individual is the owner and he is holding against him, but the animus to hold the property openly under the claim or colour of title in derogation of the title of all others, whoever they may be, known or unknown. Possession as full owner implies denial to title of all others. That is why adverse possession is said to be hostile possession under the claim or colour of title. Possession under a wrong or mistaken impression that the defendant himself is the owner and nobody else in the world has ownership is also adverse possession, even if the fact that somebody else is the owner or his identity is not known. The possessor, who claims independent title, need not be aware that someone else is owner and even if he is aware that he is not the true owner, he is not expected to make an enquiry as to who the true owner is. It is for the true owner to keep his eyes open to protect his right against open invasions. 11. The law laid down in the above decision can be put differently. When a grantee, in taking possession under his deed, goes unintentionally and by mistake beyond his proper boundaries, and enters upon and actually occupies and improves lands not included in the deed, claiming and supposing it to be his, his occupation is to be deemed adverse within the meaning of the statute of limitation. If continued for the required length of time, it will bar the right of the true owner. If continued for the required length of time, it will bar the right of the true owner. Similarly, if a person takes possession of some land either by mistake or by force without knowing the identity of the true owner of that land and continuous there openly, and without any interruption for the required period of twelve years, he can raise a valid plea of adverse possession against the unknown true owner. 12. Even at the time of holding the above proposition, there were divergent views on the disputed question raised above. The learned Judge laid down the above proposition in disagreement with Musammal Sitabai v. Jumo (157 Indian Cases 283), Amritsarya Ram and Another v. Diwanchand (AIR 1929 Lahore 625), Shah Niwaz and Another v. Ghulam Shah and Others (AIR 1938 Lahore 324) and Kidar Nath and Others v. Ramchand and Others (AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 335), wherein the courts held that there cannot be adverse possession if the defendant himself did now know that he was occupying somebody else's land. Dissenting the above view, the learned Judge further held that the above proposition is not the correct exposition of law of adverse possession. The learned Judge for holding the said proposition placed reliance on various other decisions such as:- In Allahabad and others v. Fazal Dad and others (46 Indian Cases 964), the law laid down was that the criterion of adverse possession is, whether a person possesses land, claiming it as his own; if he does, he must be held to be in adverse possession. He may be mistaken in his rights or he may be conscious that he is an usurper, but his possession is for himself and against all others. In Mg. Po Lon v. Mg. Ba On and another (AIR 1925 Rangoon 111), Secy. of State v. District Board of Tanjore ( AIR 1930 Mad. 679 ) and Amar Nath v. Ram Rakha and another (AIR 1937 Lahore 811) also, the same law was laid down. These decisions and the opinions were approved in Raman Nair Madhavan Nair v. Kuttiyamma Karthiyaniamma ( 1954 KLT 195 ), which distinguished Bibhabati Devi's case ( AIR 1947 PC 19 ). Devaki Amma v. Meenakshy Amma ( 1989 (2) KLT 130 ). 13. These decisions and the opinions were approved in Raman Nair Madhavan Nair v. Kuttiyamma Karthiyaniamma ( 1954 KLT 195 ), which distinguished Bibhabati Devi's case ( AIR 1947 PC 19 ). Devaki Amma v. Meenakshy Amma ( 1989 (2) KLT 130 ). 13. Subsequently, in Devaki Pillai's case (supra), another Single Judge of this Court also followed the proposition laid down in Raman's case (supra) and further held that : "In the case of possession by a person who improves the property though under the bona fide belief that he is the owner of the property; and the real owner looks one and does not take any action it cannot be said that the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of at his sweet will and pleasure without any time limit". Going by all the above decisions cited by both counsel, it is seen that, though the proposition held by this Court in Raman's case and followed in Devaki Pillai's case, has not been considered and over ruled by the Apex Court in Anjanappa's case and Munichikkanna Reddy's case, the Apex Court has taken a view contrary to the proposition held by this Court in Raman's case and Devaki Pillai's case. THE SUPREME COURT ON THE POINT 14. What is the correct law on which this Court is bound to place its reliance to answer the questions of law raised above? In Anjanappa's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows: "The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise. Above being the position the High Court's judgment is clearly unsustainable". 15. Let us examine the nuances of the 'intention' of the adverse possessor from various angles, observed by the Privy Council and the Apex Court in various decisions also. In Chung Ping Kwan v. Lam Island Development Co. Ltd. (1997 AC 38), the Privy Council observed as under: "8. Above being the position the High Court's judgment is clearly unsustainable". 15. Let us examine the nuances of the 'intention' of the adverse possessor from various angles, observed by the Privy Council and the Apex Court in various decisions also. In Chung Ping Kwan v. Lam Island Development Co. Ltd. (1997 AC 38), the Privy Council observed as under: "8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful neglect" element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property". 16. In Takur Kishan v. Arvind kumar ( 1994 (6) SCC 591 , the Apex Court held that, "Mere possession for however length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession". A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. 17. In S.M.Karim v. Bibi Sakina ( AIR 1964 SC 1254 ), the Supreme Court observed as given below: "Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea". 18. In Periasami v. Periathambi ( 1995 (6) SCC 523 ), the Apex Court again stated that, "Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent plea is that someone else was the owner of the property". 19. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea". 18. In Periasami v. Periathambi ( 1995 (6) SCC 523 ), the Apex Court again stated that, "Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent plea is that someone else was the owner of the property". 19. In Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar ( 1996 (1) SCC 639 ), the Supreme Court held that: "As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant". 20. In Vasantiben Prahladju Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak ( 2004 (3) SCC 376 ), the Apex Court held that: "In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. 21. In Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004 (1) SCC 271), the Supreme Court held as given below: 'Animus possidendi' is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus " "In Saroop Singh v. Banto ( 2005 (8) SCC 330 ), the Supreme Court held that 'intention' implies knowledge on the part of the adverse possessor". 22. In Karnataka Wakf Board v. Govt. 22. In Karnataka Wakf Board v. Govt. of India ( 2004 (10) SCC 779 ), the Supreme Court held that: "It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner". "Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is: nec vi, nec clam, nec precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, Parsinni v. Sukhi and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka). Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a). on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equitites in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession." Relying on the above decision, in P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy's case (supra), the Supreme Court further held that, "Mention as to the real owner of the property must be specifically made in an adverse possession. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced". Put it differently, the pleas on title and adverse possession are not simultaneously maintainable and such pleas cannot be made alternatively. In case one is negatived, the party cannot seek shelter under the latter alternative plea. THE RESOLUTION 23. In the light of the principles deduced from the decisions of the Apex Court, the questions raised above can be answered as follows: Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is the basis of the law of adverse possession. At any stretch, the principles under law of adverse possession cannot be interpreted beyond the scope of Article 65 and no interpretation can be given to destroy the basis or source of law from which the law developed. For possession of immovable property or any interest there in based on title, 12 years period is provided to sue, and the said period of 12 years begins to run, when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. If that be so, the denial of right of the true owner i.e., animus possidendi is the crucial factor of adverse possession. In other words, the person who claims adverse possession must know well and bear in his mind that he is holding the property of the true title holder, adverse to his right and interest. A person is said to hold the property adversely or hostile to the real owner, when that person denies the true owner's right, excluding him from enjoyment of right over the property. If that be so, needless to say, he must know the true owner of the property, when he is holding that property. Put it differently, a person holding and enjoying as his own property or as a part of his remaining property can never be said to be possessing the property in denial of right of the true owner. While enjoying the property as his own property, his mind may whisper that it is his own property and not of any other persons. In such a situation, denial of right of the true owner is totally absent. 24. Put it differently, where possession bases on a lawful title, that it is my property, it will not be considered to be adverse possession to anybody else. In such a situation, denial of right of the true owner is totally absent. 24. Put it differently, where possession bases on a lawful title, that it is my property, it will not be considered to be adverse possession to anybody else. Mere possession, however, long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse Possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. 25. He must enjoy the property adversely to the title holder's right and interest, after making him known that such an enjoyment was against his interest. A purchaser may be in possession of some portion of the property of the true owner on the bona fide belief that, that much extent also forms part of the property, which he purchased. His belief is a mistaken notion only. He did not know that it is the property of the true owner till the true owner sues against him. Such purchaser cannot claim the right of adverse possession due to the absence of 'animus possidendi'. In short, a person who possess the property of another with a mistaken belief that he himself is the true owner of that property or that much extent of property also forms part of his remaining property cannot claim right of adverse possession as he does not know or recognise and acknowledge that it is the property of another person and that possession can never be in denial of the true owner's possession. The person who claims adverse possession must plead the identity of the true owner against whom he claims and acknowledge him in his plea. Intention to dispossess the true owner is totally absent, when he possesses property as his own property or nobody's property. Intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess, which is an essential ingredient of adverse possession. There cannot be an adverse possession against an unknown person and such a claim is unsustainable under law. Intention to dispossess the true owner is totally absent, when he possesses property as his own property or nobody's property. Intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess, which is an essential ingredient of adverse possession. There cannot be an adverse possession against an unknown person and such a claim is unsustainable under law. Necessarily, it follows that the claim of adverse possession pleaded and reserved alternatively, to press into service, anticipating a contingency, if any, when he fails to prove his possession under title as true owner, is unsustainable under the law of adverse possession and liable to be rejected. Needless to say, such pleas are mutually opposing and destructive. 26. It is true that there were conflicting views on the questions raised above. Earlier, in Raman's case and Devaki Pillai's case, this Court, relying on one view, held that possession under a wrong or mistaken impression that the defendant himself is the owner and nobody else in the world has ownership would also constitute adverse possession. In short, the adverse possessor need not acknowledge the right and title of the true owner. Put it differently, the plea of adverse possession can be raised alternatively, when he fails to prove his title. But subsequently, the Supreme Court in Anjanappa's case and in other various cases referred above has taken a view contrary to the above view and found that the above view is erroneous and unsustainable. In view of the law unequivocally declared by the Apex Court of this country in the decisions referred above, with great respect to the learned Judges of this Court, I hold that the proposition laid down by this Court in Raman's case and followed in Devaki Pillai's case is not a good law and not liable to be followed. 27. In this analysis, coming to the instant case, it is the specific case of the 3rd defendant that he has been enjoying 'B' schedule item No.3 since 1980, as the property that forms part of the property which he got under title. Put it differently, he had been enjoying the disputed property as his own property. So also, there is no pleading either recognising or acknowledging the plaintiffs as the true owners of the property. Needless to say, the element of 'animus possidendi' is totally absent. Put it differently, he had been enjoying the disputed property as his own property. So also, there is no pleading either recognising or acknowledging the plaintiffs as the true owners of the property. Needless to say, the element of 'animus possidendi' is totally absent. I have already held that alternative plea of adverse possession is unsustainable, mutually destructive and liable to be rejected. There is no illegality or impropriety in the findings whereby the courts below concurrently rejected the appellant's claim of adverse possession. So also, I do not find any kind of perversity in the appreciation of evidence from which those findings have arrived at. This appeal sans merit. The Regular Second Appeal is dismissed.